gross deviation standard in Illinois

2026A person acts recklessly “when that person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that disregard constitutes - 15 - a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2018). ¶ 43 There is a distinction between the mental state involved in performing the act and the mental state regarding the consequences of that act; as a result, “a defendant may act recklessly where he commits deliberate acts but

2020A person acts recklessly when “he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk *** and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 10 1-15-2319-B which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2008). “ ‘Reckless conduct generally involves a lesser degree of risk than conduct that creates a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.’ ” Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, ¶ 74 (quoting People v. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239, 250 (1998). ¶ 43 In Eubanks, the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, first degree murder, after fl

2019The court held this evidence "showed that the defendant consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk that the bullets he fired into the air would endanger the bodily safety of others in a residential area" and that "his disregard for the safety of others constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in a residential neighborhood." Id. at 502 , 297 Ill.Dec. 492 , 837 N.E.2d 943 .

2019“A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Watkins, 361 Ill.

2022See People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (1990); DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 252 ; Weeks, 2012 IL App (1st) 102613, ¶ 35 ; People v. Kibayasi, 2013 IL App (1st) 112291, ¶ 42 .

2015The mental state required may be inferred from the character of the defendant's acts and from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense (People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (1990); DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 252 ; Weeks, 2012 IL App (1st) 102613, ¶ 34 ), and the trier of fact is in the best position to determine whether a particular mental state is present (see DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 252 ). ¶ 28 In the instant case, there is no dispute that J.P. died as a result of defendant's conduct.

2022To prove Mr. Grunin guilty of aggravated reckless driving as charged, the State had to show that Mr. Grunin drove a motor vehicle with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons, which resulted in great bodily harm to Tony Lendino and Amanda Lendino. 625 ILCS 5/11- 503(a)(1), (c) (West 2018). ¶ 51 A person acts recklessly “when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his acts are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercis

2017As applied to the offense of reckless homicide, “A person is reckless or acts recklessly when that person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [his acts are likely to cause death or great bodily harm], and that disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2012); see also 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2012). ¶ 74 “Recklessness may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances in the record and may be established by evidence of the physical condition of the driver and his

2008“While a defendant is entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction if there is ‘slight’ evidence upon which a given theory could be based, there must be some evidence of the reckless conduct.” People v. Eason, 326 Ill.

2008“While a defendant is entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction if there is ‘slight’ evidence upon which a given theory could be based, there must be some evidence of the reckless conduct.” People v. Eason, 326 Ill.

2014"A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, *** and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2006). ¶ 79 In this case, the trial court cited People v. Castillo, 188 Ill. 2d 536 (1999), in denying defendant's request for an involuntary manslaughter instruction.

2014“A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, *** and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2006). ¶ 79 In this case, the trial court cited People v. Castillo, 188 Ill. 2d 536 (1999), in denying defendant’s request for an involuntary manslaughter instruction.

2022Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d at 105 .

2021“A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2010). ¶ 51 “The difference between involuntary manslaughter and first degree murder lies in the mental state that accompanies the conduct resulting in the victim’s death.” People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 105 (2008).

2021App. 3d 810, 818 (1982)), an involuntary manslaughter instruction is not warranted where the evidence shows Jemison intended to fire a gun, pointed it at Rozelle, and pulled the trigger; that 18 1-17-1801 conduct is more than mere recklessness (see Sipp, 378 Ill.

2015An act performed recklessly is performed wantonly, within the meaning of a statute using the latter term, unless the statute clearly requires another meaning." 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2002). ¶ 83 "Illinois courts have consistently held that when the defendant intends to fire a gun, points it in the general direction of his or her intended victim, and 31 No. 1-13-0535 shoots, such conduct is not merely reckless and does not warrant an involuntary-manslaughter instruction, regardless of the defendant's assertion that he or she did not intend to kill anyone." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peop

2014According to defendant, if the jury believed that he produced the gun and that Black was unintentionally shot while defendant and Jordan struggled over the gun, this evidence could support a finding that defendant acted recklessly. ¶ 84 Defendant is correct that "the pointing of a loaded weapon at another and then the discharge of that weapon after a struggle" may constitute a reckless act, "since such an act is a gross deviation from the standard of care exercised by a reasonable person." People v. Consago, 170 Ill.

2014According to defendant, if the jury believed that he produced the gun and that Black was unintentionally shot while defendant and Jordan struggled over the gun, this evidence could support a finding that defendant acted recklessly. ¶ 84 Defendant is correct that “the pointing of a loaded weapon at another and then the discharge of that weapon after a struggle” may constitute a reckless act, “since such an act is a gross deviation from the standard of care exercised by a reasonable person.” People v. Consago, 170 Ill.

2003People v. Potter, 5 Ill. 2d 365, 368 , 125 N.E.2d 510, 511 (1955); People v. Jakupcak, 275 Ill.

2003People v. Potter, 5 Ill. 2d 365, 368 , 125 N.E.2d 510, 511 (1955); People v. Jakupcak, 275 Ill.

2024See id. at 501-02 (the defendant acted recklessly where he discharged a firearm into the air multiple times in the backyard of a residence in a residential area). ¶ 19 Defendant next contends that the State did not establish that he endangered the bodily safety of another person, because it did not prove that any other person was in the vicinity of the shots fired or in a position where the shots could have ricocheted. -6- No. 1-23-0730 ¶ 20 To endanger a person means that a defendant’s reckless conduct “created a dangerous situation—such that an individual was in peril of probable harm or los

2019App. 3d 498, 500 , 837 N.E.2d 943, 945 (2005). “[I]n order to satisfy the element of ‘endangerment’ contained in the statute, the State must establish that a defendant’s reckless conduct created a dangerous situation—such that an individual was in peril of probable harm or loss.” Collins, 214 Ill. 2d at 215 . ¶ 21 Defendant argues he shot into the ground, a practice he believed to be safe because it lessened the possibility of any ricochet.

2021In fact, Jemison acknowledged on cross-examination that he never paid attention to the safety. ¶ 55 Although pointing a loaded weapon at another individual is a gross deviation from the standard of care exercised by a reasonable person and thus reckless (see People v. Andersch, 107 Ill.

1988App. 3d 810, 818 , 438 N.E.2d 482, 488 .) One act that courts have found can constitute recklessness and, therefore, prompt an instruction on involuntary manslaughter, is the pointing of a loaded weapon at another and then the discharge of that weapon after a struggle, since such an act is a gross deviation from the standard of care exercised by a reasonable person.

1978App.3d 582, 589 , 340 N.E.2d 178 , 183: "The pointing of a loaded revolver at another is such a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise that it constitutes recklessness." In my opinion the evidence as a whole proves the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt.

1978App. 3d 582, 589 , 340 N.E.2d 178 , 183: “The pointing of a loaded revolver at another is such a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise that it constitutes recklessness.” In my opinion the evidence as a whole proves the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt.

2026That is certainly true here. ¶ 59 Another case displaying this kind of retrospective rationalization is Mancinelli, which stated, without citation to authority, the following: “When there is excessive speed on the part of a defendant in a non- emergency situation that causes the death of another person, it is unlikely there would not be other circumstances sufficient to show that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and that such disregard was a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the same situation.

2021“When there is excessive speed on the part of a defendant in a non-emergency situation that causes the death of another person, it is unlikely there would not be other circumstances sufficient to show that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and that such disregard was a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would have exercised in the same situation.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Mancinelli, 232 Ill.

2026“A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his acts are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Grunin, 2022 IL App (1st) 200598, ¶ 51 . ¶ 21 “Recklessness may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances in the record and may be established by evidence of the physical condition of the driver and his manner of

2026“A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his acts are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Grunin, 2022 IL App (1st) 200598, ¶ 51 . ¶ 21 “Recklessness may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances in the record and may be established by evidence of the physical condition of the driver and his manner of

2022See, e.g., Crego, 395 Ill. at 458-63 (while the defendant drove his car at night on a country road with only parking lights, the evidence established that the victim was riding a bicycle without lights or reflectors on the road); People v. LaCombe, 104 Ill.

1982App. 3d 66 , 432 N.E.2d 672 .) Recklessness is defined as conscious disregard of a substantial risk that one’s acts are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to an individual, where the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would have utilized in the situation with which the defendant was confronted.

2021People v. Cunningham, 2019 IL App (1st) 160709, ¶ 27 . ¶ 34 The Criminal Code of 2012 provides that a person acts recklessly when he or she “consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2016). ¶ 35 “The discharge of a firearm is reckless when the act creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk to others.” People v. Giraud, 20

2021A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards “a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense, and that disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2016); see also People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶ 21 (“The discharge of a firearm is reckless when the act creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk to others.”).