gross deviation standard in Tennessee

2025Our Supreme Court has defined reckless conduct as “when the person is aware of, but consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk of such a nature that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances.” Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992).

2018“A person acts recklessly when the person is aware of, but consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk of such a nature that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances.” Id.

2020Moreover, “the term ‘zone of danger’ may be employed to define that area in which a reasonable probability exists that the defendant’s conduct would place others in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury if others were present in that zone or area.” Id.

2020T.C.A. -9- § 39-11-106 provides, “[t]he risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint.” With respect to reckless endangerment, the threat of death or serious bodily injury must be “imminent”; therefore, “the person must be placed in a reasonably probability of danger as opposed to a mere possibility of danger.” State v. Payne, 7 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Tenn. 1999).

2020The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint[.] Id. § 39-11-106(a)(4) (2018); see State v. Slater, 841 8.W.2d 841, 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 757, 760-61 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “[T]he evidence can show an intentional or knowing killing which is unjustified or a killing which was proximately caused by reckless or criminally negligent conduct.” State v. Butler, 880 S

2002The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint TenmCode Ann. § 39—11—106(a)(4); see also State v. Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 737, 742-43 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994); State v. Butler, 880 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994) (discussing this definition).

2011Punitive damages are warranted when “the person is aware of, but consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk of such a nature that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances.” Davis v. McGuigan, 325 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Tenn. 2010)(quoting Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521, 531 (Tenn.2008) (quoting Hodges v. S.C.

2010In the context of determining whether punitive damages are warranted, we have held that a person acts recklessly when “the person is aware of, but consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk of such a nature that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances.” Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521, 531 (Tenn.2008) (quoting Hodges v. S.C.

2021To be reckless, “[t]he risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39 - 11-302(c); see also Brown, 126 S.W.3d at 49 .

2019“Reckless conduct is defined as taking place ‘when a person is aware of, but consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk of such a nature that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances.’” Brown, 126 S.W.3d at 49 (quoting Gardner v. Insura Prop. & Cas.

2021The risk must be such “that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-106 (a)(33), -302(c). “[C]ausation is an essential element of every homicide offense[.]” State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 204 (Tenn. 2001).

2020The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint[.] Id. § 39-11-106(a)(4) (2018); see State v. Slater, 841 8.W.2d 841, 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 757, 760-61 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “[T]he evidence can show an intentional or knowing killing which is unjustified or a killing which was proximately caused by reckless or criminally negligent conduct.” State v. Butler, 880 S

2004Furthermore, “the accused must know, or should know, that his or her conduct, or the result of that conduct, will imperil the life of another given the circumstances that exist when the conduct takes place.” State v. Adams, 916 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995).

2004The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint. -3- “In other words, the accused must know, or should know, that his or her conduct, or the result of that conduct, will imperil the life of another given the circumstances that exist when the conduct takes place.” State v. Adams, 916 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tenn. Crim.

2020The danger of death or serious bodily injury is imminent when a person is “placed in a reasonable probability of danger as opposed to a mere possibility of danger.” State v. Payne, 7 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Fox, 947 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)).

2014The Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “for the threat of death or serious bodily injury to be ‘imminent,’ the person must be placed in a reasonable probability of danger as opposed to a mere possibility of danger.” State v. Payne, 7 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Fox, 947 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Tenn. Crim.

2020The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint[.] Id. § 39-11-106(a)(4) (2018); see State v. Slater, 841 8.W.2d 841, 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 757, 760-61 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “[T]he evidence can show an intentional or knowing killing which is unjustified or a killing which was proximately caused by reckless or criminally negligent conduct.” State v. Butler, 880 S

1994In State v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 757, 760-761 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991), this court stated that criminal negligence would exist if a person failed to perceive that his or her conduct presented a substantial and unjustifiable risk to another and such failure constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under the circumstances.

2014The danger of death or serious bodily injury is considered imminent only when the person was “placed in a reasonable probability of danger as opposed to a mere possibility of danger.” State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 777-78 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting State v. Payne, 7 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Tenn. 1999)).

2004When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether “ ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn.2004) (quoting State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 276 (Tenn.2002)).

2002The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint TenmCode Ann. § 39—11—106(a)(4); see also State v. Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 737, 742-43 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994); State v. Butler, 880 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994) (discussing this definition).

2002The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person's standpoint Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(4); see also State v. Clifton, 880 S.W.2d 737, 742-43 (Tenn.Crim.

2020The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint[.] Id. § 39-11-106(a)(4) (2018); see State v. Slater, 841 8.W.2d 841, 842 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Owens, 820 S.W.2d 757, 760-61 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). “[T]he evidence can show an intentional or knowing killing which is unjustified or a killing which was proximately caused by reckless or criminally negligent conduct.” State v. Butler, 880 S

2005“The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint[.]” Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106 (a)(4) (2003)).

2004In State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tenn. 1998), our supreme court held that the erroneous failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses may be harmless under certain circumstances.

2001In State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 726 (Tenn. 2001), our supreme court concluded “that an erroneous failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses is a constitutional error for which the State bears the burden of proving its harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court then explained how this constitutional standard had been applied in State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101 (Tenn. 1998): The jury in Williams was instructed not only on the charged offense of premeditated first degree murder, but also on the lesser-included offenses of second degree murder and reckless homicide.

2026In Briggs, this court held that in order to show “a gross deviation from the standard of care” in the context of a motor vehicle accident, the evidence must show “more than a ‘mere[] want of due care, inadvertence, or inattention.’” 343 S.W.3d at 110 (quoting Roe v. State, 358 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Tenn. 1962)).

2026In Briggs, this court held that in order to show “a gross deviation from the standard of care” in the context of a motor vehicle accident, the evidence must show “more than a ‘mere[] want of due care, inadvertence, or inattention.’” 343 S.W.3d at 110 (quoting Roe v. State, 358 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Tenn. 1962)).

2026The Defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury that “[a] ‘gross deviation from the standard of care’ requires more than a showing that the defendant was inattentive, inadvertent, or failed to exercise due or reasonable care.” In support of her request, the Defendant relied on State v. Briggs, in which this court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of criminally negligent homicide. 343 S.W.3d 106, 111 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).1 “Criminal negligence” requires that a defendant fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk and t

2026The Defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury that “[a] ‘gross deviation from the standard of care’ requires more than a showing that the defendant was inattentive, inadvertent, or failed to exercise due or reasonable care.” In support of her request, the Defendant relied on State v. Briggs, in which this court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of criminally negligent homicide. 343 S.W.3d 106, 111 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2010).1 “Criminal negligence” requires that a defendant fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk and t

2021See State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188 , (Tenn. 2001) (stating, in a case involving a death resulting from drag racing, that proximate cause for criminally negligent homicide is established by showing that the victim’s death was the natural and probable result of the defendant’s conduct and that the defendant’s conduct “need not be the sole or immediate cause of the victim’s death”); cf. State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Tenn. 1984) (“[T]he act of the customer in injecting himself [with heroin] is not necessarily so unexpected, unforeseeable or remote as to insulate the seller from criminal

2018The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person’s standpoint. -9- 15, 2004) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301 (b) (2003); Crittenden v. State, 978 S.W.2d 929, 930 (Tenn. 1998)).

2014“The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the accused person's standpoint.” State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d 714, 719 (Tenn. 2007).

2011Punitive damages are warranted when “the person is aware of, but consciously disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk of such a nature that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances.” Davis v. McGuigan, 325 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Tenn. 2010)(quoting Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521, 531 (Tenn.2008) (quoting Hodges v. S.C.

2008See also: Tenn. Code Ann. § 39 -ll-302(a)(b) and (c). 5 560 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tenn. 1978).

2007An automobile is considered a “deadly weapon.” State v. Tate, 912 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tenn. Crim.