gross deviation standard in Georgia

2019See also Riley v. State , 250 Ga. App. 427 , 429 (2), 551 S.E.2d 833 (2001) (The crime of reckless conduct is essentially "an instance of criminal negligence, rather than an intentional act, which causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another") (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019See also Riley v. State , 250 Ga. App. 427 , 429 (2), 551 S.E.2d 833 (2001) (The crime of reckless conduct is essentially "an instance of criminal negligence, rather than an intentional act, which causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another") (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019A reasonable jury could find that, although Ayers-Jones did not intend for Good to die, in letting him take an overloaded capsule of methamphetamine and in failing to call for help when she knew he was in drug-induced distress, she "consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk that he might [die] - and that that disregard constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." (Citation omitted.) Cowan v. State , 218 Ga. App. 422 , 422, 461 S.E.2d 587 (1995) (finding reckless conduct where defendant drove on the wrong side

2019A reasonable jury could find that, although Ayers-Jones did not intend for Good to die, in letting him take an overloaded capsule of methamphetamine and in failing to call for help when she knew he was in drug-induced distress, she "consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk that he might [die] - and that that disregard constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." (Citation omitted.) Cowan v. State , 218 Ga. App. 422 , 422, 461 S.E.2d 587 (1995) (finding reckless conduct where defendant drove on the wrong side

2017Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 132 ( 442 SE2d 444 ) (1994) (punctuation omitted); Shaw v. State, 238 Ga. App. 757, 758 (1) ( 519 SE2d 486 ) (1999) (physical precedent only) (“Slight evidence is sufficient to justify charging on a lesser included offense.”).

2017Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 132 ( 442 SE2d 444 ) (1994) (punctuation omitted); Shaw v. State, 238 Ga. App. 757, 758 (1) ( 519 SE2d 486 ) (1999) (physical precedent only) (“Slight evidence is sufficient to justify charging on a lesser included offense.”).

2022L., 316 Ga. App. at 414-15 (holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain delinquency adjudication when the evidence showed that juvenile, “without supervision, started a fire using twigs, leaves, grass and mulch in close proximity to the townhome where his younger siblings were located,” and the “fire was approximately eight inches high before [the juvenile] was discovered and instructed to put out the fire”); Baker v. State, 280 Ga. 822, 823 (1) ( 633 SE2d 541 ) (2006) (upholding conviction for reckless conduct when “[t]he jury concluded that appellant’s act of leaving his young sons unsup

2022L., 316 Ga. App. at 414-15 (holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain delinquency adjudication when the evidence showed that juvenile, “without supervision, started a fire using twigs, leaves, grass and mulch in close proximity to the townhome where his younger siblings were located,” and the “fire was approximately eight inches high before [the juvenile] was discovered and instructed to put out the fire”); Baker v. State, 280 Ga. 822, 823 (1) ( 633 SE2d 541 ) (2006) (upholding conviction for reckless conduct when “[t]he jury concluded that appellant’s act of leaving his young sons unsup

2019See also Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 472-473 (3) ( 265 SE2d 771 ) (1980) (finding no error in charge on involuntary manslaughter where there was “slight evidence” warranting the charge, as such evidence presents a jury question). 5 A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [her] act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation

2019See also Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 472-473 (3) ( 265 SE2d 771 ) (1980) (finding no error in charge on involuntary manslaughter where there was “slight evidence” warranting the charge, as such evidence presents a jury question). 5 A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [her] act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation

2019See also Collins v. State , 283 Ga. App. 188 , 189-190 (1), 192 (1) (b), 641 S.E.2d 208 (2007) (evidence sufficient to support a reckless conduct conviction where defendant twisted victim's head all the way around and slammed it toward car floorboard, breaking her neck, refused to take victim to hospital or to call her mother, and fled from law enforcement).

2019See also Collins v. State , 283 Ga. App. 188 , 189-190 (1), 192 (1) (b), 641 S.E.2d 208 (2007) (evidence sufficient to support a reckless conduct conviction where defendant twisted victim's head all the way around and slammed it toward car floorboard, breaking her neck, refused to take victim to hospital or to call her mother, and fled from law enforcement).

2017Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 132 ( 442 SE2d 444 ) (1994) (punctuation omitted); Shaw v. State, 238 Ga. App. 757, 758 (1) ( 519 SE2d 486 ) (1999) (physical precedent only) (“Slight evidence is sufficient to justify charging on a lesser included offense.”).

2017Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 132 ( 442 SE2d 444 ) (1994) (punctuation omitted); Shaw v. State, 238 Ga. App. 757, 758 (1) ( 519 SE2d 486 ) (1999) (physical precedent only) (“Slight evidence is sufficient to justify charging on a lesser included offense.”).

2016See OCGA § 16-1-6.6 See also Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 4 OCGA § 16–5–60 (b) reads: A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor. 5 OCGA § 40–6–390 (a) reads: Any person who drives any vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property c

2016See OCGA § 16-1-6.6 See also Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 4 OCGA § 16–5–60 (b) reads: A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor. 5 OCGA § 40–6–390 (a) reads: Any person who drives any vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property c

2015See Kain v. State, 287 Ga. App. 45 (1) ( 650 SE2d 749 ) (2007).

2015See Kain v. State, 287 Ga. App. 45 (1) ( 650 SE2d 749 ) (2007).

2013See Banta v. State, 282 Ga. 392, 398 (5) ( 651 SE2d 21 ) (2007).

2013See Banta v. State, 282 Ga. 392, 398 (5) ( 651 SE2d 21 ) (2007).

2012(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Snell v. State, 306 Ga. App. 651, 653 (1) ( 703 SE2d 93 ) (2010).

2012(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Snell v. State, 306 Ga. App. 651, 653 (1) ( 703 SE2d 93 ) (2010).

1998"Thus, the crime of reckless conduct is, in essence, an instance of criminal negligence, rather than an intentional act, which causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another." (Emphasis in original.) Bowers v. State, 177 Ga.App. 36, 38 (1), 338 S.E.2d 457 . "`Criminal negligence necessarily implies, not only knowledge of probable consequences which may result from the use of a given instrumentality, but also wilful or wanton disregard of the probable effects of such instrumentality upon others likely to be affected thereby.'... `Criminal negligence is something more than ordin

1998"Thus, the crime of reckless conduct is, in essence, an instance of criminal negligence, rather than an intentional act, which causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another." (Emphasis in original.) Bowers v. State, 177 Ga.App. 36, 38 (1), 338 S.E.2d 457 . "`Criminal negligence necessarily implies, not only knowledge of probable consequences which may result from the use of a given instrumentality, but also wilful or wanton disregard of the probable effects of such instrumentality upon others likely to be affected thereby.'... `Criminal negligence is something more than ordin

2026Cf. Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557 , 558–60 (2007), disapproved of in part by McIver, 314 Ga. at 135 & n.48 (trial court erred in refusing request for jury charge on involuntary manslaughter based on unlawful act of reckless conduct because testimony that the defendant and victim both believed the gun was unloaded when he pointed it at her and pulled the trigger during “horseplay” was slight evidence of crim- inal negligence).

2023Further, the text of the two statutes does not indicate that substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor.”). 20 OCGA § 51-1-11 (c) incorporates the criminal definition of “Reckless Conduct.” This is because the criminal statute defines the crime of “Reckless Conduct,” Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1325-1326, and does not use or define “reckless” as a standalone term, se

2009See OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) (“A person who . . . endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); Baker v. State, 280 Ga. 822, 823 (1) ( 633 SE2d 541 ) (2006) (the act of leaving a nine-month-old child in a walker unsupervised on the second floor of a townhome with no protective device blocking

2009See OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) (“A person who . . . endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); Baker v. State, 280 Ga. 822, 823 (1) ( 633 SE2d 541 ) (2006) (the act of leaving a nine-month-old child in a walker unsupervised on the second floor of a townhome with no protective device blocking

2026Given these 6 See supra note 3 & accompanying text. 7 Golden v. State, 310 Ga. 538, 540 (1) ( 852 SE2d 524 ) (2020) (quotation marks omitted).

2026Given these 6 See supra note 3 & accompanying text. 7 Golden v. State, 310 Ga. 538, 540 (1) ( 852 SE2d 524 ) (2020) (quotation marks omitted).

2024See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); Acosta v. State, 311 Ga. 320, 327 (857 SE2d 701) (2021).

2024See OCGA § 17-8-58 (b); Acosta v. State, 311 Ga. 320, 327 (857 SE2d 701) (2021).

2023See Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 363-364 (3) ( 882 SE2d 289 ) (2022) (concluding the trial court did not err by refusing to in- struct the jury on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter predi- cated on the misdemeanors of discharging a firearm while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, OCGA § 16-11-134, and discharging a firearm on the property of another, OCGA § 16-11-104, where the same conduct amounted to the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); Welch v. State, 306 Ga. 470, 474 (2) ( 831 SE2d 761 ) (2019) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by n

2023See Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 363-364 (3) (882 SE2d 289) (2022) (concluding the trial court did not err by refusing to in- struct the jury on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter predi- cated on the misdemeanors of discharging a firearm while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, OCGA § 16-11-134, and discharging a firearm on the property of another, OCGA § 16-11-104, where the same conduct amounted to the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); Welch v. State, 306 Ga. 470, 474 (2) (821 SE2d 761) (2019) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by not i

2023See Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 363-364 (3) ( 882 SE2d 289 ) (2022) (concluding the trial court did not err by refusing to in- struct the jury on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter predi- cated on the misdemeanors of discharging a firearm while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, OCGA § 16-11-134, and discharging a firearm on the property of another, OCGA § 16-11-104, where the same conduct amounted to the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); Welch v. State, 306 Ga. 470, 474 (2) ( 831 SE2d 761 ) (2019) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by n

2023See Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 363-364 (3) (882 SE2d 289) (2022) (concluding the trial court did not err by refusing to in- struct the jury on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter predi- cated on the misdemeanors of discharging a firearm while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, OCGA § 16-11-134, and discharging a firearm on the property of another, OCGA § 16-11-104, where the same conduct amounted to the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); Welch v. State, 306 Ga. 470, 474 (2) (821 SE2d 761) (2019) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by not i

2023Prince v. State, 306 Ga. App. 604, 605-606 (2) ( 702 SE2d 785 ) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023Prince v. State, 306 Ga. App. 604, 605-606 (2) ( 702 SE2d 785 ) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023See also Hounkpatin v. State, 313 Ga. 789, 793 (873 SE2d 201) (2022) (stating that jury was authorized to credit experts’ 12 Under OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), “reckless conduct” is committed when a person “causes bodily harm to . . . another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 19 testimony as to cause of child’s death and to reject defense hypot

2023See also Hounkpatin v. State, 313 Ga. 789, 793 (873 SE2d 201) (2022) (stating that jury was authorized to credit experts’ 12 Under OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), “reckless conduct” is committed when a person “causes bodily harm to . . . another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 19 testimony as to cause of child’s death and to reject defense hypot

2023See Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 363-364 (3) (882 SE2d 289) (2022) (concluding the trial court did not err by refusing to in- struct the jury on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter predi- cated on the misdemeanors of discharging a firearm while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, OCGA § 16-11-134, and discharging a firearm on the property of another, OCGA § 16-11-104, where the same conduct amounted to the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); Welch v. State, 306 Ga. 470, 474 (2) (821 SE2d 761) (2019) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by not i

2023See Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 357, 363-364 (3) (882 SE2d 289) (2022) (concluding the trial court did not err by refusing to in- struct the jury on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter predi- cated on the misdemeanors of discharging a firearm while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, OCGA § 16-11-134, and discharging a firearm on the property of another, OCGA § 16-11-104, where the same conduct amounted to the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); Welch v. State, 306 Ga. 470, 474 (2) (821 SE2d 761) (2019) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by not i

2023B., 313 Ga. 846, 853 (3) ( 874 SE2d 101 ) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted), the product-liability statute and the statute defining the crime of reckless conduct are not related to the same subject matter.

2023See also Hounkpatin v. State, 313 Ga. 789, 793 (873 SE2d 201) (2022) (stating that jury was authorized to credit experts’ 12 Under OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), “reckless conduct” is committed when a person “causes bodily harm to . . . another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 19 testimony as to cause of child’s death and to reject defense hypot

2023See also Hounkpatin v. State, 313 Ga. 789, 793 (873 SE2d 201) (2022) (stating that jury was authorized to credit experts’ 12 Under OCGA § 16-5-60 (b), “reckless conduct” is committed when a person “causes bodily harm to . . . another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his or her act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” 19 testimony as to cause of child’s death and to reject defense hypot

2022“It is a basic rule of construction that a statute . . . should be construed to make all its parts harmonize and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part, as it is not of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor. 23 presumed that the legislature intended that any part would be without meaning.” (Citatio

2022“It is a basic rule of construction that a statute . . . should be construed to make all its parts harmonize and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part, as it is not of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor. 23 presumed that the legislature intended that any part would be without meaning.” (Citatio

2022See Henderson v. Hames, 287 Ga. 534, 538-539 (3) (697 SE2d 798) (2010) (construing virtually identical language in OCGA § 16-11-108, misuse of a firearm while hunting, as prescribing the mens rea of the offense, and holding Hames’ convictions void for failure of the indictment to allege that the defendant “consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm to or endanger the safety of another person” although the indictment did allege a gross deviation from the standard of care). 38 The Court of Appeals has also applied this analysis in case

2022See Henderson v. Hames, 287 Ga. 534, 538-539 (3) (697 SE2d 798) (2010) (construing virtually identical language in OCGA § 16-11-108, misuse of a firearm while hunting, as prescribing the mens rea of the offense, and holding Hames’ convictions void for failure of the indictment to allege that the defendant “consciously disregard[ed] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm to or endanger the safety of another person” although the indictment did allege a gross deviation from the standard of care). 38 The Court of Appeals has also applied this analysis in case