66 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2026 35 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hatchellgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Hatchell, 322 Or App 309, 312 , 519 P3d 563 (2022) (concluding that “the 596 State v. Pfannenstiel trial court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury that the mental state of criminal negligence applied to the serious physical injury element of the second-degree assault count, that the error was not harmless, and that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion to correct that error”). 2024See State v. Hatchell, 322 Or App 309, 312 , 519 P3d 563 (2022) (concluding that “the 596 State v. Pfannenstiel trial court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury that the mental state of criminal negligence applied to the serious physical injury element of the second-degree assault count, that the error was not harmless, and that it is appropriate to exercise our discretion to correct that error”). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Millsgreen2 sentences1982She contends that there was insufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant left Pamelia unattended at home for a period of time likely to endanger the child’s health and welfare. 3 In State v. Mills, 52 Or App 777, 783, 629 P2d 861 , rev den 291 Or 662 (1981), we held: “* * * [ORS 163.545] forbids only that conduct by those having custody of a child under the age of ten years which, by the location and period of time for which a child is left unattended, constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person whould exercise in such a situation 1982She contends that there was insufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant left Pamelia unattended at home for a period of time likely to endanger the child’s health and welfare. 3 In State v. Mills, 52 Or App 777, 783, 629 P2d 861 , rev den 291 Or 662 (1981), we held: “* * * [ORS 163.545] forbids only that conduct by those having custody of a child under the age of ten years which, by the location and period of time for which a child is left unattended, constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person whould exercise in such a situation | 3 | 3 |
State v. Shedrickgreen2 sentences2024The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable per- son would observe in the situation.” ORS 161.085(10); see also State v. Shedrick, 370 Or 255 , 270- 71, 518 P3d 559 (2022) (a criminal negligence culpable men- tal state may also be proved by knowledge or recklessness). 2024The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable per- son would observe in the situation.” ORS 161.085(10); see also State v. Shedrick, 370 Or 255 , 270- 71, 518 P3d 559 (2022) (a criminal negligence culpable men- tal state may also be proved by knowledge or recklessness). | 2 | 7 |
State v. Milesgreen2 sentences2024Id. (applying standard for determining whether failure to give culpable mental state instruction was harmless); see State v. Miles, 326 Or App 410, 423 , 533 P3d 368 (2023) (declining to correct plain error because, “in the context of tackling C from behind while she was handcuffed at the wrists, we conclude that the trial court would have found that defendant failed to be aware of a substantial risk that so doing could cause a serious physical injury, or that the risk was of such a nature and degree that defendant’s failure to be aware of it was a gross deviation from the stan- dard of care t 2024Id. (applying standard for determining whether failure to give culpable mental state instruction was harmless); see State v. Miles, 326 Or App 410, 423 , 533 P3d 368 (2023) (declining to correct plain error because, “in the context of tackling C from behind while she was handcuffed at the wrists, we conclude that the trial court would have found that defendant failed to be aware of a substantial risk that so doing could cause a serious physical injury, or that the risk was of such a nature and degree that defendant’s failure to be aware of it was a gross deviation from the stan- dard of care t | 2 | 2 |
State v. Owengreen2 sentences2024See Owen, 369 Or at 324 (“Even if the court had given defendant’s requested instruction about criminal negligence, in view of the jury’s findings that defendant engaged in assaultive conduct * * * and knowingly used his boots and the ground as dangerous weapons, the jury would not have found that defendant was unaware that his actions would cause * * * physical inju- ries.”). 2023Owen forecloses that reasoning, and we are bound by it. 369 Or at 321 (adhering to the holding in Barnes that the knowingly mental state did not apply to the injury element). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Stonegreen2 sentences2024Because a culpable mental state of at least criminal negligence attaches to the “substantial risk of physical injury” element,2 a properly instructed jury would have had to find (1) that defendant failed to be aware that he was creating a substantial risk of physical injury and (2) that that risk was “of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitute[d] a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” ORS 161.085(10) (defining “crimi- nal negligence”).3 In assessing whether the omission of a mental-state instruction was 2024Because a culpable mental state of at least criminal negligence attaches to the “substantial risk of physical injury” element,2 a properly instructed jury would have had to find (1) that defendant failed to be aware that he was creating a substantial risk of physical injury and (2) that that risk was “of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitute[d] a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” ORS 161.085(10) (defining “crimi- nal negligence”).3 In assessing whether the omission of a mental-state instruction was | 1 | 3 |
State v. Stringergreen2 sentences2019See State v. Lewis, 352 Or 626, 641 , 290 P3d 288 (2012) (stating that “the ordinary negligence standard of care * * * provides the benchmark for determining whether the defendant’s conduct was a ‘gross deviation’ ”); State v. Stringer, 49 Or App 51, 55 , 618 P2d 1309 (1980), aff’d, 291 Or 527 , 633 P2d 770 (1981), on reh’g, 292 Or 388 , 639 P2d 1264 (1982) (concluding that the trial court’s instruction that the jury must find that the defendant’s conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of reasonable care was the correct instruction because it “correctly informed the jury as to 2019See State v. Lewis, 352 Or 626, 641 , 290 P3d 288 (2012) (stating that “the ordinary negligence standard of care * * * provides the benchmark for determining whether the defendant’s conduct was a ‘gross deviation’ ”); State v. Stringer, 49 Or App 51, 55 , 618 P2d 1309 (1980), aff’d, 291 Or 527 , 633 P2d 770 (1981), on reh’g, 292 Or 388 , 639 P2d 1264 (1982) (concluding that the trial court’s instruction that the jury must find that the defendant’s conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of reasonable care was the correct instruction because it “correctly informed the jury as to | 1 | 3 |
State v. Hortongreen2 sentences2025Consequently, “viewing the record as a whole and in the context of the jury’s other findings, even though there is some likelihood that the verdict would have been different (such that the error was not legally harmless), it is an extremely low likelihood.” Horton, 327 Or App at 266 (emphasis in original). “[W]e are ultimately unpersuaded that the gravity of the error, the ends of justice, or the other relevant considerations warrant exercising our discretion to reverse” defendant’s conviction on Count 4. 2023Id. (quoting State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630-31 , 529 P3d 999 (2023)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Perkinsgreen2 sentences2023Id. (quoting State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630-31 , 529 P3d 999 (2023)). 2023Id. (quoting State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630-31 , 529 P3d 999 (2023)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Lewis, 352 Or 626, 641 , 290 P3d 288 (2012) (stating that “the ordinary negligence standard of care * * * provides the benchmark for determining whether the defendant’s conduct was a ‘gross deviation’ ”); State v. Stringer, 49 Or App 51, 55 , 618 P2d 1309 (1980), aff’d, 291 Or 527 , 633 P2d 770 (1981), on reh’g, 292 Or 388 , 639 P2d 1264 (1982) (concluding that the trial court’s instruction that the jury must find that the defendant’s conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of reasonable care was the correct instruction because it “correctly informed the jury as to 2019See State v. Lewis, 352 Or 626, 641 , 290 P3d 288 (2012) (stating that “the ordinary negligence standard of care * * * provides the benchmark for determining whether the defendant’s conduct was a ‘gross deviation’ ”); State v. Stringer, 49 Or App 51, 55 , 618 P2d 1309 (1980), aff’d, 291 Or 527 , 633 P2d 770 (1981), on reh’g, 292 Or 388 , 639 P2d 1264 (1982) (concluding that the trial court’s instruction that the jury must find that the defendant’s conduct constituted a gross deviation from the standard of reasonable care was the correct instruction because it “correctly informed the jury as to | 1 | 2 |
State v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2019ORS 161.085(9) (defining "recklessly" for purposes of state criminal code); see State v. Clark , 256 Or. 2019We have explained that the “difference between the two mental states is that a criminally negligent defendant grossly deviates from the standard of care for a reasonable person by failing to be aware of a risk, whereas a reckless defendant grossly deviates from the standard of care of a reasonable person by consciously disregarding a known risk.” State v. Clark, 256 Or App 428 , 435 n 6, 300 P3d 281 (2013) (emphases in original). | 1 | 2 |
State v. S. N. R.green2 sentences2019App. 728 , 739, 320 P.3d 569 (2014) (defendant's decision to look for the next appropriate place to pull over did not constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation). 2017We concluded that the evidence was “insufficient to support a determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the] youth consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that she would fall asleep while driving and that [the] youth’s conduct was a gross deviation from the standard of care of a reasonable driver.” Id. at 735 . | 1 | 2 |
Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor and Industriesgreen2 sentences2015Further, the risk must have been “of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitute[d] a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable per- son would [have] observe[d] in the situation.” Id. (emphasis added). 2015Further, the risk must have been “of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitute [d] a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would [have] observe [d] in the situation.” Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Torresgreen2 sentences2014See State v. Paragon, 195 Or App 265, 270 , 97 P3d 691 (2004). 2007Criminal negligence is established if, given the reason for leaving the child in the setting and the circumstances in which the child was left, the risk of physical harm was such a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe.” State v. Paragon, 195 Or App 265, 270 , 97 P3d 691 (2004). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Paragongreen2 sentences2014See State v. Paragon, 195 Or App 265, 270 , 97 P3d 691 (2004). 2007Criminal negligence is established if, given the reason for leaving the child in the setting and the circumstances in which the child was left, the risk of physical harm was such a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe.” State v. Paragon, 195 Or App 265, 270 , 97 P3d 691 (2004). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Acreegreen2 sentences2025The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 381 (2025) 391 negligence are ones of risk and awareness of that risk.” State v. Acree, 338 Or App 98, 102 , 565 P3d 60 (2025) (emphases in original). “[T]he awareness is not of the value of the items themselves; it is of the risk—the possibility or chance—that the aggregate value of the items exceeded the value limit in the statute.” Id. at 103 (emphases in original). 2025The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 381 (2025) 391 negligence are ones of risk and awareness of that risk.” State v. Acree, 338 Or App 98, 102 , 565 P3d 60 (2025) (emphases in original). “[T]he awareness is not of the value of the items themselves; it is of the risk—the possibility or chance—that the aggregate value of the items exceeded the value limit in the statute.” Id. at 103 (emphases in original). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Neder v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Braygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Simonovgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Graham v. Howtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Nelsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Noegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gainesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hilgert v. Mark Twain/Mercantile Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lotchesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Quartiergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fitch
green
2 sentences2025In particular, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, they demonstrate that suspicious circumstances—such as “squirreliness” or lying—standing alone do not allow for a nonspeculative inference that a defendant was, in fact, aware of a substantial and unjusti- fiable risk that they did not have the owner’s permission to use the vehicle. 212 State v. Smith We affirmed a conviction for UUV in Fitch where the “[d]efendant’s dubious story about the purchase, the lack of a bill of sale or title for the car, and possession of other documents resembling various registrations in names that were not 2025In particular, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, they demonstrate that suspicious circum- stances—such as “squirreliness” or lying—standing alone do not allow for a nonspeculative inference that a defendant was, in fact, aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that they did not have the owner’s permission to use the vehicle. 212 State v. Smith We affirmed a conviction for UUV in Fitch where the “[d]efendant’s dubious story about the purchase, the lack of a bill of sale or title for the car, and possession of other documents resembling various registrations in names that were not | 3 | 2024–2025 |
State v. McLaughlin
green
2 sentences1984The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." State v. McLaughlin, 42 Or. 1984The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” State v. McLaughlin, 42 Or App 215, 219 , 600 P2d 474 , rev den 288 Or 173 (1979). | 3 | 1982–2004 |
State v. Sepelak
neutral
2 sentences2026The risk must be “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Id. 2026The risk must be “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Id. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
cluster 10876367
neutral
2 sentences2026Cite as 350 Or App 641 (2026) 645 grabbed Baby Girl, and dragged her through the fence into defendant’s yard, where both dogs “started mauling her” until Gaul went into the yard and defendant came out of her house to intervene. 2026Cite as 350 Or App 641 (2026) 645 grabbed Baby Girl, and dragged her through the fence into defendant’s yard, where both dogs “started mauling her” until Gaul went into the yard and defendant came out of her house to intervene. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Smith
neutral
2 sentences2025The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Cite as 338 Or App 206 (2025) 211 vehicle”). 2025The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Cite as 338 Or App 206 (2025) 211 vehicle”). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2024Nonprecedential Memo Op: 332 Or App 143 (2024) 145 and thus not a basis for reversal, where there is “little like- lihood that the error affected the jury’s verdict.” State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003). 2024Nonprecedential Memo Op: 332 Or App 143 (2024) 145 and thus not a basis for reversal, where there is “little like- lihood that the error affected the jury’s verdict.” State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003). | 2 | 2010–2024 |
State v. Boggs
green
2 sentences2023The court in Shedrick said that, in order to prove that the error in failing to give the instruction was harm- less, the state was required to prove (1) that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the money left on the top of the ATM was at least $1,000; and (2) that the defendant’s “failure to be aware of [the risk that there was Cite as 324 Or App 1 (2023) 5 more than $1,000] was a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in that situ- ation.” 370 Or at 271 . 2023The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Cite as 324 Or App 1 (2023) 7 Assuming, as the court did in Shedrick, that the jury would have found that defendant nevertheless was unaware of that risk, the jury would then have had to consider the nature of the risk and whether defendant’s failure to be aware of it was a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in that situation. 370 Or at 271 . | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Sell
green
2 sentences2023Cite as 328 Or App 82 (2023) 95 that they saw defendant land a kick or a punch on O’Connor, and defense counsel argued in closing that O’Connor’s injury may have been involuntarily caused by defendant’s metallic handcuffs while defendant was being thrown to the ground by the officers. 2023Cite as 328 Or App 82 (2023) 95 that they saw defendant land a kick or a punch on O’Connor, and defense counsel argued in closing that O’Connor’s injury may have been involuntarily caused by defendant’s metallic handcuffs while defendant was being thrown to the ground by the officers. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Goff
green
2 sentences2007The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” We have previously described the elements of child neglect by paraphrasing the Supreme Court: “In State v. Goff, 297 Or 635, 638 , 686 P2d 1023 (1984), the court noted that the offense is made up of physical and mental elements. 2007The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” We have previously described the elements of child neglect by paraphrasing the Supreme Court: “In State v. Goff, 297 Or 635, 638 , 686 P2d 1023 (1984), the court noted that the offense is made up of physical and mental elements. | 2 | 2004–2007 |
State v. Heward
green
1 sentence2025The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Nonprecedential Memo Op: 341 Or App 381 (2025) 391 negligence are ones of risk and awareness of that risk.” State v. Acree, 338 Or App 98, 102 , 565 P3d 60 (2025) (emphases in original). “[T]he awareness is not of the value of the items themselves; it is of the risk—the possibility or chance—that the aggregate value of the items exceeded the value limit in the statute.” Id. at 103 (emphases in original). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Miles
green
1 sentence2024Cite as 330 Or App 1 (2024) 5 officer when she threatened to tase defendant. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Dahlgren
neutral
1 sentence2024Nonprecedential Memo Op: 332 Or App 143 (2024) 145 and thus not a basis for reversal, where there is “little like- lihood that the error affected the jury’s verdict.” State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32 , 77 P3d 1111 (2003). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. McCarthy neutral | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Lupoli
green
2 sentences2024Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the state and accepting reasonable infer- ences, State v. Lupoli, 348 Or 346, 366 , 234 P3d 117 (2010), we agree with the state that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant acted recklessly. 2024Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the state and accepting reasonable infer- ences, State v. Lupoli, 348 Or 346, 366 , 234 P3d 117 (2010), we agree with the state that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant acted recklessly. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Turnidge
green
2 sentences2024When determining what the mental state element requires of the state’s proof for a particular charge, “the starting point is to identify the result, conduct, or cir- cumstance ‘described’ by the statute setting out the elements of the offense.” State v. Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or 364 , 460- 61, 374 P3d 853 (2016), cert den, 580 US 1070 (2017). 2024When determining what the mental state element requires of the state’s proof for a particular charge, “the starting point is to identify the result, conduct, or cir- cumstance ‘described’ by the statute setting out the elements of the offense.” State v. Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or 364 , 460- 61, 374 P3d 853 (2016), cert den, 580 US 1070 (2017). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Vanornum green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Ohio v. Roberts red | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Acosta neutral | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Horn-Garcia green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Hernandez v. Barbo MacHinery Co. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. McNally green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Harris green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Crosby green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Harbert green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Wakefield green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Stringer green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Stringer green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Rossiter green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Schlender green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| MAKINSON v. Lampert green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Hickman/Hickman green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Savage green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Morehouse v. Haynes green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Huesties v. Board On Police Standards & Training green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Mejia green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Chakerian green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Boone green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Lawrence green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Mershon v. Oregonian Publishing green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.