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25 Wisconsin opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2026 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Langlade County v. D. J. W.green2 sentences2024See Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶25 , 390 Wis. 2d 50 , 937 N.W.2d 901 . 4 No. 2024AP924 facts.” Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶47 , 391 Wis. 2d 231 , 942 N.W.2d 277 . ¶9 Circuit courts are required “to make specific factual findings with reference to” the dangerousness standard or standards that the court relies on in determining that an individual is dangerous for purposes of WIS. 2024See Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶25 , 390 Wis. 2d 50 , 937 N.W.2d 901 . 4 No. 2024AP924 facts.” Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶47 , 391 Wis. 2d 231 , 942 N.W.2d 277 . ¶9 Circuit courts are required “to make specific factual findings with reference to” the dangerousness standard or standards that the court relies on in determining that an individual is dangerous for purposes of WIS. | 2 | 3 |
Sauk County v. S. A. M.green2 sentences2026See Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶¶5, 32 , 402 Wis. 2d 379 , 975 N.W.2d 162 (“If the government presents clear and convincing evidence that the committed person remains mentally ill, treatable, and dangerous under one of the five standards … then the court must order that person recommitted ….”). 5 No. 2025AP2522 ¶14 WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. provides that an individual’s dangerousness is established if the person “[e]vidences a substantial probability of physical harm to himself or herself as manifested by evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily ha 2026See Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶¶5, 32 , 402 Wis. 2d 379 , 975 N.W.2d 162 (“If the government presents clear and convincing evidence that the committed person remains mentally ill, treatable, and dangerous under one of the five standards … then the court must order that person recommitted ….”). 5 No. 2025AP2522 ¶14 WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. provides that an individual’s dangerousness is established if the person “[e]vidences a substantial probability of physical harm to himself or herself as manifested by evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily ha | 2 | 2 |
Marathon County v. D. K.green2 sentences2024See Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶25 , 390 Wis. 2d 50 , 937 N.W.2d 901 . 4 No. 2024AP924 facts.” Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶47 , 391 Wis. 2d 231 , 942 N.W.2d 277 . ¶9 Circuit courts are required “to make specific factual findings with reference to” the dangerousness standard or standards that the court relies on in determining that an individual is dangerous for purposes of WIS. 2024See Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶25 , 390 Wis. 2d 50 , 937 N.W.2d 901 . 4 No. 2024AP924 facts.” Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶47 , 391 Wis. 2d 231 , 942 N.W.2d 277 . ¶9 Circuit courts are required “to make specific factual findings with reference to” the dangerousness standard or standards that the court relies on in determining that an individual is dangerous for purposes of WIS. | 2 | 2 |
Winnebago County v. S.H.green2 sentences2026S.H., 393 Wis. 2d 511, ¶9 . ¶24 E.R.B. argues that his is a case in which his threats were “old enough, weak enough, or otherwise insufficient to support clear and convincing evidence under the substantial likelihood of the dangerousness test.” Id., ¶13 n.6. 2026S.H., 393 Wis. 2d 511, ¶9 . ¶24 E.R.B. argues that his is a case in which his threats were “old enough, weak enough, or otherwise insufficient to support clear and convincing evidence under the substantial likelihood of the dangerousness test.” Id., ¶13 n.6. | 1 | 3 |
Outagamie County v. Melanie L.green2 sentences2020See S.H., 393 Wis. 2d 511, ¶14 ; see also Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶38 , 349 Wis. 2d 148 , 833 N.W.2d 607 (“We accept reasonable inferences from the facts available to the circuit court.”). ¶19 We agree with Lisa that the relevant dangerousness standard is WIS. 2020See S.H., 393 Wis. 2d 511, ¶14 ; see also Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶38 , 349 Wis. 2d 148 , 833 N.W.2d 607 (“We accept reasonable inferences from the facts available to the circuit court.”). ¶19 We agree with Lisa that the relevant dangerousness standard is WIS. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Portage Cnty. v. J.W.K. (In Re Mental Commitment of J.W.K.)
green
2 sentences2025“The dangerousness standard is not more or less onerous during an extension proceeding”; “[e]ach extension hearing requires proof of current dangerousness.” Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶24 , 386 Wis. 2d 672 , 927 N.W.2d 509 . 2025“The dangerousness standard is not more or less onerous during an extension proceeding”; “[e]ach extension hearing requires proof of current dangerousness.” Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶24 , 386 Wis. 2d 672 , 927 N.W.2d 509 . | 8 | 2019–2025 |
Waukesha Cnty. v. S.L.L. (In Re Mental Commitment of S.L.L.)
green
2 sentences2021Waukesha Cnty. v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶10 , 387 Wis. 2d 333 , 929 N.W.2d 140 . ¶14 Brian argues that the dangerousness standard the County intended to pursue was consistently unclear. 2021Waukesha Cnty. v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶10 , 387 Wis. 2d 333 , 929 N.W.2d 140 . ¶14 Brian argues that the dangerousness standard the County intended to pursue was consistently unclear. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
Lessard v. Schmidt
green
2 sentences1987Vacated, on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. 1987Because of the permanency theme underlying ch. 55, Stats., the state has a compelling interest in requiring that all the historical acts of the alleged incompetent be viewed when determining whether or not the dangerousness requirement has been met. [5] Vacated on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Schmidt v. Lessard
green
2 sentences1987Vacated, on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. 1987Because of the permanency theme underlying ch. 55, Stats., the state has a compelling interest in requiring that all the historical acts of the alleged incompetent be viewed when determining whether or not the dangerousness requirement has been met. [5] Vacated on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Giacomantonio
green
1 sentence2023Neither party argues that this finding matters to any issue raised on appeal and I address it no further. 7 No. 2022AP1852 452, 885 N.W.2d 394 (referring to § 910.02 as “Wisconsin’s best evidence rule”).4 Rather than argue that an exception to this rule applies, the County argues that the officer’s testimony was not offered to prove the contents of the emails, but instead to provide the officer’s “recollection of the statements that D.F.B. specifically admitted to.” In reply, D.F.B. argues that this is “a distinction without a difference,” given that the County elicited the testimony for the c | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Sheboygan County v. M.W.
green
2 sentences2023Thus, the “specific factual findings” contemplated by D.J.W. must mean findings more specific than the court’s ultimate legal conclusion of dangerousness, suggesting that D.J.W. requires specific evidentiary findings of fact that refer to the applicable dangerousness standard. ¶15 This reading also comports with a concurring opinion by Justice Hagedorn in Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40 , 402 Wis. 2d 1 , 974 N.W.2d 733 , that further discusses the D.J.W. directive. 2023Thus, the “specific factual findings” contemplated by D.J.W. must mean findings more specific than the court’s ultimate legal conclusion of dangerousness, suggesting that D.J.W. requires specific evidentiary findings of fact that refer to the applicable dangerousness standard. ¶15 This reading also comports with a concurring opinion by Justice Hagedorn in Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40 , 402 Wis. 2d 1 , 974 N.W.2d 733 , that further discusses the D.J.W. directive. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Lessard v. Schmidt
green
1 sentence2021He cites Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Whitrock
green
2 sentences2020Cf. State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 970 , 468 N.W.2d 696 (1991) (forfeiture may be overcome when the issue is “fully brief[ed]”). ¶14 Because I conclude that D.J.’s due process argument is forfeited, I do not address whether or when the County was required to specify the dangerousness standard it intended to rely on at trial, or whether the County’s conduct violated D.J.’s procedural due process rights.6 II. 2020Cf. State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 970 , 468 N.W.2d 696 (1991) (forfeiture may be overcome when the issue is “fully brief[ed]”). ¶14 Because I conclude that D.J.’s due process argument is forfeited, I do not address whether or when the County was required to specify the dangerousness standard it intended to rely on at trial, or whether the County’s conduct violated D.J.’s procedural due process rights.6 II. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Randall
green
2 sentences1998In State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800 , 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995) {Randall I), the supreme court implied that the dangerousness factors set forth in § 971.17(4)(d), Stats., 1993-94, which apply to persons adjudicated not guilty by reasons of mental disease or defect for offenses committed after January 1,1991, may be useful in evaluating Randall's dangerousness, on remand. 1998In State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800 , 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995) {Randall I), the supreme court implied that the dangerousness factors set forth in § 971.17(4)(d), Stats., 1993-94, which apply to persons adjudicated not guilty by reasons of mental disease or defect for offenses committed after January 1,1991, may be useful in evaluating Randall's dangerousness, on remand. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Lessard v. Schmidt
green
1 sentence1987Wis. 1974); vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975); on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Whitmarsh v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence1987Wis. 1974); vacated, 421 U.S. 957 (1975); on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.