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10 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 2005–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mendonza v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2019See Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 791-792 (1996). 2016L. c. 276, § 58A (4), where each hearing was held “immediately upon the person’s first appearance before the court.” Orders for pretrial detention affirmed. 2 As we observed in Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass. 771, 780 (1996), the Commonwealth bears a “heavy burden” to satisfy G. | 2 | 2 |
John Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.green1 sentence2026See Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 659-660 (risk of reoffense relating only to noncontact offenses, where victim not put in fear of bodily harm, unlikely to pose moderate degree of dangerousness). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hurleygreen1 sentence2025There is no dispute that all five conditions were met with respect to the victim's testimony at the dangerousness hearing.5 See Commonwealth v. 5 On cross-examination, the defendant elicited from the victim that she was intoxicated on the night of the incident, that she was the one who put the note on the door saying that no one was home, that she had falls on her own at home, that she never told the police that the defendant had assaulted her even though the defendant was not present, that she initially refused 6 Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 63 (2009) (admission of detention hearing testimony at tri | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. McCantsgreen1 sentence2018See Commonwealth v. McCants , 20 Mass. App. Ct. 294 , 297 (1985) ("Docket entries are prima facie evidence of the facts recorded there"). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Senagreen1 sentence2016See Commonwealth v. Sena, 441 Mass. 822, 833 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Housewrightgreen1 sentence2016See Commonwealth v. Housewright, 470 Mass. 665, 677-678 (2015). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Burgessgreen1 sentence2010Cf. Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 366, 375 (2008) (sexual dangerousness). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kennedygreen1 sentence2005An erroneous determination that a continuance is justified infringes on the defendant’s liberty interest because it leads to unwarranted detention until the dangerousness hearing. “ [Confinement without legal justification is never innocuous.” Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 435 Mass. 527, 530 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Diggs (SJC 12008) Commonwealth v. Soto
green
2 sentences2019L. c. 276, § 58A, as set forth in Commonwealth v. Diggs , 475 Mass. 79 , 80, 54 N.E.3d 1115 (2016), allowed the Commonwealth to seek a dangerousness hearing in the Superior Court notwithstanding the defendant's release on conditions following his arraignment in the District Court. 2019L. c. 276, § 58A, as set forth in Commonwealth v. Diggs , 475 Mass. 79 , 80, 54 N.E.3d 1115 (2016), allowed the Commonwealth to seek a dangerousness hearing in the Superior Court notwithstanding the defendant's release on conditions following his arraignment in the District Court. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Beckles v. United States
green
2 sentences2019Analogizing to Beckles v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 886 , 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017), the Commonwealth contends that § 58A should not be subject to a rigorous vagueness analysis because the statute only triggers the Commonwealth's right to move for a dangerousness hearing and does not define a criminal offense or "fix" a permissible sentence. 2019Analogizing to Beckles v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 886 , 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017), the Commonwealth contends that § 58A should not be subject to a rigorous vagueness analysis because the statute only triggers the Commonwealth's right to move for a dangerousness hearing and does not define a criminal offense or "fix" a permissible sentence. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hinnant
green
1 sentence2010As in Torres and in contrast to Hinnant, petitioner, 424 Mass. 900 (1997), the judge found that the juvenile, “with his somewhat limited abilities, can participate in the [§ 58A] hearing.” The risk of strategic error is no greater at a dangerousness hearing than a bail hearing, because the defendant’s or juvenile’s interests are clear (to obtain his release on conditions and avoid a finding of dangerousness), the hearing cannot be waived (because the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence), and the defendant or juvenile almost never testifies. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Commonwealth v. Nieves
green
1 sentence2010The decisions that an attorney must make at a § 58A hearing — what evidence, if any, to present and whether and how to cross-examine the Commonwealth’s witnesses — are “quintessential^ the types of choices that attorneys regularly make with respect to their competent clients.” Commonwealth v. Nieves, supra at 592 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.