dangerousness inquiry in California

2020The determination of the legislative intent to limit retroactive application of Propositions 36 and 47 did not depend on the dangerousness inquiry. ( Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 656–657; DeHoyos, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 605 .) Moreover, Johnson minimizes the substantive requirement for relief imposed by section 1170.95.

2019To the contrary, Conley notes "[o]ur cases do not 'dictate to legislative drafters the forms in which laws must be written' to express an intent to modify or limit the retroactive effect of an ameliorative change; rather, they require 'that the Legislature demonstrate its intention with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can discern and effectuate it.' " ( Conley , supra , 63 Cal.4th at pp. 656-657, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 622 , 373 P.3d 435 ; see also *867 People v. Superior Court ( Lara ) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299 , 312, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 394 , 410 P.3d 22 [explaining Conley held Estrada 's inferenc

2020However, “[w]hile defendant is correct that section 1170.95 does not require a dangerousness inquiry, neither Conley nor DeHoyos holds that inquiry was the indispensable statutory feature on which the result in those cases turned.” (People v. Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 728 .) Consequently, the petition procedure is defendant’s sole avenue to invoke Senate Bill 1437, and we decline to consider, in the present appeal, defendant’s arguments predicated on Senate Bill 1437.

2019As Martinez explained when rejecting one of the same contentions, although section 1170.95 does not require a dangerousness inquiry, neither Conley nor DeHoyos held that inquiry was the “indispensable statutory feature on which the result in those cases turned.” (Martinez, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 728 .) And, Munoz’s contention that no additional fact finding is required in order to apply section 1170.95 is simply incorrect.

2016(See e.g., Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1299-1300.) Unlike the hearing on dangerousness, or even the resentencing hearing itself, the trial court does not exercise discretion when determining eligibility, as it is a legal question, and the court cannot consider evidence beyond the record of conviction. (§ 1170.126, subd. (f); Oehmigen, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 7 .) Thus, even though the court’s threshold eligibility determination may be critical to the ultimate outcome of the recall petition, the defendant’s presence would not contribute to the fairness of the proceeding on the l

2015Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B).) In Hofferber, our Supreme Court read a dangerousness requirement into this definition of “gravely disabled” in order to comport with Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715 , and In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798 . ( Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 174-175.) Nevertheless, we do agree an incompetent criminal defendant’s “dangerous mental condition must be found beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 178.) 13 clears the dangerousness hurdle (see Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1302-1303), which he did not do.

2024(Cf. ibid. [trial court considered term length, nature of the crime, and age of defendant].) Since these factors showed that his violence actually increased with age, we cannot say the court’s decision was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377 .) G.

2020The determination of the legislative intent to limit retroactive application of Propositions 36 and 47 did not depend on the dangerousness inquiry. ( Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 656–657; DeHoyos, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 605 .) Moreover, Johnson minimizes the substantive requirement for relief imposed by section 1170.95.

2020The determination of the legislative intent to limit retroactive application of Propositions 36 and 47 did not depend on the dangerousness inquiry. ( Conley, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 656–657; DeHoyos, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 605 .) Moreover, Johnson minimizes the substantive requirement for relief imposed by section 1170.95.

2016As in traditional sentencing proceedings, at a dangerousness hearing under Proposition 47, superior courts may “consider a broad range of information, including responsible unsworn and out-of-court statements concerning the defendant, provided there is a substantial basis for believing the information is reliable.” (Couzens & Bigelow, Proposition 47: “The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act” (May 2016) p. 54, <http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Prop-47-Information.pdf> [as of May 27, 2016], citing People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, 754 ; People v. Lamb (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 664, 683 .) Ho

2016As in traditional sentencing proceedings, at a dangerousness hearing under Proposition 47, superior courts may “consider a broad range of information, including responsible unsworn and out-of-court statements concerning the defendant, provided there is a substantial basis for believing the information is reliable.” (Couzens & Bigelow, Proposition 47: “The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act” (May 2016) p. 54, <http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Prop-47-Information.pdf> [as of May 27, 2016], citing People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, 754 ; People v. Lamb (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 664, 683 .) Ho

2015(Id. at p. 1299, fn. 23.) Kaulick also looked to Dillon v. United States (2010) 560 U.S. 817 (Dillon), in which a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to have essential facts found by a jury 5 beyond a reasonable doubt did not apply to downward sentence modifications prompted by intervening law.

2015Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B).) In Hofferber, our Supreme Court read a dangerousness requirement into this definition of “gravely disabled” in order to comport with Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715 , and In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798 . ( Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 174-175.) Nevertheless, we do agree an incompetent criminal defendant’s “dangerous mental condition must be found beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 178.) 13 clears the dangerousness hurdle (see Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1302-1303), which he did not do.

2015Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B).) In Hofferber, our Supreme Court read a dangerousness requirement into this definition of “gravely disabled” in order to comport with Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715 , and In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798 . ( Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 174-175.) Nevertheless, we do agree an incompetent criminal defendant’s “dangerous mental condition must be found beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 178.) 13 clears the dangerousness hurdle (see Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1302-1303), which he did not do.

2015Finally, we also reject defendant’s argument that the dangerousness finding “should at least be made upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” This argument is based on Ninth Circuit precedent holding that “when a sentencing factor has an extremely disproportionate impact on the sentence relative to the offense of conviction, due process requires that the government prove the facts underlying the enhancement by clear and convincing evidence.” (United States v. Jordan (9th Cir. 2001) 256 F.3d 922, 930 ; see also United States v. Pineda-Doval (9th Cir. 2010) 614 F.3d 1019, 1041 .) Aside

2015Code, § 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B).) In Hofferber, our Supreme Court read a dangerousness requirement into this definition of “gravely disabled” in order to comport with Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715 , and In re Davis (1973) 8 Cal.3d 798 . ( Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 174-175.) Nevertheless, we do agree an incompetent criminal defendant’s “dangerous mental condition must be found beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 178.) 13 clears the dangerousness hurdle (see Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1302-1303), which he did not do.

2012And this question points out the fact that this is constitutionally to [szc] vague and does not hold up as a dangerousness standard for civil commitment.” “While a section 6500 commitment results in a substantial loss of liberty, it is a civil proceeding, not a criminal proceeding, because the goal of the proceeding is the treatment of the potential committee, not punishment.” (People v. Wilkinson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 547 .) In the state of Oregon, a person may be involuntarily committed if he or she is found to be “ ‘mentally ill,’ ” which is defined by statute as having a “ ‘mental

2012And this question points out the fact that this is constitutionally to [szc] vague and does not hold up as a dangerousness standard for civil commitment.” “While a section 6500 commitment results in a substantial loss of liberty, it is a civil proceeding, not a criminal proceeding, because the goal of the proceeding is the treatment of the potential committee, not punishment.” (People v. Wilkinson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 547 .) In the state of Oregon, a person may be involuntarily committed if he or she is found to be “ ‘mentally ill,’ ” which is defined by statute as having a “ ‘mental

2004(People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti), supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 920 .) The Ghilotti court further noted the fact a person is willing to pursue voluntary treatment suggests he has more motivation, ability and opportunity to function lawfully if free in the community despite his mental impairment.

1992In People v. Gibson (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1425 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 56 ], we analyzed this statutory scheme prior to its amendment in 1989 and held it was “essentially penal in nature.” (Id.., at p. 1434.) Subsequent amendments have cured the constitutional defects identified in Gibson by amending its retroactivity provision (§ 2980) and adding a present dangerousness requirement (§ 2962).

1992In People v. Gibson (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1425 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 56 ], we analyzed this statutory scheme prior to its amendment in 1989 and held it was “essentially penal in nature.” (Id.., at p. 1434.) Subsequent amendments have cured the constitutional defects identified in Gibson by amending its retroactivity provision (§ 2980) and adding a present dangerousness requirement (§ 2962).