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24 California opinions name it 2 courts 1917–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Saenzgreen2 sentences2013Code, § 290, subds. (b), (c).) Such offenses include “any offense involving lewd or lascivious conduct under Section 272.” (Id., subd. (c).) It has been said that the process of determining whether an offense is nonexemptible “presents a high danger of error.” (Doe v. Saenz (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 960, 997 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 ].) “This danger of error is enhanced due to the complexity of the statutory scheme identifying more than 50 non-exemptible offenses, some of which are non-exemptible only under specified conditions.” (Ibid.) Circumstances Surrounding José’s Conviction On February 23, 201 2013Code, § 290, subds. (b), (c).) Such offenses include “any offense involving lewd or lascivious conduct under Section 272.” (Id., subd. (c).) It has been said that the process of determining whether an offense is nonexemptible “presents a high danger of error.” (Doe v. Saenz (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 960, 997 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 ].) “This danger of error is enhanced due to the complexity of the statutory scheme identifying more than 50 non-exemptible offenses, some of which are non-exemptible only under specified conditions.” (Ibid.) Circumstances Surrounding José’s Conviction On February 23, 201 | 3 | 4 |
Alvis v. County of Venturagreen2 sentences2023(See Alvis v. County of Ventura (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 536, 550 [public entity “may rely on the allegations of the complaint to establish causation”].) Appellants allege Caltrans was “well aware of deer entering the roadway in the area of the accident” yet failed to safeguard motorists or warn them adequately of the danger in violation of section 835. 2023(See Alvis v. County of Ventura (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 536, 550 [public entity “may rely on the allegations of the complaint to establish causation”].) Appellants allege Caltrans was “well aware of deer entering the roadway in the area of the accident” yet failed to safeguard motorists or warn them adequately of the danger in violation of section 835. | 2 | 2 |
Gresher v. Andersongreen2 sentences2008Code, §§ 1502, subd. (a)(1)-(8), 1558, subd. (h); Doe v. Saenz, supra, at p. 974 .) (8) The process of determining whether an offense is nonexemptible "presents a high danger of error." ( Doe v. Saenz, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 997.) "This danger of error is enhanced due to the complexity of the statutory scheme identifying more than 50 non-exemptible offenses, some of which are non-exemptible only under specified conditions." ( Ibid. ; see generally Gresher v. Anderson, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 96 .) Nonexemptible offenses include "sexual battery, certain crimes affecting children or t 2008Code, §§ 1502, subd. (a)(l)-(8), 1558, subd. (h); Doe v. Saenz, supra, at p. 974 .) The process of determining whether an offense is nonexemptible “presents a high danger of error.” (Doe v. Saenz, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 997.) “This danger of error is enhanced due to the complexity of the statutory scheme identifying more than 50 non-exemptible offenses, some of which are non-exemptible only under specified conditions.” (Ibid.; see generally Gresher v. Anderson, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 96 .) Nonexemptible offenses include “sexual battery, certain crimes affecting children or the elde | 2 | 2 |
Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.green2 sentences1978(Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal.3d 596, 600 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 552 P.2d 425 ]; Emde v. San Joaquin County etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 154 [ 143 P.2d 20 , 150 A.L.R. 916 ].) Thus, the danger of a standard of propriety different from that established in Linn , is nonexistent if suit is brought in California. 1978(Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal.3d 596, 600 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 552 P.2d 425 ]; Emde v. San Joaquin County etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 154 [ 143 P.2d 20 , 150 A.L.R. 916 ].) Thus, the danger of a standard of propriety different from that established in Linn , is nonexistent if suit is brought in California. | 2 | 2 |
Emde v. San Joaquin County Central Labor Councilgreen2 sentences1978(Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal.3d 596, 600 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 552 P.2d 425 ]; Emde v. San Joaquin County etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 154 [ 143 P.2d 20 , 150 A.L.R. 916 ].) Thus, the danger of a standard of propriety different from that established in Linn , is nonexistent if suit is brought in California. 1978(Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal.3d 596, 600 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 641 , 552 P.2d 425 ]; Emde v. San Joaquin County etc. Council, 23 Cal.2d 146, 154 [ 143 P.2d 20 , 150 A.L.R. 916 ].) Thus, the danger of a standard of propriety different from that established in Linn , is nonexistent if suit is brought in California. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Falsettagreen2 sentences2000(Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [ 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-219 , 93 L.Ed. 168 ]; Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 181 [ 117 S.Ct. 644, 650-651 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 ]; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 630-631 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 775 , 685 P.2d 1126 ]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913-915 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d 182 ]; People v. Orellano, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Even when the trial court has screened the evidence under section 352, there is still a danger that the presumption of innocence will melt under the heat of emotions aroused 2000(Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [ 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-219 , 93 L.Ed. 168 ]; Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 181 [ 117 S.Ct. 644, 650-651 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 ]; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 630-631 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 775 , 685 P.2d 1126 ]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913-915 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d 182 ]; People v. Orellano, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Even when the trial court has screened the evidence under section 352, there is still a danger that the presumption of innocence will melt under the heat of emotions aroused | 1 | 2 |
Michelson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000(Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [ 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-219 , 93 L.Ed. 168 ]; Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 181 [ 117 S.Ct. 644, 650-651 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 ]; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 630-631 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 775 , 685 P.2d 1126 ]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913-915 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d 182 ]; People v. Orellano, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Even when the trial court has screened the evidence under section 352, there is still a danger that the presumption of innocence will melt under the heat of emotions aroused 2000(Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [ 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-219 , 93 L.Ed. 168 ]; Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 181 [ 117 S.Ct. 644, 650-651 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 ]; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 630-631 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 775 , 685 P.2d 1126 ]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913-915 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d 182 ]; People v. Orellano, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Even when the trial court has screened the evidence under section 352, there is still a danger that the presumption of innocence will melt under the heat of emotions aroused | 1 | 1 |
Old Chief v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000(Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [ 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-219 , 93 L.Ed. 168 ]; Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 181 [ 117 S.Ct. 644, 650-651 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 ]; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 630-631 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 775 , 685 P.2d 1126 ]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913-915 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d 182 ]; People v. Orellano, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Even when the trial court has screened the evidence under section 352, there is still a danger that the presumption of innocence will melt under the heat of emotions aroused 2000(Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [ 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-219 , 93 L.Ed. 168 ]; Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 181 [ 117 S.Ct. 644, 650-651 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 ]; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 630-631 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 775 , 685 P.2d 1126 ]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913-915 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d 182 ]; People v. Orellano, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Even when the trial court has screened the evidence under section 352, there is still a danger that the presumption of innocence will melt under the heat of emotions aroused | 1 | 1 |
People v. Orellanogreen1 sentence2000(Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [ 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-219 , 93 L.Ed. 168 ]; Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 181 [ 117 S.Ct. 644, 650-651 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 ]; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 630-631 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 775 , 685 P.2d 1126 ]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913-915 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d 182 ]; People v. Orellano, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Even when the trial court has screened the evidence under section 352, there is still a danger that the presumption of innocence will melt under the heat of emotions aroused | 1 | 1 |
People v. Alcalared2 sentences2000(Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [ 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-219 , 93 L.Ed. 168 ]; Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 181 [ 117 S.Ct. 644, 650-651 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 ]; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 630-631 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 775 , 685 P.2d 1126 ]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913-915 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d 182 ]; People v. Orellano, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Even when the trial court has screened the evidence under section 352, there is still a danger that the presumption of innocence will melt under the heat of emotions aroused 2000(Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [ 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-219 , 93 L.Ed. 168 ]; Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 181 [ 117 S.Ct. 644, 650-651 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 ]; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 630-631 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 775 , 685 P.2d 1126 ]; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913-915 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847 , 986 P.2d 182 ]; People v. Orellano, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 186.) Even when the trial court has screened the evidence under section 352, there is still a danger that the presumption of innocence will melt under the heat of emotions aroused | 1 | 1 |
Bollenbach v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992Because a judge presiding *557 over a trial necessarily has substantial influence on the jury ( Bollenbach v. United States (1946) 326 U.S. 607, 612 [ 90 L.Ed. 350, 354 , 66 S.Ct. 402 ]), every judicial comment on the evidence carries with it an appreciable risk that the jury may discount its own view of the evidence in deference to the judge's opinion. ( People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 407 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 159 , 658 P.2d 86 ].) Therefore, in the interest of protecting the right to jury trial while giving efficacy to our state Constitution's grant of authority to comment on the evidence, 1992Because a judge presiding *557 over a trial necessarily has substantial influence on the jury ( Bollenbach v. United States (1946) 326 U.S. 607, 612 [ 90 L.Ed. 350, 354 , 66 S.Ct. 402 ]), every judicial comment on the evidence carries with it an appreciable risk that the jury may discount its own view of the evidence in deference to the judge's opinion. ( People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 407 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 159 , 658 P.2d 86 ].) Therefore, in the interest of protecting the right to jury trial while giving efficacy to our state Constitution's grant of authority to comment on the evidence, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cookgreen2 sentences1992Because a judge presiding *557 over a trial necessarily has substantial influence on the jury ( Bollenbach v. United States (1946) 326 U.S. 607, 612 [ 90 L.Ed. 350, 354 , 66 S.Ct. 402 ]), every judicial comment on the evidence carries with it an appreciable risk that the jury may discount its own view of the evidence in deference to the judge's opinion. ( People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 407 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 159 , 658 P.2d 86 ].) Therefore, in the interest of protecting the right to jury trial while giving efficacy to our state Constitution's grant of authority to comment on the evidence, 1992Because a judge presiding *557 over a trial necessarily has substantial influence on the jury ( Bollenbach v. United States (1946) 326 U.S. 607, 612 [ 90 L.Ed. 350, 354 , 66 S.Ct. 402 ]), every judicial comment on the evidence carries with it an appreciable risk that the jury may discount its own view of the evidence in deference to the judge's opinion. ( People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 407 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 159 , 658 P.2d 86 ].) Therefore, in the interest of protecting the right to jury trial while giving efficacy to our state Constitution's grant of authority to comment on the evidence, | 1 | 1 |
Stovall v. Dennogreen2 sentences1980(Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 302 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206 ]; Foster v. California (1969) 394 U.S. 440, 443 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 402, 406 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 ].) Here, Mrs. S. was effectively told, “this is the man who molested your daughter’s friend.” The danger of error in identification is at its greatest when the police display only the picture of a single individual and it is heightened when the witness has indications that there is other evidence that the person in the photograph committed the crime. 1980(Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 302 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206 ]; Foster v. California (1969) 394 U.S. 440, 443 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 402, 406 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 ].) Here, Mrs. S. was effectively told, “this is the man who molested your daughter’s friend.” The danger of error in identification is at its greatest when the police display only the picture of a single individual and it is heightened when the witness has indications that there is other evidence that the person in the photograph committed the crime. | 1 | 1 |
Foster v. Californiagreen2 sentences1980(Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 302 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206 ]; Foster v. California (1969) 394 U.S. 440, 443 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 402, 406 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 ].) Here, Mrs. S. was effectively told, “this is the man who molested your daughter’s friend.” The danger of error in identification is at its greatest when the police display only the picture of a single individual and it is heightened when the witness has indications that there is other evidence that the person in the photograph committed the crime. 1980(Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 302 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206 ]; Foster v. California (1969) 394 U.S. 440, 443 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 402, 406 , 89 S.Ct. 1127 ].) Here, Mrs. S. was effectively told, “this is the man who molested your daughter’s friend.” The danger of error in identification is at its greatest when the police display only the picture of a single individual and it is heightened when the witness has indications that there is other evidence that the person in the photograph committed the crime. | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1980(Simmons v. United *181 States, supra, 390 U.S. 377, 383 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1252 ].) The extraordinary suggestiveness of this identification procedure raises considerable doubt that the prosecution would have been able to introduce Mrs. S.’s identification over a timely objection by defense counsel. 1980(Simmons v. United *181 States, supra, 390 U.S. 377, 383 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 1252 ].) The extraordinary suggestiveness of this identification procedure raises considerable doubt that the prosecution would have been able to introduce Mrs. S.’s identification over a timely objection by defense counsel. | 1 | 1 |
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridgegreen2 sentences1978However, in such instances, "the Court has required that, in the interests of uniform development of the law, state courts must apply federal law." Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, supra, 403 U.S. 274, 314 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 473, 499 ].) Accordingly, California had adopted the rule, enunciated in Linn , that the plaintiff, in order to make out a case for relief, in any action for defamation arising out of a labor dispute, must prove that the statement was made with malice and injured him. ( Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal.3d 596, 600 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 641 , 552 P.2d 425 ]; Emde v. San J 1978However, in such instances, "the Court has required that, in the interests of uniform development of the law, state courts must apply federal law." Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, supra, 403 U.S. 274, 314 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 473, 499 ].) Accordingly, California had adopted the rule, enunciated in Linn , that the plaintiff, in order to make out a case for relief, in any action for defamation arising out of a labor dispute, must prove that the statement was made with malice and injured him. ( Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal.3d 596, 600 [ 131 Cal. Rptr. 641 , 552 P.2d 425 ]; Emde v. San J | 1 | 1 |
People v. Westergreen2 sentences1975(People v. Wester (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 232, 238 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; People v. Hewitt (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 197, 199 [ 53 P.2d 365 ].) In Davis v. Erickson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 860 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 350 P.2d 535 ], we stated if a court recalls the jury for the purpose of reading unintentionally omitted instructions the danger that the instruction will be overemphasized may be avoided if the court admonishes the jury not to attach any particular emphasis to the fact that it is reading certain instructions which had been inadvertently omitted in its first reading or by rereading all the instructi 1975(People v. Wester (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 232, 238 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; People v. Hewitt (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 197, 199 [ 53 P.2d 365 ].) In Davis v. Erickson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 860 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 350 P.2d 535 ], we stated if a court recalls the jury for the purpose of reading unintentionally omitted instructions the danger that the instruction will be overemphasized may be avoided if the court admonishes the jury not to attach any particular emphasis to the fact that it is reading certain instructions which had been inadvertently omitted in its first reading or by rereading all the instructi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hewittgreen2 sentences1975(People v. Wester (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 232, 238 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; People v. Hewitt (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 197, 199 [ 53 P.2d 365 ].) In Davis v. Erickson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 860 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 350 P.2d 535 ], we stated if a court recalls the jury for the purpose of reading unintentionally omitted instructions the danger that the instruction will be overemphasized may be avoided if the court admonishes the jury not to attach any particular emphasis to the fact that it is reading certain instructions which had been inadvertently omitted in its first reading or by rereading all the instructi 1975(People v. Wester (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 232, 238 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; People v. Hewitt (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 197, 199 [ 53 P.2d 365 ].) In Davis v. Erickson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 860 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 350 P.2d 535 ], we stated if a court recalls the jury for the purpose of reading unintentionally omitted instructions the danger that the instruction will be overemphasized may be avoided if the court admonishes the jury not to attach any particular emphasis to the fact that it is reading certain instructions which had been inadvertently omitted in its first reading or by rereading all the instructi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Duffy v. City of Oceanside
green
1 sentence2024There is a serious danger that a warning will become a self-fulfilling prophecy, stigmatizing the parolee and causing him to be reminded he is not normal. [Citation.] We thus do not say that the decision to employ a parolee does not involve any risk but only that the benefits to be gained by warning of that risk do not outweigh the burdens thereby engendered.” (Duffy, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 674 .) Those burdens are also relevant here. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Cesar V.
green
2 sentences2022Since the danger that a challenge to fight creates, and that the Legislature intended to prohibit, is unaffected by the challenger’s subjective intent to actually cause a fight or his subjective belief that a fight will not occur or is unlikely to occur, no specific intent is required.” (In re Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989, 998-999 , fns. omitted.) Based on Detective Boisvert’s testimony that the question “Where are you from?” initiated a challenge to fight, the jury could reasonably conclude Ramirez committed a violation of section 415, subdivision (1). 2022Since the danger that a challenge to fight creates, and that the Legislature intended to prohibit, is unaffected by the challenger’s subjective intent to actually cause a fight or his subjective belief that a fight will not occur or is unlikely to occur, no specific intent is required.” (In re Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989, 998-999 , fns. omitted.) Based on Detective Boisvert’s testimony that the question “Where are you from?” initiated a challenge to fight, the jury could reasonably conclude Ramirez committed a violation of section 415, subdivision (1). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Wells
green
1 sentence2015L., supra, 529 U.S. at pages 273–274, applies when an anonymous tipster contemporaneously reports drunken or erratic driving on a public roadway and officers are able to corroborate significant innocent details of the tip, such as detailed descriptions of the vehicle and its location. ( Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1080–1081, 1087–1088; People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 464 .) In Wells, a California Highway Patrol officer received a dispatch report of a “possibly intoxicated driver ‘weaving all over the roadway’ ” in “a 1980’s model blue van traveling north on Highway 99 at Airport Dri | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Dolly
green
1 sentence2015L., supra, 529 U.S. at pages 273–274, applies when an anonymous tipster contemporaneously reports drunken or erratic driving on a public roadway and officers are able to corroborate significant innocent details of the tip, such as detailed descriptions of the vehicle and its location. ( Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1080–1081, 1087–1088; People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 464 .) In Wells, a California Highway Patrol officer received a dispatch report of a “possibly intoxicated driver ‘weaving all over the roadway’ ” in “a 1980’s model blue van traveling north on Highway 99 at Airport Dri | 1 | 2015–2015 |
County of Riverside v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2011(See County of Riverside, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 798-799 [noting requirement of background investigation prior to hiring]; id. at p. 805 [defining issue as whether an “applicant” can waive POBRA rights “with respect to a background investigation, while otherwise retaining” other rights under POBRA].) Thus the court focused on the anomalous conflation, in the case before it, of the county’s dual roles of prehiring investigator and posthiring “actuar employer. ( 27 Cal.4th at p. 805 , original italics.) Under such circumstances, the majority noted, there was the danger that a waiver of POBRA r 2011(See County of Riverside, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 798-799 [noting requirement of background investigation prior to hiring]; id. at p. 805 [defining issue as whether an “applicant” can waive POBRA rights “with respect to a background investigation, while otherwise retaining” other rights under POBRA].) Thus the court focused on the anomalous conflation, in the case before it, of the county’s dual roles of prehiring investigator and posthiring “actuar employer. ( 27 Cal.4th at p. 805 , original italics.) Under such circumstances, the majority noted, there was the danger that a waiver of POBRA r | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Brown
green
2 sentences1988(People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512 ; People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1277 .) This danger becomes even more serious when the prosecutor gives false weight to the case in aggravation by arguing that lack of evidence in mitigation should be weighed in aggravation. 1988It is settled that there is a danger that an instruction in the apparently mandatory language of Penal Code section 190.3 will cause jurors to think that they must weigh aggravating against mitigating circumstances without *583 regard to their personal view as to the appropriate penalty, and impose the death penalty despite a personal conviction that the penalty is not appropriate in the particular case. ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512 ; People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1277 .) This danger becomes even more serious when the prosecutor gives false weight to the case in aggravatio | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Allen
green
2 sentences1988(People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512 ; People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1277 .) This danger becomes even more serious when the prosecutor gives false weight to the case in aggravation by arguing that lack of evidence in mitigation should be weighed in aggravation. 1988It is settled that there is a danger that an instruction in the apparently mandatory language of Penal Code section 190.3 will cause jurors to think that they must weigh aggravating against mitigating circumstances without *583 regard to their personal view as to the appropriate penalty, and impose the death penalty despite a personal conviction that the penalty is not appropriate in the particular case. ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512 ; People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1277 .) This danger becomes even more serious when the prosecutor gives false weight to the case in aggravatio | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.
green
2 sentences1987Whether a person owes a duty of care to another person is a question of law. ( Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40 , 46 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ].) However, foreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration in determining the element of duty. 1987Whether a person owes a duty of care to another person is a question of law. ( Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40 , 46 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ].) However, foreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration in determining the element of duty. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Lakeside v. Oregon
green
2 sentences1987If he declines to object any prejudice is speculative since it is possible that the instruction actually worked to the defendant’s advantage.” (Id.) Finally, we note that the United States Supreme Court has held that it is not error to give a cautionary instruction—even in the face of the defendant’s objection. 8 (Lakeside v. Oregon (1978) 435 U.S. 333 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 319 , 98 S.Ct. 1091 ].) The court observed, “[t]he petitioners’ argument would require indulgence in two very doubtful assumptions: First, that the jurors have not noticed that the defendant did not testify and will not, therefore, 1987If he declines to object any prejudice is speculative since it is possible that the instruction actually worked to the defendant’s advantage.” (Id.) Finally, we note that the United States Supreme Court has held that it is not error to give a cautionary instruction—even in the face of the defendant’s objection. 8 (Lakeside v. Oregon (1978) 435 U.S. 333 [ 55 L.Ed.2d 319 , 98 S.Ct. 1091 ].) The court observed, “[t]he petitioners’ argument would require indulgence in two very doubtful assumptions: First, that the jurors have not noticed that the defendant did not testify and will not, therefore, | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Thompson v. County of Alameda
green
1 sentence1986(See Thompson v. County of Alameda, supra, 27 Cal. 3d at p. 757 .) We thus do not say that the decision to employ a parolee does not involve any risk but only that the benefits to be gained by warning of that risk do not outweigh the burdens thereby engendered. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Aden v. Younger
green
2 sentences1986(Ad en v. Younger, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d at p. 672 .) Berkeley Ordinance 5504, by criminalizing the use of ECT in all cases, clearly infringes on the free choice of psychiatric patients who voluntarily and competently elect ECT, contrary to the express intent of the Legislature that “the integrity and free choice of every such patient [be] fully recognized and protected.” (Stats. 1976, ch. 1109, § 1, p. 4992, italics added.) In light of this legislative history and the decision in Aden v. Younger, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d 662 , we conclude that the total ban on ECT contained *106 in Berkeley’s Ordi 1986(Ad en v. Younger, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d at p. 672 .) Berkeley Ordinance 5504, by criminalizing the use of ECT in all cases, clearly infringes on the free choice of psychiatric patients who voluntarily and competently elect ECT, contrary to the express intent of the Legislature that “the integrity and free choice of every such patient [be] fully recognized and protected.” (Stats. 1976, ch. 1109, § 1, p. 4992, italics added.) In light of this legislative history and the decision in Aden v. Younger, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d 662 , we conclude that the total ban on ECT contained *106 in Berkeley’s Ordi | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Davis v. Erickson
green
2 sentences1975(People v. Wester (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 232, 238 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; People v. Hewitt (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 197, 199 [ 53 P.2d 365 ].) In Davis v. Erickson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 860 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 350 P.2d 535 ], we stated if a court recalls the jury for the purpose of reading unintentionally omitted instructions the danger that the instruction will be overemphasized may be avoided if the court admonishes the jury not to attach any particular emphasis to the fact that it is reading certain instructions which had been inadvertently omitted in its first reading or by rereading all the instructi 1975(People v. Wester (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 232, 238 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 699 ]; People v. Hewitt (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 197, 199 [ 53 P.2d 365 ].) In Davis v. Erickson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 860 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 350 P.2d 535 ], we stated if a court recalls the jury for the purpose of reading unintentionally omitted instructions the danger that the instruction will be overemphasized may be avoided if the court admonishes the jury not to attach any particular emphasis to the fact that it is reading certain instructions which had been inadvertently omitted in its first reading or by rereading all the instructi | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Goncalves v. Los Banos Mining Co. green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Strnod v. Abadie green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Sholar v. Barker green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Scragg v. Sallee green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Zibbell v. Southern Pacific Co. green | 1 | 1917–1917 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.