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7 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1962–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texsun Feed Yards, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross v. Ralston Purina Company, Defendant-Appellant-Crossgreen2 sentences1977Friedman, 2 Products Liability § 16.01[4] at 3-39 (1976): “Contributory negligence in the sense of an unreasonable use of a product after discovery of the defect and the danger is a defense.” See also Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Company, 447 F.2d 660, 668-669 (5th Cir. 1971). 1977Friedman, 2 Products Liability § 16.01[4] at 3-39 (1976): "Contributory negligence in the sense of an unreasonable use of a product after discovery of the defect and the danger is a defense." See also Texsun Feed Yards, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Company, 447 F.2d 660, 668-669 (5th Cir. 1971). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Drichas v. State
green
2 sentences2018The court of criminal appeals stated that the lower court “misconstrued the actual danger requirement by equating a deadly weapon’s capability of causing death or serious bodily injury with its probability of doing [so], thus reading into the statute an additional requirement of evasive action or zone of danger.” Id. 799–800 (emphasis in original). 2018“Specific intent to use a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon is not required.” Id. at 798 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cura-Cruz v. CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC
green
1 sentence2018“This ‘commensurate with the danger’ standard does not impose a higher duty of care; rather, it more fully defines what ordinary care is under the facts presented.” Cura-Cruz, 522 S.W.3d at 570 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Magro v. Ragsdale Brothers, Inc.
green
1 sentence1999See General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 358 , 359 (Tex.1993); Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., 721 S.W.2d 832 (Tex.1986). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
West Texas Utilities Co. v. Renner
green
1 sentence1991We think that the proper resolution of this issue in the case before us was stated by the court in Wendell when it said, “However, this ‘commensurate with the danger’ standard does not impose a higher duty of care, it merely more fully defines what is ordinary care under the facts presented” and by the court in West Texas Utilities Co. v. Renner, 53 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Comm’n App.1932, holding approved), when it said, “[T]he meaning of the common-law rule of ordinary care is elastic enough to meet all emergencies; the amount of care depends upon the exigency confronted.” As authority for the use o | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Robert R. Walker, Inc. v. Burgdorf
green
1 sentence1991Walker v. Burgdorf, 150 Tex. 603 , 244 S.W.2d 506 (1951). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Robert R. Walker, Inc. v. Burgdorf
green
1 sentence1991Walker v. Burgdorf, 150 Tex. 603 , 244 S.W.2d 506 (1951). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks
green
2 sentences1971Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Sup.— 1967); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., supra. It would be inconsistent to impose on the plaintiff the burden of procuring a jury finding as to the causal connection between the seller’s failure to give warning and his injury, which finding would necessarily include a finding that the plaintiff would have discovered the danger if warning had been given. 1971Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Sup.— 1967); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., supra. It would be inconsistent to impose on the plaintiff the burden of procuring a jury finding as to the causal connection between the seller's failure to give warning and his injury, which finding would necessarily include a finding that the plaintiff would have discovered the danger if warning had been given. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
City of Fort Worth v. Barlow
green
1 sentence1962City of Fort Worth v. Barlow, Tex.Civ.App., 313 S.W.2d 906 (NRE) and the cases there cited. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.