publication rule in California

2020To satisfy the publication requirement, a plaintiff must show the statement was communicated “to some third person who understands the defamatory meaning of the statement and its application to the person to whom reference is made.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645 ; Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1242 .) As the trial court concluded, plaintiffs did not “provide any evidence of extrinsic circumstances which show that [Durbin] understood [the alleged 9 statement] in that derogatory sense” and it was undisputed that Durbin “did not understand the statement as alleg

2014(See Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1251 [all causes of action based on publication of allegedly defamatory material barred by statute of limitations under the single publication rule]; Long v. Walt Disney Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 868, 870, 874-875 [all causes of action based on alleged appropriation of likenesses barred by statute of limitations].) Respondents are unable to show a probability of prevailing on the merits because their appropriation causes of action are untimely.

2016(See Strick v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 916, 922-923 [discussing the rule’s application to causes of action for negligence, fraud, and deceit when, in substance, they are actions for defamation]; see also Gilbreath, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 404 [applying the rule to statements on the internet].) Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of showing a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of her claim under step 2 because the causes of action forming her claim fall within the scope of the single publication rule, and her claim thus expired one year after the statements at iss

2016(See Strick v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 916, 922-923 [discussing the rule’s application to causes of action for negligence, fraud, and deceit when, in substance, they are actions for defamation]; see also Gilbreath, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 404 [applying the rule to statements on the internet].) Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of showing a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of her claim under step 2 because the causes of action forming her claim fall within the scope of the single publication rule, and her claim thus expired one year after the statements at iss

2021(See Christoff, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 482 , quoting Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co. (1st Cir. 1962) 300 F.2d 256, 260 [“ ‘Whether the single publication rule should be applied to the circumstances of this case had best be decided when we know what they were.’ ”].) That said, on remand, the parties would be well advised 55 to consider how Christoff, Belli, and Kanarek relate to the specific production of product labels at issue here and fashion a republication jury instruction accordingly.

2009(Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co. (1st Cir. 1962) 300 F.2d 256, 260 [“Whether the single publication rule should be applied to the circumstances of this case had best be decided when we know what they were.”].) The parties did not have a reason or an opportunity to present such evidence in light of the trial court’s erroneous ruling that the single-publication rule did not apply to claims for misappropriation of likeness.

2016(See Strick v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 916, 922-923 [discussing the rule’s application to causes of action for negligence, fraud, and deceit when, in substance, they are actions for defamation]; see also Gilbreath, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 404 [applying the rule to statements on the internet].) Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of showing a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits of her claim under step 2 because the causes of action forming her claim fall within the scope of the single publication rule, and her claim thus expired one year after the statements at iss

2015(Strick v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 916, 924 [applying statute to determine when the statute of limitations accrues for causes of action for libel, fraud, and deceit based on the publication of a magazine article]; see also McGuiness v. Motor Trend Magazine (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 59, 63 [applying statute to cause of action for negligence]; Baugh v. CBS, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 1993) 828 F.Supp. 745, 756 [applying statute to claims including unfair competition, fraud, and infliction of emotional distress to the extent based on the broadcast of information about plaintiff].) Allen’s citation t

2021(Christoff, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 483, fn. 2 [conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.].) 49 (Christoff, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 485 [conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.].) She then noted that when a publisher set up a “more or less automated system for printing and distributing an item . . . and does not make a separate publishing decision as to each copy or small batch of copies, to call each such distribution a new ‘issue’ of the material would defeat the purposes of the single publication rule.” (Ibid.) Yet, she believed a republication would occur and thus a new cause of action accrue “where a publication has

2021(Christoff, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 483, fn. 2 [conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.].) 49 (Christoff, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 485 [conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.].) She then noted that when a publisher set up a “more or less automated system for printing and distributing an item . . . and does not make a separate publishing decision as to each copy or small batch of copies, to call each such distribution a new ‘issue’ of the material would defeat the purposes of the single publication rule.” (Ibid.) Yet, she believed a republication would occur and thus a new cause of action accrue “where a publication has

2016(See, e.g., Long v. Walt Disney Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 868 , 872- 874 [holding under the single publication rule that the plaintiffs could not circumvent statutory limitations by proceeding on theories other than defamation, where their causes of action, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, arose from allegedly defamatory broadcasts and related internet activity].) Plaintiff showed only that the 11 To the extent this phrasing may be interpreted to mean that defendant repeated the statements by reposting them on separate occasions, not only is the phrasing an awkward and

2014(See Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1251 [all causes of action based on publication of allegedly defamatory material barred by statute of limitations under the single publication rule]; Long v. Walt Disney Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 868, 870, 874-875 [all causes of action based on alleged appropriation of likenesses barred by statute of limitations].) Respondents are unable to show a probability of prevailing on the merits because their appropriation causes of action are untimely.

2016(See Keeton, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 777 .) To prevent the extraordinary burden on courts and litigants of having a defamation plaintiff sue separately in 50 states—and to allow effective application of a statute of limitations for publications that continue or recur over lengthy periods—most states have adopted the single publication rule, allowing only a single action per publication, but one in which all damages from the publication may be recovered.

2016(See Keeton, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 777.) To prevent the extraordinary burden on courts and litigants of having a defamation plaintiff sue separately in 50 states—and to allow effective application of a statute of limitations for publications that continue or recur over lengthy periods—most states have adopted the single publication rule, allowing only a single action per publication, but one in which all damages from the publication may be recovered.

2015(Traditional Cat, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 398-399.) 15 868, (2004); Roberts v. McAfee, Inc. (9th Cir. 2011) 660 F.3d 1156, 1167 [collecting cases].) Allen’s citation to Hellar v. Bianco (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 424 , an inapplicable case that predates the codification of the single publication rule in California (not to mention the Internet) does not support his claim.

2015(See Roberts v. McAfee, Inc., supra, 660 F.3d at p. 1168 (noting that Hellar does not “address[] the definition of republication; indeed, [it does not] address[] the single-publication rule at all”).) Likewise, Allen’s unsupported suggestions that the “length of time the Defendants keep the Articles posted . . . determines the number of republications” and that length of time is a “question of fact for the jury” are contrary to authority, as discussed above.

2015(Strick v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 916, 924 [applying statute to determine when the statute of limitations accrues for causes of action for libel, fraud, and deceit based on the publication of a magazine article]; see also McGuiness v. Motor Trend Magazine (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 59, 63 [applying statute to cause of action for negligence]; Baugh v. CBS, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 1993) 828 F.Supp. 745, 756 [applying statute to claims including unfair competition, fraud, and infliction of emotional distress to the extent based on the broadcast of information about plaintiff].) Allen’s citation t

2015(Strick v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 916, 924 [applying statute to determine when the statute of limitations accrues for causes of action for libel, fraud, and deceit based on the publication of a magazine article]; see also McGuiness v. Motor Trend Magazine (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 59, 63 [applying statute to cause of action for negligence]; Baugh v. CBS, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 1993) 828 F.Supp. 745, 756 [applying statute to claims including unfair competition, fraud, and infliction of emotional distress to the extent based on the broadcast of information about plaintiff].) Allen’s citation t

2014(Ibid.; see Cabesuela, supra, at p. 112 ; Van-Go Transport v. New York City Bd. of Educ.

2014(See NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1231 (NBCUniversal) [“Generally, the limitations period starts running 13 when the last element of a cause of action is complete.”].) Kinney did not file suit until July 2012. “‘Under the single-publication rule, with respect to the statute of limitations, publication generally is said to occur on the “first general distribution of the publication to the public.” [Citations.]’”4 (Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v. Gilbreath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 401 .) “The single publication rule applies to Internet publication rega

2014(See NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1231 (NBCUniversal) [“Generally, the limitations period starts running 13 when the last element of a cause of action is complete.”].) Kinney did not file suit until July 2012. “‘Under the single-publication rule, with respect to the statute of limitations, publication generally is said to occur on the “first general distribution of the publication to the public.” [Citations.]’”4 (Traditional Cat Assn., Inc. v. Gilbreath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 401 .) “The single publication rule applies to Internet publication rega

2014In addition, the record indicates that Kinney’s profile was not republished but was merely moved to a section of the website entitled “Article Archives,” which allows the reader “to search all of the articles that are no longer published on the main site.” We conclude that removing the date and moving the profile to the archives section of BCG’s website was not sufficient to constitute a republication of the article. 4 The single publication rule is codified in Civil Code section 3425.3 and provides in part: “No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or slander o

1997Code, §§8110, 8120; Estate of Buckley (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 434, 449 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 281 ] [“[T]he Legislature has apparently determined that because the court seeks to bind the world by its judgment, the publication requirement is vital.”].) Code of Civil Procedure section 1420 et seq. authorizes the Attorney General to commence a proceeding to obtain a judgment that the state is entitled to unclaimed property by reason of an escheat.

1997Code, §§8110, 8120; Estate of Buckley (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 434, 449 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 281 ] [“[T]he Legislature has apparently determined that because the court seeks to bind the world by its judgment, the publication requirement is vital.”].) Code of Civil Procedure section 1420 et seq. authorizes the Attorney General to commence a proceeding to obtain a judgment that the state is entitled to unclaimed property by reason of an escheat.

1986This court can find no reason why a similar rule should not be extended to claims of false light."]; Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath (Supreme Ct. 1947) 188 Misc. 479 [ 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, 785 ] [The doctrine that equity will not enjoin publication of a libel also precludes an injunction sought on a theory of false light invasion of privacy]; Fouts v. Fawcett Publications (D.Conn. 1953) 116 F. Supp. 535, 537 ["[T]he only reasonable conclusion is that any State which adopts the single publication rule for purposes of the tort of libel, would also adopt it and apply it, with the same test as to

1986This court can find no reason why a similar rule should not be extended to claims of false light.”]; Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath (Supreme Ct. 1947) 188 Misc. 479 [ 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, 785 ] [The doctrine that equity will not enjoin publication of a libel also precludes an injunction sought on a theory of false light invasion of privacy]; Fouts v. Fawcett Publications (D.Conn. 1953) 116 F.Supp. 535, 537 [“[T]he only reasonable conclusion is that any State which adopts the single publication rule for purposes of the tort of libel, would also adopt it and apply it, with the same test as to