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25 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C.green2 sentences2020We do not address whether dismissal, rather than a stay, would be proper in such a circumstance, see 14 M.R.S. § 5928(4) (2020); we note the issue only to explain why the pendency of the motion to dismiss did not obviate resolution of the factual dispute regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement. 5 court deems it necessary, a period of limited discovery followed by adjudication pursuant to a summary judgment standard or even, should a genuine dispute remain, a testimonial hearing.4 See Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 773-76 (3d Cir. 2013). 2020We do not address whether dismissal, rather than a stay, would be proper in such a circumstance, see 14 M.R.S. § 5928(4) (2020); we note the issue only to explain why the pendency of the motion to dismiss did not obviate resolution of the factual dispute regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement. 5 court deems it necessary, a period of limited discovery followed by adjudication pursuant to a summary judgment standard or even, should a genuine dispute remain, a testimonial hearing.4 See Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 773-76 (3d Cir. 2013). | 3 | 3 |
Josefine Bahn v. Mark Smallgreen2 sentences2026See Bahn, 2019 ME 69, ¶¶ 2, 7-8 , 207 A.3d 1211 (vacating an order enforcing a settlement agreement and remanding for a testimonial hearing as to the existence of an agreement and its substance because the record contained insufficient evidence, even though the court previously “stated on the record that an agreement was reached on all points”); Marie, 2008 ME 73, ¶¶ 8-10 , 946 A.2d 418 . 2026See Bahn, 2019 ME 69, ¶¶ 2, 7-8 , 207 A.3d 1211 (vacating an order enforcing a settlement agreement and remanding for a testimonial hearing as to the existence of an agreement and its substance because the record contained insufficient evidence, even though the court previously “stated on the record that an agreement was reached on all points”); Marie, 2008 ME 73, ¶¶ 8-10 , 946 A.2d 418 . | 1 | 1 |
Boyd v. Mantergreen1 sentence2021See Boyd v. Manter, 2018 ME 25, ¶ 9 , 179 A.3d 906 . | 1 | 1 |
Melanie G. Boyd v. Edward W. Mantergreen1 sentence2021See Boyd v. Manter, 2018 ME 25, ¶ 9 , 179 A.3d 906 . | 1 | 1 |
Franks v. Delawaregreen2 sentences2016See State v. Diana, 2014 ME 45 , ¶ 11 n.1, 89 A.3d 132 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978)). 10 . 2016See State v. Diana, 2014 ME 45 , ¶ 11 n.1, 89 A.3d 132 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978)). 10 . | 1 | 1 |
State of Maine v. Arnold A. Dianagreen2 sentences2016See State v. Diana, 2014 ME 45 , ¶ 11 n.1, 89 A.3d 132 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978)). 10 . 2016See State v. Diana, 2014 ME 45 , ¶ 11 n.1, 89 A.3d 132 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978)). 10 . | 1 | 1 |
Matthew W. Pitts v. Amanda M. Mooregreen2 sentences2016Such a third-party petitioner is therefore required to attest, from the outset of the litigation, to the sufficiency of his or her relationship with the child or to some other extraordinary circumstance.5 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1803(2), 1891(2); see Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 35 , 90 A.3d 1169 ; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30 , 761 A.2d 291 . 5 Standing may be determined based only on the affidavit, or after a testimonial hearing at which only the issue of standing is considered. 2016Such a third-party petitioner is therefore required to attest, from the outset of the litigation, to the sufficiency of his or her relationship with the child or to some other extraordinary circumstance.5 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1803(2), 1891(2); see Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 35 , 90 A.3d 1169 ; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30 , 761 A.2d 291 . 5 Standing may be determined based only on the affidavit, or after a testimonial hearing at which only the issue of standing is considered. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mikulewiczgreen1 sentence2003It is well established in Maine law that a statement which is voluntary and therefore-admissible in evidence is one that “results from the free choice of a rational mind, if it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all the circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair.” State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1 , J 10, 704 A.2d 387, 390-91 (quoting State v. Mikulewicz; 462 A.2d 497, 501 (Me. 1983)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Coombsgreen2 sentences2003It is well established in Maine law that a statement which is voluntary and therefore-admissible in evidence is one that “results from the free choice of a rational mind, if it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all the circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair.” State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1 , J 10, 704 A.2d 387, 390-91 (quoting State v. Mikulewicz; 462 A.2d 497, 501 (Me. 1983)). 2003It is well established in Maine law that a statement which is voluntary and therefore-admissible in evidence is one that “results from the free choice of a rational mind, if it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all the circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair.” State v. Coombs, 1998 ME 1 , J 10, 704 A.2d 387, 390-91 (quoting State v. Mikulewicz; 462 A.2d 497, 501 (Me. 1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Baker's Table, Inc. v. City of Portlandgreen2 sentences2002See Baker's Table, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2000 ME 7 , { 11, n.6, 743 A.2d 237, 241 ; Underwood v. City of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166 , { 23, 715 A.2d 148, 155 . 2002See Baker's Table, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2000 ME 7 , { 11, n.6, 743 A.2d 237, 241 ; Underwood v. City of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166 , { 23, 715 A.2d 148, 155 . | 1 | 1 |
Gagne v. Cianbro Corp.green1 sentence1997Cf. Gagne v. Cianbro, 431 A.2d 1313, 1317 (Me.1981) (affirming reinstatement of a zoning board appeal pursuant to Keating when plaintiffs immediately instituted suit on discovery of construction activity indicating the existence of a modified building permit eight months after it had been issued). | 1 | 1 |
Trans Coastal Corp. v. Curtisgreen1 sentence1993This is our first opportunity to address the question whether the failure to hold a testimonial hearing on a motion to dismiss an order authorizing an ex parte attachment constitutes clear error. “[A] motion to dissolve [an] ex parte attachment is treated as the equivalent of a contested motion for attachment after notice, with ... the party seeking attachment *1010 having the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence its entitlement to recovery of an amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment.” Trans Coastal Corp. v. Curtis, 622 A.2d 1186, 1188-89 (Me.1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Casalegreen2 sentences1993In short, a full testimonial hearing would have provided the trial court with a more complete factual basis than the cold pages of an expert’s affidavit, and accompanying photographs, on which to base its ultimate decision on the motion for a new trial pursuant to the criteria set forth in State v. Casale, 148 Me. 312, 319-20 , 92 A.2d 718, 722 (1952). 1993In short, a full testimonial hearing would have provided the trial court with a more complete factual basis than the cold pages of an expert’s affidavit, and accompanying photographs, on which to base its ultimate decision on the motion for a new trial pursuant to the criteria set forth in State v. Casale, 148 Me. 312, 319-20 , 92 A.2d 718, 722 (1952). | 1 | 1 |
| Storer Communications, Inc. v. Giovangreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Mrs. Mgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2016Eaton v. Paradis, 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8 n.5, 91 A.3d 590 ; Davis v. Anderson, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 17 , 953 A.2d 1166 . 6 . 2016Eaton v. Paradis, 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8 n.5, 91 A.3d 590 ; Davis v. Anderson, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 17 , 953 A.2d 1166 . 6 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
James R. Eaton v. Kelly L. Paradis
green
2 sentences2016Eaton v. Paradis, 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8 n.5, 91 A.3d 590 ; Davis v. Anderson, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 17 , 953 A.2d 1166 . 6 . 2016Eaton v. Paradis, 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8 n.5, 91 A.3d 590 ; Davis v. Anderson, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 17 , 953 A.2d 1166 . 6 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Marie v. Renner
green
2 sentences2026See Bahn, 2019 ME 69, ¶¶ 2, 7-8 , 207 A.3d 1211 (vacating an order enforcing a settlement agreement and remanding for a testimonial hearing as to the existence of an agreement and its substance because the record contained insufficient evidence, even though the court previously “stated on the record that an agreement was reached on all points”); Marie, 2008 ME 73, ¶¶ 8-10 , 946 A.2d 418 . 2026See Bahn, 2019 ME 69, ¶¶ 2, 7-8 , 207 A.3d 1211 (vacating an order enforcing a settlement agreement and remanding for a testimonial hearing as to the existence of an agreement and its substance because the record contained insufficient evidence, even though the court previously “stated on the record that an agreement was reached on all points”); Marie, 2008 ME 73, ¶¶ 8-10 , 946 A.2d 418 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Concord General Mutual Insurance v. Northern Assurance Co.
green
2 sentences2021It stated that a "party is not entitled to a testimonial hearing on a motion to vacate or to confirm an arbitration award in the absence of a showing that such a hearing will disclose relevant facts not otherwise before the court in affidavit form." Id. 4 See Arbitrator's Order Dete1mining Attorney's Fees and Costs at 5; Arbitrator's Final Award at 12, 16. 5 Civil Rule 43(e) provides that "[w]hen a motion is based on facts not appearing ofrecord the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the comt may direct that the matter heard wholly or partly in ora 2021It stated that a "party is not entitled to a testimonial hearing on a motion to vacate or to confirm an arbitration award in the absence of a showing that such a hearing will disclose relevant facts not otherwise before the court in affidavit form." Id. 4 See Arbitrator's Order Dete1mining Attorney's Fees and Costs at 5; Arbitrator's Final Award at 12, 16. 5 Civil Rule 43(e) provides that "[w]hen a motion is based on facts not appearing ofrecord the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the comt may direct that the matter heard wholly or partly in ora | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re Patricia S.
green
1 sentence2019P. 43(e) (“When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.”); Randall v. Conley, 2010 ME 68, ¶¶ 18-19 , 2 A.3d 328 (“We review the court’s decision not to hear testimony only for abuse of discretion.” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶40] We conclude that the MPA plainly and unambiguously does not require a testimonial hearing in every case before a court may properly adjudicate parentage based on a genetic tes | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Randall v. Conley
green
2 sentences2019P. 43(e) (“When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.”); Randall v. Conley, 2010 ME 68, ¶¶ 18-19 , 2 A.3d 328 (“We review the court’s decision not to hear testimony only for abuse of discretion.” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶40] We conclude that the MPA plainly and unambiguously does not require a testimonial hearing in every case before a court may properly adjudicate parentage based on a genetic tes 2019P. 43(e) (“When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.”); Randall v. Conley, 2010 ME 68, ¶¶ 18-19 , 2 A.3d 328 (“We review the court’s decision not to hear testimony only for abuse of discretion.” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶40] We conclude that the MPA plainly and unambiguously does not require a testimonial hearing in every case before a court may properly adjudicate parentage based on a genetic tes | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In re Patricia S.
green
1 sentence2019P. 43(e) (“When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.”); Randall v. Conley, 2010 ME 68, ¶¶ 18-19 , 2 A.3d 328 (“We review the court’s decision not to hear testimony only for abuse of discretion.” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶40] We conclude that the MPA plainly and unambiguously does not require a testimonial hearing in every case before a court may properly adjudicate parentage based on a genetic tes | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Morin v. Maine Education Ass'n
green
1 sentence2018Id. iT 6. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Rideout v. Riendeau
green
2 sentences2016Such a third-party petitioner is therefore required to attest, from the outset of the litigation, to the sufficiency of his or her relationship with the child or to some other extraordinary circumstance.5 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1803(2), 1891(2); see Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 35 , 90 A.3d 1169 ; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30 , 761 A.2d 291 . 5 Standing may be determined based only on the affidavit, or after a testimonial hearing at which only the issue of standing is considered. 2016Such a third-party petitioner is therefore required to attest, from the outset of the litigation, to the sufficiency of his or her relationship with the child or to some other extraordinary circumstance.5 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1803(2), 1891(2); see Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 35 , 90 A.3d 1169 ; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30 , 761 A.2d 291 . 5 Standing may be determined based only on the affidavit, or after a testimonial hearing at which only the issue of standing is considered. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Patrick T. Jackson III v. Sally A. (Jackson) Macleod
green
2 sentences2015The court’s ultimate decision to grant a motion to modify is reviewed for “an abuse of discretion or an error of law.” Id. ¶26. [¶ 5] A parent who moves for a modification of parental rights “must demonstrate that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the previous decree and that the modification is in the best interests of the children as determined through an analysis of the factors in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).” Jackson v. MacLeod, 2014 ME 110, ¶ 21 , 100 A.3d 484 . 2015The court’s ultimate decision to grant a motion to modify is reviewed for “an abuse of discretion or an error of law.” Id. ¶26. [¶ 5] A parent who moves for a modification of parental rights “must demonstrate that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the previous decree and that the modification is in the best interests of the children as determined through an analysis of the factors in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).” Jackson v. MacLeod, 2014 ME 110, ¶ 21 , 100 A.3d 484 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Sloan v. Christianson
green
2 sentences2015After a testimonial hearing, the court granted the motion in a written order, and Pearson appealed. [¶ 4] We review the trial court’s findings of fact in an order modifying parental rights and responsibilities for clear error, and “will vacate the judgment only if no competent evidence exists in the record to support it.” Sloan v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 25 , 43 A.3d 978 (quotation marks omitted). 2015After a testimonial hearing, the court granted the motion in a written order, and Pearson appealed. [¶ 4] We review the trial court’s findings of fact in an order modifying parental rights and responsibilities for clear error, and “will vacate the judgment only if no competent evidence exists in the record to support it.” Sloan v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 25 , 43 A.3d 978 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Underwood v. City of Presque Isle
green
2 sentences2002See Baker's Table, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2000 ME 7 , { 11, n.6, 743 A.2d 237, 241 ; Underwood v. City of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166 , { 23, 715 A.2d 148, 155 . 2002See Baker's Table, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2000 ME 7 , { 11, n.6, 743 A.2d 237, 241 ; Underwood v. City of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166 , { 23, 715 A.2d 148, 155 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Doucette v. Washburn
green
2 sentences2001Id. [¶ 8] Mylon contends that the District Court erred in not holding a testimonial hearing and in finding that Ann is entitled to fifty percent of Mylon's pension as of the date of his retirement. [1] Mylon several times expressed to the court that testimony was unnecessary, and it was at his urging that the court decided not to hear testimony. 2001Id. [¶ 8] Mylon contends that the District Court erred in not holding a testimonial hearing and in finding that Ann is entitled to fifty percent of Mylon’s pension as of the date of his retirement. 1 Mylon several times expressed to the court that testimony was unnecessary, and it was at his urging that the court decided not to hear testimony. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
1 sentence2001In the defendant's memorandum, he confines himself to a single challenge that, "The continued detention of Mr. Daigneault after the time necessary for officers to investigate and complete the accident report was unreasonable and exceeded the scope of intrusion allowed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)." He argues that the reason for the initial detention had long dissipated by the time the canine unit had arrived and that no reasonable or articulable suspicion arose during the detention that would indicate that the defendant possessed drugs in his vehicle. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Maine v. Moulton
green
2 sentences1997In his motion in limine York objected to the admission of the recorded information citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 , 106 S.Ct. 477 , 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel violated in case in which police informant used body wire to record conversation with the defendant after the defendant’s right to counsel had attached). 1997In his motion in limine York objected to the admission of the recorded information citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 , 106 S.Ct. 477 , 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel violated in case in which police informant used body wire to record conversation with the defendant after the defendant’s right to counsel had attached). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Walker
green
1 sentence1993The trial court refused to conduct a full testimonial hearing under the authority of State v. Walker, 510 A.2d 1064 (Me.1986); and, after an offer of proof was made by the defendants, denied their motion for a new trial. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
ATLANTIC HEATING COMPANY, INC. v. Lavin
green
1 sentence1993Atlantic Heating, 572 A.2d at 479 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Branzburg v. Hayes green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Fuentes v. Shevin green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Bossie v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Baker Bus Service v. Keith green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.