testimonial hearing in Maine

2016Eaton v. Paradis, 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8 n.5, 91 A.3d 590 ; Davis v. Anderson, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 17 , 953 A.2d 1166 . 6 .

2016Eaton v. Paradis, 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8 n.5, 91 A.3d 590 ; Davis v. Anderson, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 17 , 953 A.2d 1166 . 6 .

2016Eaton v. Paradis, 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8 n.5, 91 A.3d 590 ; Davis v. Anderson, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 17 , 953 A.2d 1166 . 6 .

2016Eaton v. Paradis, 2014 ME 61 , ¶ 8 n.5, 91 A.3d 590 ; Davis v. Anderson, 2008 ME 125, ¶ 17 , 953 A.2d 1166 . 6 .

2021It stated that a "party is not entitled to a testimonial hearing on a motion to vacate or to confirm an arbitration award in the absence of a showing that such a hearing will disclose relevant facts not otherwise before the court in affidavit form." Id. 4 See Arbitrator's Order Dete1mining Attorney's Fees and Costs at 5; Arbitrator's Final Award at 12, 16. 5 Civil Rule 43(e) provides that "[w]hen a motion is based on facts not appearing ofrecord the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the comt may direct that the matter heard wholly or partly in ora

2021It stated that a "party is not entitled to a testimonial hearing on a motion to vacate or to confirm an arbitration award in the absence of a showing that such a hearing will disclose relevant facts not otherwise before the court in affidavit form." Id. 4 See Arbitrator's Order Dete1mining Attorney's Fees and Costs at 5; Arbitrator's Final Award at 12, 16. 5 Civil Rule 43(e) provides that "[w]hen a motion is based on facts not appearing ofrecord the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the comt may direct that the matter heard wholly or partly in ora

2019P. 43(e) (“When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.”); Randall v. Conley, 2010 ME 68, ¶¶ 18-19 , 2 A.3d 328 (“We review the court’s decision not to hear testimony only for abuse of discretion.” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶40] We conclude that the MPA plainly and unambiguously does not require a testimonial hearing in every case before a court may properly adjudicate parentage based on a genetic tes

2019P. 43(e) (“When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.”); Randall v. Conley, 2010 ME 68, ¶¶ 18-19 , 2 A.3d 328 (“We review the court’s decision not to hear testimony only for abuse of discretion.” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶40] We conclude that the MPA plainly and unambiguously does not require a testimonial hearing in every case before a court may properly adjudicate parentage based on a genetic tes

2019P. 43(e) (“When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.”); Randall v. Conley, 2010 ME 68, ¶¶ 18-19 , 2 A.3d 328 (“We review the court’s decision not to hear testimony only for abuse of discretion.” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶40] We conclude that the MPA plainly and unambiguously does not require a testimonial hearing in every case before a court may properly adjudicate parentage based on a genetic tes

2019P. 43(e) (“When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.”); Randall v. Conley, 2010 ME 68, ¶¶ 18-19 , 2 A.3d 328 (“We review the court’s decision not to hear testimony only for abuse of discretion.” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶40] We conclude that the MPA plainly and unambiguously does not require a testimonial hearing in every case before a court may properly adjudicate parentage based on a genetic tes

2018Id. iT 6.

2016Such a third-party petitioner is therefore required to attest, from the outset of the litigation, to the sufficiency of his or her relationship with the child or to some other extraordinary circumstance.5 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1803(2), 1891(2); see Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 35 , 90 A.3d 1169 ; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30 , 761 A.2d 291 . 5 Standing may be determined based only on the affidavit, or after a testimonial hearing at which only the issue of standing is considered.

2016Such a third-party petitioner is therefore required to attest, from the outset of the litigation, to the sufficiency of his or her relationship with the child or to some other extraordinary circumstance.5 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1803(2), 1891(2); see Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 35 , 90 A.3d 1169 ; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30 , 761 A.2d 291 . 5 Standing may be determined based only on the affidavit, or after a testimonial hearing at which only the issue of standing is considered.

2015After a testimonial hearing, the court granted the motion in a written order, and Pearson appealed. [¶ 4] We review the trial court’s findings of fact in an order modifying parental rights and responsibilities for clear error, and “will vacate the judgment only if no competent evidence exists in the record to support it.” Sloan v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 25 , 43 A.3d 978 (quotation marks omitted).

2015After a testimonial hearing, the court granted the motion in a written order, and Pearson appealed. [¶ 4] We review the trial court’s findings of fact in an order modifying parental rights and responsibilities for clear error, and “will vacate the judgment only if no competent evidence exists in the record to support it.” Sloan v. Christianson, 2012 ME 72, ¶ 25 , 43 A.3d 978 (quotation marks omitted).

2015The court’s ultimate decision to grant a motion to modify is reviewed for “an abuse of discretion or an error of law.” Id. ¶26. [¶ 5] A parent who moves for a modification of parental rights “must demonstrate that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the previous decree and that the modification is in the best interests of the children as determined through an analysis of the factors in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).” Jackson v. MacLeod, 2014 ME 110, ¶ 21 , 100 A.3d 484 .

2015The court’s ultimate decision to grant a motion to modify is reviewed for “an abuse of discretion or an error of law.” Id. ¶26. [¶ 5] A parent who moves for a modification of parental rights “must demonstrate that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the previous decree and that the modification is in the best interests of the children as determined through an analysis of the factors in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3).” Jackson v. MacLeod, 2014 ME 110, ¶ 21 , 100 A.3d 484 .

2002See Baker's Table, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2000 ME 7 , { 11, n.6, 743 A.2d 237, 241 ; Underwood v. City of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166 , { 23, 715 A.2d 148, 155 .

2002See Baker's Table, Inc. v. City of Portland, 2000 ME 7 , { 11, n.6, 743 A.2d 237, 241 ; Underwood v. City of Presque Isle, 1998 ME 166 , { 23, 715 A.2d 148, 155 .

2001In the defendant's memorandum, he confines himself to a single challenge that, "The continued detention of Mr. Daigneault after the time necessary for officers to investigate and complete the accident report was unreasonable and exceeded the scope of intrusion allowed under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)." He argues that the reason for the initial detention had long dissipated by the time the canine unit had arrived and that no reasonable or articulable suspicion arose during the detention that would indicate that the defendant possessed drugs in his vehicle.

2001Id. [¶ 8] Mylon contends that the District Court erred in not holding a testimonial hearing and in finding that Ann is entitled to fifty percent of Mylon's pension as of the date of his retirement. [1] Mylon several times expressed to the court that testimony was unnecessary, and it was at his urging that the court decided not to hear testimony.

2001Id. [¶ 8] Mylon contends that the District Court erred in not holding a testimonial hearing and in finding that Ann is entitled to fifty percent of Mylon’s pension as of the date of his retirement. 1 Mylon several times expressed to the court that testimony was unnecessary, and it was at his urging that the court decided not to hear testimony.

1997In his motion in limine York objected to the admission of the recorded information citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 , 106 S.Ct. 477 , 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel violated in case in which police informant used body wire to record conversation with the defendant after the defendant’s right to counsel had attached).

1997In his motion in limine York objected to the admission of the recorded information citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 , 106 S.Ct. 477 , 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel violated in case in which police informant used body wire to record conversation with the defendant after the defendant’s right to counsel had attached).

1993Atlantic Heating, 572 A.2d at 479 .

1993The trial court refused to conduct a full testimonial hearing under the authority of State v. Walker, 510 A.2d 1064 (Me.1986); and, after an offer of proof was made by the defendants, denied their motion for a new trial.

1990By contrast to these circuit court cases, the Sixth Circuit reads Branzburg as refusing to “interpret[ ] the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir.1987) (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690 , 92 S.Ct. at 2661 ).

1990By contrast to these circuit court cases, the Sixth Circuit reads Branzburg as refusing to “interpret[ ] the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir.1987) (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690 , 92 S.Ct. at 2661 ).