testimonial privilege in Maryland

2022App. at 116 (citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972)).

2022App. at 116 (citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972)).

2022The Court of Special Appeals further noted that one aspect of legislative privilege is a testimonial privilege that protects a legislator from questioning other than in the 80 legislative body itself. 97 Md.

2022The Court of Special Appeals further noted that one aspect of legislative privilege is a testimonial privilege that protects a legislator from questioning other than in the 80 legislative body itself. 97 Md.

2018Nevertheless, "courts ... indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a testimonial waiver [of the Fifth Amendment privilege.]" Klein v. Harris , 667 F.2d 274 , 287 (2d.

1995Id. at 288-89 .

2018Cir. 1981) (citing Emspak v. United States , 349 U.S. 190 , 198, 75 S.Ct. 687 , 99 L.Ed. 997 (1955) ).

2018Cir. 1981) (citing Emspak v. United States , 349 U.S. 190 , 198, 75 S.Ct. 687 , 99 L.Ed. 997 (1955) ).

2014Moreover, the Supreme Court’s holding in Jaffee established a testimonial privilege under the federal rules of evidence based on “reason and experience.” Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 , 116 S.Ct. at 1928 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 344 .

2014Moreover, the Supreme Court’s holding in Jaffee established a testimonial privilege under the federal rules of evidence based on “reason and experience.” Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 , 116 S.Ct. at 1928 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 344 .

2009Because such exemptions are, as a general rule, disfavored, 2 however, the burden is upon a party assert *508 ing a testimonial privilege 1) expressly to claim it, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-74 , 71 S.Ct. 438 , 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951), and 2) to demonstrate an entitlement to it, Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951).

2009Because such exemptions are, as a general rule, disfavored, 2 however, the burden is upon a party assert *508 ing a testimonial privilege 1) expressly to claim it, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-74 , 71 S.Ct. 438 , 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951), and 2) to demonstrate an entitlement to it, Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951).

2009Because such exemptions are, as a general rule, disfavored, 2 however, the burden is upon a party assert *508 ing a testimonial privilege 1) expressly to claim it, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-74 , 71 S.Ct. 438 , 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951), and 2) to demonstrate an entitlement to it, Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951).

2009Because such exemptions are, as a general rule, disfavored, 2 however, the burden is upon a party assert *508 ing a testimonial privilege 1) expressly to claim it, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-74 , 71 S.Ct. 438 , 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951), and 2) to demonstrate an entitlement to it, Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951).

2009The sweeping impact of the relocation was described by Reynolds v. State, 88 Md.App. 197, 216 , 594 A.2d 609 (1991): The testimonial privilege, long a familiar fixture in the courthouse, had been massively moved out to the station house.

2009The sweeping impact of the relocation was described by Reynolds v. State, 88 Md.App. 197, 216 , 594 A.2d 609 (1991): The testimonial privilege, long a familiar fixture in the courthouse, had been massively moved out to the station house.

2005See, e.g., Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 511-20 (holding that provision repealing authority for local industrial development authority should be disregarded); Brown v. State, 359 Md. 180 , 753 A.2d 84 (2000) (construing statute that declared that one spouse "incompetent" to testify with respect to confidential communications with other spouse to create a testimonial privilege rather than a rule of witness competency); see also 85 Opinions of the Attorney General ___ (2000) [Opinion No. 00-011 (May 19, 2000)] (concluding that Election Law required State officials to make determinations concerning law

2005See, e.g., Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 511-20 (holding that provision repealing authority for local industrial development authority should be disregarded); Brown v. State, 359 Md. 180 , 753 A.2d 84 (2000) (construing statute that declared that one spouse "incompetent" to testify with respect to confidential communications with other spouse to create a testimonial privilege rather than a rule of witness competency); see also 85 Opinions of the Attorney General ___ (2000) [Opinion No. 00-011 (May 19, 2000)] (concluding that Election Law required State officials to make determinations concerning law

2004On the same principle, the court in United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir.1989), held that, “as a general matter it is improper to permit a witness [spouse] to claim a testimonial privilege in front of the jury where the witness’s intention not to testify is known beforehand.” Likewise, in San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560, 566 (5th *708 Cir.1965), which was decided when the federal common-law spousal adverse testimony privilege was interpreted to allow the witness spouse or the defendant spouse to claim the privilege, the court held that the prosecutor could not ca

2004On the same principle, the court in United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir.1989), held that, “as a general matter it is improper to permit a witness [spouse] to claim a testimonial privilege in front of the jury where the witness’s intention not to testify is known beforehand.” Likewise, in San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560, 566 (5th *708 Cir.1965), which was decided when the federal common-law spousal adverse testimony privilege was interpreted to allow the witness spouse or the defendant spouse to claim the privilege, the court held that the prosecutor could not ca

2004On the same principle, the court in United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir.1989), held that, “as a general matter it is improper to permit a witness [spouse] to claim a testimonial privilege in front of the jury where the witness’s intention not to testify is known beforehand.” Likewise, in San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560, 566 (5th *708 Cir.1965), which was decided when the federal common-law spousal adverse testimony privilege was interpreted to allow the witness spouse or the defendant spouse to claim the privilege, the court held that the prosecutor could not ca

2004On the same principle, the court in United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir.1989), held that, “as a general matter it is improper to permit a witness [spouse] to claim a testimonial privilege in front of the jury where the witness’s intention not to testify is known beforehand.” Likewise, in San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560, 566 (5th *708 Cir.1965), which was decided when the federal common-law spousal adverse testimony privilege was interpreted to allow the witness spouse or the defendant spouse to claim the privilege, the court held that the prosecutor could not ca

2004On the same principle, the court in United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir.1989), held that, “as a general matter it is improper to permit a witness [spouse] to claim a testimonial privilege in front of the jury where the witness’s intention not to testify is known beforehand.” Likewise, in San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560, 566 (5th *708 Cir.1965), which was decided when the federal common-law spousal adverse testimony privilege was interpreted to allow the witness spouse or the defendant spouse to claim the privilege, the court held that the prosecutor could not ca

2004On the same principle, the court in United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir.1989), held that, “as a general matter it is improper to permit a witness [spouse] to claim a testimonial privilege in front of the jury where the witness’s intention not to testify is known beforehand.” Likewise, in San Fratello v. United States, 340 F.2d 560, 566 (5th *708 Cir.1965), which was decided when the federal common-law spousal adverse testimony privilege was interpreted to allow the witness spouse or the defendant spouse to claim the privilege, the court held that the prosecutor could not ca

2003In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), a majority of the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that news. reporters have a testimonial privilege:’ We are asked to create another [privilege] by interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy.

2003In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), a majority of the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that news. reporters have a testimonial privilege:’ We are asked to create another [privilege] by interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy.

2000The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Adamson, 72 Ohio St.3d 431 , 650 N.E.2d 875 (1995), construed a provision similar to Maryland’s section 9-106.

2000The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Adamson, 72 Ohio St.3d 431 , 650 N.E.2d 875 (1995), construed a provision similar to Maryland’s section 9-106.

1995This John Foster, however, did not testify at respondent’s trial; the profound memory loss he suffered during the approximately 18 months following his identification prevented him from affirming, explaining, or elaborating upon his out-of-court statement just as surely and completely as his assertion of a testimonial privilege, or his death, would have. 484 U.S. at 566 , 108 S.Ct. at 846 .

1995This John Foster, however, did not testify at respondent’s trial; the profound memory loss he suffered during the approximately 18 months following his identification prevented him from affirming, explaining, or elaborating upon his out-of-court statement just as surely and completely as his assertion of a testimonial privilege, or his death, would have. 484 U.S. at 566 , 108 S.Ct. at 846 .

1993To preserve legislative independence, we have concluded that ‘legislators engaged “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity” ... should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation’s results but also from the burden of defending themselves.’ ” (Emphasis added.) This last statement, first made in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 , 87 S.Ct. 1425, 1427 , 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967), construing the privilege as protecting a legislator against both the consequences of litigation and the burden of even having to defend himself in a court proceeding, has resulted in the privileg

1993To preserve legislative independence, we have concluded that ‘legislators engaged “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity” ... should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation’s results but also from the burden of defending themselves.’ ” (Emphasis added.) This last statement, first made in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 , 87 S.Ct. 1425, 1427 , 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967), construing the privilege as protecting a legislator against both the consequences of litigation and the burden of even having to defend himself in a court proceeding, has resulted in the privileg

1993The Supreme Court held as much in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 , 92 S.Ct. 2614 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 , reh. denied, 409 U.S. 902 , 93 S.Ct. 98 , 34 L.Ed.2d 165 (1972).

1993The Supreme Court held as much in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 , 92 S.Ct. 2614 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 , reh. denied, 409 U.S. 902 , 93 S.Ct. 98 , 34 L.Ed.2d 165 (1972).

1991Id., 373 U.S. at 187 , 83 S.Ct. at 1155 ; Allen, 318 Md. at 174 , 567 A.2d 118 .

1991Id., 373 U.S. at 187 , 83 S.Ct. at 1155 ; Allen, 318 Md. at 174 , 567 A.2d 118 .

1984The precise holding reflected in the Court of Appeals Opinion was this: “We shall here hold that ordinarily an absolute privilege applies to a defamatory statement published in a document which is prepared for possible use in connection with a pending judicial proceeding but which has not been filed in that proceeding.” 288 Md. at 4 , 415 A.2d 292 .

1984The precise holding reflected in the Court of Appeals Opinion was this: “We shall here hold that ordinarily an absolute privilege applies to a defamatory statement published in a document which is prepared for possible use in connection with a pending judicial proceeding but which has not been filed in that proceeding.” 288 Md. at 4 , 415 A.2d 292 .

1984The Court of Appeals had earlier stated in Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 97 , 182 A.2d 54 (1962), that the absolute immunity enjoyed by witnesses and parties extended to defamatory statements “uttered in the course of a trial or contained in pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other documents directly related to the case.” Building upon that and upon the underlying public policy rationale for the privilege regarding judicial testimony, we and the Court of Appeals concluded that the testimonial privilege, which applied even in the face of malice, extended as well to pre-trial communication

1984The Court of Appeals had earlier stated in Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 97 , 182 A.2d 54 (1962), that the absolute immunity enjoyed by witnesses and parties extended to defamatory statements “uttered in the course of a trial or contained in pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other documents directly related to the case.” Building upon that and upon the underlying public policy rationale for the privilege regarding judicial testimony, we and the Court of Appeals concluded that the testimonial privilege, which applied even in the face of malice, extended as well to pre-trial communication

1983As to this, the court said: "If the newsman’s testimonial privilege is to be broadened, as in New York, to cover disclosure of *172 'any news or the source of any such news’..., it can only be done by the Legislature.” Id. at 726 , 294 A.2d at 157 .

1983As to this, the court said: "If the newsman’s testimonial privilege is to be broadened, as in New York, to cover disclosure of *172 'any news or the source of any such news’..., it can only be done by the Legislature.” Id. at 726 , 294 A.2d at 157 .