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12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Chalice Renee Zeitnergreen1 sentence2019Zeitner, 246 Ariz. at 166, ¶ 18 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hassongreen1 sentence2018It would serve little purpose, and would make little sense, for a patient to retain the power to prevent her physician from testifying when the physician can be legally compelled to release the patient's medical records—the confidences the privilege is designed to protect already will have been disclosed. ¶27 In construing statutes, we "apply constructions that make practical sense" rather than those that "frustrate legislative intent." State v. Hasson, 217 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 11 (App. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Tucson Medical Center Incorporated v. Rowlesgreen1 sentence2018Cf. Rowles, 21 Ariz. App. at 427 (although nominally a testimonial privilege, physician-patient privilege also shields records a physician maintains for his or her patients). | 1 | 1 |
In re MH 2006-000490green1 sentence2014See also In re MH 2006-000490, 214 Ariz. 485, 487-88, ¶ 9 , 154 P.3d 387 , 389-90 (App. 2007) (“In lieu of in-court testimony, a court may admit or take judicial notice of the physicians’ affidavits appended to the petition.”). ¶14 As defined in A.R.S. § 36-501(25), a mental disorder “means a substantial disorder of the person’s emotional processes, thought, cognition or memory.” Persistent or acute disability is defined as “a severe mental disorder” that, if not treated: (1) “has a substantial probability of causing the person to suffer . . . abnormal mental, emotional 5 IN THE MATTER OF GARY | 1 | 1 |
In Re Mh Xxxx-Xxxxxxgreen1 sentence2014See also In re MH 2006-000490, 214 Ariz. 485, 487-88, ¶ 9 , 154 P.3d 387 , 389-90 (App. 2007) (“In lieu of in-court testimony, a court may admit or take judicial notice of the physicians’ affidavits appended to the petition.”). ¶14 As defined in A.R.S. § 36-501(25), a mental disorder “means a substantial disorder of the person’s emotional processes, thought, cognition or memory.” Persistent or acute disability is defined as “a severe mental disorder” that, if not treated: (1) “has a substantial probability of causing the person to suffer . . . abnormal mental, emotional 5 IN THE MATTER OF GARY | 1 | 1 |
Sun Health Corp. v. Myersgreen2 sentences2011See Sun Health Corp. v. Myers, 205 Ariz. 315, 317, ¶ 2 , 70 P.3d 444, 446 (App.2003). ¶ 5 We start (and end) our analysis with the language of the constitutional portion of the Victims Bill of Rights and its implementing statutes. 2011See Sun Health Corp. v. Myers, 205 Ariz. 315, 317, ¶ 2 , 70 P.3d 444, 446 (App.2003). ¶ 5 We start (and end) our analysis with the language of the constitutional portion of the Victims Bill of Rights and its implementing statutes. | 1 | 1 |
Roman Catholic Diocese v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2006See Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 204 Ariz. 225, 227, ¶ 2 , 62 P.3d 970, 972 (App.2003). 2006See Roman Catholic Diocese of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 204 Ariz. 225, 227, ¶ 2 , 62 P.3d 970, 972 (App.2003). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Patricia Davies and Martin Kapreliangreen1 sentence1989See, e.g., United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1008 , 106 S.Ct. 533 , 88 L.Ed.2d 464 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Fuller v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1989See, e.g., United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1008 , 106 S.Ct. 533 , 88 L.Ed.2d 464 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Borntrager v. Stevasgreen1 sentence1989See, e.g., United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1008 , 106 S.Ct. 533 , 88 L.Ed.2d 464 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Matecki v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1989See, e.g., United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1008 , 106 S.Ct. 533 , 88 L.Ed.2d 464 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Robert J. Fletcher v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1983Fletcher v. United States, 332 F.2d 724, 726 (D.C.Cir.1964); United States v. Ritz, supra. Prosecutorial insistence in asking prejudicial questions depicting a defendant’s involvement in the crime after it becomes clear that the witness-alleged accomplice has refused and will continue to refuse to testify is an attempt to build the prosecutor’s case out of inferences arising from use of the testimonial privilege and is misconduct. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Loren Lee Kinggreen1 sentence1983United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d at 650 ; United States v. King, 461 F.2d 53, 56 (8th Cir.1972); Fletcher v. United States, supra; Annot., 19 A.L.R. 4th 368 , 379-81 (1983); 1 M. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Namet v. United States
green
2 sentences1983In Namet , the Court did indicate that such action by a prosecutor could be error under the theory of prosecutorial misconduct, if it appeared that the government made “a conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case out of inferences arising from use of the testimonial privilege.” Id. at 186 , 83 S.Ct. at 1154-55 . 1983In Namet , the Court did indicate that such action by a prosecutor could be error under the theory of prosecutorial misconduct, if it appeared that the government made “a conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case out of inferences arising from use of the testimonial privilege.” Id. at 186 , 83 S.Ct. at 1154-55 . | 2 | 1977–1983 |
State v. Mincey
green
2 sentences2019We have held that the privilege protects "[a]ll information obtained by the physician, whether from examination, testing, or direct communication," State v. Mincey , 141 Ariz. 425 , 439, 687 P.2d 1180 , 1194 (1984), and, although framed as a testimonial privilege, the privilege also protects patient medical records, see Tucson Med. 2019We have held that the privilege protects "[a]ll information obtained by the physician, whether from examination, testing, or direct communication," State v. Mincey , 141 Ariz. 425 , 439, 687 P.2d 1180 , 1194 (1984), and, although framed as a testimonial privilege, the privilege also protects patient medical records, see Tucson Med. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Tucson Medical Center, Incorporated v. Misevch
green
2 sentences2019Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch , 113 Ariz. 34 , 37, 545 P.2d 958 , 961 (1976) (citing Tucson Med. 2019Ctr., Inc. v. Misevch , 113 Ariz. 34 , 37, 545 P.2d 958 , 961 (1976) (citing Tucson Med. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Blazek v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2018This testimonial privilege, known as the anti-marital fact privilege, enables a defendant-spouse in a criminal proceeding "to prevent the other spouse from testifying." Blazek v. Superior Court , 177 Ariz. 535 , 538, 869 P.2d 509 (App. 1994). 1 ¶ 8 The anti-marital fact privilege, though rooted in common law, has existed in Arizona in some statutory form since before statehood. 2018This testimonial privilege, known as the anti-marital fact privilege, enables a defendant-spouse in a criminal proceeding "to prevent the other spouse from testifying." Blazek v. Superior Court , 177 Ariz. 535 , 538, 869 P.2d 509 (App. 1994). 1 ¶ 8 The anti-marital fact privilege, though rooted in common law, has existed in Arizona in some statutory form since before statehood. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Crow
green
2 sentences2018State v. Crow , 104 Ariz. 579 , 583, 457 P.2d 256 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Burchett , 107 Ariz. 185 , 484 P.2d 181 (1971) ; see also Rev. 2018State v. Crow , 104 Ariz. 579 , 583, 457 P.2d 256 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Burchett , 107 Ariz. 185 , 484 P.2d 181 (1971) ; see also Rev. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Burchett
green
2 sentences2018State v. Crow , 104 Ariz. 579 , 583, 457 P.2d 256 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Burchett , 107 Ariz. 185 , 484 P.2d 181 (1971) ; see also Rev. 2018State v. Crow , 104 Ariz. 579 , 583, 457 P.2d 256 (1969), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Burchett , 107 Ariz. 185 , 484 P.2d 181 (1971) ; see also Rev. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
cluster 326121
green
1 sentence1983United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d at 650 ; United States v. King, 461 F.2d 53, 56 (8th Cir.1972); Fletcher v. United States, supra; Annot., 19 A.L.R. 4th 368 , 379-81 (1983); 1 M. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. Cota
green
2 sentences1983In State v. Cota, 102 Ariz. 416 , 432 P.2d 428 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1008 , 88 S.Ct. 1256 , 20 L.Ed.2d 109 (1968), we held that the privilege was a “personal immunity for the witness,” that the witness was not disqualified from being called to the stand and that even if the state was aware that the witness would invoke the privilege, it “had the right to show that it was presenting all the relevant evidence____” Id. 102 Ariz. at 421 , 432 P.2d at 433 . 1983In State v. Cota, 102 Ariz. 416 , 432 P.2d 428 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1008 , 88 S.Ct. 1256 , 20 L.Ed.2d 109 (1968), we held that the privilege was a “personal immunity for the witness,” that the witness was not disqualified from being called to the stand and that even if the state was aware that the witness would invoke the privilege, it “had the right to show that it was presenting all the relevant evidence____” Id. 102 Ariz. at 421 , 432 P.2d at 433 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
United States v. Joan Belle Ritz, Linda Ann Ritz, Robert M. Ritz, Jr. And John Paul Ritz
green
1 sentence1983Fletcher v. United States, 332 F.2d 724, 726 (D.C.Cir.1964); United States v. Ritz, supra. Prosecutorial insistence in asking prejudicial questions depicting a defendant’s involvement in the crime after it becomes clear that the witness-alleged accomplice has refused and will continue to refuse to testify is an attempt to build the prosecutor’s case out of inferences arising from use of the testimonial privilege and is misconduct. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Fair v. Board of Elections
green
1 sentence1983In State v. Cota, 102 Ariz. 416 , 432 P.2d 428 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1008 , 88 S.Ct. 1256 , 20 L.Ed.2d 109 (1968), we held that the privilege was a “personal immunity for the witness,” that the witness was not disqualified from being called to the stand and that even if the state was aware that the witness would invoke the privilege, it “had the right to show that it was presenting all the relevant evidence____” Id. 102 Ariz. at 421 , 432 P.2d at 433 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Sandefur v. Kropp
green
1 sentence1983In State v. Cota, 102 Ariz. 416 , 432 P.2d 428 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1008 , 88 S.Ct. 1256 , 20 L.Ed.2d 109 (1968), we held that the privilege was a “personal immunity for the witness,” that the witness was not disqualified from being called to the stand and that even if the state was aware that the witness would invoke the privilege, it “had the right to show that it was presenting all the relevant evidence____” Id. 102 Ariz. at 421 , 432 P.2d at 433 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Jones v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1972(See Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, pp. 22-23; Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U.Chi.L.Rev. 687, 699-701.) * * Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 58 Cal.2d 56 , 22 Cal.Rptr. 879 , 372 P.2d 919, 921 , 96 A.L.R.2d 1213 (1962). 1972(See Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, pp. 22-23; Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U.Chi.L.Rev. 687, 699-701.) * * Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada County, 58 Cal.2d 56 , 22 Cal.Rptr. 879 , 372 P.2d 919, 921 , 96 A.L.R.2d 1213 (1962). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Brown v. United States
green
2 sentences1968Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 , 78 S.Ct. 622 , 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958); McCormick on Evidence § 131, at 275; Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 98, at 160. 1968Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 , 78 S.Ct. 622 , 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958); McCormick on Evidence § 131, at 275; Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 98, at 160. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.