14 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Brown v. State, 242 Ga. 536, 538-539 (3) ( 250 SE2d 438 ) (1978). 2012Brown v. State, 242 Ga. 536, 538-539 (3) ( 250 SE2d 438 ) (1978). | 3 | 3 |
Brooks v. Stategreen2 sentences2012We note that our Supreme Court has limited the exercise of the privilege set out in OCGA § 24-9-27 in cases where the testimony tends only to bring infamy, disgrace or public contempt upon a witness or his family, as follows: In Brooks v. State, 233 Ga. 524 (2) ( 212 SE2d 355 ) (1975), this court construed the foregoing testimonial privilege, in accordance with the great weight of authority, to require the witness to answer questions tending to bring infamy, disgrace or public contempt upon himself or his family, if the proposed evidence is material to the issues in the case; it is only where 2012We note that our Supreme Court has limited the exercise of the privilege set out in OCGA § 24-9-27 in cases where the testimony tends only to bring infamy, disgrace or public contempt upon a witness or his family, as follows: In Brooks v. State, 233 Ga. 524 (2) ( 212 SE2d 355 ) (1975), this court construed the foregoing testimonial privilege, in accordance with the great weight of authority, to require the witness to answer questions tending to bring infamy, disgrace or public contempt upon himself or his family, if the proposed evidence is material to the issues in the case; it is only where | 1 | 4 |
Younger v. Stategreen2 sentences2013These actions taken by the court did not impose unreasonable limits on Palacios-Baras’s cross- examination of Tejada, nor did the actions cut off all inquiry into the subject of Tejada’s testimonial immunity.42 Instead, as the record reveals, Palacios-Baras’s 40 Id. (citations and punctuation omitted); see Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 199 (3) ( 702 SE2d 183 ) (2010). 41 See Corson, supra; In re Long, supra. 42 See generally Young v. State, 290 Ga. 441, 444 (5) ( 721 SE2d 839 ) (2012) (“The Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective 23 counsel thereafter chose not to as 2013These actions taken by the court did not impose unreasonable limits on Palacios-Baras’s cross- examination of Tejada, nor did the actions cut off all inquiry into the subject of Tejada’s testimonial immunity.42 Instead, as the record reveals, Palacios-Baras’s 40 Id. (citations and punctuation omitted); see Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 199 (3) ( 702 SE2d 183 ) (2010). 41 See Corson, supra; In re Long, supra. 42 See generally Young v. State, 290 Ga. 441, 444 (5) ( 721 SE2d 839 ) (2012) (“The Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective 23 counsel thereafter chose not to as | 1 | 1 |
Corson v. Hamesgreen1 sentence2013These actions taken by the court did not impose unreasonable limits on Palacios-Baras’s cross- examination of Tejada, nor did the actions cut off all inquiry into the subject of Tejada’s testimonial immunity.42 Instead, as the record reveals, Palacios-Baras’s 40 Id. (citations and punctuation omitted); see Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 199 (3) ( 702 SE2d 183 ) (2010). 41 See Corson, supra; In re Long, supra. 42 See generally Young v. State, 290 Ga. 441, 444 (5) ( 721 SE2d 839 ) (2012) (“The Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective 23 counsel thereafter chose not to as | 1 | 1 |
Perez v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Palacios-Baras contends that the trial court erred by rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). 43 Vogelson, supra at 638, n. 3, quoting Perez v. State, 254 Ga. App. 872, 876 ( 564 SE2d 208 ) (2002) (Ruffin, J., concurring specially). 44 See Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 274-275 (4) ( 528 SE2d 250 ) (2000) (finding no abuse of discretion, where defendant was allowed to amply explore the state’s witness’s potential 2013Palacios-Baras contends that the trial court erred by rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). 43 Vogelson, supra at 638, n. 3, quoting Perez v. State, 254 Ga. App. 872, 876 ( 564 SE2d 208 ) (2002) (Ruffin, J., concurring specially). 44 See Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 274-275 (4) ( 528 SE2d 250 ) (2000) (finding no abuse of discretion, where defendant was allowed to amply explore the state’s witness’s potential | 1 | 1 |
Hodo v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Palacios-Baras contends that the trial court erred by rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). 43 Vogelson, supra at 638, n. 3, quoting Perez v. State, 254 Ga. App. 872, 876 ( 564 SE2d 208 ) (2002) (Ruffin, J., concurring specially). 44 See Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 274-275 (4) ( 528 SE2d 250 ) (2000) (finding no abuse of discretion, where defendant was allowed to amply explore the state’s witness’s potential 2013Palacios-Baras contends that the trial court erred by rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”) (citation omitted; emphasis in original). 43 Vogelson, supra at 638, n. 3, quoting Perez v. State, 254 Ga. App. 872, 876 ( 564 SE2d 208 ) (2002) (Ruffin, J., concurring specially). 44 See Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272, 274-275 (4) ( 528 SE2d 250 ) (2000) (finding no abuse of discretion, where defendant was allowed to amply explore the state’s witness’s potential | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen2 sentences2013These actions taken by the court did not impose unreasonable limits on Palacios-Baras’s cross- examination of Tejada, nor did the actions cut off all inquiry into the subject of Tejada’s testimonial immunity.42 Instead, as the record reveals, Palacios-Baras’s 40 Id. (citations and punctuation omitted); see Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 199 (3) ( 702 SE2d 183 ) (2010). 41 See Corson, supra; In re Long, supra. 42 See generally Young v. State, 290 Ga. 441, 444 (5) ( 721 SE2d 839 ) (2012) (“The Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective 23 counsel thereafter chose not to as 2013These actions taken by the court did not impose unreasonable limits on Palacios-Baras’s cross- examination of Tejada, nor did the actions cut off all inquiry into the subject of Tejada’s testimonial immunity.42 Instead, as the record reveals, Palacios-Baras’s 40 Id. (citations and punctuation omitted); see Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 199 (3) ( 702 SE2d 183 ) (2010). 41 See Corson, supra; In re Long, supra. 42 See generally Young v. State, 290 Ga. 441, 444 (5) ( 721 SE2d 839 ) (2012) (“The Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective 23 counsel thereafter chose not to as | 1 | 1 |
Kennestone Hospital, Inc. v. Hopsongreen2 sentences2001(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Kennestone Hosp. v. Hopson, 273 Ga. 145, 148 ( 538 SE2d 742 ) (2000). 2001(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Kennestone Hosp. v. Hopson, 273 Ga. 145, 148 ( 538 SE2d 742 ) (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Ostroff v. Coynergreen2 sentences1997Accord Ostroff v. Coyner, 187 Ga. App. 109, 115 (4), 116 ( 369 SE2d 298 ). 1997Accord Ostroff v. Coyner, 187 Ga. App. 109, 115 (4), 116 ( 369 SE2d 298 ). | 1 | 1 |
Simpson v. Simpsongreen2 sentences1997The trial court did not err in charging the jury that an adverse inference may be drawn by a party in a civil case who invokes a testimonial privilege. “[A]lthough a person does have a right to invoke the privilege^] [under OCGA § 24-9-27] in a civil case in order to protect himself, when he does so, an inference against his interest may be drawn by the factfinder.” Simpson v. Simpson, 233 Ga. 17, 21 ( 209 SE2d 611 ). 1997The trial court did not err in charging the jury that an adverse inference may be drawn by a party in a civil case who invokes a testimonial privilege. “[A]lthough a person does have a right to invoke the privilege^] [under OCGA § 24-9-27] in a civil case in order to protect himself, when he does so, an inference against his interest may be drawn by the factfinder.” Simpson v. Simpson, 233 Ga. 17, 21 ( 209 SE2d 611 ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Masongreen2 sentences1994We are not prepared to rule that the conduct of counsel waived appellant’s right to appeal this issue of constitutional import. “[A] waiver of the important right to appeal an adverse ruling should not be inferred unless it is clear and unmistakable.” State v. Mason, 181 Ga. App. 806, 808 (1) ( 353 SE2d 915 ). 1994We are not prepared to rule that the conduct of counsel waived appellant’s right to appeal this issue of constitutional import. “[A] waiver of the important right to appeal an adverse ruling should not be inferred unless it is clear and unmistakable.” State v. Mason, 181 Ga. App. 806, 808 (1) ( 353 SE2d 915 ). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences1985Williams v. State, 244 Ga. 485, 489 ( 260 SE2d 879 ) (1979). 1985Williams v. State, 244 Ga. 485, 489 ( 260 SE2d 879 ) (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Hurst v. Stategreen2 sentences1982See also Hurst v. State, 160 Ga. App. 830 ( 287 SE2d 677 ) (1982); 81 AmJur2d Witnesses, § 297. 1982See also Hurst v. State, 160 Ga. App. 830 ( 287 SE2d 677 ) (1982); 81 AmJur2d Witnesses, § 297. | 1 | 1 |
Namet v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1979See Namet v. United States, 373 U. S. 179 (1963). 1979See Namet v. United States, 373 U. S. 179 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dotson v. State
green
2 sentences2000Dotson v. State, 213 Ga.App. 7 (1), 443 S.E.2d 650 (1994), is distinguishable because there, "[t]he trial court gave appellant no opportunity before declaring mistrial either to object thereto or to present an argument as to the appropriate means of correcting the testimonial error." Here, Putnam's counsel had the opportunity to propose alternatives both in chambers and in court when he was invited to comment on the mistrial. 2000Dotson v. State, 213 Ga.App. 7 (1), 443 S.E.2d 650 (1994), is distinguishable because there, "[t]he trial court gave appellant no opportunity before declaring mistrial either to object thereto or to present an argument as to the appropriate means of correcting the testimonial error." Here, Putnam's counsel had the opportunity to propose alternatives both in chambers and in court when he was invited to comment on the mistrial. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Stanley v. State
green
2 sentences1986E.g., Stanley v. State, 240 Ga. 341 (6) ( 241 SE2d 173 ) (1977). 1986E.g., Stanley v. State, 240 Ga. 341 (6) ( 241 SE2d 173 ) (1977). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Dennis v. Adcock
green
2 sentences1984Several times since Pavesich the courts of this state have attempted to harmonize the individual’s right to privacy with competing interests: the freedoms of speech and press (Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (V) ( 200 SE2d 127 ) (1973)); the necessities of commerce (Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 268 ( 223 SE2d 468 ) (1976)); legitimate public interests (Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publishing Co., 164 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 297 SE2d 94 ) (1982)); Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83 (2) ( 263 SE2d 119 ) (1980)); and the testimonial privilege (Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425 (4) ( 226 1984Several times since Pavesich the courts of this state have attempted to harmonize the individual’s right to privacy with competing interests: the freedoms of speech and press (Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (V) ( 200 SE2d 127 ) (1973)); the necessities of commerce (Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 268 ( 223 SE2d 468 ) (1976)); legitimate public interests (Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publishing Co., 164 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 297 SE2d 94 ) (1982)); Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83 (2) ( 263 SE2d 119 ) (1980)); and the testimonial privilege (Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425 (4) ( 226 | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Sims v. State
green
1 sentence1984Several times since Pavesich the courts of this state have attempted to harmonize the individual’s right to privacy with competing interests: the freedoms of speech and press (Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (V) ( 200 SE2d 127 ) (1973)); the necessities of commerce (Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 268 ( 223 SE2d 468 ) (1976)); legitimate public interests (Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publishing Co., 164 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 297 SE2d 94 ) (1982)); Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83 (2) ( 263 SE2d 119 ) (1980)); and the testimonial privilege (Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425 (4) ( 226 | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co.
green
1 sentence1984Several times since Pavesich the courts of this state have attempted to harmonize the individual’s right to privacy with competing interests: the freedoms of speech and press (Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (V) ( 200 SE2d 127 ) (1973)); the necessities of commerce (Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 268 ( 223 SE2d 468 ) (1976)); legitimate public interests (Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publishing Co., 164 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 297 SE2d 94 ) (1982)); Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83 (2) ( 263 SE2d 119 ) (1980)); and the testimonial privilege (Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425 (4) ( 226 | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Ramsey v. Georgia Gazette Publishing Co.
green
2 sentences1984Several times since Pavesich the courts of this state have attempted to harmonize the individual’s right to privacy with competing interests: the freedoms of speech and press (Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (V) ( 200 SE2d 127 ) (1973)); the necessities of commerce (Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 268 ( 223 SE2d 468 ) (1976)); legitimate public interests (Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publishing Co., 164 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 297 SE2d 94 ) (1982)); Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83 (2) ( 263 SE2d 119 ) (1980)); and the testimonial privilege (Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425 (4) ( 226 1984Several times since Pavesich the courts of this state have attempted to harmonize the individual’s right to privacy with competing interests: the freedoms of speech and press (Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (V) ( 200 SE2d 127 ) (1973)); the necessities of commerce (Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 268 ( 223 SE2d 468 ) (1976)); legitimate public interests (Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publishing Co., 164 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 297 SE2d 94 ) (1982)); Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83 (2) ( 263 SE2d 119 ) (1980)); and the testimonial privilege (Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425 (4) ( 226 | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn
green
2 sentences1984Several times since Pavesich the courts of this state have attempted to harmonize the individual’s right to privacy with competing interests: the freedoms of speech and press (Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (V) ( 200 SE2d 127 ) (1973)); the necessities of commerce (Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 268 ( 223 SE2d 468 ) (1976)); legitimate public interests (Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publishing Co., 164 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 297 SE2d 94 ) (1982)); Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83 (2) ( 263 SE2d 119 ) (1980)); and the testimonial privilege (Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425 (4) ( 226 1984Several times since Pavesich the courts of this state have attempted to harmonize the individual’s right to privacy with competing interests: the freedoms of speech and press (Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (V) ( 200 SE2d 127 ) (1973)); the necessities of commerce (Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 268 ( 223 SE2d 468 ) (1976)); legitimate public interests (Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publishing Co., 164 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 297 SE2d 94 ) (1982)); Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83 (2) ( 263 SE2d 119 ) (1980)); and the testimonial privilege (Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425 (4) ( 226 | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Doe v. Sears
green
2 sentences1984Several times since Pavesich the courts of this state have attempted to harmonize the individual’s right to privacy with competing interests: the freedoms of speech and press (Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (V) ( 200 SE2d 127 ) (1973)); the necessities of commerce (Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 268 ( 223 SE2d 468 ) (1976)); legitimate public interests (Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publishing Co., 164 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 297 SE2d 94 ) (1982)); Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83 (2) ( 263 SE2d 119 ) (1980)); and the testimonial privilege (Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425 (4) ( 226 1984Several times since Pavesich the courts of this state have attempted to harmonize the individual’s right to privacy with competing interests: the freedoms of speech and press (Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60 (V) ( 200 SE2d 127 ) (1973)); the necessities of commerce (Hines v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 268 ( 223 SE2d 468 ) (1976)); legitimate public interests (Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publishing Co., 164 Ga. App. 693 (1) ( 297 SE2d 94 ) (1982)); Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83 (2) ( 263 SE2d 119 ) (1980)); and the testimonial privilege (Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425 (4) ( 226 | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Branzburg v. Hayes
green
1 sentence1982The United States Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665 (92 SC 2646, 33 LE2d 626) (1972), held that no constitutional basis for such a testimonial privilege exists under the First Amendment. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.