testimonial hearing in Oregon

2024The Court did not say whether one, neither, or both of these sources would make the statements testimonial—“only that before the court can decide the primary purpose of the out-of-court statements 25 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS introduced at Smith’s trial, it needs to determine exactly what those statements were.” Id. at 802 . {¶64} To determine whether a given statement is “testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, a court must (1) “identify the out-of-court statement introduced,” and then (2) “determine, given all the ‘relevant circumstances,’ the principal reason [the

2024The Court did not say whether one, neither, or both of these sources would make the statements testimonial—“only that before the court can decide the primary purpose of the out-of-court statements 25 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS introduced at Smith’s trial, it needs to determine exactly what those statements were.” Id. at 802 . {¶64} To determine whether a given statement is “testimonial” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, a court must (1) “identify the out-of-court statement introduced,” and then (2) “determine, given all the ‘relevant circumstances,’ the principal reason [the

2016Under Oregon case law, then, there are at least two limitations on a witness’s “expansive duty” to accommodate a criminal defendant’s “broad right” to compel production of evidence, Cartwright, 336 Or at 417 : relevance and privilege.

2016A court’s authority rests in its obligation to enforce the duty to give evidence unless a testimonial privilege applies.” Id.

2013Finally, the marital communications privilege may be asserted in civil and criminal cases, but the testimonial privilege may be asserted in criminal cases alone.” State v. Serrano, 346 Or 311, 318-19 , 210 P3d 892 (2009) (citations omitted).

2013Finally, the marital communications privilege may be asserted in civil and criminal cases, but the testimonial privilege may be asserted in criminal cases alone.” State v. Serrano, 346 Or 311, 318-19 , 210 P3d 892 (2009) (citations omitted).

2003Put another way, even if due process ordinarily would entitle petitioner to a testimonial hearing before the board decided whether to designate him as a predatory sex offender, see Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or. 362, 378-81 , 15 P.3d 548 (2000), the failure to provide such a hearing in this case was harmless error, see Meadows v. Board of Parole, 181 Or.App. 565, 579 , 47 P.3d 506 (2002), rev. den., 335 Or. 355 , 67 P.3d 937 (2003). [17] Petitioner next argues that the board's order violates Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. [18] He contends that the factors u

2003Put another way, even if due process ordinarily would entitle petitioner to a testimonial hearing before the board decided whether to designate him as a predatory sex offender, see Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or. 362, 378-81 , 15 P.3d 548 (2000), the failure to provide such a hearing in this case was harmless error, see Meadows v. Board of Parole, 181 Or.App. 565, 579 , 47 P.3d 506 (2002), rev. den., 335 Or. 355 , 67 P.3d 937 (2003). [17] Petitioner next argues that the board's order violates Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. [18] He contends that the factors u

2003Put another way, even if due process ordinarily would entitle petitioner to a testimonial hearing before the board decided whether to designate him as a predatory sex offender, see Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or. 362, 378-81 , 15 P.3d 548 (2000), the failure to provide such a hearing in this case was harmless error, see Meadows v. Board of Parole, 181 Or.App. 565, 579 , 47 P.3d 506 (2002), rev. den., 335 Or. 355 , 67 P.3d 937 (2003). [17] Petitioner next argues that the board's order violates Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. [18] He contends that the factors u

2003Put another way, even if due process ordinarily would entitle petitioner to a testimonial hearing before the board decided whether to designate him as a predatory sex offender, see Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or. 362, 378-81 , 15 P.3d 548 (2000), the failure to provide such a hearing in this case was harmless error, see Meadows v. Board of Parole, 181 Or.App. 565, 579 , 47 P.3d 506 (2002), rev. den., 335 Or. 355 , 67 P.3d 937 (2003). [17] Petitioner next argues that the board's order violates Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. [18] He contends that the factors u

2003Put another way, even if due process ordinarily would entitle petitioner to a testimonial hearing before the board decided whether to designate him as a predatory sex offender, see Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or. 362, 378-81 , 15 P.3d 548 (2000), the failure to provide such a hearing in this case was harmless error, see Meadows v. Board of Parole, 181 Or.App. 565, 579 , 47 P.3d 506 (2002), rev. den., 335 Or. 355 , 67 P.3d 937 (2003). [17] Petitioner next argues that the board's order violates Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. [18] He contends that the factors u

2003Put another way, even if due process ordinarily would entitle petitioner to a testimonial hearing before the board decided whether to designate him as a predatory sex offender, see Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 331 Or. 362, 378-81 , 15 P.3d 548 (2000), the failure to provide such a hearing in this case was harmless error, see Meadows v. Board of Parole, 181 Or.App. 565, 579 , 47 P.3d 506 (2002), rev. den., 335 Or. 355 , 67 P.3d 937 (2003). [17] Petitioner next argues that the board's order violates Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution. [18] He contends that the factors u

1980State ex rel Calley v. Olsen, 271 Or 369 , 532 P2d 230 (1975).

1980State ex rel Calley v. Olsen, 271 Or 369 , 532 P2d 230 (1975).

1975In State v. Johnson, 243 Or 532 , 413 P2d 383 (1966), the Oregon Supreme Court held it reversible error for the prosecution to call the defendant’s alleged accomplice to the stand, after defendant’s counsel had informed the court and prosecutor that the subject witness intended to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination.

1975In State v. Johnson, 243 Or 532 , 413 P2d 383 (1966), the Oregon Supreme Court held it reversible error for the prosecution to call the defendant’s alleged accomplice to the stand, after defendant’s counsel had informed the court and prosecutor that the subject witness intended to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination.

1975First, some courts have indicated that error may be based upon a concept of prosecutorial misconduct, when the Government makes a conscious and flagrant .attempt to build its case out of inferences arising from use of the testimonial privilege * * * .” (Emphasis supplied.) 373 US at 186 .