testimonial privilege in Florida

1986It is well-settled that the testimonial privilege for non-party journalists “is applicable to criminal as well as civil cases and to confidential and nonconfidential sources of information.” Tribune Co. v. Green, supra. 440 So. 2d at 486 .

1985It is well-settled that the testimonial privilege for non-party journalists “is applicable to criminal as well as civil cases and to confidential and non-confidential sources of information.” Tribune Co. v. Green, supra. 440 So.2d at 486 .

1983Ohio 1965) (distinguishing testimonial privilege and holding that a patient’s protagonist may not engage in unsupervised conversations with the treating physician, that the mere waiver of a testimonial privilege does not release the doctor from his duty of secrecy and loyalty and that no one may be permitted to induce a breach of these duties); Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701 , 287 So.2d 824 (1973) (holding that a medical doctor is under a general duty not to make extra-judicial disclosures of information acquired in the course of the doctor-patient relationship and that a breach of that duty wi

1983Ohio 1965) (distinguishing testimonial privilege and holding that a patient’s protagonist may not engage in unsupervised conversations with the treating physician, that the mere waiver of a testimonial privilege does not release the doctor from his duty of secrecy and loyalty and that no one may be permitted to induce a breach of these duties); Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701 , 287 So.2d 824 (1973) (holding that a medical doctor is under a general duty not to make extra-judicial disclosures of information acquired in the course of the doctor-patient relationship and that a breach of that duty wi

2012The applicable portion of this article, popularly known as the “Speech or Debate Clause,” provides in pertinent part that “in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, [senators and representatives shall] be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.” The Tenney case dealt with immunity from suit, but the Supreme Court subsequently held in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 , 92 S.Ct. 2614

2012The applicable portion of this article, popularly known as the “Speech or Debate Clause,” provides in pertinent part that “in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, [senators and representatives shall] be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.” The Tenney case dealt with immunity from suit, but the Supreme Court subsequently held in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 , 92 S.Ct. 2614

2012The subject was discussed in Girardeau v. State, 403 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) and City of Pompano Beach v. Swerdlow Lightspeed Management Co., LLC, 942 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), but in each of those cases the court stopped short of holding that a legislative privilege exists.

2012The subject was discussed in Girardeau v. State, 403 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) and City of Pompano Beach v. Swerdlow Lightspeed Management Co., LLC, 942 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), but in each of those cases the court stopped short of holding that a legislative privilege exists.

2002Instead, the Ritchie case involved a Pennsylvania statute which provided that case files of the state Children and Youth Services agency ("CYS") were not public records and must be held confidential. 480 U.S. at 43-44 , 107 S.Ct. 989 .

2002Instead, the Ritchie case involved a Pennsylvania statute which provided that case files of the state Children and Youth Services agency ("CYS") were not public records and must be held confidential. 480 U.S. at 43-44 , 107 S.Ct. 989 .

1995More importantly, the statute must be strictly interpreted and exceptions to it broadly construed both because it is in derogation of the common law as expressed in Coralluzzo and Frantz , which impose no restrictions on the availability of this information, see Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1990); Graham v. Edwards, 472 So.2d 803 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 482 So.2d 348 (1986), and because it erects a testimonial privilege which may "not [be] lightly created nor expansively construed, for [it is] in derogation of the search for truth." United States v. Nix

1995More importantly, the statute must be strictly interpreted and exceptions to it broadly construed both because it is in derogation of the common law as expressed in Coralluzzo and Frantz , which impose no restrictions on the availability of this information, see Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1990); Graham v. Edwards, 472 So.2d 803 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 482 So.2d 348 (1986), and because it erects a testimonial privilege which may "not [be] lightly created nor expansively construed, for [it is] in derogation of the search for truth." United States v. Nix

1995More importantly, the statute must be strictly interpreted and exceptions to it broadly construed both because it is in derogation of the common law as expressed in Coralluzzo and Frantz , which impose no restrictions on the availability of this information, see Thornber v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 568 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1990); Graham v. Edwards, 472 So.2d 803 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 482 So.2d 348 (1986), and because it erects a testimonial privilege which may "not [be] lightly created nor expansively construed, for [it is] in derogation of the search for truth." United States v. Nix

1994E.g., Small v. Shure, 94 So.2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1957) ("Plaintiff's act of deposing defendant did not waive the protection of the statute where no part of the deposition was offered in evidence."); In re Estate of McCoy, 445 So.2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Harrell v. Florida First National Bank, 354 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); In re Estate of Bechtel, 348 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 360 So.2d 1247 (Fla. 1978); Bordacs v. Kimmel, 139 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962).

1994E.g., Small v. Shure, 94 So.2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1957) ("Plaintiff's act of deposing defendant did not waive the protection of the statute where no part of the deposition was offered in evidence."); In re Estate of McCoy, 445 So.2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Harrell v. Florida First National Bank, 354 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); In re Estate of Bechtel, 348 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 360 So.2d 1247 (Fla. 1978); Bordacs v. Kimmel, 139 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962).

1994E.g., Small v. Shure, 94 So.2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1957) ("Plaintiff's act of deposing defendant did not waive the protection of the statute where no part of the deposition was offered in evidence."); In re Estate of McCoy, 445 So.2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Harrell v. Florida First National Bank, 354 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); In re Estate of Bechtel, 348 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 360 So.2d 1247 (Fla. 1978); Bordacs v. Kimmel, 139 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962).

1994E.g., Small v. Shure, 94 So.2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1957) ("Plaintiff's act of deposing defendant did not waive the protection of the statute where no part of the deposition was offered in evidence."); In re Estate of McCoy, 445 So.2d 680 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Harrell v. Florida First National Bank, 354 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); In re Estate of Bechtel, 348 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 360 So.2d 1247 (Fla. 1978); Bordacs v. Kimmel, 139 So.2d 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962).

1908Langley v. Owens, 52 Fla. 302 , 42 South.