crux defense in New York

2018Petitioners' arguments that they are exempt from OAC liability because the signs are [*6]accessory use signs and that the fines imposed for the violations are excessive - alluded to by the dissent - are unpreserved ( see Matter of JT Tai , 85 AD3d at 435 ) and in any event without merit ( see Matter of Contest Promotions-NY LLC v New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals , 116 AD3d 446 [1st Dept 2014]; OTR Media Group, Inc. v City of New York , 83 AD3d 451, 454 [1st Dept 2011]).

2018Petitioners' arguments that they are exempt from OAC liability because the signs are [*6]accessory use signs and that the fines imposed for the violations are excessive - alluded to by the dissent - are unpreserved ( see Matter of JT Tai , 85 AD3d at 435 ) and in any event without merit ( see Matter of Contest Promotions-NY LLC v New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals , 116 AD3d 446 [1st Dept 2014]; OTR Media Group, Inc. v City of New York , 83 AD3d 451, 454 [1st Dept 2011]).

2018Such omissions do not, however, implicate the continuous treatment doctrine ( see id. ; Toxey v State of New York , 279 AD2d 927, 928 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 711 [2001]; Salquerro v State of New York , 212 AD2d 827, 828 [1995]).

2006In addition, because the crux of the claim was the deprivation of medical treatment for a particular period of time and not that claimant received continuing treatment for his condition, we reject his assertion that he was entitled to a tolling of the statute of limitations pursuant to the “continuing treatment” doctrine (see Salquerro v State of New York, 212 AD2d 827, 828 [1995]). " Turning to the part of claimant’s appeal seeking relief from the Court of Claims’ dismissal of the remaining two causes of action alleging the failure to supply sufficient winter clothing, those causes of action

2026Where the crux of a claim is within scope of Article 78, the claim must be brought as an Article 78 proceeding and cannot be deemed timely be couching it in some other form of legal relief (see Todras v City of New York, 11 AD3d 383,384 [1st Dept 2004]; Foster v City of New York, 157 AD2d 516, 517-518 [1st Dept 1990]; see also Almodovar v City of New York, 82 Misc.3d 1235[A] at *2 [Sup. Ct. New York County 2024] [Kingo, J.]).

2026Where the crux of a claim is within scope of Article 78, the claim must be brought as an Article 78 proceeding and cannot be deemed timely be couching it in some other form of legal relief (see Todras v City of New York, 11 AD3d 383,384 [1st Dept 2004]; Foster v City of New York, 157 AD2d 516, 517-518 [1st Dept 1990]; see also Almodovar v City of New York, 82 Misc.3d 1235[A] at *2 [Sup. Ct. New York County 2024] [Kingo, J.]).

2026Given the central importance of Baerthlein's credibility — particularly "in a case such as this, where casting doubt on the prosecution's medical proof is the crux of the defense" ( People v Caldavado , 26 NY3d 1034, 1036 [2015]) — Rain's alleged failures, if true, were not the product of a legitimate but ill-advised trial strategy ( see People v McGee , 20 NY3d at 518 ).

2026Because the issues raised by defendant cannot be resolved on the record and the motion papers alone, County Court must hold a hearing where defendant will need to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Rain knew about the impeachment material and that she failed to share that knowledge with defendant ( see CPL 440.30 [5], [6]; People v Salas , 44 NY3d 374 , 384 [2025] ; People v Caldavado , 26 NY3d at 1036-1037 ; People v Kellam , 237 AD3d 1520 , 1521 [4th Dept 2025]).

2025While these errors viewed individually may be insufficient to warrant a new trial, viewed together, where, as here, the sole evidence is the defendant's confession and the crux of the defense was the testimony of an expert in false confessions who asserted that the defendant was intellectually and psychologically predisposed to make a false confession, the errors had the cumulative effect of depriving the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial ( see People v Mattocks , 100 AD3d 930, 931; People v Engstrom , 86 AD3d 580, 581; People v Andre , 185 AD2d 276, 277-278).

2025While these errors viewed individually may be insufficient to warrant a new trial, viewed together, where, as here, the sole evidence is the defendant's confession and the crux of the defense was the testimony of an expert in false confessions who asserted that the defendant was intellectually and psychologically predisposed to make a false confession, the errors had the cumulative effect of depriving the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial ( see People v Mattocks , 100 AD3d 930, 931 ; People v Engstrom , 86 AD3d 580, 581 ; People v Andre , 185 AD2d 276, 277-278 ).

2025While these errors viewed individually may be insufficient to warrant a new trial, viewed together, where, as here, the sole evidence is the defendant's confession and the crux of the defense was the testimony of an expert in false confessions who asserted that the defendant was intellectually and psychologically predisposed to make a false confession, the errors had the cumulative effect of depriving the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial ( see People v Mattocks , 100 AD3d 930, 931; People v Engstrom , 86 AD3d 580, 581; People v Andre , 185 AD2d 276, 277-278).

2025While these errors viewed individually may be insufficient to warrant a new trial, viewed together, where, as here, the sole evidence is the defendant's confession and the crux of the defense was the testimony of an expert in false confessions who asserted that the defendant was intellectually and psychologically predisposed to make a false confession, the errors had the cumulative effect of depriving the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial ( see People v Mattocks , 100 AD3d 930, 931 ; People v Engstrom , 86 AD3d 580, 581 ; People v Andre , 185 AD2d 276, 277-278 ).

2025While these errors viewed individually may be insufficient to warrant a new trial, viewed together, where, as here, the sole evidence is the defendant's confession and the crux of the defense was the testimony of an expert in false confessions who asserted that the defendant was intellectually and psychologically predisposed to make a false confession, the errors had the cumulative effect of depriving the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial ( see People v Mattocks , 100 AD3d 930, 931; People v Engstrom , 86 AD3d 580, 581; People v Andre , 185 AD2d 276, 277-278).

2025While these errors viewed individually may be insufficient to warrant a new trial, viewed together, where, as here, the sole evidence is the defendant's confession and the crux of the defense was the testimony of an expert in false confessions who asserted that the defendant was intellectually and psychologically predisposed to make a false confession, the errors had the cumulative effect of depriving the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial ( see People v Mattocks , 100 AD3d 930, 931 ; People v Engstrom , 86 AD3d 580, 581 ; People v Andre , 185 AD2d 276, 277-278 ).

2020As the court's stated grounds for plaintiff's frivolous conduct bring the matter within CPLR 8303-a, thereby invoking the exception provided under 22 NYCRR 130-1.5, the court erred in basing any award on 22 NYCRR part 130 and was limited to providing costs and counsel fees pursuant to the statute. "[B]y the express terms of CPLR 8303—a (a), an award [to a successful party] of costs and reasonable [counsel] fees for frivolous litigation may not exceed [$10,000]" ( Zysk v Kaufman, Borgeest & Ryan, LLP , 53 AD3d 482, 483 [2008]).

2018This is because, "[i]n fixing the maximum penalty for a crime, a legislature 'include[s] within the definition of the crime itself a judgment about the seriousness of the offense' " ( Blanton , 489 US at 541 , quoting Frank , 395 US at 149 ), and "[t]he penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken 'as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments' " ( Duncan , 391 US at 160 , quoting Clawans , 300 US at 628 ). [*3] Consistent with the Supreme Court's instruction that the maximum potential penalty for a particular offense must be the crux of the analysis as to whether a right to a j

2018In that regard, the Supreme Court has articulated at least one clear rule based on the potential length of incarceration—namely, "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized" ( Baldwin , 399 US at 69 ) because the possibility of such a penalty being imposed is "sufficiently severe by itself to take the offense out of the category of 'petty' " and place it within the scope of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial protections ( id. at 69 n 6; see Blanton , 489 US at 542 ).

2018Stated differently, the "the crux of the claim was the deprivation of medical treatment for a particular period of time and not that claimant received continuing treatment for his [infection]" ( Watson v State of New York , 35 AD3d 985, 986 [2006], lv denied 8 NY3d 816 [2007]).

2018Such omissions do not, however, implicate the continuous treatment doctrine ( see id. ; Toxey v State of New York , 279 AD2d 927, 928 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 711 [2001]; Salquerro v State of New York , 212 AD2d 827, 828 [1995]).

2015Accordingly, although a hearing is not invariably required on a CPL 440.10 motion, under the circumstances presented here, defendant’s proof raised a question — in the absence of any submissions from defense counsel — as to whether counsel’s alleged deficiencies were merely the result of a reasonable, but unsuccessful, trial strategy (see generally Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 690 [1984]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]), or whether counsel failed to “pursue the minimal investigation required under the circumstances” (People v Oliveras, 21 NY3d 339, 348 [2013]).

2015Accordingly, although a hearing is not invariably required on a CPL 440.10 motion, under the circumstances presented here, defendant’s proof raised a question — in the absence of any submissions from defense counsel — as to whether counsel’s alleged deficiencies were merely the result of a reasonable, but unsuccessful, trial strategy (see generally Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 690 [1984]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]), or whether counsel failed to “pursue the minimal investigation required under the circumstances” (People v Oliveras, 21 NY3d 339, 348 [2013]).

2015Accordingly, although a hearing is not invariably required on a CPL 440.10 motion, under the circumstances presented here, defendant’s proof raised a question — in the absence of any submissions from defense counsel — as to whether counsel’s alleged deficiencies were merely the result of a reasonable, but unsuccessful, trial strategy (see generally Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 690 [1984]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]), or whether counsel failed to “pursue the minimal investigation required under the circumstances” (People v Oliveras, 21 NY3d 339, 348 [2013]).