crux inquiry in California

2023(See Morgan, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 626 .) Thus, regardless of whether Trujillo breached his duty of care to plaintiffs by 7 (See Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 629 [“ ‘The crux of the inquiry is to determine whether there is participation in some manner by the [tortfeasor] in the conduct or omission which caused the injury beyond the mere failure to perform a duty imposed upon him by law[,]’ ” italics added].) 8 The plaintiffs were “electricians who were seriously injured when they fell from a rolling scaffold which toppled over after one of its wheels fell into [the] hole .

2023(See Morgan, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 626 .) Thus, regardless of whether Trujillo breached his duty of care to plaintiffs by 7 (See Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 629 [“ ‘The crux of the inquiry is to determine whether there is participation in some manner by the [tortfeasor] in the conduct or omission which caused the injury beyond the mere failure to perform a duty imposed upon him by law[,]’ ” italics added].) 8 The plaintiffs were “electricians who were seriously injured when they fell from a rolling scaffold which toppled over after one of its wheels fell into [the] hole .

1985(At p. 381; see also Weyerhaeuser S. S. Co. v. Nacirema Co., supra, 355 U.S. at p. 568 [ 2 L.Ed.2d at p. 495 ].) Reviewing prior cases, the court concluded: “The thrust of these cases is that if the person seeking indemnity personally participates in an affirmative act of negligence, or is physically connected with an act or omission by knowledge or acquiescence in it on his part, or fails to perform some duty in connection with the omission which he may have undertaken by virtue of his agreement, he is deprived of the right of indemnity.” ( 208 Cal.App.2d at p. 382 .) “The crux of the inquiry

1975Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal.App.2d 604, 607 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 701 ]; Kennedy v. Colt (1959) 216 Ore. 647 [ 339 P.2d 450,453 ]; Rest., Restitution (1937) §§ 76, 86, 89.) In the leading case of Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal.App.2d 367, 381-382 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 301 ], Justice Molinari stated: “The crux of the inquiry [whether a right to indemnity exists] is participation in some manner by the person seeking indemnity in the conduct or omission which caused the injury beyond the mere failure to perform the duty imposed upon him by law. [Citations omitted.] The thrust of these cases is that

2016(People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 305 [defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must establish a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion]; accord, People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 568 .) As the Supreme Court cautioned in Seumanu, “‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’” (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1338 ; see People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 8

2016(People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 305 [defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must establish a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion]; accord, People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 568 .) As the Supreme Court cautioned in Seumanu, “‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’” (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1338 ; see People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 8

2016(People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 305 [defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must establish a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion]; accord, People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 568 .) As the Supreme Court cautioned in Seumanu, “‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’” (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1338 ; see People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 8

2016(People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 305 [defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must establish a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion]; accord, People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 568 .) As the Supreme Court cautioned in Seumanu, “‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’” (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1338 ; see People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 8

2016(People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 305 [defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must establish a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion]; accord, People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 568 .) As the Supreme Court cautioned in Seumanu, “‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’” (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1338 ; see People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 8

2016(People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 305 [defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must establish a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion]; accord, People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 568 .) As the Supreme Court cautioned in Seumanu, “‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’” (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1338 ; see People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 8

2016(People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 305 [defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must establish a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion]; accord, People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 568 .) As the Supreme Court cautioned in Seumanu, “‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’” (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1338 ; see People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 8

2016(People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 305 [defendant asserting prosecutorial misconduct must establish a reasonable likelihood the jury construed the remarks in an objectionable fashion]; accord, People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 568 .) As the Supreme Court cautioned in Seumanu, “‘[a]n attack on the defendant’s attorney can be seriously prejudicial as an attack on the defendant himself, and, in view of the accepted doctrines of legal ethics and decorum [citation], it is never excusable.’” (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1338 ; see People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 8

1998You may consider such evidence solely for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant actually formed the mental state which is an element of the crimes charged in Counts One and Seven, to wit, murder and attempted murder.” Relying upon our opinions in People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ] and People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 119 , 538 P.2d 247 , 92 A.L.R.3d 845 ], defendant argues that because his proposed instruction “pinpointed” the crux of his defense and related the reasonable doubt standard of proof to pa

1998You may consider such evidence solely for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant actually formed the mental state which is an element of the crimes charged in Counts One and Seven, to wit, murder and attempted murder.” Relying upon our opinions in People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ] and People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 119 , 538 P.2d 247 , 92 A.L.R.3d 845 ], defendant argues that because his proposed instruction “pinpointed” the crux of his defense and related the reasonable doubt standard of proof to pa

1976(See Morgan v. Stubblefield, supra, at pp. 625, 627 ; Cahill Brothers, Inc. v. Clementina Co., supra, at pp. 382-383; see also Pearson Ford Co. v. Ford Motor Co. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 269 , 275 . . .) “Passive negligence has been found or assumed from the failure to discover a defective condition created by others (Markley v. Beagle, supra, at pp. 955-956, 962 ), failure to exercise a right to inspect certain work and specify changes (Muth v. Urricelqui (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 901 , 911 . . .), and failure to exercise a supervisory right to order removal of defective material (Safeway Stores, In

1975(See Morgan v. Stubblefield, supra, at pp. 625, 627 ; Cahill Brothers, Inc. v. Clementina Co., supra, at pp. 382-383; see also Pearson Ford Co. v. Ford Motor Co. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 269, 275 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 279 ].) *630 Passive negligence has been found or assumed from the failure to discover a defective condition created by others (Markley v. Beagle, supra, at pp. 955-956, 962 ), failure to exercise a right to inspect certain work and specify changes (Muth v. Urricelqui (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 901, 911 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 166 ]), and failure to exercise a supervisory right to order removal of defec

1976(See Morgan v. Stubblefield, supra, at pp. 625, 627 ; Cahill Brothers, Inc. v. Clementina Co., supra, at pp. 382-383; see also Pearson Ford Co. v. Ford Motor Co. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 269 , 275 . . .) “Passive negligence has been found or assumed from the failure to discover a defective condition created by others (Markley v. Beagle, supra, at pp. 955-956, 962 ), failure to exercise a right to inspect certain work and specify changes (Muth v. Urricelqui (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 901 , 911 . . .), and failure to exercise a supervisory right to order removal of defective material (Safeway Stores, In

1975(See Morgan v. Stubblefield, supra, at pp. 625, 627 ; Cahill Brothers, Inc. v. Clementina Co., supra, at pp. 382-383; see also Pearson Ford Co. v. Ford Motor Co. (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 269, 275 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 279 ].) *630 Passive negligence has been found or assumed from the failure to discover a defective condition created by others (Markley v. Beagle, supra, at pp. 955-956, 962 ), failure to exercise a right to inspect certain work and specify changes (Muth v. Urricelqui (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 901, 911 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 166 ]), and failure to exercise a supervisory right to order removal of defec

2023FP Fails To Establish a Triable Issue Regarding Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Arose From Trujillo’s Active Negligence “Passive negligence is found in mere nonfeasance, such as the failure to discover a dangerous condition or to perform a duty imposed by law. [Citations.] Active negligence, on the other hand, is found if [a tortfeasor] has personally participated in an affirmative act of negligence, was connected with negligent acts or omissions by knowledge or acquiescence, or has failed to perform a precise duty which the [tortfeasor] had agreed to perform. [Citations.] ‘The crux of the inquiry

2023FP Fails To Establish a Triable Issue Regarding Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Arose From Trujillo’s Active Negligence “Passive negligence is found in mere nonfeasance, such as the failure to discover a dangerous condition or to perform a duty imposed by law. [Citations.] Active negligence, on the other hand, is found if [a tortfeasor] has personally participated in an affirmative act of negligence, was connected with negligent acts or omissions by knowledge or acquiescence, or has failed to perform a precise duty which the [tortfeasor] had agreed to perform. [Citations.] ‘The crux of the inquiry

2024Analysis “Pinpoint instructions ‘relate particular facts to a legal issue in the case or “pinpoint” the crux of a defendant’s case . . . .’ ” (People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333 , 348–349.) These instructions “ ‘are not required to be given sua sponte and must be given only upon request. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1117 .) A defendant who fails to request such an instruction “forfeits the claim on appeal.” (People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1001 .) Here, the burglary instruction that Reed argues should have been given at trial—an instruction that wou

2012(See, e.g., Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119.) We do not find any error in the refusal to give these instructions.

2026They changed the rules, which misled us. “[¶ . . . ¶] “After the 2005 policy year, [SCIF] came out to ReadyLink and they conducted a routine audit of our payroll and they decided that our per diem reimbursements were payroll. [¶] They said according to the applicable workers’ compensation rules and laws, our per diem was not true reimbursement, but instead, was payroll. [¶] And they claimed that because our per diem was payroll, they added 18 “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right after knowledge of the facts.” (Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 572 ; accord Lanigan v

2025(Mercury, supra, at p. 100.) 19 The court noted that “pleadings, including complaints, are not typically evidentiary matters that are submitted to a jury in adjudicating a controversy.” (Id. at p. 103.) The court further noted the demurrer that led to dismissal of the complaint was based on standing, an issue to which the exhibits did not pertain, and thus the exhibits “were not submitted as a basis for adjudication in connection with the court’s disposition of defendants’ demurrer.” (Id. at pp. 103–104.) After reviewing NBC Subsidiary and the comments of the Advisory Committee to rule 2.550,

2025(Mercury, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 100– 101.) In particular, the court relied on the Advisory Committee comment that “ ‘[t]he sealed records rules . . . do not apply to discovery proceedings, motions, and materials that are not used at trial or submitted to the court as a basis for adjudication,’ ” a different articulation of the rule 2.550(a)(3) exception that the court found reflected “the intent of the Judicial Council” when promulgating the rule.

2016In most cases, there is no need to weigh conflicting evidence because the crux of the inquiry is whether “the findings made by the government agency ... are based on substantial evidence.” ( Landgate, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1022; see Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 391 [“the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development”].) In other words, a court typically need only determine whether the condemner has done its constitutionally required homework.

2016In most cases, there is no need to weigh conflicting evidence because the crux of the inquiry is whether ―the findings made by the government agency . . . are based on substantial evidence.‖ (Landgate, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1022; see Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 391 [―the city must make some sort of individualized determination 16 that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development‖].) In other words, a court typically need only determine whether the condemner has done its constitutionally required homework.

2016In most cases, there is no need to weigh conflicting evidence because the crux of the inquiry is whether ―the findings made by the government agency . . . are based on substantial evidence.‖ (Landgate, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1022; see Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 391 [―the city must make some sort of individualized determination 16 that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development‖].) In other words, a court typically need only determine whether the condemner has done its constitutionally required homework.

2008Nonsuit Sandoval contends that nonsuit was improper on his due process claim under 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983). 9 The crux of his claim—often called a “Monell” claim—was that DPSS, a department of Los Angeles County (the County), denied Sandoval due process in declining to *1178 reinstate him pursuant to the January 2003 Commission decision when he reported for work in June 2004. 10 Under United States Code section 1983, the County cannot be held liable for Sandoval’s injuries in the absence of a “policy, official decision or custom.” (Ogborn v. City of Lancaster (2002) 1

2008Nonsuit Sandoval contends that nonsuit was improper on his due process claim under 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983). 9 The crux of his claim—often called a “Monell” claim—was that DPSS, a department of Los Angeles County (the County), denied Sandoval due process in declining to *1178 reinstate him pursuant to the January 2003 Commission decision when he reported for work in June 2004. 10 Under United States Code section 1983, the County cannot be held liable for Sandoval’s injuries in the absence of a “policy, official decision or custom.” (Ogborn v. City of Lancaster (2002) 1

2008Nonsuit Sandoval contends that nonsuit was improper on his due process claim under 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983). 9 The crux of his claim—often called a “Monell” claim—was that DPSS, a department of Los Angeles County (the County), denied Sandoval due process in declining to *1178 reinstate him pursuant to the January 2003 Commission decision when he reported for work in June 2004. 10 Under United States Code section 1983, the County cannot be held liable for Sandoval’s injuries in the absence of a “policy, official decision or custom.” (Ogborn v. City of Lancaster (2002) 1

2008Nonsuit Sandoval contends that nonsuit was improper on his due process claim under 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983). 9 The crux of his claim—often called a “Monell” claim—was that DPSS, a department of Los Angeles County (the County), denied Sandoval due process in declining to *1178 reinstate him pursuant to the January 2003 Commission decision when he reported for work in June 2004. 10 Under United States Code section 1983, the County cannot be held liable for Sandoval’s injuries in the absence of a “policy, official decision or custom.” (Ogborn v. City of Lancaster (2002) 1