5 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leigh Raymond Tamuragreen1 sentence2024See United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492 , 1497–98 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that there were alternative sources and that the elicited testimony would be “cumulative at best”); United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 601 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that the prosecutor’s testimony would be duplicative impeachment). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Albert Dupuy, United States of America v. Christie Buzard, United States of America v. Juan Antonio Tercerogreen1 sentence2024See United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492 , 1497–98 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that there were alternative sources and that the elicited testimony would be “cumulative at best”); United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 601 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that the prosecutor’s testimony would be duplicative impeachment). | 1 | 1 |
Weaver v. Grahamgreen2 sentences2003See Weaver v. Graham, 460 U.S. 24 , 31, 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). 2003See Weaver v. Graham, 460 U.S. 24 , 31, 101 S.Ct. 960 , 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blakely v. Washington
green
1 sentence2026The crux of this claim was that the sentencing court improperly aggravated his sentence in violation of various constitutional rights, including those articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). ¶6 The postconviction court denied the motion, concluding that the first claim lacked merit and the second had been previously raised and resolved. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence2026The crux of this claim was that the sentencing court improperly aggravated his sentence in violation of various constitutional rights, including those articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). ¶6 The postconviction court denied the motion, concluding that the first claim lacked merit and the second had been previously raised and resolved. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Weld County School District Re-12 v. Bymer
green
1 sentence2001The crux of the test is the "existence of employment that is reasonably available to the claimant under his or her particular cireumstances." Weld County School District RE 12 v. Bymer, supra, 955 P.2d at 558 . - PTD benefits may be awarded even if a claimant holds some type of post-injury employment. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Perez
green
2 sentences1977See United States v. Dinitz, supra; Illinois v. Somerville, supra; United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); Espinoza v. District Court, supra; Maes v. District Court, supra. The crux of this doctrine is simply that, where “manifest necessity” is demonstrated, the public interest in a fair trial and a just verdict outweighs the defendant’s dual interests in proceeding to a verdict or avoiding retrial for the same offense. 1977See United States v. Dinitz, supra; Illinois v. Somerville, supra; United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); Espinoza v. District Court, supra; Maes v. District Court, supra. The crux of this doctrine is simply that, where “manifest necessity” is demonstrated, the public interest in a fair trial and a just verdict outweighs the defendant’s dual interests in proceeding to a verdict or avoiding retrial for the same offense. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
United States v. Jorn
green
2 sentences1977See United States v. Dinitz, supra; Illinois v. Somerville, supra; United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); Espinoza v. District Court, supra; Maes v. District Court, supra. The crux of this doctrine is simply that, where “manifest necessity” is demonstrated, the public interest in a fair trial and a just verdict outweighs the defendant’s dual interests in proceeding to a verdict or avoiding retrial for the same offense. 1977See United States v. Dinitz, supra; Illinois v. Somerville, supra; United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); Espinoza v. District Court, supra; Maes v. District Court, supra. The crux of this doctrine is simply that, where “manifest necessity” is demonstrated, the public interest in a fair trial and a just verdict outweighs the defendant’s dual interests in proceeding to a verdict or avoiding retrial for the same offense. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.