crux inquiry in Indiana

1979Although the transcript does not show the necessary interrogational format for a determination of the necessity to appoint pauper counsel, Haynes v. State (1973), 155 Ind.App. 472 , 293 N.E.2d 204 ; DeFrisco v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 609 , 288 N.E.2d 576 , the court’s entry for January 12, 1978, designates Fisher as “Pauper Counsel to represent the Defendant as advisory counsel only.” Whether such an appointment fulfills the constitutional guarantee is the crux of our inquiry.

1979Although the transcript does not show the necessary interrogational format for a determination of the necessity to appoint pauper counsel, Haynes v. State (1973), 155 Ind.App. 472 , 293 N.E.2d 204 ; DeFrisco v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 609 , 288 N.E.2d 576 , the court’s entry for January 12, 1978, designates Fisher as “Pauper Counsel to represent the Defendant as advisory counsel only.” Whether such an appointment fulfills the constitutional guarantee is the crux of our inquiry.

1979Although the transcript does not show the necessary interrogational format for a determination of the necessity to appoint pauper counsel, Haynes v. State (1973), 155 Ind.App. 472 , 293 N.E.2d 204 ; DeFrisco v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 609 , 288 N.E.2d 576 , the court’s entry for January 12, 1978, designates Fisher as “Pauper Counsel to represent the Defendant as advisory counsel only.” Whether such an appointment fulfills the constitutional guarantee is the crux of our inquiry.

1979Although the transcript does not show the necessary interrogational format for a determination of the necessity to appoint pauper counsel, Haynes v. State (1973), 155 Ind.App. 472 , 293 N.E.2d 204 ; DeFrisco v. State (1972), 153 Ind.App. 609 , 288 N.E.2d 576 , the court’s entry for January 12, 1978, designates Fisher as “Pauper Counsel to represent the Defendant as advisory counsel only.” Whether such an appointment fulfills the constitutional guarantee is the crux of our inquiry.

2019Id. “‘Although the amount of time that has passed is not dispositive, a statement that is made long after the startling event is usually less likely to be an excited utterance.’” Sandefur v. State, 945 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Boatner v. State, 934 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). [9] In this case, neither party contests whether there was a startling event or whether the statement related to the event.

2017Indeed, as Driver acknowledges, “[T]he parole statutes makes no specific provision for dealing with consecutive sentences.” Hannis, 816 N.E.2d at 877 .

2012Co., Inc. v. McCarrell, 163 Ind. App. 613 , 325 N.E.2d 844 (1975), reh’g denied, in which the court addressed whether the jury was improperly instructed upon loss of earning as an element of damages.

2012Co., Inc. v. McCarrell, 163 Ind. App. 613 , 325 N.E.2d 844 (1975), reh’g denied, in which the court addressed whether the jury was improperly instructed upon loss of earning as an element of damages.

2011It does not apply to statements obtained by “luck or happenstance.” See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176 , 106 S.Ct. 477 .

2006Of course, nearly every duty by an obligor can be argued to have been bargained for; however, the crux of this test is whether that obligation goes to very essence of the contract such that it marks a duty "of a personal nature." Id.