crux inquiry in Maryland

2010When a defendant seeks to cross-examine a State’s witness to show bias or motive, “the crux of the inquiry insofar as its relevance is concerned, is the witness’s state of mind.” Smallwood, 320 Md. at 309, 577 A.2d at 360 (quoting Brown, 74 Md.App. at 421 , 538 A.2d at 320 ); accord Calloway, 414 Md. at 636-38 , 996 A.2d at 880-81 ; see also Hoover v. State, 714 F.2d 301, 305 (4th Cir.1983) (“The vital question ... is what the witness understands he or she will receive” because the “likelihood that a prosecution witness is shading or even contriving testimony adverse to the defendant reasonabl

2010When a defendant seeks to cross-examine a State’s witness to show bias or motive, “the crux of the inquiry insofar as its relevance is concerned, is the witness’s state of mind.” Smallwood, 320 Md. at 309, 577 A.2d at 360 (quoting Brown, 74 Md.App. at 421 , 538 A.2d at 320 ); accord Calloway, 414 Md. at 636-38 , 996 A.2d at 880-81 ; see also Hoover v. State, 714 F.2d 301, 305 (4th Cir.1983) (“The vital question ... is what the witness understands he or she will receive” because the “likelihood that a prosecution witness is shading or even contriving testimony adverse to the defendant reasonabl

2018Co. v. Brock , 430 Md. 714 , 727, 63 A.3d 40 (2013) (quoting Lippert v. Jung , 366 Md. 221 , 227, 783 A.2d 206 (2001) ).

2018Co. v. Brock , 430 Md. 714 , 727, 63 A.3d 40 (2013) (quoting Lippert v. Jung , 366 Md. 221 , 227, 783 A.2d 206 (2001) ).

2015The older cases relied upon by the Hardisty Court, such as Armstrong Enterprises v. Citizens Building & Loan Ass’n of Montgomery County, 244 Md. 545 , 224 A.2d 456 (1966), have not been overruled.

2015The older cases relied upon by the Hardisty Court, such as Armstrong Enterprises v. Citizens Building & Loan Ass’n of Montgomery County, 244 Md. 545 , 224 A.2d 456 (1966), have not been overruled.

2015Advancing to the crux of its analysis, the Hardisty Court analogized the position of a tax sale certificate holder in a proceeding to foreclose the right of redemption to that of a mortgagee, 268 Md. at 212 , 299 A.2d 771 , an analogy the Court of Appeals cited with approval as recently as 1996, see Magraw v. Dillow, 341 Md. 492, 505 , 671 A.2d 485 (1996).

2015Advancing to the crux of its analysis, the Hardisty Court analogized the position of a tax sale certificate holder in a proceeding to foreclose the right of redemption to that of a mortgagee, 268 Md. at 212 , 299 A.2d 771 , an analogy the Court of Appeals cited with approval as recently as 1996, see Magraw v. Dillow, 341 Md. 492, 505 , 671 A.2d 485 (1996).

2015Advancing to the crux of its analysis, the Hardisty Court analogized the position of a tax sale certificate holder in a proceeding to foreclose the right of redemption to that of a mortgagee, 268 Md. at 212 , 299 A.2d 771 , an analogy the Court of Appeals cited with approval as recently as 1996, see Magraw v. Dillow, 341 Md. 492, 505 , 671 A.2d 485 (1996).

2015Advancing to the crux of its analysis, the Hardisty Court analogized the position of a tax sale certificate holder in a proceeding to foreclose the right of redemption to that of a mortgagee, 268 Md. at 212 , 299 A.2d 771 , an analogy the Court of Appeals cited with approval as recently as 1996, see Magraw v. Dillow, 341 Md. 492, 505 , 671 A.2d 485 (1996).

2012Second, the McFadden court used as authority for its position Fowlkes v. State, 117 Md.App. 573 , 701 A.2d 862 (1997).

2012Second, the McFadden court used as authority for its position Fowlkes v. State, 117 Md.App. 573 , 701 A.2d 862 (1997).

2011Id.

2011Id.

2011What is essential to the preservation of the right to cross-examine is that the interrogator be permitted to probe into whether the witness is acting under a hope or belief of leniency or reward.’ ” Brown, 74 Md.App. at 421 , 538 A.2d 317 (quoting Fletcher v. State, 50 Md.App. 349, 359 , 437 A.2d 901 (1981)).

2011What is essential to the preservation of the right to cross-examine is that the interrogator be permitted to probe into whether the witness is acting under a hope or belief of leniency or reward.’ ” Brown, 74 Md.App. at 421 , 538 A.2d 317 (quoting Fletcher v. State, 50 Md.App. 349, 359 , 437 A.2d 901 (1981)).

2006In the absence of any cases directly on point supporting his position from this Court, Mr. DeHaan points to Carrigan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 326 Or. 97 , 949 P.2d 705 (1997), for the proposition that injuries sustained in the course of a carjacking are covered under statutes that provide benefits “for injuries ‘resulting from the use, occupancy, or maintenance of any motor vehicle....'" Id. at 99, 949 P.2d at 706 .

2006In the absence of any cases directly on point supporting his position from this Court, Mr. DeHaan points to Carrigan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 326 Or. 97 , 949 P.2d 705 (1997), for the proposition that injuries sustained in the course of a carjacking are covered under statutes that provide benefits “for injuries ‘resulting from the use, occupancy, or maintenance of any motor vehicle....'" Id. at 99, 949 P.2d at 706 .

2005The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed Napoleone's conviction, explaining: Since the crux of the defense was that while the defendant had lied concerning the purpose of his investigation he had not presented himself as ["]an employee of the Veterans Administration,["] he had the right to have prospective jurors questioned as to whether they had such a moral or ethical repugnance toward liars and lying that they could not evaluate his testimony ["]objectively and fairly.["] Id. at 354 .

2005The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed Napoleone’s conviction, explaining: Since the crux of the defense was that while the defendant had lied concerning the purpose of his investigation he had not presented himself as [“]an employee of the Veterans Administration^”] he had the right to have prospective jurors questioned as to whether they had such a moral or ethical repugnance toward liars and lying that they could not evaluate his testimony [“]objectively and fairly.[”] Id. at 354 .

1981Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213 (1980); Accord, United States v. Crumley, 565 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1978). *359 As these cases suggest, the crux of the inquiry insofar as its relevance is concerned, is the witness’s state of mind.

1977The Court of Appeals in Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md. 127 , 128 A. 2d 430 (1957), a case involving the installation of metal awnings in *659 violation of restrictions requiring prior submission and approval, said: “The real crux of the inquiry in determining whether there has been such a change in the neighborhood so as to defeat the covenant is to ascertain the purposes to be accomplished by the imposition of the restrictions. [W]e think the reasons for them were to develop an attractive and inviting community.

1977The Court of Appeals in Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md. 127 , 128 A. 2d 430 (1957), a case involving the installation of metal awnings in *659 violation of restrictions requiring prior submission and approval, said: “The real crux of the inquiry in determining whether there has been such a change in the neighborhood so as to defeat the covenant is to ascertain the purposes to be accomplished by the imposition of the restrictions. [W]e think the reasons for them were to develop an attractive and inviting community.

1970In Lustig v. United States, 338 U. S. 74 (1949) the Court said of the Byars holding: “The crux of that doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver platter.” At 78-79. 3 .