24 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Culbersongreen2 sentences2026To date, “a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel or with an invalid waiver of the right to counsel has been the only constitutional infirmity that has been recognized by the Ohio or the United States Supreme Courts with regard to a collateral attack on a conviction that was used to enhance a criminal penalty.” State v. Gerken, 2023-Ohio- 2244, ¶ 25 (6th Dist.), citing Phillips at ¶ 7 , citing State v. Culberson, 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 659, 660 (7th Dist. 2001); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S.485, 496-497 (1994) (dealing with federal sentencing statutes). {¶ 22} “Both 2026To date, “a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel or with an invalid waiver of the right to counsel has been the only constitutional infirmity that has been recognized by the Ohio or the United States Supreme Courts with regard to a collateral attack on a conviction that was used to enhance a criminal penalty.” State v. Gerken, 2023-Ohio- 2244, ¶ 25 (6th Dist.), citing Phillips at ¶ 7 , citing State v. Culberson, 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 659, 660 (7th Dist. 2001); see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S.485, 496-497 (1994) (dealing with federal sentencing statutes). {¶ 22} “Both | 2 | 9 |
State v. Brandongreen2 sentences2005“That infirmity consists of a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel, or its corollary, an invalid waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Culberson (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 660 , 756 N.E.2d 734 , citing State v. Brandon (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 85, 86 , 543 N.E.2d 501 ; Baldasar v. Illinois (1980), 446 U.S. 222, 226 , 100 S.Ct. 1585 , 64 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Nichols v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 738 , 114 S.Ct. 1921 , 128 L.Ed.2d 745 ; Custis v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 485, 496 , 114 S.Ct. 1732 , 128 L.Ed.2d 517 . 2005“That infirmity consists of a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel, or its corollary, an invalid waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Culberson (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 660 , 756 N.E.2d 734 , citing State v. Brandon (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 85, 86 , 543 N.E.2d 501 ; Baldasar v. Illinois (1980), 446 U.S. 222, 226 , 100 S.Ct. 1585 , 64 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Nichols v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 738 , 114 S.Ct. 1921 , 128 L.Ed.2d 745 ; Custis v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 485, 496 , 114 S.Ct. 1732 , 128 L.Ed.2d 517 . | 1 | 5 |
State v. Hoguegreen1 sentence2026State v. Hogue, 2018-Ohio-1109, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.). {¶25} Garee contends that he made a prima facie showing that his 2009 plea was uncounseled. | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Calabresegreen2 sentences2023See Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 Ohio St.3d 334 , 2002-Ohio-2217 , 767 N.E.2d 725 , ¶ 15 (“Where an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior actions taken without jurisdiction”). {¶ 23} Our judgment granting a peremptory writ of prohibition against Judge Kirby renders moot Reynolds’s request for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Loxley from giving effect to the invalid immunity order because there is no suggestion in the record that Judge 2023See Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 Ohio St.3d 334 , 2002-Ohio-2217 , 767 N.E.2d 725 , ¶ 15 (“Where an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior actions taken without jurisdiction”). {¶ 23} Our judgment granting a peremptory writ of prohibition against Judge Kirby renders moot Reynolds’s request for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Loxley from giving effect to the invalid immunity order because there is no suggestion in the record that Judge | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Calabresegreen2 sentences2023See Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 Ohio St.3d 334 , 2002-Ohio-2217 , 767 N.E.2d 725 , ¶ 15 (“Where an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior actions taken without jurisdiction”). {¶ 23} Our judgment granting a peremptory writ of prohibition against Judge Kirby renders moot Reynolds’s request for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Loxley from giving effect to the invalid immunity order because there is no suggestion in the record that Judge 2023See Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 Ohio St.3d 334 , 2002-Ohio-2217 , 767 N.E.2d 725 , ¶ 15 (“Where an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior actions taken without jurisdiction”). {¶ 23} Our judgment granting a peremptory writ of prohibition against Judge Kirby renders moot Reynolds’s request for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Loxley from giving effect to the invalid immunity order because there is no suggestion in the record that Judge | 1 | 1 |
State v. O'Neillgreen1 sentence2001See, also, State v. O'Neill (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 48 , 52-53 . | 1 | 1 |
Forester v. Scottgreen2 sentences1981We adopt the following statement from the case of Forester v. Scott (1973), 38 Ohio App. 2d 15, at 18 [ 67 O.O.2d 158 ] (footnotes omitted): “In this regard, there has emerged a divergency of views regarding the legal significance which should be attached to a forbearance based on an invalid claim. 1981We adopt the following statement from the case of Forester v. Scott (1973), 38 Ohio App. 2d 15, at 18 [ 67 O.O.2d 158 ] (footnotes omitted): “In this regard, there has emerged a divergency of views regarding the legal significance which should be attached to a forbearance based on an invalid claim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Custis v. United States
green
2 sentences2009Id. at 496-497 . {¶ 12} In State v. Culberson , 142 Ohio App.3d 656 , 2001-Ohio-3261 , the court held that, "when a criminal defendant is collaterally challenging a prior penalty-enhancing conviction on the basis of constitutional infirmity, the only recognized constitutional infirmity is that he or she was denied the fundamental right to be represented by counsel, or the necessary corollary, an invalid waiver of the right to counsel." Id. at 662-663; see also State v. Rockburn , 8th Dist. 2005“That infirmity consists of a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel, or its corollary, an invalid waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Culberson (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 660 , 756 N.E.2d 734 , citing State v. Brandon (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 85, 86 , 543 N.E.2d 501 ; Baldasar v. Illinois (1980), 446 U.S. 222, 226 , 100 S.Ct. 1585 , 64 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Nichols v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 738 , 114 S.Ct. 1921 , 128 L.Ed.2d 745 ; Custis v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 485, 496 , 114 S.Ct. 1732 , 128 L.Ed.2d 517 . | 7 | 2001–2018 |
Nichols v. United States
green
2 sentences2005“That infirmity consists of a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel, or its corollary, an invalid waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Culberson (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 660 , 756 N.E.2d 734 , citing State v. Brandon (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 85, 86 , 543 N.E.2d 501 ; Baldasar v. Illinois (1980), 446 U.S. 222, 226 , 100 S.Ct. 1585 , 64 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Nichols v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 738 , 114 S.Ct. 1921 , 128 L.Ed.2d 745 ; Custis v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 485, 496 , 114 S.Ct. 1732 , 128 L.Ed.2d 517 . 2005“That infirmity consists of a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel, or its corollary, an invalid waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Culberson (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 660 , 756 N.E.2d 734 , citing State v. Brandon (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 85, 86 , 543 N.E.2d 501 ; Baldasar v. Illinois (1980), 446 U.S. 222, 226 , 100 S.Ct. 1585 , 64 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Nichols v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 738 , 114 S.Ct. 1921 , 128 L.Ed.2d 745 ; Custis v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 485, 496 , 114 S.Ct. 1732 , 128 L.Ed.2d 517 . | 4 | 2001–2005 |
Baldasar v. Illinois
red
2 sentences2005“That infirmity consists of a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel, or its corollary, an invalid waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Culberson (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 660 , 756 N.E.2d 734 , citing State v. Brandon (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 85, 86 , 543 N.E.2d 501 ; Baldasar v. Illinois (1980), 446 U.S. 222, 226 , 100 S.Ct. 1585 , 64 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Nichols v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 738 , 114 S.Ct. 1921 , 128 L.Ed.2d 745 ; Custis v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 485, 496 , 114 S.Ct. 1732 , 128 L.Ed.2d 517 . 2005“That infirmity consists of a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel, or its corollary, an invalid waiver of the right to counsel.” State v. Culberson (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 660 , 756 N.E.2d 734 , citing State v. Brandon (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 85, 86 , 543 N.E.2d 501 ; Baldasar v. Illinois (1980), 446 U.S. 222, 226 , 100 S.Ct. 1585 , 64 L.Ed.2d 169 ; Nichols v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 738 , 114 S.Ct. 1921 , 128 L.Ed.2d 745 ; Custis v. United States (1994), 511 U.S. 485, 496 , 114 S.Ct. 1732 , 128 L.Ed.2d 517 . | 4 | 2001–2005 |
State v. Henderson (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2025The State opposed the motion, contending that the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent holdings in State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480 , 2020-Ohio-2913 , 159 N.E.3d 248 , and State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2020-Ohio-4784 , 162 N.E.3d 776 , did not afford Levy relief from his conviction because (1) a denial of counsel renders a conviction voidable, and (2) res judicata prevented Levy from this challenge because he could have raised this issue in his direct appeal. 2025The State opposed the motion, contending that the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent holdings in State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480 , 2020-Ohio-2913 , 159 N.E.3d 248 , and State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2020-Ohio-4784 , 162 N.E.3d 776 , did not afford Levy relief from his conviction because (1) a denial of counsel renders a conviction voidable, and (2) res judicata prevented Levy from this challenge because he could have raised this issue in his direct appeal. | 2 | 2023–2025 |
State v. Harper (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2025The State opposed the motion, contending that the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent holdings in State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480 , 2020-Ohio-2913 , 159 N.E.3d 248 , and State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2020-Ohio-4784 , 162 N.E.3d 776 , did not afford Levy relief from his conviction because (1) a denial of counsel renders a conviction voidable, and (2) res judicata prevented Levy from this challenge because he could have raised this issue in his direct appeal. 2025The State opposed the motion, contending that the Ohio Supreme Court’s recent holdings in State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480 , 2020-Ohio-2913 , 159 N.E.3d 248 , and State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285 , 2020-Ohio-4784 , 162 N.E.3d 776 , did not afford Levy relief from his conviction because (1) a denial of counsel renders a conviction voidable, and (2) res judicata prevented Levy from this challenge because he could have raised this issue in his direct appeal. | 2 | 2023–2025 |
State v. Brooke
green
2 sentences2018However, there is a limited right to collaterally attack a conviction when the state proposes to use the past conviction to enhance the penalty of a later criminal offense.” State v. Brooke, 113 Ohio St.3d 199 , 2007-Ohio-1533 , ¶ 8. {¶16} While there is a limited right to collaterally attack a prior conviction used as a penalty-enhancement, courts have held that the “ ‘only recognized constitutional infirmity [to collaterally attack a prior, penalty-enhancing conviction] is that [a defendant] was denied the fundamental right to be represented by counsel, or the necessary corollary, an invalid 2016We disagree. {¶6} R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d) states the following: Except as otherwise provided in division (G)(1)(e) of this section, an offender who, within six years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or four violations of division (A) or (B) of this section or other equivalent offenses or an offender who, within twenty years of the offense, previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to five or more violations of that nature is guilty of a felony of the fourth degree. {¶7} In State v. Brooke, 113 Ohio St.3d 199 , 2007-Ohio-1533 , syllabus, the Sup | 2 | 2016–2018 |
State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2023Although a sentence imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a structural error that is reversible on appeal, see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-659 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), fn. 25, such a sentence is not void ab initio for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, see Bozsik v. Hudson, 110 Ohio St.3d 245 , 2006-Ohio-4356 , 852 N.E.2d 1200 , ¶ 9 (explaining that an invalid waiver of counsel does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction). {¶ 22} Because this court’s decision in Ogle II, 167 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2021- Ohio-4453, 190 N.E.3d 594 , is i 2023Although a sentence imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a structural error that is reversible on appeal, see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-659 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), fn. 25, such a sentence is not void ab initio for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, see Bozsik v. Hudson, 110 Ohio St.3d 245 , 2006-Ohio-4356 , 852 N.E.2d 1200 , ¶ 9 (explaining that an invalid waiver of counsel does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction). {¶ 22} Because this court’s decision in Ogle II, 167 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2021- Ohio-4453, 190 N.E.3d 594 , is i | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bozsik v. Hudson
green
1 sentence2023Although a sentence imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a structural error that is reversible on appeal, see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-659 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), fn. 25, such a sentence is not void ab initio for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, see Bozsik v. Hudson, 110 Ohio St.3d 245 , 2006-Ohio-4356 , 852 N.E.2d 1200 , ¶ 9 (explaining that an invalid waiver of counsel does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction). {¶ 22} Because this court’s decision in Ogle II, 167 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2021- Ohio-4453, 190 N.E.3d 594 , is i | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2023Although a sentence imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a structural error that is reversible on appeal, see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-659 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), fn. 25, such a sentence is not void ab initio for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, see Bozsik v. Hudson, 110 Ohio St.3d 245 , 2006-Ohio-4356 , 852 N.E.2d 1200 , ¶ 9 (explaining that an invalid waiver of counsel does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction). {¶ 22} Because this court’s decision in Ogle II, 167 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2021- Ohio-4453, 190 N.E.3d 594 , is i 2023Although a sentence imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a structural error that is reversible on appeal, see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-659 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), fn. 25, such a sentence is not void ab initio for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, see Bozsik v. Hudson, 110 Ohio St.3d 245 , 2006-Ohio-4356 , 852 N.E.2d 1200 , ¶ 9 (explaining that an invalid waiver of counsel does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction). {¶ 22} Because this court’s decision in Ogle II, 167 Ohio St.3d 181 , 2021- Ohio-4453, 190 N.E.3d 594 , is i | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Haught
green
1 sentence2023State v. Haught, 670 N.E.2d 232 , 1996-Ohio-353 (1996). {¶47} Appellant correctly argues, and the state concedes, the waiver of jury trial in this case was invalid. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Lowe
neutral
1 sentence2018Columbiana No. 08CO37 , 2010-Ohio-2788, ¶ 25 , quoting State v. Culberson, 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 662-663 , 2001-Ohio-3261 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Armbruster, Unpublished Decision (1-26-2004)
neutral
1 sentence2016No. 9-03-15, 2004-Ohio-289 ], at ¶7, quoting Culberson, supra.” Id. at ¶21. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Zamorski
green
2 sentences2011Id. at 524-25 . {¶10} Here, the State wanted to use the readings obtained during the invalid test. 2011Id. at 524-25 . {¶10} Here, the State wanted to use the readings obtained during the invalid test. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2010This court has held that "when a criminal defendant is collaterally challenging a prior penalty-enhancing conviction on the basis of constitutional infirmity, the only recognized constitutional infirmity is that he or she was denied the fundamental right to be represented by counsel, or the necessary corollary, an invalid waiver of the right to counsel." State v. Culberson, 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 662-663 , 2001-Ohio-3261 , 756 N.E.2d 734 . {¶26} Once the State has proven the existence of the defendant's prior -7- convictions, the onus is on the defendant to make "a prima facie showing that he ha 2010This court has held that "when a criminal defendant is collaterally challenging a prior penalty-enhancing conviction on the basis of constitutional infirmity, the only recognized constitutional infirmity is that he or she was denied the fundamental right to be represented by counsel, or the necessary corollary, an invalid waiver of the right to counsel." State v. Culberson, 142 Ohio App.3d 656, 662-663 , 2001-Ohio-3261 , 756 N.E.2d 734 . {¶26} Once the State has proven the existence of the defendant's prior -7- convictions, the onus is on the defendant to make "a prima facie showing that he ha | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Brooke
neutral
2 sentences2009No. 82196, 2003-Ohio-3537 , at ¶ 10; State v. Brooke , 165 Ohio App.3d 409 , 2005-Ohio-6161 , at ¶ 9 . {¶ 13} In this case, Dowhan did not allege that he was not represented by counsel in his prior case or that he entered an invalid waiver of the right to counsel. 2009No. 82196, 2003-Ohio-3537 , at ¶ 10; State v. Brooke , 165 Ohio App.3d 409 , 2005-Ohio-6161 , at ¶ 9 . {¶ 13} In this case, Dowhan did not allege that he was not represented by counsel in his prior case or that he entered an invalid waiver of the right to counsel. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Charles Rosenthal
green
1 sentence2006However, the Second Circuit held “that the specific ‘factual background’ may in some instances excuse the judge’s failure to give ‘explicit warning and advice’ regarding the waiver of counsel.” Id., quoting United States v. Rosenthal (C.A.2, 1972), 470 F.2d 837, 845 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States Ex Rel. Harold Konigsberg v. Leon J. Vincent, Superintendent of Green Haven Correctional Facility
green
2 sentences2006The trial court directed that counsel sit at counsel table and assist, id. at 133 , and the defendant “conferred] repeatedly with his lawyers throughout the trial.” Id. at 134 . {¶ 94} Konigsberg argued that this constituted an invalid waiver of counsel “because the [trial] judge failed to explore the consequences with him on the record.” Id. 2006The trial court directed that counsel sit at counsel table and assist, id. at 133 , and the defendant “conferred] repeatedly with his lawyers throughout the trial.” Id. at 134 . {¶ 94} Konigsberg argued that this constituted an invalid waiver of counsel “because the [trial] judge failed to explore the consequences with him on the record.” Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Tate
green
2 sentences1998In State v. Tate (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 50 , 13 O.O.3d 36 , 391 N.E.2d 738 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that, absent a valid waiver of the defendant’s right to a jury trial, the trial court lacks “jurisdiction” to try the defendant without a jury. 1998In State v. Tate (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 50 , 13 O.O.3d 36 , 391 N.E.2d 738 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that, absent a valid waiver of the defendant’s right to a jury trial, the trial court lacks “jurisdiction” to try the defendant without a jury. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Davis v. Wallace
green
1 sentence1976In Davis v. Wallace (1922), 257 U. S. 478 , the United States Supreme Court struck down a tax statute that contained an invalid exception. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.