invalid waiver in Texas

2016Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 709, 714 (Tex. 2008), and an agency decision based on an invalid rule must be reversed and remanded to the agency if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced thereby, see Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.174(2) (specifying when trial court must reverse and remand agency decision).

2015Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 709, 714 (Tex.2008), and an agency decision based on an invalid rule must be reversed and remanded to the agency if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced thereby, see Gov’t Code § 2001.174(2) (specifying when trial court must reverse and remand agency decision).

2012See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.163; see also Acker, 949 S.W.2d at 316 (holding that trial court’s *846 failure to admonish contemnor of her right to counsel under 157.163 rendered subsequent contempt order void, despite the fact parties had agreed to the contempt order); In re Pass, No. 02-05-00457-CV, 2006 WL 668744 , *3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Mar. 16, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding that eontemnor’s answer of “[s]ure” to trial court request to proceed with contempt hearing an invalid waiver of right to counsel because trial court had not yet admonished contemnor under 157.163).

2012Code Ann. § 157.163 ; see also Acker, 949 S.W.2d at 316 (holding that trial court’s failure to admonish contemnor of her right to counsel under 157.163 rendered subsequent contempt order void, despite the fact parties had agreed to the contempt order); In re Pass, No. 02–05–00457–CV, 2006 WL 668744 , *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 16, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding that contemnor’s answer of “[s]ure” to trial court request to proceed with contempt hearing an invalid waiver of right to counsel because trial court had not yet admonished contemnor under 157.163).

2014Montenegro v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 419 S.W.3d 561, 572 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, pet. denied); see Vernon v. Perrien, 390 S.W.3d 47, 61 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied).

2013See Vernon, 390 S.W.3d at 61 .

2025Tex. State Bd. Of Pharm. v. Witcher, 447 S.W.3d 520, 527 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. denied) (“A rule that is not properly promulgated under mandatory APA procedures is invalid . . . and an agency decision based on an invalid rule must be reversed and remanded to the agency if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced 13 Under 16 Texas Administrative Code Section 25.5(42)(A), the term “electric utility” explicitly excludes a municipal corporation. 50 thereby.”) (citing El Paso Hosp.

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 Texas State Board of Pharmacy v. Witcher, 447 S.W.3d 520 (2014) [11] Health Review Board of Pharmacy waived appellate review of any error in trial court’s order concerning the scope of remand following invalidation of Board’s reciprocal-discipline policy as an invalid rule not promulgated in accordance with Administrative Procedure Act (APA), where Board did not challenge the trial court’s order with respect to the scope of remand.

2025See Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 531 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) [(op. on reh’g)].

2020See Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 531 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

2024Safety v. Salazar, 304 S.W.3d 896, 903 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (explaining that plaintiffs may seek both declaratory and injunctive relief because Section 2001.038’s purpose “is to obtain a final declaration of a rule’s validity before the rule is applied” (quoting Rutherford Oil Corp. v. General Land Office of State of Tex., 776 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex. 48 between the parties about whether the Department Statement is an invalid rule under the APA remains live, and Roe’s and the Briggles’ APA claims that form the basis for the temporary injunction are not moot.

2024Safety v. Salazar, 304 S.W.3d 896, 903 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (emphasis in original) (quoting Rutherford Oil Corp. v. General Land Off., 776 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no writ)).

2024Safety v. Salazar, 304 S.W.3d 896, 903 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (explaining that plaintiffs may seek both declaratory and injunctive relief because Section 2001.038’s purpose “is to obtain a final declaration of a rule’s validity before the rule is applied” (quoting Rutherford Oil Corp. v. General Land Office of State of Tex., 776 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex. 48 between the parties about whether the Department Statement is an invalid rule under the APA remains live, and Roe’s and the Briggles’ APA claims that form the basis for the temporary injunction are not moot.

2024Safety v. Salazar, 304 S.W.3d 896, 903 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (emphasis in original) (quoting Rutherford Oil Corp. v. General Land Off., 776 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no writ)).

2008See Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-42 .

2008See Downer , 701 S.W.2d at 241–42.

2005See id.

2004See id.

1993On appeal, by one point of error, FSB contends that the trial court erred because it "has jurisdiction to entertain a request for and grant declaratory relief against an invalid rule adopted by the Comptroller." FSB relies on two cases from this Court to support its position that it may bring a declaratory judgment to challenge a Comptroller's rule: Bullock v. Marathon Oil Co. , 798 S.W.2d 353, 359-61 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, no writ); Hammerman & Gainer, Inc. v. Bullock , 791 S.W.2d 330, 331 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, no writ).

1993On appeal, by one point of error, FSB contends that the trial court erred because it “has jurisdiction to entertain a request for and grant declaratory relief against an invalid rule adopted by the Comptroller.” FSB relies on two cases from this Court to support its position that it may bring a declaratory judgment to challenge a Comptroller’s rule: Bullock v. Marathon Oil Co., 798 S.W.2d 353, 359-61 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no writ); Hammerman & Gainer, Inc. v. Bullock, 791 S.W.2d 330, 331 (Tex.App.— *83-95 Austin 1990, no writ).

1993On appeal, by one point of error, FSB contends that the trial court erred because it "has jurisdiction to entertain a request for and grant declaratory relief against an invalid rule adopted by the Comptroller." FSB relies on two cases from this Court to support its position that it may bring a declaratory judgment to challenge a Comptroller's rule: Bullock v. Marathon Oil Co. , 798 S.W.2d 353, 359-61 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, no writ); Hammerman & Gainer, Inc. v. Bullock , 791 S.W.2d 330, 331 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, no writ).

1993On appeal, by one point of error, FSB contends that the trial court erred because it “has jurisdiction to entertain a request for and grant declaratory relief against an invalid rule adopted by the Comptroller.” FSB relies on two cases from this Court to support its position that it may bring a declaratory judgment to challenge a Comptroller’s rule: Bullock v. Marathon Oil Co., 798 S.W.2d 353, 359-61 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, no writ); Hammerman & Gainer, Inc. v. Bullock, 791 S.W.2d 330, 331 (Tex.App.— *83-95 Austin 1990, no writ).

2025“An invalid waiver waives nothing.” Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353, 358 (Tex. Crim.

2025“An invalid waiver waives nothing.” Osorio-Lopez, 663 S.W.3d at 756 (quoting Williams, 252 S.W.3d at 358 ).

2023Teon Mgmt., LLC v. Turquoise Bay Corp., 357 S.W.3d 719 , 726–27 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, pet. denied).

2018Teon Mgmt., LLC v. Turquoise Bay Corp., 357 S.W.3d 719, 726-27 (Tex.App.--Eastland 2011, pet. denied).

2024See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 , 65–66 (2000); Miller ex rel.

2024See Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (characterizing natural parental right as essential, basic civil right).

2024See id. art.

2024Entertainment Publ’ns, 292 S.W.3d at 715, 719 .

2022It is true that plaintiffs must show “concrete 4 injury.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2008).

2021Mindy cannot demonstrate reversible error because the agreed docket control order that she references—and challenges as an invalid waiver of her right to a jury trial—is not in the appellate record.1 It is well settled that “[t]he appellant bears the burden to bring forward on appeal a sufficient record to show the error committed by the trial court.” Huston v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 434 S.W.3d 630, 636 (Tex. 1 Allan has attached the agreed docket control order—along with three previous docket control orders—as an appendix to his brief.

2019App. 1997) (holding that, “if an indigent defendant is not entitled to an ex parte hearing on his Ake motion, he is forced to choose between either foregoing the appointment of an expert disclosing to the State in some detail his defensive theories about weaknesses in the State’s case” and that this result “is contrary to Ake’s concern that an indigent defendant who is entitled to expert assistance have ‘meaningful access to justice,’ and undermines the work product doctrine”). 12 See Reese v. State, 772 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. App.—Waco 1989, pet. ref’d) (holding that, “when a rule may be fairl

2019See Thomson v. Locke, 66 Tex. 383 , 1 S.W.112, 115 (Tex. 1886) (holding that a suit to quiet title lies “to enable the holder of the feeblest equity to remove from his way to legal title any unlawful hindrance having the appearance of better right”).