invalid exception in Maryland

13 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 1937–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

Case	Followed	Cited
Jackson v. Dackman Co.green md · 2011 · cited in 2 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 2 sentences 2017After striking down the Act’s immunity provisions, the Court declined to invalidate the Act as a whole, concluding that the “dominant purpose of the Act can be given effect without the invalid immunity provisions.” Dackman, 422 Md. at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2017After striking down the Act’s immunity provisions, the Court declined to invalidate the Act as a whole, concluding that the “dominant purpose of the Act can be given effect without the invalid immunity provisions.” Dackman, 422 Md. at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted).	2	2
Michael Robert Pulido v. Chris Chrones, Warden, Michael Robert Pulido v. Chris Chrones, Wardengreen ca9 · 2007 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Pulido v. Chrones, 487 F.3d 669, 676 (9th Cir.2007). 2009Pulido v. Chrones, 487 F.3d 669, 676 (9th Cir.2007).	1	1
Turner v. Stategreen md · 1984 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995 2 sentences 1995In Turner v. State, 299 Md. 565, 576-577 , 474 A.2d 1297, 1302-1303 (1984), this Court reviewed the principles of sever-ability applicable to a prohibitory statute with an invalid exception: “The primary focus in questions of severability is legislative intent. 1995In Turner v. State, 299 Md. 565, 576-577 , 474 A.2d 1297, 1302-1303 (1984), this Court reviewed the principles of sever-ability applicable to a prohibitory statute with an invalid exception: “The primary focus in questions of severability is legislative intent.	1	1
Davidson v. Millergreen md · 1975 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 2 sentences 1987In the earlier case of Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 83 , 344 A.2d 422, 439 (1975), the Court stated the principle in more imperative terms: Likewise we mention that even though constitutional and unconstitutional provisions of a law are contained in the same section, the entire section or enactment is not invalid unless the provisions are essentially and inseparably connected in substance____ It thus becomes the duty of the court whenever possible to separate the valid from the invalid provisions____ Cities Service v. Governor, 290 Md. 553 , 431 A.2d 663 (1981), tempers this declaration by 1987In the earlier case of Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 83 , 344 A.2d 422, 439 (1975), the Court stated the principle in more imperative terms: Likewise we mention that even though constitutional and unconstitutional provisions of a law are contained in the same section, the entire section or enactment is not invalid unless the provisions are essentially and inseparably connected in substance____ It thus becomes the duty of the court whenever possible to separate the valid from the invalid provisions____ Cities Service v. Governor, 290 Md. 553 , 431 A.2d 663 (1981), tempers this declaration by	1	1
J. Bernstein & Sons v. Hobelmangreen md · 1889 · cited in 1 Maryland opinions naming this issue, 1937–1937 2 sentences 1937Supra; Bernstein & Sons v. Hobelman, Trustee, 70 Md. 29, 37, 38 , 16 A. 374 . 1937Supra; Bernstein & Sons v. Hobelman, Trustee, 70 Md. 29, 37, 38 , 16 A. 374 .	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

Case	Cited	Years
State v. Schuller green md · 1977 2 sentences 1985A long established principle of statutory construction in determining severability questions, is that where the Legislature enacts a prohibition with an excepted class, and a court finds that the classification is constitutionally infirm, the court will ordinarily not presume that the Legislature would have enacted the prohibition without the exception, thereby extending the prohibition to a class of persons whom the Legislature clearly intended should not be reached. [ Id. at 319 , 372 A.2d at 1083 .] See Turner v. State, supra ; Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593 , 380 A.2d 1052 (1977). 1985A long established principle of statutory construction in determining severability questions, is that where the Legislature enacts a prohibition with an. excepted class, and a court finds that the classification is constitutionally infirm, the court will ordinarily not presume that the Legislature would have enacted the prohibition without the exception, thereby extending the prohibition to a class of persons whom the Legislature clearly intended should not be reached. [Id. at 319, 372 A.2d at 1083 .] See Turner v. State, supra; Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593 , 380 A.2d 1052 (1977).	3	1977–1985
Nutwell v. County Commissioners green md · 1909 2 sentences 1981State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305 , 372 A.2d 1076 (1977); Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 386 , 80 A. 1066 (1911); Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110 Md. 667 , 73 A. 710 (1909); Storck v. Baltimore City, 101 Md. 476 , 61 A. 330 (1905). 1981State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305 , 372 A.2d 1076 (1977); Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 386 , 80 A. 1066 (1911); Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110 Md. 667 , 73 A. 710 (1909); Storck v. Baltimore City, 101 Md. 476 , 61 A. 330 (1905).	2	1977–1981
Curtis v. MacTier green md · 1911 2 sentences 1981State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305 , 372 A.2d 1076 (1977); Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 386 , 80 A. 1066 (1911); Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110 Md. 667 , 73 A. 710 (1909); Storck v. Baltimore City, 101 Md. 476 , 61 A. 330 (1905). 1981State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305 , 372 A.2d 1076 (1977); Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 386 , 80 A. 1066 (1911); Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110 Md. 667 , 73 A. 710 (1909); Storck v. Baltimore City, 101 Md. 476 , 61 A. 330 (1905).	2	1977–1981
Storck v. Mayor of Baltimore green md · 1905 2 sentences 1981State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305 , 372 A.2d 1076 (1977); Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 386 , 80 A. 1066 (1911); Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110 Md. 667 , 73 A. 710 (1909); Storck v. Baltimore City, 101 Md. 476 , 61 A. 330 (1905). 1981State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305 , 372 A.2d 1076 (1977); Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 386 , 80 A. 1066 (1911); Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110 Md. 667 , 73 A. 710 (1909); Storck v. Baltimore City, 101 Md. 476 , 61 A. 330 (1905).	2	1977–1981
Cities Service Co. v. Governor green md · 1981 2 sentences 1987In the earlier case of Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 83 , 344 A.2d 422, 439 (1975), the Court stated the principle in more imperative terms: Likewise we mention that even though constitutional and unconstitutional provisions of a law are contained in the same section, the entire section or enactment is not invalid unless the provisions are essentially and inseparably connected in substance____ It thus becomes the duty of the court whenever possible to separate the valid from the invalid provisions____ Cities Service v. Governor, 290 Md. 553 , 431 A.2d 663 (1981), tempers this declaration by 1987In the earlier case of Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 83 , 344 A.2d 422, 439 (1975), the Court stated the principle in more imperative terms: Likewise we mention that even though constitutional and unconstitutional provisions of a law are contained in the same section, the entire section or enactment is not invalid unless the provisions are essentially and inseparably connected in substance____ It thus becomes the duty of the court whenever possible to separate the valid from the invalid provisions____ Cities Service v. Governor, 290 Md. 553 , 431 A.2d 663 (1981), tempers this declaration by	1	1987–1987
Sturman v. Ingraham green nyappdiv · 1976 2 sentences 1986Perini relies upon a statement in the decision that the proposed SHP provided "... important and relevant information when analyzing need according to CÓMAR 10.24.01.07D(2)(c)(1983).” Perini also cites to the Commission’s admission that the proposed plan “... can and reasonably should, be used when determining the need for the project____” Perini suggests that although the Commission termed the use of the policies as “important and relevant information,” implying that the 211 proposed SHP was not used as a regulation per se, “[i]t is the effect of the use of the Proposed SHP, not the label pl 1986Perini relies upon a statement in the decision that the proposed SHP provided "... important and relevant information when analyzing need according to CÓMAR 10.24.01.07D(2)(c)(1983).” Perini also cites to the Commission’s admission that the proposed plan “... can and reasonably should, be used when determining the need for the project____” Perini suggests that although the Commission termed the use of the policies as “important and relevant information,” implying that the 211 proposed SHP was not used as a regulation per se, “[i]t is the effect of the use of the Proposed SHP, not the label pl	1	1986–1986
Cheshire Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care neutral pactcompl · 1977 1 sentence 1986Perini relies upon a statement in the decision that the proposed SHP provided "... important and relevant information when analyzing need according to CÓMAR 10.24.01.07D(2)(c)(1983).” Perini also cites to the Commission’s admission that the proposed plan “... can and reasonably should, be used when determining the need for the project____” Perini suggests that although the Commission termed the use of the policies as “important and relevant information,” implying that the *211 proposed SHP was not used as a regulation per se, “[i]t is the effect of the use of the Proposed SHP, not the label pl	1	1986–1986
Salmon Brook Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care green conn · 1979 2 sentences 1986Perini relies upon a statement in the decision that the proposed SHP provided "... important and relevant information when analyzing need according to CÓMAR 10.24.01.07D(2)(c)(1983).” Perini also cites to the Commission’s admission that the proposed plan “... can and reasonably should, be used when determining the need for the project____” Perini suggests that although the Commission termed the use of the policies as “important and relevant information,” implying that the 211 proposed SHP was not used as a regulation per se, “[i]t is the effect of the use of the Proposed SHP, not the label pl 1986Perini relies upon a statement in the decision that the proposed SHP provided "... important and relevant information when analyzing need according to CÓMAR 10.24.01.07D(2)(c)(1983).” Perini also cites to the Commission’s admission that the proposed plan “... can and reasonably should, be used when determining the need for the project____” Perini suggests that although the Commission termed the use of the policies as “important and relevant information,” implying that the 211 proposed SHP was not used as a regulation per se, “[i]t is the effect of the use of the Proposed SHP, not the label pl	1	1986–1986
Cheshire Convalescent Center v. Comm. on Hospitals green connsuperct · 1977 1 sentence 1986Perini relies upon a statement in the decision that the proposed SHP provided "... important and relevant information when analyzing need according to CÓMAR 10.24.01.07D(2)(c)(1983).” Perini also cites to the Commission’s admission that the proposed plan “... can and reasonably should, be used when determining the need for the project____” Perini suggests that although the Commission termed the use of the policies as “important and relevant information,” implying that the *211 proposed SHP was not used as a regulation per se, “[i]t is the effect of the use of the Proposed SHP, not the label pl	1	1986–1986
Wheeler v. State green md · 1978 2 sentences 1985A long established principle of statutory construction in determining severability questions, is that where the Legislature enacts a prohibition with an. excepted class, and a court finds that the classification is constitutionally infirm, the court will ordinarily not presume that the Legislature would have enacted the prohibition without the exception, thereby extending the prohibition to a class of persons whom the Legislature clearly intended should not be reached. [Id. at 319, 372 A.2d at 1083 .] See Turner v. State, supra; Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593 , 380 A.2d 1052 (1977). 1985A long established principle of statutory construction in determining severability questions, is that where the Legislature enacts a prohibition with an. excepted class, and a court finds that the classification is constitutionally infirm, the court will ordinarily not presume that the Legislature would have enacted the prohibition without the exception, thereby extending the prohibition to a class of persons whom the Legislature clearly intended should not be reached. [Id. at 319, 372 A.2d at 1083 .] See Turner v. State, supra; Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593 , 380 A.2d 1052 (1977).	1	1985–1985
Aye v. State green mdctspecapp · 1973 1 sentence 1974We said in Aye , at 39: “If the criminal court to which jurisdiction over a child had been waived by a juvenile court determines the order of waiver to be invalid on its face, it should refer the matter back to the juvenile court for the issuance of a proper order before trying the case.” We observed, id., at 40 , that “. . . an indictment returned or information issued on the basis of an invalid waiver is void and the accused may not be legally tried thereunder in a criminal court.” The waiver order is subject to appellate review upon an appeal by the accused from a judgment entered upon his	1	1974–1974
Snyder v. Cearfoss green md · 1947 2 sentences 1948Snyder v. Cearfoss, 187 Md. 635 , 51 A. 2d 264 . 1948Snyder v. Cearfoss, 187 Md. 635 , 51 A. 2d 264 .	1	1948–1948
Tawes, Comptroller v. Williams green md · 1941 2 sentences 1946The case at bar is not in the same classification as those of Tawes, Comptroller v. Williams, 179 Md. 224 , 17 A. 2d 137 , 132 A. L. 1946The case at bar is not in the same classification as those of Tawes, Comptroller v. Williams, 179 Md. 224 , 17 A. 2d 137 , 132 A. L.	1	1946–1946
Mayor of Baltimore v. Radecke green md · 1878 1 sentence 1946It was said by Judge Miller in the case of Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217 , at page 231, 33 Am.	1	1946–1946

Where else courts name it

TX 56 (1955–2025) NY 44 (1909–2025) CA 36 (1928–2025) FL 25 (1958–2026) OH 24 (1976–2026) IL 22 (1983–2024) LA 18 (1971–2019) CO 18 (1993–2026) ID 16 (1987–2025) OR 16 (1983–2026) MI 15 (1967–2023) PA 15 (1939–2021) MD 13 (1937–2017) MN 12 (1960–2026) WA 12 (1897–2024) WI 9 (1975–2022) AZ 8 (1935–2024) CT 8 (1993–2022) MO 7 (1915–1998) IN 7 (1976–2023) VA 6 (1852–1998) OK 6 (1933–1985) HI 5 (1973–2018) NV 5 (1998–2025) NJ 5 (1959–2026) AL 5 (1898–2016) SD 4 (2007–2025) TN 4 (1940–2009) MA 4 (1983–2020) VT 3 (1987–2016) WV 3 (1946–2014) ME 3 (1985–2012) IA 3 (1976–2014) AR 2 (1988–2021) MS 2 (2010–2021) KS 2 (1985–2022) NM 2 (2001–2006) NC 2 (1989–1997) KY 2 (1928–1931) AK 2 (1975–1996) NH 2 (1977–2006) ND 2 (2006–2006) GA 2 (1989–2003)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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