set hearing in Ohio

2000When the common pleas court is reviewing a decision of the Ohio Real Estate Commission, "the commission must be given considerable discretion in a license suspension or revocation hearing in determining whether certain conduct is violative of a set standard of practice in the industry." Hughes v. Ohio Div. of Real Estate (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 757 , 760 , citing Vradenburg v. Ohio Real Estate Comm. (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 102 , 104 .

1998“Upon review, the commission must be given considerable discretion in a license suspension or revocation hearing in determining whether certain conduct is violative of a set standard of practice in the industry.” Hughes v. Ohio Div. of Real Estate (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 757, 760 , 621 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 , citing Vradenburg v. Ohio Real Estate Comm. (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 102, 104 , 8 OBR 136, 138-139, 456 N.E.2d 573, 575-576 .

2018Id.

2017Id.

2011Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217 . {¶16} Pursuant to a final hearing order filed January 11, 2010, the trial court set the hearing for April 30, 2010, and listed the discovery cut-off date as "30 days prior to trial." During the discussion on the continuance request, appellant admitted that he served appellee with interrogatories and document requests on March 29 and 30, 2010.

2006Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217 . {¶ 18} By notice filed May 2, 2005, the trial court set the hearing on appellant's motion to vacate judgment for May 26, 2005.

2007Jones v. Farrar (1946), 146 Ohio St. 467 , 471-472 , 32 Ohio Op. 542 , 544 , 66 N.E.2d 531 , 534." {¶ 12} In a case similar to this pending action, In re Byrd , Franklin App. No. 04AP-854, 2005-Ohio-3148 , the Tenth District Court of Appeals (quoting from State v. Withrow , Franklin App. No. 03AP-999, 2004-Ohio-3699 ) stated as follows: "R.C. 2953.32 (B) mandates that the trial court set a hearing for an expungement application.

2005Byrd in Hamilton County for attempted misuse of credit cards, requests that this case be remanded to the trial court to determine whether appellee is a "first offender." More specifically, the state requests a remand for a determination as to whether appellee's conviction for attempted misuse of a credit card in Hamilton County, and her conviction for receiving stolen property in case No. 90CR-4982, involve convictions that "result from or are connected with the same act or result from offenses committed at the same time[.]" R.C. 2953.31 (A). {¶ 8} In State v. Withrow, Franklin App. No. 03AP-9

2000When the common pleas court is reviewing a decision of the Ohio Real Estate Commission, "the commission must be given considerable discretion in a license suspension or revocation hearing in determining whether certain conduct is violative of a set standard of practice in the industry." Hughes v. Ohio Div. of Real Estate (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 757 , 760 , citing Vradenburg v. Ohio Real Estate Comm. (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 102 , 104 .

1998“Upon review, the commission must be given considerable discretion in a license suspension or revocation hearing in determining whether certain conduct is violative of a set standard of practice in the industry.” Hughes v. Ohio Div. of Real Estate (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 757, 760 , 621 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 , citing Vradenburg v. Ohio Real Estate Comm. (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 102, 104 , 8 OBR 136, 138-139, 456 N.E.2d 573, 575-576 .

2023Lucas No. L-21-1263, 2023-Ohio-207, ¶ 21 .

2017In State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279 , 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999), the Ohio Supreme Court delineated a set of factors for a trial court to employ when assessing the credibility of 4 affidavits accompanying petitions for postconviction relief.

2017In State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279 , 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999), the Ohio Supreme Court delineated a set of factors for a trial court to employ when assessing the credibility of 4 affidavits accompanying petitions for postconviction relief.

2016Ashtabula No. 2005-A-0031, 2006-Ohio-4823, ¶ 58 , this court noted that a set hearing date was improper to consider a motion for summary judgment that had not been filed at least 14 days prior to that date.

2015Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons, 140 Ohio St.3d 7 , 2014-Ohio-2354 , 14 N.E.2d 989 ,¶36(“And even when there is no conviction, it is mandatory for the court to set a hearing date.”) . {¶41} In the case at bar, a review of the transcript of the oral hearing on motion to seal records held March 31, 2014 indicates that the trial court and the parties only addressed the issue of whether Grillo was “an eligible offender.” T. at 12.

2015Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons, 140 Ohio St.3d 7 , 2014-Ohio-2354 , 14 N.E.2d 989 ,¶36(“And even when there is no conviction, it is mandatory for the court to set a hearing date.”) . {¶41} In the case at bar, a review of the transcript of the oral hearing on motion to seal records held March 31, 2014 indicates that the trial court and the parties only addressed the issue of whether Grillo was “an eligible offender.” T. at 12.

2013No. 01 CA 107, 2002-Ohio-4176 , ¶50. {¶11} This Court, in State v. Cuthbertson and many subsequent cases, has adopted a set of factors first cited in State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240 , 661 N.E.2d 788 (1st Dist.1995).

2013No. 01 CA 107, 2002-Ohio-4176 , ¶50. {¶11} This Court, in State v. Cuthbertson and many subsequent cases, has adopted a set of factors first cited in State v. Fish, 104 Ohio App.3d 236, 240 , 661 N.E.2d 788 (1st Dist.1995).

2009Most frequently cited are a set of questions recommended by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in State v. Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d at 197 , 65 O.O.2d 316 , 304 N.E.2d 396 : {¶ 7} “(1) Did there exist a long-standing close personal relationship between the party and the out-of-state counsel? (2) Is the out-of-state counsel the customary counsel for the party in jurisdictions where such out-of-state counsel is admitted to practice? and (3) What is the situation with respect to the availability of counsel admitted to practice in Ohio who are competent to represent the party in the case?” {¶ 8} Also

2009Most frequently cited are a set of questions recommended by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in State v. Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d at 197 , 65 O.O.2d 316 , 304 N.E.2d 396 : {¶ 7} “(1) Did there exist a long-standing close personal relationship between the party and the out-of-state counsel? (2) Is the out-of-state counsel the customary counsel for the party in jurisdictions where such out-of-state counsel is admitted to practice? and (3) What is the situation with respect to the availability of counsel admitted to practice in Ohio who are competent to represent the party in the case?” {¶ 8} Also

2009Most frequently cited are a set of questions recommended by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in State v. Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d at 197 , 65 O.O.2d 316 , 304 N.E.2d 396 : {¶ 7} “(1) Did there exist a long-standing close personal relationship between the party and the out-of-state counsel? (2) Is the out-of-state counsel the customary counsel for the party in jurisdictions where such out-of-state counsel is admitted to practice? and (3) What is the situation with respect to the availability of counsel admitted to practice in Ohio who are competent to represent the party in the case?” {¶ 8} Also

2009Most frequently cited are a set of questions recommended by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in State v. Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d at 197 , 65 O.O.2d 316 , 304 N.E.2d 396 : {¶ 7} “(1) Did there exist a long-standing close personal relationship between the party and the out-of-state counsel? (2) Is the out-of-state counsel the customary counsel for the party in jurisdictions where such out-of-state counsel is admitted to practice? and (3) What is the situation with respect to the availability of counsel admitted to practice in Ohio who are competent to represent the party in the case?” {¶ 8} Also

2009Most frequently cited are a set of questions recommended by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in State v. Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d at 197 , 65 O.O.2d 316 , 304 N.E.2d 396 : {¶ 7} “(1) Did there exist a long-standing close personal relationship between the party and the out-of-state counsel? (2) Is the out-of-state counsel the customary counsel for the party in jurisdictions where such out-of-state counsel is admitted to practice? and (3) What is the situation with respect to the availability of counsel admitted to practice in Ohio who are competent to represent the party in the case?” {¶ 8} Also

2009Most frequently cited are a set of questions recommended by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in State v. Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d at 197 , 65 O.O.2d 316 , 304 N.E.2d 396 : {¶ 7} “(1) Did there exist a long-standing close personal relationship between the party and the out-of-state counsel? (2) Is the out-of-state counsel the customary counsel for the party in jurisdictions where such out-of-state counsel is admitted to practice? and (3) What is the situation with respect to the availability of counsel admitted to practice in Ohio who are competent to represent the party in the case?” {¶ 8} Also

2009Most frequently cited are a set of questions recommended by the Tenth District Court of Appeals in State v. Ross, 36 Ohio App.2d at 197 , 65 O.O.2d 316 , 304 N.E.2d 396 : {¶ 7} “(1) Did there exist a long-standing close personal relationship between the party and the out-of-state counsel? (2) Is the out-of-state counsel the customary counsel for the party in jurisdictions where such out-of-state counsel is admitted to practice? and (3) What is the situation with respect to the availability of counsel admitted to practice in Ohio who are competent to represent the party in the case?” {¶ 8} Also

2008This court's prior opinion did not suggest that the Parkers were entitled to a new trial in order to determine damages, nor were the Parkers permitted to submit additional evidence for the trial court's consideration. {¶ 18} Further, the Parkers argue that the trial court did not specifically address damages permitted by the Restatement, as noted by this court in Parker v. Hegler , *Page 6 2006-Ohio-6495 .

2007Jones v. Farrar (1946), 146 Ohio St. 467 , 471-472 , 32 Ohio Op. 542 , 544 , 66 N.E.2d 531 , 534." {¶ 12} In a case similar to this pending action, In re Byrd , Franklin App. No. 04AP-854, 2005-Ohio-3148 , the Tenth District Court of Appeals (quoting from State v. Withrow , Franklin App. No. 03AP-999, 2004-Ohio-3699 ) stated as follows: "R.C. 2953.32 (B) mandates that the trial court set a hearing for an expungement application.

2007Jones v. Farrar (1946), 146 Ohio St. 467 , 471-472 , 32 Ohio Op. 542 , 544 , 66 N.E.2d 531 , 534." {¶ 12} In a case similar to this pending action, In re Byrd , Franklin App. No. 04AP-854, 2005-Ohio-3148 , the Tenth District Court of Appeals (quoting from State v. Withrow , Franklin App. No. 03AP-999, 2004-Ohio-3699 ) stated as follows: "R.C. 2953.32 (B) mandates that the trial court set a hearing for an expungement application.

2007Jones v. Farrar (1946), 146 Ohio St. 467 , 471-472 , 32 Ohio Op. 542 , 544 , 66 N.E.2d 531 , 534." {¶ 12} In a case similar to this pending action, In re Byrd , Franklin App. No. 04AP-854, 2005-Ohio-3148 , the Tenth District Court of Appeals (quoting from State v. Withrow , Franklin App. No. 03AP-999, 2004-Ohio-3699 ) stated as follows: "R.C. 2953.32 (B) mandates that the trial court set a hearing for an expungement application.

2002"One of the principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers `to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing claims and disbursement of benefits.'" Egelhoff v. Egelhoff (2001), 532 U.S. 141 , 148 , 121 S.Ct. 1322 , 1328 , 149 L.Ed. 264 , 272 , citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne , (1987), 482 U.S. 1 , 9, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 , 107 S.Ct. 2211 .

2002"One of the principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers `to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing claims and disbursement of benefits.'" Egelhoff v. Egelhoff (2001), 532 U.S. 141 , 148 , 121 S.Ct. 1322 , 1328 , 149 L.Ed. 264 , 272 , citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne , (1987), 482 U.S. 1 , 9, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 , 107 S.Ct. 2211 .

2002"One of the principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers `to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing claims and disbursement of benefits.'" Egelhoff v. Egelhoff (2001), 532 U.S. 141 , 148 , 121 S.Ct. 1322 , 1328 , 149 L.Ed. 264 , 272 , citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne , (1987), 482 U.S. 1 , 9, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 , 107 S.Ct. 2211 .

2002"One of the principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers `to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing claims and disbursement of benefits.'" Egelhoff v. Egelhoff (2001), 532 U.S. 141 , 148 , 121 S.Ct. 1322 , 1328 , 149 L.Ed. 264 , 272 , citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne , (1987), 482 U.S. 1 , 9, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 , 107 S.Ct. 2211 .

1991(State v. Stauffer [1976], 48 Ohio St.2d 54 , 2 O.O.3d 169 , 356 N.E.2d 724 , overruled.)” It follows that since a jury demand had been filed on April 10, 1990, and since, on that date, the trial court set the hearing for April 13, 1990, the demand was timely as it was filed “on or before the third day following receipt of notice,” i.e., it was made on April 10, 1990, the date the notice was sent.

1991(State v. Stauffer [1976], 48 Ohio St.2d 54 , 2 O.O.3d 169 , 356 N.E.2d 724 , overruled.)” It follows that since a jury demand had been filed on April 10, 1990, and since, on that date, the trial court set the hearing for April 13, 1990, the demand was timely as it was filed “on or before the third day following receipt of notice,” i.e., it was made on April 10, 1990, the date the notice was sent.

1991In Hawkins v. Ivy (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 114 , 4 O.O.3d 243 , 363 N.E.2d 367 , the court set the test for wanton misconduct when it held: “Where the driver of an automobile fails to exercise any care whatsoever toward those to whom he owes a duty of care, and his failure occurs under circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result, such failure constitutes wanton misconduct.” In the case sub judice, the appellee presented evidence to raise a question as to whether or not officer Mitchell had failed to exercise sufficient care under the circumstances in which there was a

1991In Hawkins v. Ivy (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 114 , 4 O.O.3d 243 , 363 N.E.2d 367 , the court set the test for wanton misconduct when it held: “Where the driver of an automobile fails to exercise any care whatsoever toward those to whom he owes a duty of care, and his failure occurs under circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result, such failure constitutes wanton misconduct.” In the case sub judice, the appellee presented evidence to raise a question as to whether or not officer Mitchell had failed to exercise sufficient care under the circumstances in which there was a