set hearing in California

2026The court set a hearing pursuant to People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas), disapproved in part as stated in Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 23, fn. 17 (Kopp), to determine Sanchez’s ability to pay.

2020(Id. at p. 1161.) “She was then convicted of a series of misdemeanor offenses for driving with a suspended license, and in each case was given the impossible choice whether to ‘pay[]’ mandatory fees and fines—which she could not do, because of her poverty—or go to jail. [Citation.] After serving jail time in the first three of these cases, she still faced outstanding debt, which mounted with each conviction.” (People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 138 (Johnson).) Upon her fourth conviction for driving with a suspended license, Dueñas was placed on probation and again ordered to pay mand

2022Defendant then requested a Marsden4 hearing and the court set a hearing for that purpose. 4 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 6.

1993If it’s simply a matter of being comfortable with him.” Defendant: “There is a reason why I don’t feel comfortable with him.” The court set a hearing for December 17 pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 156 , 465 P.2d 44 ], in order to afford defendant an opportunity to state his reason.

2017(See, e.g., People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843 , 861, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 771 P.2d 1270 ; People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836 , 844, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57 , 705 P.2d 380 ["The enacting body is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial constructions in effect at the time legislation is enacted"]; see also People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347 , 379, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 , 397 P.3d 936 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.) ["California cases have established a set of standard rules for the construction of voter initiatives. 'We interpret voter initiatives using the same principles that govern cons

2017(See, e.g., People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843 , 861, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 771 P.2d 1270 ; People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836 , 844, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57 , 705 P.2d 380 ["The enacting body is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial constructions in effect at the time legislation is enacted"]; see also People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347 , 379, 220 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 , 397 P.3d 936 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.) ["California cases have established a set of standard rules for the construction of voter initiatives. 'We interpret voter initiatives using the same principles that govern cons

2017Padron then asked to reinstate its motion for terminating sanctions, and the court set a hearing on that motion for April 29, 2016. 3 However, on April 14, 2016, we issued our opinion in Lopez , supra , 246 Cal.App.4th 566 , 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 .

2017Padron then asked to reinstate its motion for terminating sanctions, and the court set a hearing on that motion for April 29, 2016. 3 However, on April 14, 2016, we issued our opinion in Lopez , supra , 246 Cal.App.4th 566 , 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 .

2013While this appeal was pending, Mother’s counsel brought to our attention the recent decision in Maggie S. v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 662 [ 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 337 ].

2013While this appeal was pending, Mother’s counsel brought to our attention the recent decision in Maggie S. v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 662 .

2026In its ruling on the claim of exemption, the court explained that “residence” for subpoena purposes differed from “domicile” for exemption purposes. 4 At that hearing, Davis cited McMullen v. Haycock (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 753 (McMullen) for the first time, arguing it was directly on point.

2025In this appeal from his sentence, he challenges an electronic search condition (Probation Condition 13) on the ground it is invalid under In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.) and People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and is unconstitutionally overbroad.

2025(See also People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327 , 1331–1335 [rejecting very similar challenge to three of the four instructions at issue].) Guan offers no persuasive argument to distinguish or provide a basis to disagree with those opinions.

2025In this appeal from his sentence, he challenges an electronic search condition (Probation Condition 13) on the ground it is invalid under In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.) and People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and is unconstitutionally overbroad.

2025We agree with the analyses rejecting identical challenges to the same set of standard instructions as set forth in People v. Ocegueda, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th 548 and People v. Jones (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 995 , 1001– 1002, and will not repeat those analyses here.

2025A failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a section 388 petition is prejudicial if “ ‘ “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached.’ ” ’ ” (In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 108, 128 .) Although the court did not conduct a full evidentiary hearing, it is somewhat misleading to characterize its denial of father’s petition as “summary.” After reviewing father’s petition, the court set a hearing to decide whether to conduct a full evidentiary hearing.

2024(Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 211, 213, 221-222.) Second, 6 if such a relationship or such circumstances exist, then the court must consider a set of factors articulated in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland, and the Rowland factors) to decide whether policy considerations nonetheless militate in favor of limiting or not recognizing that affirmative duty.

2023Mens Rea For direct perpetrator liability for implied malice murder, “ ‘The mental component is the requirement that the defendant “knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and . . . acts with a conscious disregard for life.” ’ ” (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1181 .) The evidence was sufficient to support the mens rea element as a direct perpetrator.

2022If you desire to consult an attorney, you should do so immediately.” (§ 913, subd. (b).) The statute uses the word “shall” with respect to the warning. (§ 913, subd. (b).) “This language indicates that the warning is mandatory.” (Chalmers v. County of L.A. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 461, 465 (Chalmers).) “It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that the word ‘may’ is ordinarily construed as permissive, whereas ‘shall’ is ordinarily construed as mandatory, particularly when both terms are used in the same statute.” (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 443 ; se

2022Sadly, we are at the end of the time allotted by the Legislature . . . for [Father] to show that he can safely parent [J.Y.].” The court set a hearing to determine a permanent plan pursuant to section 366.26.3 3 Reunification services for the parent of a child who was under three years of age on the date of initial removal are generally provided with a presumptive minimum of six months of services, but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care, unless the child is returned to the home of the parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B); In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 21 ;

2022DISCUSSION A. Section 1170.95 Section 1170.95, as amended by Senate Bill 775, “creates a procedure for convicted murderers [and attempted murderers] who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957 .) Where a petitioner files a section 1170.95 petition that contains all of the statutorily required information and requests counsel, the court must appoint counsel and order briefing.

2022In In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634 , the reviewing court outlined a set of factors courts should consider when determining whether a parent’s use of physical discipline “on a particular occasion falls within (or instead exceeds) the scope of [the] parental right to discipline.” (Id. at p. 641.) Those factors include: “(1) whether the parent’s conduct is genuinely disciplinary; (2) whether the punishment is ‘necess[ary]’ (that is, whether the discipline was ‘warranted by the circumstances’); and (3) ‘whether the amount of punishment was reasonable or excessive.’ ” (Ibid.) As to the first

2022Specifically, the opening brief contains many factual assertions unsupported by any record citations, “in dramatic noncompliance with appellate procedures.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229 , 1245–1246.) Additionally, while the opening brief includes point headings, within some of the point headings McNeal discusses issues that are not related to that point heading, makes factual assertions without any record citations, and fails to offer any legal authority or cogent analysis as to how or why the court erred in its determinations or how he was prejudiced by those determinations.

2022(Aas, at pp. 646, 645.) Thus, in addressing and ultimately rejecting the plaintiffs’ negligence theory, Aas did consider, in a belt-and-suspenders fashion, how the Biakanja factors applied to the facts before it. ( Aas, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 646–649; see also Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 219 [explaining that although a case from this court may have considered a set of factors in a “belt-and- suspenders fashion” to “ ‘explain further why we should not impose a duty,’ ” this does not mean that those factors constitute the sole mode of analysis to determine whether a duty exists].) But Aas n

2022(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794 ; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 609– 610.) Banks identified a nonexhaustive set of factors for determining if the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony, and Clark provided a similar set of factors for determining if the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.

2022Sadly, we are at the end of the time allotted by the Legislature . . . for [Father] to show that he can safely parent [J.Y.].” The court set a hearing to determine a permanent plan pursuant to section 366.26.3 3 Reunification services for the parent of a child who was under three years of age on the date of initial removal are generally provided with a presumptive minimum of six months of services, but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered foster care, unless the child is returned to the home of the parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B); In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 21 ;

2022(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794 ; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 609– 610.) Banks identified a nonexhaustive set of factors for determining if the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felony, and Clark provided a similar set of factors for determining if the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.

2021In Cooper v. Dupnik (1992) 963 F.2d 1220 , 1223–1227, 1242, officers acted pursuant to a preconceived plan to knowingly violate the law by ignoring suspects’ invocation of Miranda rights, thereby turning the advisements into a “farce.” Nothing remotely similar occurred here.

2021Unlike in this case, in Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands v. Mendiola (9th Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 475 , 481–483, overruled on another ground by George v. Camacho (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 1393 , 1395, Miranda warnings were given in combination with a set of warnings about local statutory rights; together, the warnings were equivocal, contradictory, and open to misinterpretation.

2021Unlike in this case, in Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands v. Mendiola (9th Cir. 1992) 976 F.2d 475 , 481–483, overruled on another ground by George v. Camacho (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 1393 , 1395, Miranda warnings were given in combination with a set of warnings about local statutory rights; together, the warnings were equivocal, contradictory, and open to misinterpretation.