set factors in Minnesota

2019Further, when considering the nature of the private interest, we weigh "(1) the duration of the [deprivation of property]; (2) the availability of hardship relief; and (3) the availability of prompt postrevocation review." Heddan v. Dirkswager , 336 N.W.2d 54 , 60 (Minn. 1983) (citing Montrym , 443 U.S. at 11 -12 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ).

2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub

2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub

2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub

2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub

2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub

2019In United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency , 461 U.S. 555 , 564, 103 S.Ct. 2005 , 76 L.Ed.2d 143 (1983), the Supreme Court applied the Barker factors when assessing procedural due process violations in a forfeiture case. 4 *602 Mathews identified a different set of factors to balance when assessing procedural due process challenges: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub

2019Further, when considering the nature of the private interest, we weigh "(1) the duration of the [deprivation of property]; (2) the availability of hardship relief; and (3) the availability of prompt postrevocation review." Heddan v. Dirkswager , 336 N.W.2d 54 , 60 (Minn. 1983) (citing Montrym , 443 U.S. at 11 -12 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ).

2019Further, when considering the nature of the private interest, we weigh "(1) the duration of the [deprivation of property]; (2) the availability of hardship relief; and (3) the availability of prompt postrevocation review." Heddan v. Dirkswager , 336 N.W.2d 54 , 60 (Minn. 1983) (citing Montrym , 443 U.S. at 11 -12 , 99 S.Ct. 2612 ).

2018State v. Brist , 812 N.W.2d 51 , 54 (Minn. 2012) ; see Bourjaily , 483 U.S. at 175 , 107 S.Ct. at 2778 .

2018The fee agreement "is merely one factor, among a host of others that the district court is to consider in awarding reasonable attorney fees." See Green , 826 N.W.2d at 538 . *661 Our conclusion lies somewhere between the parties' arguments.

2018Relying on a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, United States v. Nazemian , 948 F.2d 522 , 527 (9th Cir. 1991), the district court examined a set of factors to determine whether the interpreter's statements "fairly should be considered the statement of the speaker." The district court concluded that the interpreter was a "language conduit" or an agent of Lopez-Ramos, and it treated the translated statements in English as Lopez-Ramos's own statements.

2018Faricy Law Firm , 2017 WL 1832415 , at *4 (applying some of the Ashford factors in a new six-factor test); Ashford v. Interstate Trucking Corp. of Am., Inc. , 524 N.W.2d 500 , 504 (Minn. App. 1994) (affirming the district court's consideration of four factors); L-tryptophan , 518 N.W.2d at 621 (providing an eight-factor test).

1998Processing Servs., 489 N.W.2d 231, 232 (Minn.1992), the supreme court held that a new trial motion was properly dismissed where the notice of motion and motion for a new trial set the hearing date beyond the 30-day limitation period, neither party requested an extension, and the court itself was not involved in the scheduling of the hearing.