set factors in Colorado

2018While "[w]e have never reduced the question of a trial error's prejudicial impact to a specific set of factors[,] ... the strength of the properly admitted evidence supporting the guilty verdict is clearly an 'important consideration' in the harmless error analysis." Pernell v. People , 2018 CO 13 , ¶ 25, 411 P.3d 669 , 673 (quoting Crider v. People , 186 P.3d 39 , 43 (Colo. 2008) ); accord Johnson , ¶ 12 .

2018While “[w]e have never reduced the question of a trial error’s prejudicial impact to a specific set of factors[,] . . . the strength of the properly admitted evidence supporting the guilty verdict is clearly an ‘important consideration’ in the harmless error analysis.” Pernell v. People, 2018 CO 13, ¶ 25 , 411 P.3d 669, 673 (quoting Crider v. People, 186 P.3d 39, 43 (Colo. 2008)); accord Johnson, ¶ 12.

2011In general, to determine whether there was a need "that could not brook the delay incident to obtaining a warrant," Miller, 773 P.2d at 1057 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir.1970)), we employ the following set of factors: (1) a grave offense is involved, particularly a crime of violence; (2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) there exists a clear showing of probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime; (4) there is a strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) the likelihood exists that the suspect wi

2011In general, to determine whether there was a need "that could not brook the delay incident to obtaining a warrant," Miller, 773 P.2d at 1057 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir.1970)), we employ the following set of factors: (1) a grave offense is involved, particularly a crime of violence; (2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) there exists a clear showing of probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime; (4) there is a strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) the likelihood exists that the suspect wi

2011In general, to determine whether there was a need "that could not brook the delay incident to obtaining a warrant," Miller, 773 P.2d at 1057 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir.1970)), we employ the following set of factors: (1) a grave offense is involved, particularly a crime of violence; (2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) there exists a clear showing of probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime; (4) there is a strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) the likelihood exists that the suspect wi

2011In general, to determine whether there was a need "that could not brook the delay incident to obtaining a warrant," Miller, 773 P.2d at 1057 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir.1970)), we employ the following set of factors: (1) a grave offense is involved, particularly a crime of violence; (2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) there exists a clear showing of probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime; (4) there is a strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) the likelihood exists that the suspect wi

2026In his written objection, Pope did not assert a section 18-1.3-603(2)(a) violation. ¶4 Defense counsel agreed to reschedule the first restitution hearing and did not object when the court set the hearing beyond the ninety-one-day deadline then-required by section 18-1.3- 1 As discussed further below, the statute has since been amended. 1 603(1)(b).2 At the rescheduled hearing, Pope stipulated that he was responsible for $1,300 for H.T.’s mental health services, but he objected to payment on behalf of A.T. ¶5 The trial court ordered Pope to pay the full requested amount of $1,972 in restitution

2025Accordingly, I would reject Babcock's challenge to the timeliness of the restitution award and affirm the judgment of the division below, although on a different ground from that on which the division relied (and on which the majority here relies). ¶53 In reaching this conclusion, I acknowledge that in Weeks , ¶ 40, 498 P.3d at 155, we said that a finding of good cause to extend the court's deadline to determine the amount of restitution had to be made expressly and before the deadline expires.

2002Instead of mandating that a trial court consider a particular set of factors in assessing the reliability of expert testimony, we have held that "the CRE 702 inquiry contemplates a wide range of considerations that may be pertinent to the evidence at issue." Shreck, 22 P.3d at 77 ; see also Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105, 1114 (Colo.1999) (holding that instead of articulating a specific multi-factored test, it is preferable to focus on "whether the evidence is reasonably reliable information that will assist the trier of fact").

2002Instead of mandating that a trial court consider a particular set of factors in assessing the reliability of expert testimony, we have held that “the CRE 702 inquiry contemplates a wide range of considerations that may be pertinent to the evidence at issue.” Shreck, 22 P.3d at 77 ; see also Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105, 1114 (Colo.1999) (holding that instead of articulating a specific multi-factored test, it is preferable to focus on “whether the evidence is reasonably reliable information that will assist the trier of fact”).

2025The majority reaches this conclusion notwithstanding the absence of evidence that Babcock was aware of the deadline and its effect and that he intended to waive it. ¶33 Because I believe that the majority's ruling is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word "waiver," and because I further believe that the majority's opinion undermines the principles of waiver and forfeiture that we articulated unanimously just seven years ago in People v. Rediger , 2018 CO 32, ¶¶ 39-40, 416 P.3d 893, 902, I respectfully disagree. ¶34 In my view, when a defendant asks the court to set a hearing outside t

2025The majority reaches this conclusion notwithstanding the absence of evidence that Babcock was aware of the deadline and its effect and that he intended to waive it. ¶33 Because I believe that the majority's ruling is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word "waiver," and because I further believe that the majority's opinion undermines the principles of waiver and forfeiture that we articulated unanimously just seven years ago in People v. Rediger , 2018 CO 32, ¶¶ 39-40, 416 P.3d 893, 902, I respectfully disagree. ¶34 In my view, when a defendant asks the court to set a hearing outside t

2021Further, the Court concluded that the Washington statute interfered with ERISA’s objective of nationally uniform plan administration, which enables employers to “establish a uniform administrative scheme” and provide “a set of standard procedures to guide processing of 13 claims and disbursement of benefits.” Id. at 148 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987)).

2020See id. at 1319 (evaluating the validity of probationer’s geographical restrictions); see also Forsythe, 43 P.3d at 654 (applying the Brockelman factors when evaluating the constitutionality of a probation condition that restricted probationer’s unsupervised contact with her children). ¶ 32 Our difficulty in this case is that the record contains insufficient information to apply these factors.

2020To evaluate the validity of similar restrictions, those opinions have considered a set of factors laid out by our supreme court in Brockelman, 933 P.2d 1315 : (1) whether the restriction is reasonably related to the underlying offense; (2) whether the restriction is punitive to the point of being unrelated to rehabilitation; (3) whether the restriction is unduly severe and restrictive; (4) whether the defendant may petition the court to lift 15 the restriction temporarily when necessary; and (5) whether less restrictive means are available.

2020See id. at 1319 (evaluating the validity of probationer’s geographical restrictions); see also Forsythe, 43 P.3d at 654 (applying the Brockelman factors when evaluating the constitutionality of a probation condition that restricted probationer’s unsupervised contact with her children). ¶ 32 Our difficulty in this case is that the record contains insufficient information to apply these factors.

2018While "[w]e have never reduced the question of a trial error's prejudicial impact to a specific set of factors[,] ... the strength of the properly admitted evidence supporting the guilty verdict is clearly an 'important consideration' in the harmless error analysis." Pernell v. People , 2018 CO 13 , ¶ 25, 411 P.3d 669 , 673 (quoting Crider v. People , 186 P.3d 39 , 43 (Colo. 2008) ); accord Johnson , ¶ 12 .

2018While "[w]e have never reduced the question of a trial error's prejudicial impact to a specific set of factors[,] ... the strength of the properly admitted evidence supporting the guilty verdict is clearly an 'important consideration' in the harmless error analysis." Pernell v. People , 2018 CO 13 , ¶ 25, 411 P.3d 669 , 673 (quoting Crider v. People , 186 P.3d 39 , 43 (Colo. 2008) ); accord Johnson , ¶ 12 .

2017You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.”); Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198 (“You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning.” (emphasis omitted)); Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356 (“You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have him present with you while you are being questioned, and all during the questioning.”). ¶38 True, Powell upheld a set of warnings that did not expressly reference the right to counsel during interrogation.

2017You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.”); Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198 , 109 S.Ct. 2875 (“You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning.” (emphasis omitted)); Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356 , 101 S.Ct. 2806 (‘You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have him present with you while you are being questioned, and all during the questioning.”). ¶38 True, Powell upheld a set of warnings that did not expressly reference the right to counsel during interro

2017You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.”); Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198 (“You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning.” (emphasis omitted)); Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356 (“You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have him present with you while you are being questioned, and all during the questioning.”). ¶38 True, Powell upheld a set of warnings that did not expressly reference the right to counsel during interrogation.

2017You have the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview.”); Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 198 , 109 S.Ct. 2875 (“You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, and to have him with you during questioning.” (emphasis omitted)); Prysock, 453 U.S. at 356 , 101 S.Ct. 2806 (‘You have the right to talk to a lawyer before you are questioned, have him present with you while you are being questioned, and all during the questioning.”). ¶38 True, Powell upheld a set of warnings that did not expressly reference the right to counsel during interro

2015See, e.g., People v. Liggett, 2014 CO 72 , ¶ 22, 334 P.3d 231, 237 (cautioning that a list of thirteen factors used to determine whether a defendant’s statements made during custodial interrogation were voluntary must be applied not as a mechanical checklist, but rather “to inform the ultimate inquiry, which is whether the police’s conduct was coercive so as to overbear the defendant’s will”) (citing People v. McIntyre, 2014 CO 39 , ¶ 16, 325 P.3d 583, 587 ).

2015See, e.g., People v. Liggett, 2014 CO 72, ¶ 22 , 834 P.3d 231 , 237 (cautioning that a list of thirteen factors used to determine whether a defendant's statements made during custodial interrogation were voluntary must be applied not as a mechanical checklist, but rather "to inform the ultimate inquiry, which is whether the police's conduct was coercive so as to overbear the defendant's will") (citing People v. McIntyre, 2014 CO 39, ¶ 16 , 325 P.3d 5836 587).

2015See, e.g., People v. Liggett, 2014 CO 72 , ¶ 22, 334 P.3d 231, 237 (cautioning that a list of thirteen factors used to determine whether a defendant’s statements made during custodial interrogation were voluntary must be applied not as a mechanical checklist, but rather “to inform the ultimate inquiry, which is whether the police’s conduct was coercive so as to overbear the defendant’s will”) (citing People v. McIntyre, 2014 CO 39 , ¶ 16, 325 P.3d 583, 587 ).

2015See, e.g., People v. Liggett, 2014 CO 72, ¶ 22 , 834 P.3d 231 , 237 (cautioning that a list of thirteen factors used to determine whether a defendant's statements made during custodial interrogation were voluntary must be applied not as a mechanical checklist, but rather "to inform the ultimate inquiry, which is whether the police's conduct was coercive so as to overbear the defendant's will") (citing People v. McIntyre, 2014 CO 39, ¶ 16 , 325 P.3d 5836 587).

2014See People v. Sepeda, 196 Colo. 13, 19 , 581 P.2d 723, 727 (1978) (adopting a test from the Tenth Circuit to determine the constitutionality of a method for assembling the list of names in a jury pool); see also M.S. v. People, 2013 CO 35 , ¶ 16 n. 9, 303 P.3d 102 (“The Colorado Supreme Court is bound only by decisions of the United States Supreme Court and is not bound by decisions of lower federal courts.”).

2014See People v. Sepeda, 196 Colo. 13, 19 , 581 P.2d 723, 727 (1978) (adopting a test from the Tenth Circuit to determine the constitutionality of a method for assembling the list of names in a jury pool); see also M.S. v. People, 2013 CO 35 , ¶ 16 n. 9, 303 P.3d 102 (“The Colorado Supreme Court is bound only by decisions of the United States Supreme Court and is not bound by decisions of lower federal courts.”).

2014See People v. Sepeda, 196 Colo. 13, 19 , 581 P.2d 723, 727 (1978) (adopting a test from the Tenth Circuit to determine the constitutionality of a method for assembling the list of names in a jury pool); see also M.S. v. People, 2013 CO 35 , ¶ 16 n. 9, 303 P.3d 102 (“The Colorado Supreme Court is bound only by decisions of the United States Supreme Court and is not bound by decisions of lower federal courts.”).

2014See People v. Sepeda, 196 Colo. 13, 19 , 581 P.2d 723, 727 (1978) (adopting a test from the Tenth Circuit to determine the constitutionality of a method for assembling the list of names in a jury pool); see also M.S. v. People, 2013 CO 35 , ¶ 16 n. 9, 303 P.3d 102 (“The Colorado Supreme Court is bound only by decisions of the United States Supreme Court and is not bound by decisions of lower federal courts.”).

2010See Maj. op. at 875 (considering a set of factors similar to those set forth in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)).

2010See Maj. op. at 875 (considering a set of factors similar to those set forth in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)).

2002Instead of mandating that a trial court consider a particular set of factors in assessing the reliability of expert testimony, we have held that "the CRE 702 inquiry contemplates a wide range of considerations that may be pertinent to the evidence at issue." Shreck, 22 P.3d at 77 ; see also Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105, 1114 (Colo.1999) (holding that instead of articulating a specific multi-factored test, it is preferable to focus on "whether the evidence is reasonably reliable information that will assist the trier of fact").

2002Instead of mandating that a trial court consider a particular set of factors in assessing the reliability of expert testimony, we have held that “the CRE 702 inquiry contemplates a wide range of considerations that may be pertinent to the evidence at issue.” Shreck, 22 P.3d at 77 ; see also Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 1105, 1114 (Colo.1999) (holding that instead of articulating a specific multi-factored test, it is preferable to focus on “whether the evidence is reasonably reliable information that will assist the trier of fact”).