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24 California opinions name it 2 courts 1908–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wear v. Calderongreen1 sentence2022Plaintiffs also suggest that the offer of a waiver of costs was invalid because Dee Ann’s medical expenses exceeded $1.2 million, citing Pineda and Wear v. Calderon (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 818, 821 (Wear). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hacklergreen1 sentence2013(See Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 319 (Brown) [rejecting argument that polygraph condition is per se invalid and illegal]; People v. Hackler (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1058 [“ ‘it is well established that courts have broad discretion to impose restrictive conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety’ ”]; § 730, subd. (b) [“[w]hen a ward . . . is placed under the supervision of the probation officer . . . , [t]he court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2013(See Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 319 (Brown) [rejecting argument that polygraph condition is per se invalid and illegal]; People v. Hackler (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1058 [“ ‘it is well established that courts have broad discretion to impose restrictive conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety’ ”]; § 730, subd. (b) [“[w]hen a ward . . . is placed under the supervision of the probation officer . . . , [t]he court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rolando Aleman, Francisco Rosariogreen1 sentence2010(U.S. v. Aleman (2d Cir. 2002) 286 F.3d 86, 90-91 [whether defendant complied with immunity agreement offered by prosecutor was “precisely the question” a jury would decide in connection with one of the counts of the indictment; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss indictment on basis of agreement would have been improper]; U.S. v. Blackwell (D.N.J. 1997) 954 F.Supp. 944 , 954—955 [evidence pertaining to statute of limitations defense was intertwined with evidence pertaining to alleged offense; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss was improper].) 4 The cases cited by defendant, and by the tria | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brunnergreen2 sentences2010(See, e.g., Griego v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 568, 573-577 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 351 ]; People v. Superior Court (Perry) (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 536, 539-541 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 665 ]; People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 908, 914-917 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 501 ].) However, as we discuss, an offer of immunity made by a prosecutor is fundamentally different from a promise of dismissal made by a law enforcement officer. 3 Other cases cited by the People also are distinguishable. 2010(See, e.g., Griego v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 568, 573-577 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 351 ]; People v. Superior Court (Perry) (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 536, 539-541 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 665 ]; People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 908, 914-917 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 501 ].) However, as we discuss, an offer of immunity made by a prosecutor is fundamentally different from a promise of dismissal made by a law enforcement officer. 3 Other cases cited by the People also are distinguishable. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Superior Court (Perry)green2 sentences2010(See, e.g., Griego v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 568, 573-577 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 351 ]; People v. Superior Court (Perry) (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 536, 539-541 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 665 ]; People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 908, 914-917 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 501 ].) However, as we discuss, an offer of immunity made by a prosecutor is fundamentally different from a promise of dismissal made by a law enforcement officer. 3 Other cases cited by the People also are distinguishable. 2010(See, e.g., Griego v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 568, 573-577 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 351 ]; People v. Superior Court (Perry) (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 536, 539-541 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 665 ]; People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 908, 914-917 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 501 ].) However, as we discuss, an offer of immunity made by a prosecutor is fundamentally different from a promise of dismissal made by a law enforcement officer. 3 Other cases cited by the People also are distinguishable. | 1 | 1 |
Griego v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2010(See, e.g., Griego v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 568, 573-577 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 351 ]; People v. Superior Court (Perry) (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 536, 539-541 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 665 ]; People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 908, 914-917 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 501 ].) However, as we discuss, an offer of immunity made by a prosecutor is fundamentally different from a promise of dismissal made by a law enforcement officer. 3 Other cases cited by the People also are distinguishable. 2010(See, e.g., Griego v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 568, 573-577 [ 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 351 ]; People v. Superior Court (Perry) (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 536, 539-541 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 665 ]; People v. Brunner (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 908, 914-917 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 501 ].) However, as we discuss, an offer of immunity made by a prosecutor is fundamentally different from a promise of dismissal made by a law enforcement officer. 3 Other cases cited by the People also are distinguishable. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Carrillogreen1 sentence2007(U.S. v. Carrillo, supra, 123 F.Supp.2d at p. 1236 [“The investigators had no basis to believe any of the participants would be willing to cooperate”].) Accordingly, approaching a member of the organization with an offer to enter a relocation program posed the same risk of *396 compromising the investigation as did approaching a member of the organization with an offer of immunity. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Allengreen2 sentences2006There is nothing improperly coercive about confronting a lesser participant in a crime with his or her predicament, and offering immunity from prosecution for the witness’s criminal role in return for the witness’s promise to testify fully and fairly. ( Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th 330, 354-355 ; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 862 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 802 P.2d 906 ]; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1252 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] (Allen).) As we conclude elsewhere in this opinion, Cornwell’s immunity agreement was not coercive, because it did not require her to testify 2006There is nothing improperly coercive about confronting a lesser participant in a crime with his or her predicament, and offering immunity from prosecution for the witness’s criminal role in return for the witness’s promise to testify fully and fairly. ( Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th 330, 354-355 ; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 862 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 802 P.2d 906 ]; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1252 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] (Allen).) As we conclude elsewhere in this opinion, Cornwell’s immunity agreement was not coercive, because it did not require her to testify | 1 | 1 |
People v. Danielsgreen2 sentences2006There is nothing improperly coercive about confronting a lesser participant in a crime with his or her predicament, and offering immunity from prosecution for the witness’s criminal role in return for the witness’s promise to testify fully and fairly. ( Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th 330, 354-355 ; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 862 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 802 P.2d 906 ]; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1252 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] (Allen).) As we conclude elsewhere in this opinion, Cornwell’s immunity agreement was not coercive, because it did not require her to testify 2006There is nothing improperly coercive about confronting a lesser participant in a crime with his or her predicament, and offering immunity from prosecution for the witness’s criminal role in return for the witness’s promise to testify fully and fairly. ( Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th 330, 354-355 ; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 862 [ 277 Cal.Rptr. 122 , 802 P.2d 906 ]; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1252 [ 232 Cal.Rptr. 849 , 729 P.2d 115 ] (Allen).) As we conclude elsewhere in this opinion, Cornwell’s immunity agreement was not coercive, because it did not require her to testify | 1 | 1 |
People v. Douglasred2 sentences1995Our conclusion bears emphasis here: "There is nothing improper in confronting a suspect with the predicament he is in, or with an offer to refrain from prosecuting the suspect if he will cooperate with the police investigation." ( Id. at p. 863; see also Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 502, fn. 7 .) If an offer of immunity is not considered coercive, then an offer of release from custody in return for cooperation likewise should not render a witness's statement coerced. 1995Our conclusion bears emphasis here: “There is nothing improper in confronting a suspect with the predicament he is in, or with an offer to refrain from prosecuting the suspect if he will cooperate with the police investigation.” (Id. at p. 863; see also Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 502, fn. 7 .) If an offer of immunity is not considered coercive, then an offer of release from custody in return for cooperation likewise should not render a witness’s statement coerced. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hallred2 sentences1989In People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 152 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ], disapproved on another point in People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 25 , 720 P.2d 913 ], we held that “If a fact is not genuinely disputed, evidence offered to prove that fact is irrelevant and inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 210 and 350 respectively.” Through the offer of the defense, the facts covered by the proposed stipulation—the victim was a human being and was alive before the alleged criminal act was committed and dead afterwards—were removed from dispute. 1989In People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 152 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ], disapproved on another point in People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 25 , 720 P.2d 913 ], we held that “If a fact is not genuinely disputed, evidence offered to prove that fact is irrelevant and inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 210 and 350 respectively.” Through the offer of the defense, the facts covered by the proposed stipulation—the victim was a human being and was alive before the alleged criminal act was committed and dead afterwards—were removed from dispute. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Campbellgreen2 sentences1989As we noted at the outset of this discussion, immunity is a creature of statute and its terms have been defined by the Legislature in Penal Code section 1324. “ ‘Use immunity’ precludes punishment for the compelled disclosures by cutting the causal link between the incriminating testimony and its use through the exclusion of the compelled testimony or any evidence derived from it. . . . ‘Transactional immunity’ immunizes the defendant from prosecution for any offense which is implicated by the compelled testimony whether or not the testimony is in fact used.” (People v. Campbell (1982) 137 Cal 1989As we noted at the outset of this discussion, immunity is a creature of statute and its terms have been defined by the Legislature in Penal Code section 1324. “ ‘Use immunity’ precludes punishment for the compelled disclosures by cutting the causal link between the incriminating testimony and its use through the exclusion of the compelled testimony or any evidence derived from it. . . . ‘Transactional immunity’ immunizes the defendant from prosecution for any offense which is implicated by the compelled testimony whether or not the testimony is in fact used.” (People v. Campbell (1982) 137 Cal | 1 | 1 |
Fuller v. Lindenbaumgreen2 sentences1988If there is any conflict in the affidavits, those in favor of the prevailing party must be taken as true, and the facts stated therein must be considered as established.’ ” (City of San Leandro v. Highsmith, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 146, 153 , quoting Fuller v. Lindenbaum (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 227, 230 [ 84 P.2d 155 ].) First Gross contends that the Water District induced his noncompliance with section 1250.410 by representing to him that a letter from counsel for the Fair Political Practices Commission (the FPPC), citing Government Code section 1090, prohibited engaging in any exchange of offers 1988If there is any conflict in the affidavits, those in favor of the prevailing party must be taken as true, and the facts stated therein must be considered as established.’ ” (City of San Leandro v. Highsmith, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 146, 153 , quoting Fuller v. Lindenbaum (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 227, 230 [ 84 P.2d 155 ].) First Gross contends that the Water District induced his noncompliance with section 1250.410 by representing to him that a letter from counsel for the Fair Political Practices Commission (the FPPC), citing Government Code section 1090, prohibited engaging in any exchange of offers | 1 | 1 |
| Kastigar v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dyergreen2 sentences1978Furthermore, the limitations imposed on the offer of immunity, being limited to the greater or lessor [ sic ] recollections of the various witnesses, are not so clearly set forth as to preclude the Court from considering that the motivating cause for the Defendant's incriminating statements was in fact the original offer of immunity." I (2) We acknowledge and affirm that when there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether a confession has been freely and voluntarily made, the determination of the trial court, when supported by substantial evidence, is binding upon the appellate court. ( Peo 1978Furthermore, the limitations imposed on the offer of immunity, being limited to the greater or lessor [ sic ] recollections of the various witnesses, are not so clearly set forth as to preclude the Court from considering that the motivating cause for the Defendant's incriminating statements was in fact the original offer of immunity." I (2) We acknowledge and affirm that when there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether a confession has been freely and voluntarily made, the determination of the trial court, when supported by substantial evidence, is binding upon the appellate court. ( Peo | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Medinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Samuel H. Hood v. United States of America, Harry A. Jackson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Goldsteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lawsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Darnoldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kellergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Badgett
green
2 sentences2014We have never held, nor has any authority been offered in support of the proposition, that an offer of leniency in return for cooperation with the police renders a third party statement involuntary or eventual trial testimony coerced…. [T]estimony given under an immunity agreement does not violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial, if the grant of immunity is made on condition the witness testifies fully and fairly.” ( Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 354-355.) “If an offer of immunity is not considered coercive, then an offer of release from custody in return for cooperation likewise sho 2013We have never held, nor has any authority been offered in support of the proposition, that an offer of leniency in return for cooperation with the police renders a third party statement involuntary or eventual trial testimony coerced. [T]estimony given under an immunity agreement does not violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial, if the grant of immunity is made on condition the witness 22. testifies fully and fairly.” (Id. at pp. 354–355.) “If an offer of immunity is not considered coercive, then an offer of release from custody in return for cooperation likewise should not render a witn | 3 | 2006–2014 |
In Re Tahl
yellow
1 sentence2014So when the People conveyed the offer to the defense, it was with a lot of consideration for the victim and what they went through.” Appellant’s statement that “he hopes his sentence can be reduced to 10 years” was explained by the following sentence in the probation officer’s report thusly: “He explained that the men in his family generally die around age 60, and he is concerned that he is going to die while imprisoned.” (Appellant was 53 at the time of his plea.) The probation officer assigned to the case concluded that: “Considering the damage defendant has inflicted upon the victim and the | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Stallman v. Bell
green
1 sentence2014Thus, the ‘terms and conditions’ of the offer required an analysis of plaintiff’s pre-offer costs to determine whether it in fact achieved an overall better result.” (Id. at pp. 971-972.) Similarly, in Stallman v. Bell (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 740 , the court held a trial court erred in refusing to consider preoffer costs in determining whether a party had obtained a more favorable judgment than the 998 offer, which provided “ ‘each side to bear its own costs.’ ” (Stallman, at p. 749; see id. at pp. 747-749.) With no focal point, defendant broadly attacks Stallman as having been decided before a | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Boykin v. Alabama
red
1 sentence2014So when the People conveyed the offer to the defense, it was with a lot of consideration for the victim and what they went through.” Appellant’s statement that “he hopes his sentence can be reduced to 10 years” was explained by the following sentence in the probation officer’s report thusly: “He explained that the men in his family generally die around age 60, and he is concerned that he is going to die while imprisoned.” (Appellant was 53 at the time of his plea.) The probation officer assigned to the case concluded that: “Considering the damage defendant has inflicted upon the victim and the | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Gerald Lawrence Hallam
green
1 sentence2010(U.S. v. Aleman (2d Cir. 2002) 286 F.3d 86, 90-91 [whether defendant complied with immunity agreement offered by prosecutor was “precisely the question” a jury would decide in connection with one of the counts of the indictment; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss indictment on basis of agreement would have been improper]; U.S. v. Blackwell (D.N.J. 1997) 954 F.Supp. 944 , 954—955 [evidence pertaining to statute of limitations defense was intertwined with evidence pertaining to alleged offense; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss was improper].) 4 The cases cited by defendant, and by the tria | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. David Javier Garcia
green
1 sentence2010(U.S. v. Aleman (2d Cir. 2002) 286 F.3d 86, 90-91 [whether defendant complied with immunity agreement offered by prosecutor was “precisely the question” a jury would decide in connection with one of the counts of the indictment; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss indictment on basis of agreement would have been improper]; U.S. v. Blackwell (D.N.J. 1997) 954 F.Supp. 944 , 954—955 [evidence pertaining to statute of limitations defense was intertwined with evidence pertaining to alleged offense; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss was improper].) 4 The cases cited by defendant, and by the tria | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company
green
1 sentence2010(U.S. v. Aleman (2d Cir. 2002) 286 F.3d 86, 90-91 [whether defendant complied with immunity agreement offered by prosecutor was “precisely the question” a jury would decide in connection with one of the counts of the indictment; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss indictment on basis of agreement would have been improper]; U.S. v. Blackwell (D.N.J. 1997) 954 F.Supp. 944 , 954—955 [evidence pertaining to statute of limitations defense was intertwined with evidence pertaining to alleged offense; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss was improper].) 4 The cases cited by defendant, and by the tria | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Blackwell
green
1 sentence2010(U.S. v. Aleman (2d Cir. 2002) 286 F.3d 86, 90-91 [whether defendant complied with immunity agreement offered by prosecutor was “precisely the question” a jury would decide in connection with one of the counts of the indictment; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss indictment on basis of agreement would have been improper]; U.S. v. Blackwell (D.N.J. 1997) 954 F.Supp. 944 , 954—955 [evidence pertaining to statute of limitations defense was intertwined with evidence pertaining to alleged offense; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss was improper].) 4 The cases cited by defendant, and by the tria | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Santobello v. New York
green
1 sentence2010(U.S. v. Aleman (2d Cir. 2002) 286 F.3d 86, 90-91 [whether defendant complied with immunity agreement offered by prosecutor was “precisely the question” a jury would decide in connection with one of the counts of the indictment; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss indictment on basis of agreement would have been improper]; U.S. v. Blackwell (D.N.J. 1997) 954 F.Supp. 944 , 954—955 [evidence pertaining to statute of limitations defense was intertwined with evidence pertaining to alleged offense; therefore pretrial motion to dismiss was improper].) 4 The cases cited by defendant, and by the tria | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Gruttadauria
green
1 sentence2007(See U.S. v. Gruttadauria (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 439 F.Supp.2d 240, 248 .) In neither circumstance can the affidavit be faulted for failing to identify these particular investigative techniques by name instead of by category, nor have defendants offered any reason for second-guessing law enforcement’s assessment of the relative risks and benefits of either technique. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Jones v. Dumrichob
green
2 sentences2002The plaintiff claimed the Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to compromise, of a waiver of costs only, “was not a reasonable offer, but rather a token, tactical one made only to preserve the right to later claim these disputed costs.” (Jones, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262 .) However, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the plaintiff did not show any factual basis to claim the offer was “ ‘unrealistic and unreasonable’ ” or made solely in order to “ ‘gain a strategic advantage.’ ” (Jones, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1263 .) Instead, the offer of a waiver of costs 2002The plaintiff claimed the Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to compromise, of a waiver of costs only, “was not a reasonable offer, but rather a token, tactical one made only to preserve the right to later claim these disputed costs.” (Jones, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262 .) However, the Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the plaintiff did not show any factual basis to claim the offer was “ ‘unrealistic and unreasonable’ ” or made solely in order to “ ‘gain a strategic advantage.’ ” (Jones, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1263 .) Instead, the offer of a waiver of costs | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Valentine
green
2 sentences1989In People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 152 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ], disapproved on another point in People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 25 , 720 P.2d 913 ], we held that “If a fact is not genuinely disputed, evidence offered to prove that fact is irrelevant and inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 210 and 350 respectively.” Through the offer of the defense, the facts covered by the proposed stipulation—the victim was a human being and was alive before the alleged criminal act was committed and dead afterwards—were removed from dispute. 1989In People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 152 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 844 , 616 P.2d 826 ], disapproved on another point in People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 25 , 720 P.2d 913 ], we held that “If a fact is not genuinely disputed, evidence offered to prove that fact is irrelevant and inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 210 and 350 respectively.” Through the offer of the defense, the facts covered by the proposed stipulation—the victim was a human being and was alive before the alleged criminal act was committed and dead afterwards—were removed from dispute. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
City of San Leandro v. Highsmith
green
1 sentence1988If there is any conflict in the affidavits, those in favor of the prevailing party must be taken as true, and the facts stated therein must be considered as established.’ ” (City of San Leandro v. Highsmith, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d 146, 153 , quoting Fuller v. Lindenbaum (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 227, 230 [ 84 P.2d 155 ].) First Gross contends that the Water District induced his noncompliance with section 1250.410 by representing to him that a letter from counsel for the Fair Political Practices Commission (the FPPC), citing Government Code section 1090, prohibited engaging in any exchange of offers | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Johnson v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1978But the record does not show that Margo Compton actually received immunity; on the contrary, the prosecutor represented to the court that an offer of immunity had been declined with a statement to the effect, “I want to tell my story and I am not worried about the rest of that.” No plausible theory has been advanced as to how that circumstance could have been viewed as exculpatory under Johnson v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 248 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 32 , 539 P.2d 792 ]. 1978But the record does not show that Margo Compton actually received immunity; on the contrary, the prosecutor represented to the court that an offer of immunity had been declined with a statement to the effect, “I want to tell my story and I am not worried about the rest of that.” No plausible theory has been advanced as to how that circumstance could have been viewed as exculpatory under Johnson v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 248 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 32 , 539 P.2d 792 ]. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Daly v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1978Klein, P. L, and Cobey, L, concurred. 1 According to the petition, the city attorney implied that the grant of immunity to some petitioners would oblige other petitioners “represented by the same counsel” to cross-examine them “thus causing petitioners to split up and obtain separate lawyers.” The return admits that “the City argued that one of the unsaid causes of the opposition to *284 the offered grant of immunity was that the various clients of the witnesses’ attorney had conflicting interests compounded by the offer of immunity and would have a difficult time dealing with the conflict at | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| People v. Beagle red | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| People v. Bevins green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| People v. Terry green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| People v. Branch green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| People v. Valdez green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| People v. Schwartz green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| People v. Ryan green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| People v. Bemmerly green | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| People v. Ward green | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| People v. Durrant green | 1 | 1908–1908 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.