motions hearing in District of Columbia

1992At trial the government did not offer evidence of appellant's response to the question whether he had a car, but the fact was brought out on cross examination by his counsel. [2] At trial, there was testimony that the police also found a paper with appellant's name on it and another paper indicating that the car was owned by Valentino Cooke. [3] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). [4] The government maintains that at the motions hearing appellant argued only that the statement and money should be suppressed because he had not been advised of his Miranda rights af

1992At trial the government did not offer evidence of appellant's response to the question whether he had a car, but the fact was brought out on cross examination by his counsel. [2] At trial, there was testimony that the police also found a paper with appellant's name on it and another paper indicating that the car was owned by Valentino Cooke. [3] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). [4] The government maintains that at the motions hearing appellant argued only that the statement and money should be suppressed because he had not been advised of his Miranda rights af

2006The motions hearing was rescheduled for June 23, 1995. [11] Counsel for Mr. Ford had resigned from his position at the Public Defender Service, and Mr. Cullison wanted new counsel. [12] The prosecutor asserted that "a severance... will endanger the lives of witnesses who have to testify twice and will force taxpayers to pay for two trials." The government would be "forced to call the same witnesses at two trials ... [and] to pick two juries." Government counsel pointed to the District's "bleak financial state," and commented that "taxpayers [would be asked] to waste money on two trials when th

2006The motions hearing was rescheduled for June 23, 1995. [11] Counsel for Mr. Ford had resigned from his position at the Public Defender Service, and Mr. Cullison wanted new counsel. [12] The prosecutor asserted that "a severance... will endanger the lives of witnesses who have to testify twice and will force taxpayers to pay for two trials." The government would be "forced to call the same witnesses at two trials ... [and] to pick two juries." Government counsel pointed to the District's "bleak financial state," and commented that "taxpayers [would be asked] to waste money on two trials when th

2009The trial judge also commented, "I would find that Mr. Plummer was seized at the time the police drew their guns on him.” 5 . 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000).

2009The trial judge also commented, "I would find that Mr. Plummer was seized at the time the police drew their guns on him.” 5 . 529 U.S. 266 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000).

2001NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] After Jones had acknowledged "holding" the drugs, the officers asked him additional questions, e.g., "if he wanted to volunteer information on who[m] he bought it from, stuff like that." According to Officer Groomes, however, Jones "didn't want to say anything about that." It appears that the officers also posed these substantive questions to Jones without giving him a Miranda warning, but by this time Jones had already made his incriminating statement. [3] Jones testified on his own behalf at the motions h

2001NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] After Jones had acknowledged "holding" the drugs, the officers asked him additional questions, e.g., "if he wanted to volunteer information on who[m] he bought it from, stuff like that." According to Officer Groomes, however, Jones "didn't want to say anything about that." It appears that the officers also posed these substantive questions to Jones without giving him a Miranda warning, but by this time Jones had already made his incriminating statement. [3] Jones testified on his own behalf at the motions h

2001NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] After Jones had acknowledged "holding" the drugs, the officers asked him additional questions, e.g., "if he wanted to volunteer information on who[m] he bought it from, stuff like that." According to Officer Groomes, however, Jones "didn't want to say anything about that." It appears that the officers also posed these substantive questions to Jones without giving him a Miranda warning, but by this time Jones had already made his incriminating statement. [3] Jones testified on his own behalf at the motions h

2001NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] After Jones had acknowledged "holding" the drugs, the officers asked him additional questions, e.g., "if he wanted to volunteer information on who[m] he bought it from, stuff like that." According to Officer Groomes, however, Jones "didn't want to say anything about that." It appears that the officers also posed these substantive questions to Jones without giving him a Miranda warning, but by this time Jones had already made his incriminating statement. [3] Jones testified on his own behalf at the motions h

2000The court responded, "I’m going to count on the government to bring to my attention anything you feel is outside the scope of what was developed at the motions hearing ... as long as it stays within the framework of what was developed at the motion hearing I’m going to allow the question.” Allowing the pretrial hearing to rigidly define the scope of questioning at trial would be an error because "a defendant's right of cross-examination is more limited at suppression hearings than at trials.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 669 , 100 S.Ct. 2406 , 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980).

2000The court responded, "I’m going to count on the government to bring to my attention anything you feel is outside the scope of what was developed at the motions hearing ... as long as it stays within the framework of what was developed at the motion hearing I’m going to allow the question.” Allowing the pretrial hearing to rigidly define the scope of questioning at trial would be an error because "a defendant's right of cross-examination is more limited at suppression hearings than at trials.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 669 , 100 S.Ct. 2406 , 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980).

1997Cf. Allen v. United States, 697 A.2d 1 (D.C.1997). [3] The trial court observed, "If I am not required to make those determinations at the motions hearing, then I obviously retain some discretion to defer when I am going to make them and I am exercising that discretion." Greenwood v. United States, 659 A.2d 825, 828 (D.C.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 326 , 133 L.Ed.2d 227 (1995).

1997The trial court observed, “If I am not required to make those determinations at the motions hearing, then I obviously retain some discretion to defer when I am going to make them and I am exercising that discretion.” Greenwood v. United States, 659 A.2d 825, 828 (D.C.), cert. denied, U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 326 , 133 L.Ed.2d 227 (1995).

1997Cf. Allen v. United States, 697 A.2d 1 (D.C.1997). [3] The trial court observed, "If I am not required to make those determinations at the motions hearing, then I obviously retain some discretion to defer when I am going to make them and I am exercising that discretion." Greenwood v. United States, 659 A.2d 825, 828 (D.C.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 326 , 133 L.Ed.2d 227 (1995).

1997The trial court observed, “If I am not required to make those determinations at the motions hearing, then I obviously retain some discretion to defer when I am going to make them and I am exercising that discretion.” Greenwood v. United States, 659 A.2d 825, 828 (D.C.), cert. denied, U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 326 , 133 L.Ed.2d 227 (1995).

1997Cf. Allen v. United States, 697 A.2d 1 (D.C.1997). [3] The trial court observed, "If I am not required to make those determinations at the motions hearing, then I obviously retain some discretion to defer when I am going to make them and I am exercising that discretion." Greenwood v. United States, 659 A.2d 825, 828 (D.C.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 326 , 133 L.Ed.2d 227 (1995).

1992In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , *427 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Supreme Court held that “[a] conviction on adequate and admissible evidence should not be set aside” on the grounds of inadequacy of evidence at the suppression hearing if “[t]he whole matter was gone into at trial, so no right of the defendants was infringed.” Id. at 162 , 45 S.Ct. at 288 . 6 On the basis of the Carroll decision, appellate courts have accepted as well established law that trial testimony may be considered in determining whether error was committed in ruling on a pretrial motion to suppres

1992In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , *427 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), the Supreme Court held that “[a] conviction on adequate and admissible evidence should not be set aside” on the grounds of inadequacy of evidence at the suppression hearing if “[t]he whole matter was gone into at trial, so no right of the defendants was infringed.” Id. at 162 , 45 S.Ct. at 288 . 6 On the basis of the Carroll decision, appellate courts have accepted as well established law that trial testimony may be considered in determining whether error was committed in ruling on a pretrial motion to suppres

1992Further, in opposition to the motion for a new trial, the government stated that the December 5, 1988 report was not in the custody or control of the United States, nor was its substance known to the United States, as of the date of the motions hearing and cited Brady, supra note 19 , 373 U.S. 83, n. 19 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , and Gates v. United States, 481 A.2d 120, 125-27 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058 , 105 S.Ct. 1772 , 84 L.Ed.2d 832 (1985). *853 The defense did not dispute these assertions.

1992Further, in opposition to the motion for a new trial, the government stated that the December 5, 1988 report was not in the custody or control of the United States, nor was its substance known to the United States, as of the date of the motions hearing and cited Brady, supra note 19 , 373 U.S. 83, n. 19 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , and Gates v. United States, 481 A.2d 120, 125-27 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058 , 105 S.Ct. 1772 , 84 L.Ed.2d 832 (1985). *853 The defense did not dispute these assertions.