motions bar in New York

2014(Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562 .) The relevant statutory provision which is key to resolving the motions at bar is Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), which states in pertinent part: “Unless specifically made applicable, the provisions of this title, except the provisions of sections eleven hundred ninety-two through eleven hundred ninety-six of this chapter, shall not apply to persons, teams, motor vehicles, and other equipment while actually engaged in work on a highway nor shall the provisions of subsection (a) of section twelve hundred two apply to hazard vehicles while actually engaged in haz

1998(See, Bassuk v White, 200 AD2d 550 [2d Dept 1994].) The court reserved decision on the pending motions and on defense counsel’s oral application for default judgment.

1985This requirement is necessary to ensure that one is not rewarded for his own misconduct.” (Cf. Greene v State of New York, Ct Cl, Oct. 9, 1985, claim No. 70831, motion No. M-33417, McCabe, J.) In making my determination whether or not the claim prima facie has shown "that there exists a likelihood or a reasonable probability (cf. Tucker v Toia, 54 AD2d 322 ) that [claimant] will be successful in meeting [the] burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that [she] was unjustly convicted and imprisoned.” (Rivers v State of New York, 130 Misc 2d 544, 547 .) I have considered the claim

1985This requirement is necessary to ensure that one is not rewarded for his own misconduct.” (Cf. Greene v State of New York, Ct Cl, Oct. 9, 1985, claim No. 70831, motion No. M-33417, McCabe, J.) In making my determination whether or not the claim prima facie has shown "that there exists a likelihood or a reasonable probability (cf. Tucker v Toia, 54 AD2d 322 ) that [claimant] will be successful in meeting [the] burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that [she] was unjustly convicted and imprisoned.” (Rivers v State of New York, 130 Misc 2d 544, 547 .) I have considered the claim

1973Neither of these codifications attempts to treat the disclosure requirements mandated by Brady v. Maryland ( 373 U. S. 83 ) or the procedures required under People v. Rosario (9 N Y 2d 286) with respect to the production upon the trial of prior statements of a witness who has testified for the prosecution.

1973F. Supp. 425; United States v. Dioguardi, 332 F. Supp. 7 , supra.) (d) STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES, PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES AND OTHER PERSONS The motions at bar contain sweeping demands for discovery of statements made to the prosecutor by persons other than the defendants, including correctional officers, Deputy Sheriffs, State Troopers, clerical personnel, the Commissioner and other officers from the Department of Correctional Services, the Commanding General of the National Guard, and personnel connected with both the Attica and Auburn Correctional Facilities.

1971(See, also, People v. De Lago, 16 N Y 2d 289, cert. den. 383 U. S. 963 ; People v. Montaparo, 34 Misc 2d 624 ; People v. Johnson, 49 Misc 2d 244 .) Returning to the instant motions and the hearing held thereon, these factors stand out: (1) The premises to he searched are physically located on Kew Gardens Road, two houses away from the intersection with Hillside Avenue, albeit the premises are designated as 132-32 Hillside Avenue and not Kew Gardens Road. (2) The premises consist of a single structure of which the particular unit “ basement apt. and second floor apt.” occupied by defendants was

1971(See, also, People v. De Lago, 16 N Y 2d 289, cert. den. 383 U. S. 963 ; People v. Montaparo, 34 Misc 2d 624 ; People v. Johnson, 49 Misc 2d 244 .) Returning to the instant motions and the hearing held thereon, these factors stand out: (1) The premises to he searched are physically located on Kew Gardens Road, two houses away from the intersection with Hillside Avenue, albeit the premises are designated as 132-32 Hillside Avenue and not Kew Gardens Road. (2) The premises consist of a single structure of which the particular unit “ basement apt. and second floor apt.” occupied by defendants was

1971(See, also, People v. De Lago, 16 N Y 2d 289, cert. den. 383 U. S. 963 ; People v. Montaparo, 34 Misc 2d 624 ; People v. Johnson, 49 Misc 2d 244 .) Returning to the instant motions and the hearing held thereon, these factors stand out: (1) The premises to he searched are physically located on Kew Gardens Road, two houses away from the intersection with Hillside Avenue, albeit the premises are designated as 132-32 Hillside Avenue and not Kew Gardens Road. (2) The premises consist of a single structure of which the particular unit “ basement apt. and second floor apt.” occupied by defendants was

1966The cause of action under the Connecticut Dram Shop Act and the causes of action in the case at bar are different (cf. Zueker v. Vogt, supra; Moyer v. Lo Jim Cafe, 19 A D 2d 523, affd. 14 N Y 2d 792; Bator v. Barry, 282 App. Div. 324 ).

1966The cause of action under the Connecticut Dram Shop Act and the causes of action in the case at bar are different (cf. Zueker v. Vogt, supra; Moyer v. Lo Jim Cafe, 19 A D 2d 523, affd. 14 N Y 2d 792; Bator v. Barry, 282 App. Div. 324 ).

1961Special Term states in its memorandum that in the argument before him counsel for the defendants on three occasions conceded ‘ ‘ that for the purposes of the motions no claim was made that Bayer Aspirin Tablets are a harmful remedy ”. ( 22 Misc 2d 131, 133 , supra.) The appellants, upon the argument of this appeal, refused to make such a concession although they readily admitted that for the purposes of the appeal it was not necessary to prove that aspirin was harmful.

1960These admissions are binding upon the defendants for they were made to avoid “ some question arising on the pleadings ” (Gracie Square Realty Corp. v. Choice Realty Corp., 305 N. Y. 271, 278 ; Lloyd v. R.

1947The motion for summary judgment on the merits is based upon findings of fact made by the United States District Court in an action brought by Standard against Markham, as Alien Property Custodian ( 64 F. Supp. 656 ).