motions hearing in Colorado

2015Evidence presented at a motions hearing showed that the Littleton Police Department's standard operating procedure for impounded vehicles required officers to inventory the contents of a closed container if access to the container "can be gained without physical damage to the container or the contents." The trial court ultimately denied Parks's motions, citing Pineda v. People, 230 P.3d 1181 (Colo.2010), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Vaughn, 2014 CO 71 , 334 P.3d 226 , and finding that the police officer had followed a standardized departmental policy in conducting the inventory

2015Evidence presented at a motions hearing showed that the Littleton Police Department’s standard operating procedure for impounded vehicles required officers to inventory the contents of a closed container if access to the container “can be gained without physical damage to the container or the contents.” The trial court ultimately denied Parks’s motions, citing Pineda v. People , 230 P.3d 1181 (Colo. 2010), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Vaughn , 2014 CO 71 , and finding that the police officer had followed a standardized departmental policy in conducting the inventory search and

2015Evidence presented at a motions hearing showed that the Littleton Police Department's standard operating procedure for impounded vehicles required officers to inventory the contents of a closed container if access to the container "can be gained without physical damage to the container or the contents." The trial court ultimately denied Parks's motions, citing Pineda v. People, 230 P.3d 1181 (Colo.2010), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Vaughn, 2014 CO 71 , 334 P.3d 226 , and finding that the police officer had followed a standardized departmental policy in conducting the inventory

2015Evidence presented at a motions hearing showed that the Littleton Police Department’s standard operating procedure for impounded vehicles required officers to inventory the contents of a closed container if access to the container “can be gained without physical damage to the container or the contents.” The trial court ultimately denied Parks’s motions, citing Pineda v. People , 230 P.3d 1181 (Colo. 2010), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Vaughn , 2014 CO 71 , and finding that the police officer had followed a standardized departmental policy in conducting the inventory search and

2026First, at the motions hearing , the testifying detective admitted that the conversation was intended to "illicit responses about what [Castro-Velasquez] did the night of the crime." This is precisely the conduct Harris prohibits. 762 P.2d at 657 .

2026And while a district court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, that requirement “does not include inventing arguments not made by the pro se party.” Minshall v. Johnston, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 21 . ¶ 36 Outrageous government conduct is “conduct that violates fundamental fairness and is shocking to the universal sense of justice.” People v. Medina, 51 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Colo. App. 2001), aff’d sub nom.

2026Therefore, it found no violation under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and denied Graciano’s motion as to those statements. ¶ 12 Before trial, defense counsel moved to preclude Thompson’s testimony because he had “absolutely no personal knowledge of what happened.” The court overruled the objection stating, “The fact that he may not have remembered much or almost all of what happened” was not “a basis to categorically exclude his testimony.” Thompson testified consistently with his description of events at the motions hearing.

2026A. Additional Background ¶8 Before trial, the prosecution endorsed Miller as a generalized expert witness and provided a general summary of her proposed 2 testimony.1 Quintanilla moved to exclude Miller as an expert under CRE 702, CRE 403, and CRE 608 and alternatively requested a hearing under People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001). ¶9 At a motions hearing, the court denied the request for a Shreck hearing.

2025He points out that the graffiti locations were different, the perpetrator used different tools in each location (colored spray paint versus black paint or marker), and the incidents occurred more than a month apart. 2 To the extent D.R.M. contends that the juvenile court could not rely on the prosecution’s motion to support its decision to consolidate the cases but was required to rely only on evidence received at the motions hearing, he cites no supporting authority. 7 ¶ 14 When assessing whether two cases are of the “same or similar character,” courts consider “the elements of the offenses a

2025Phillips v. People, 2019 CO 72, ¶ 21 ; People v. Stanley, 56 P.3d 1241, 1244 (Colo. App. 2002). ¶ 50 Although D.R.M. argued in his motion to suppress that his seizure was unlawful, defense counsel failed to obtain a ruling on that issue at the motions hearing.

2022Id. at 360 .

2014Id. ¶58      At a motions hearing, Worthon challenged the search of his duffle bags, but the trial court found that he lacked standing.

2007Id. at 219 .

2005Thus, the court accepted the prosecution's offer of proof and proceeded to analyze the admissibility of the evidence under CRE 404(b) and People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314 (Colo.1990).

2004People v. Martinez, supra. Here, evidence was presented at the motions hearing that the victim received approximately fifteen phone calls within a one-hour period at the fast-food restaurant where he was employed.

2002The court of appeals also directed the trial court to state its basic reasons and primary factual considerations in imposing its new sentence on all counts. [6] Although the witnesses described the approximate height and weight of the robber, such descriptive information is not relevant to the photo array because the photos only depict the subjects' heads and shoulders. [7] We placed two limitations on the admissibility of a declarant's statement against interest, however: (1) a trial court should exclude any of the declarant's statements that are "so self-serving as to be unreliable," and (2)

1997According to the court of appeals opinion, the agreement reached at the motions hearing was that “the information received by the informants would not be used to justify the arrest.” Id.

1997The court determined that the parties had agreed at the motions hearing “that ... the information received by the informants would not be used to justify the arrest.” Id. at 339 .

1995Contra People v. Walters, 768 P.2d 1230 , 1233 n. 1 (Colo.1989) (refusing to address whether disclosure of the informant was necessary for a determination of guilt or innocence where the defendant asserted that ground for disclosure in his motion for disclosure but did not raise it at the motions hearing).

1988"Where ... there has been no showing to the contrary by the appellant, we must presume that the district court's order accurately reflects what occurred at *964 the hearing." Parker v. Glazner, 645 P.2d 1319 , 1320 n. 1 (Colo.1987).

1988“Where ... there has been no showing to the contrary by the appellant, we must presume that the district court’s order accurately reflects what occurred at the hearing.” Parker v. Glazner, 645 P.2d 1319 , 1320 n. 1 (Colo.1987).