parameters rule in Florida

2008Although the Jaggers court did not precisely define the parameters of its exception, it specifically held that evidence that a witness has falsely accused a person of sexual abuse must be admitted when the defendant is being tried for a crime of sexual abuse and "there is no independent evidence of the abuse and the defendant's sole defense is either fabrication or mistake on the part of the alleged victims." Id.

2007In Vining, 637 So.2d 921 , a death penalty case, the Florida Supreme Court held that a capital defendant was not entitled to discharge based upon a violation of the IADA time limitations because the recapture provisions of rule 3.191 applied and the State had successfully brought the defendant to trial within the parameters of the rule once the State was notified of the defendant's request for discharge.

2007To understand the holding in Vining and how it engrafted the requirements of rule 3.191 to apply to the IADA, it is necessary to examine the precedent that it specifically relied upon, R.J.A. v. Foster, 603 So.2d 1167 (Fla.1992).

2004But we also stated that "an attorney's evaluation of the relative importance of evidence falls squarely within the parameters of the privilege." Smith, 632 So.2d at 698 .

2004The act alone of compelling an attorney to disclose a group of documents invariably reveals the counsel's "assessment of the relative importance of each of those documents, and of their significance as a collection." Id.

2002A matter is collateral if it "could not have been introduced into evidence for any purpose other than contradiction." Id. [ U.S. v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795 ] at 806 [ (7th Cir.1994) ] (quoting United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198, 207 (7th Cir.1983)).

2002A matter is collateral if it "could not have been introduced into evidence for any purpose other than contradiction." Id. [ U.S. v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795 ] at 806 [ (7th Cir.1994) ] (quoting United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198, 207 (7th Cir.1983)).

2000See also City of Treasure Island v. Provident Management Corp., 738 So.2d 357 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)(the legislature has never waived a City’s immunity from liability for prejudgment interest); State Dep’t of Transp. v. Bailey, 603 So.2d 1384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(an award of prejudgment interest does not fall within the parameters of the waiver of sovereign immunity expressed in section 768.28(5)); Berek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 396 So.2d 756 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)(recovery of punitive damages or prejudgment interest is always .precluded under waiver of immunity statute).

2000See also City of Treasure Island v. Provident Management Corp., 738 So.2d 357 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)(the legislature has never waived a City’s immunity from liability for prejudgment interest); State Dep’t of Transp. v. Bailey, 603 So.2d 1384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)(an award of prejudgment interest does not fall within the parameters of the waiver of sovereign immunity expressed in section 768.28(5)); Berek v. Metropolitan Dade County, 396 So.2d 756 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)(recovery of punitive damages or prejudgment interest is always .precluded under waiver of immunity statute).

1999In reasoning that "a criminal defendant cannot utilize the Public Records Act to gain access to records related to that defendant's case to which the defendant could not otherwise gain access pursuant to rule 3.220, without triggering a reciprocal discovery obligation," Henderson, 708 So.2d at 644 , the court relied on the following statutory language: "The provisions of this section are not intended to expand or limit the provisions of Rule 3.220, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, regarding the right and extent of discovery by the state or by a defendant in a criminal prosecution. ..." § 1

1999In reasoning that "a criminal defendant cannot utilize the Public Records Act to gain access to records related to that defendant's case to which the defendant could not otherwise gain access pursuant to rule 3.220, without triggering a reciprocal discovery obligation," Henderson, 708 So.2d at 644 , the court relied on the following statutory language: "The provisions of this section are not intended to expand or limit the provisions of Rule 3.220, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, regarding the right and extent of discovery by the state or by a defendant in a criminal prosecution. ..." § 1

1991Given the intended effect of this evidence, I consider that Dr. Goslin's generalized profile testimony is quite similar to the expert opinion testimony recited in In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App.3d 585 , 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct.App. 1987), in which the appellate court held that the lower tribunal erred in admitting expert testimony describing general characteristics common to victims of child molestation on the ground that such testimony, offered for the purpose of showing only that a child had been sexually abused, failed to meet the Kelly-Frye criteria.

1991Given the intended effect of this evidence, I consider that Dr. Goslin's generalized profile testimony is quite similar to the expert opinion testimony recited in In re Sara M., 194 Cal. App.3d 585 , 239 Cal. Rptr. 605 (Ct.App. 1987), in which the appellate court held that the lower tribunal erred in admitting expert testimony describing general characteristics common to victims of child molestation on the ground that such testimony, offered for the purpose of showing only that a child had been sexually abused, failed to meet the Kelly-Frye criteria.

1986Fleming v. Barnett Bank of East Polk County, 490 So.2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); American Salvage & Jobbing Co., Inc. v. Salomon, 367 So.2d 716 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979).

1986Fleming v. Barnett Bank of East Polk County, 490 So.2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); American Salvage & Jobbing Co., Inc. v. Salomon, 367 So.2d 716 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979).

1985In Dade County Medical Association , the court held ( 372 So.2d at 121 ): By this decision, we do not establish a general common-law "privilege" of non-disclosure of documents of the character involved in this case, much less indicate the parameters of such a privilege.

1985We hold merely that in view of what has been called "the overwhelming public interest in maintaining the confidentiality" of such records, the defendants have not made the "showing of exceptional necessity" or of "extraordinary circumstances" which is required to justify their production. [citations omitted] The Fourth District has adopted this rule in Segal v. Roberts, 380 So.2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 1980), holding: Although the statute is not applicable in this case, we nevertheless hold, as did the Third District in Dade County Medical Association v. H

1985We hold merely that in view of what has been called "the overwhelming public interest in maintaining the confidentiality" of such records, the defendants have not made the "showing of exceptional necessity" or of "extraordinary circumstances" which is required to justify their production. [citations omitted] The Fourth District has adopted this rule in Segal v. Roberts, 380 So.2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 1980), holding: Although the statute is not applicable in this case, we nevertheless hold, as did the Third District in Dade County Medical Association v. H