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6 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 2001–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2025In offering guidance, the Smith majority stated that a statement is testimonial when “the document’s primary purpose [has] ‘a focus on court.’” Smith, 602 U.S. at 802 (2024). | 1 | 1 |
American Civil Liberties Union v. Darnellgreen1 sentence2012We need not parse the language of a multitude of state and federal cases for the parameters of the requirement of standing; the Tennessee Supreme Court has already done that for us in its opinion in American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee v. Darnell, 195 S.W.3d 612, 619-21 (2006): Courts employ the doctrine of standing to determine whether a particular litigant is entitled to have a court decide the merits of a dispute or of particular issues. | 1 | 1 |
Knierim v. Leatherwoodgreen1 sentence2012Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn.1976) (holding that courts use the standing doctrine to decide whether a particular plaintiff is “properly situated to prosecute the action.”); City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, et al., 149 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004). | 1 | 1 |
City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appealsgreen1 sentence2012Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn.1976) (holding that courts use the standing doctrine to decide whether a particular plaintiff is “properly situated to prosecute the action.”); City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, et al., 149 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004). | 1 | 1 |
Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Stewart, Estes & Donnellgreen2 sentences2010Simpson, 232 S.W.3d at 24 (emphasis added). 16 *238 We find it significant that the court stated at the end of the paragraph, “[t]hese requirements accurately reflect the parameters of the privilege ....” Id. (emphasis added). 2010Simpson, 232 S.W.3d at 24 (emphasis added). 16 *238 We find it significant that the court stated at the end of the paragraph, “[t]hese requirements accurately reflect the parameters of the privilege ....” Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols
green
2 sentences2001We further conclude that the parameters of the doctrine are illustrated by the Comments to Sections 652A and 652E-I, and by this Court’s decision in Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn.1978), as it applies to the First Amendment standard for private plaintiffs and the pleading of damages. 2001We further conclude that the parameters of the doctrine are illustrated by the Comments to Sections 652A and 652E-I, and by this Court’s decision in Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978), as it applies to the First Amendment standard for private plaintiffs and the pleading of damages. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Michigan v. Bryant
green
1 sentence2025The Smith majority appears to have jettisoned the “targeted accusation” portion of the combined opinions in Williams, choosing instead to focus on the “primary purpose” of the evidence, stating that a court must examine the offered statement to “determine, given all the ‘relevant circumstances,’ the principal reason it was made.” See id. at 800-01 (citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at 369 )); see also Franklin, 145 S. Ct. at 833-34 (2025) (Gorsuch, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari) (noting that the Court had endorsed the primary purpose test in Smith but had not actually defined the paramet | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Warth v. Seldin
red
2 sentences2012Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn.1976) (holding that courts use the standing doctrine to decide whether a particular plaintiff is “properly situated to prosecute the action.”); City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, et al., 149 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004). 2012Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Knierim v. Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tenn.1976) (holding that courts use the standing doctrine to decide whether a particular plaintiff is “properly situated to prosecute the action.”); City of Brentwood v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, et al., 149 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 13, 2004). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Jones v. Trice
green
1 sentence2007The rule we have adopted today is also consistent with our prior cases that have embraced the privilege on the basis that “access to the judicial process, freedom to institute an action, or defend, or participate therein without fear of the burden of being sued for defamation is so vital and necessary to the integrity of our judicial system that it must be made paramount.” Jones, 360 S.W.2d at 51 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.