parameters hearing in Texas

2016The State’s perception of prejudice hangs on the difficulty of re-trying Mr. Talamantes if this conviction were overturned.4 1 Ex Parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) 2Id. at 215 “We reaffirm Carrio’s holding…alter[ing it]…only to the extent that we now apply Texas common law, rather than the federal standard to define the parameters of the doctrine of laches in Texas habeas corpus cases.” 3 Id. at 219 4 State’s Brief, pp. 13-17 !4 The State stipulated that the arresting officer was still with the Austin Police department,5 and the obvious presumption is that he would be avail

2016The State’s perception of prejudice hangs on the difficulty of re-trying Mr. Talamantes if this conviction were overturned.4 1 Ex Parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) 2Id. at 215 “We reaffirm Carrio’s holding…alter[ing it]…only to the extent that we now apply Texas common law, rather than the federal standard to define the parameters of the doctrine of laches in Texas habeas corpus cases.” 3 Id. at 219 4 State’s Brief, pp. 13-17 !4 The State stipulated that the arresting officer was still with the Austin Police department,5 and the obvious presumption is that he would be avail

2013See id.

2013See id.

2009See id. (allowing plenary power to be extended under certain circumstances if party adversely affected by a judgment "or other appealable order" did not timely receive notice thereof).

2009See id. (allowing plenary power to be extended under certain circumstances if party adversely affected by a judgment “or other appealable order” did not timely receive notice thereof).

2002See 927 S.W.2d 12, 19-24 (Tex.1996).

2002See 927 S.W.2d 12, 19-24 (Tex. 1996).

2001Requiring an affidavit is designed "to limit the parameters of the hearing that is sought" and prevent "limitless fishing expeditions." McIntire v. State , 698 S.W.2d 652, 659 (Tex. Crim.

1991In McIntire , the court held (footnote omitted): “As a matter of pleading and as a prerequisite to obtaining a hearing [on a motion for new trial], keeping in mind that the purpose of the affidavit requirement is to limit the parameters of the hearing that is sought, we hold that an affidavit is sufficient if it demonstrates that reasonable grounds exist for believing that jury misconduct occurred. ...”[ 8 ] McIntire, 698 S.W.2d at 658 ; Gibbs v. State, 819 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

2015See infra notes 1540-44 and accompanying text. 316 Coastal Transp., 136 S.W.3d 227 . 317 Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. 2004), abrogated by Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).

2015For example, the “substantial evidence” rule for agency contested-case determinations not only sets the parameters on a waiver of immunity from suit, see Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 198 (Tex. 2004), but it embodies a pre-existing common-law standard framed to avoid separation-of-powers problems, e.g., Fire Dep’t of City of Fort Worth v. City of Fort Worth, 147 Tex. 505, 509-510 , 217 S.W.2d 664, 666 (1949).

2015See infra notes 1540-44 and accompanying text. 316 Coastal Transp., 136 S.W.3d 227 . 317 Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. 2004), abrogated by Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).

2015In fact, the author of today’s > majority opinion once wrote, “this Court has enforced the doctrine of separation of powers more aggressively than the United States Supreme Court has.” State v. Rhine, 297 S.W.3d 301, 317 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Horizon CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896-97 (Tex. 2000) (the purpose of the fair notice pleading rule is to give the opposing party information sufficient to enable him to prepare a defense and, in the absence of special exceptions, “courts should construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the pleader”). 23 (b) Cobalt pleaded waiver.

2015For example, the “substantial evidence” rule for agency contested-case determinations not only sets the parameters on a waiver of immunity from suit, see Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 198 (Tex. 2004), but it embodies a pre-existing common-law standard framed to avoid separation-of-powers problems, e.g., Fire Dep’t of City of Fort Worth v. City of Fort Worth, 147 Tex. 505, 509-510 , 217 S.W.2d 664, 666 (1949).

2015For example, the “substantial evidence” rule for agency contested-case determinations not only sets the parameters on a waiver of immunity from suit, see Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 198 (Tex. 2004), but it embodies a pre-existing common-law standard framed to avoid separation-of-powers problems, e.g., Fire Dep’t of City of Fort Worth v. City of Fort Worth, 147 Tex. 505, 509-510 , 217 S.W.2d 664, 666 (1949).

2014As such, that case fits squarely within the parameters of the exception for cross motions for summary judgment recognized in Valence Operating Co. See Valence Operating Co., 164 S.W.3d at 661 (stating trial court has jurisdiction to consider denial of motion for summary judgment when trial court grants one motion and denies the other on same issue).

2014See also Ex parte Scott, 190 S.W.3d 672, 676-77 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (Cochran, J., concurring) (setting out reasons to apply laches and noting that relief should be denied, although State failed to raise laches and usually it “is a doctrine that must be pled and proven”); Ex parte Steptoe, 132 S.W.3d 434 , 440 n. 21 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (Cochran, J., dissenting) (stating that “re-buttable presumption casts the burden of showing a lack of prejudice” on applicant, although State did not raise laches).

2014See Friend, 370 S.W.3d at 371 (plaintiff can bring a claim if the plaintiff alleges government unit “used” property that lacked an intergral safety component); Robinson, 780 S.W.2d at 172 (plaintiff’s sole contention is that the failure to provide a life jacket is a “use of tangible personal property”) (J.

2014See Friend, 370 S.W.3d at 371 (plaintiff can bring a claim if the plaintiff alleges government unit “used” property that lacked an intergral safety component); Robinson, 780 S.W.2d at 172 (plaintiff’s sole contention is that the failure to provide a life jacket is a “use of tangible personal property”) (J.

2014Liberally construing Juarez’s petition, we conclude he alleged the whiteboard was dangerous because it lacked something to secure it to the wall that was necessary for it to be safe. –5– decedent with a life preserver, a “part of [decedent’s] swimming attire.”); Overton Mem’l Hosp. v. McGuirre, 518 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. 1975) (injuries caused by negligently providing a hospital bed without bed rails are proximately caused from condition or use of tangible property.) Although not entirely clear, it appears the Supreme Court was defining the parameters of the waiver of immunity under the “use” p

2009See id.

2001App. 1985); Vyvial v. State , 111 Tex. Crim. 111 , 10 S.W.2d 83, 84-85 (1928).

2001App. 1985); Vyvial v. State , 111 Tex. Crim. 111 , 10 S.W.2d 83, 84-85 (1928).

1994See Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d at 744 .

1991See also, Green v. State, 754 S.W.2d 687, at 688 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).