parameters doctrine in Illinois

2014We believe the narrow exception created by the revestment doctrine, as stated in Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d at 240-41 , and clarified here, strikes the proper balance between the need for certainty and finality in rulings and the requirements of justice and fairness. ¶ 27 Having clarified the parameters of the doctrine, we now consider the propriety of the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to vacate his plea and sentence on the merits.

2014We believe the narrow exception created by the revestment doctrine, as stated in Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d at 240-41 , and clarified here, strikes the proper balance between the need for certainty and finality in rulings and the requirements of justice and fairness. ¶ 27 Having clarified the parameters of the doctrine, we now consider the propriety of the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to vacate his plea and sentence on the merits.

2008In Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. at 554 , 116 S.Ct. at 1535 , 134 L.Ed.2d at 768 , the Supreme Court described the first prong of the Hunt test as requiring only "that at least one of the organization's members would have standing to sue on his own." Our own supreme court cited to Brown Group, Inc. with approval in describing the parameters of the doctrine that it was adopting.

2008Ed. 2d at 768 , 116 S. Ct. at 1535 , the Supreme Court described the first prong of the Hunt test as requiring only “that at least one of the organization’s members would have standing to sue on his own.” Our own supreme court cited to Brown Group, Inc. with approval in describing the parameters of the doctrine that it was adopting.

2008International Union, 215 Ill.2d at 47-48 , 293 Ill.Dec. 606 , 828 N.E.2d 1104 .

2008International Union, 215 Ill. 2d at 47-48 .

1993(People v. Watson (1979), 69 Ill.

1986(People v. Watson (1979), 69 Ill.

2021Merz, 94 Ill.

1994(Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d at 271-72 .) However, in reaching its conclusion the court discussed at length the parameters of the rule that a factor implicit in an offense should not be used as an aggravating factor.

1994Stating that Conover, on which the defendant in Saldivar relied, stands for the rule, the court added: "[T]his court did not intend a rigid application of the rule, thereby restricting the function of a sentencing judge by forcing him to ignore factors relevant to the imposition of sentence.” (Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d at 268 .) Noting that the Illinois Constitution provides that penalties must take into consideration both the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation (see Ill.

1993Without that essential allegation and proof, the sole basis for considering whether police harassment of probationers justifies extension of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings never arises.” ( 75 Ill. 2d at 299 , 388 N.E.2d at 418 .) Accordingly, for a probationer to bring himself within the parameters of the exception to the general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in revocation proceedings, he must, in a motion to suppress, allege and prove not only the illegality of the search and seizure but also that it was the result of police harassment.

1993Without that essential allegation and proof, the sole basis for considering whether police harassment of probationers justifies extension of the exclusionary rule to probation revocation proceedings never arises.” ( 75 Ill. 2d at 299 , 388 N.E.2d at 418 .) Accordingly, for a probationer to bring himself within the parameters of the exception to the general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in revocation proceedings, he must, in a motion to suppress, allege and prove not only the illegality of the search and seizure but also that it was the result of police harassment.

1988(Kobylanski, 63 Ill. 2d at 172-73 .) Do the administrative personnel fall within the parameters of this immunity?

1983App. 3d 830, 838 , 444 N.E.2d 782, 789 .) Thus, the Hebein court determined that even if it were to adopt the exception, the narrow parameters of the exception would not encompass the situation in that case. ( 111 Ill.

1983App. 3d 830, 838 , 444 N.E.2d 782, 789 .) Thus, the Hebein court determined that even if it were to adopt the exception, the narrow parameters of the exception would not encompass the situation in that case. ( 111 Ill.

1979Thus, in such circumstances, extension of the exclusionary rule to the probation revocation proceeding may be necessary to effectuate Fourth Amendment safeguards.” ( 518 F.2d 51 , 54 n. 5.) From the reasoning of these cases, it appears to us that a probationer to bring himself within the parameters of the exception to the general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule must, in a motion to suppress, allege not only the illegality of the search and seizure but also that it was the result of police harassment.