23 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mills v. City of Overland Parkgreen2 sentences2020See Mills, 251 Kan. 434 , Syl. ¶ 5 ('Absent some special relationship with or specific duty owed an individual, liability will not lie for damages.')." Williams, 310 Kan. 775 at 788-89. 1999Under the public duty doctrine, officials have no duty to any individual except where circumstances create a special relationship or specific duty. 251 Kan. at 446 (distinguishing Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369 , 720 P.2d 1093 [1986]). | 3 | 3 |
Keiswetter v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Under the public duty doctrine, "a plaintiff suing a governmental entity in negligence cannot establish the duty requirement of its claim when the duty is a public one, i.e., owed to the public at large and not to any particular individual." Keiswetter v. State, 304 Kan. 362, 365 , 373 P.3d 803 (2016). 2022Under the public duty doctrine, "a plaintiff suing a governmental entity in negligence cannot establish the duty requirement of its claim when the duty is a public one, i.e., owed to the public at large and not to any particular individual." Keiswetter v. State, 304 Kan. 362, 365 , 373 P.3d 803 (2016). | 2 | 3 |
Hopkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2020The district court also held that Henderson failed to provide expert testimony on the issue of duty, as it thought Hopkins v. State, 237 Kan. 601 , 702 P.2d 311 (1985), required. 2020The district court also held that Henderson failed to provide expert testimony on the issue of duty, as it thought Hopkins v. State, 237 Kan. 601 , 702 P.2d 311 (1985), required. | 2 | 3 |
Robertson v. City of Topekagreen2 sentences2020Hopkins, 237 Kan. at 609-10 (Various immunities in K.S.A. 75-6104, including that for police and fire protection, codify preexisting common-law doctrine.); see Robertson v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 358, 363 , 644 P.2d 458 (1982). 2020Hopkins, 237 Kan. at 609-10 (Various immunities in K.S.A. 75-6104, including that for police and fire protection, codify preexisting common-law doctrine.); see Robertson v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 358, 363 , 644 P.2d 458 (1982). | 2 | 3 |
Southers v. City of Farmingtongreen2 sentences2018The Missouri cases hold that an officer's individual liability is protected by the public duty doctrine because his "police pursuit conduct arose from his duties owed to the public generally." Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 620 (Mo. 2008); Throneberry v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 526 S.W.3d 198, 205-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (finding the public duty doctrine applicable to trooper's pursuit when no foreseeable injury to specific individuals). 15 Resolution of this issue requires us to interpret K.S.A. 8-1506, which is an issue of law over which we have unlimited review. 2018The Missouri cases hold that an officer's individual liability is protected by the public duty doctrine because his "police pursuit conduct arose from his duties owed to the public generally." Southers v. City of Farmington , 263 S.W.3d 603 , 620 (Mo. 2008) ; Throneberry v. Missouri State Highway Patrol , 526 S.W.3d 198 , 205-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (finding the public duty doctrine applicable to trooper's pursuit when no foreseeable injury to specific individuals). | 1 | 1 |
Throneberry v. Missouri State Highway Patrolgreen2 sentences2018The Missouri cases hold that an officer's individual liability is protected by the public duty doctrine because his "police pursuit conduct arose from his duties owed to the public generally." Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 620 (Mo. 2008); Throneberry v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 526 S.W.3d 198, 205-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (finding the public duty doctrine applicable to trooper's pursuit when no foreseeable injury to specific individuals). 15 Resolution of this issue requires us to interpret K.S.A. 8-1506, which is an issue of law over which we have unlimited review. 2018The Missouri cases hold that an officer's individual liability is protected by the public duty doctrine because his "police pursuit conduct arose from his duties owed to the public generally." Southers v. City of Farmington , 263 S.W.3d 603 , 620 (Mo. 2008) ; Throneberry v. Missouri State Highway Patrol , 526 S.W.3d 198 , 205-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (finding the public duty doctrine applicable to trooper's pursuit when no foreseeable injury to specific individuals). | 1 | 1 |
Lamb v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Lamb v. State, 33 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
Barrett Ex Rel. Barrett v. Unified School District No. 259green1 sentence2016See Barrett, 272 Kan. at 264 (after holding KTCA’s recreational use exception provided immunity, no need to consider KTCA’s discretionaiy function exception); Nichols v. U.S.D. | 1 | 1 |
Hurlbut v. Conoco, Inc.green2 sentences2009See Hurlbut v. Conoco, Inc., 253 Kan. 515, 520 , 856 P.2d 1313 (1993). 2009See Hurlbut v. Conoco, Inc., 253 Kan. 515, 520 , 856 P.2d 1313 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Wanzer v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2009The public duty doctrine was also found not to apply under District of Columbia law in Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1990), a similar action for failure to respond to a 911 call. | 1 | 1 |
South v. McCartergreen2 sentences2009See South v. McCarter, 280 Kan. 85, 94-95 , 119 P.3d 1 (2005). *112 In the brief supporting its summary judgment motion, the County argued that no special relationship existed to bar application of the public duty doctrine. 2009See South v. McCarter, 280 Kan. 85, 94-95 , 119 P.3d 1 (2005). *112 In the brief supporting its summary judgment motion, the County argued that no special relationship existed to bar application of the public duty doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fudge v. City of Kansas City
red
2 sentences2020Henderson also argued that the public duty doctrine under K.S.A. 75-6104(d), even if not waived, still did not apply because Grimes had a special relationship with Henderson, and because the statute impermissibly circumvented our Supreme Court's decision in Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369 , 720 P.2d 1093 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in Woodruff v. City of Ottawa, 263 Kan. 557 , Syl. ¶ 8, 951 P.2d 953 (1997). 2020Henderson also argued that the public duty doctrine under K.S.A. 75-6104(d), even if not waived, still did not apply because Grimes had a special relationship with Henderson, and because the statute impermissibly circumvented our Supreme Court's decision in Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369 , 720 P.2d 1093 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in Woodruff v. City of Ottawa, 263 Kan. 557 , Syl. ¶ 8, 951 P.2d 953 (1997). | 4 | 1994–2020 |
Potts v. Board of County Commissioners
green
2 sentences2020"Generally, a special duty may exist between a government agency and an injured person, rendering the public duty doctrine inapplicable to their encounter, when: (1) a special relationship existed between the governmental agency and the wrongdoer (i.e., the wrongdoer was in the State's custody or care); (2) a special relationship existed between the governmental agency and the injured person (i.e., the injured person was in the State's custody or care); or (3) the government agency performed an affirmative act that caused injury or made a specific promise or representation that under the circu 2017For purposes of the public duty doctrine, this court has held that a special duty is owed by a governmental agency to a specific individual in three instances: "(1) a special relationship existed between the governmental agency and the wrongdoer (i.e., the wrongdoer was in the State's custody or care); (2) a special relationship existed between the governmental agency and the injured person (i.e., the injured person was in the State's custody or care); or (3) the government agency performed an affirmative act that caused injury or made a specific promise or representation that under the circum | 4 | 2009–2020 |
Kirk v. City of Shawnee
green
2 sentences2008The public duty doctrine The public duty doctrine was described in Kirk v. City of Shawnee, 27 Kan. 2008No duty exists unless it is established that the agency owed a special duty to the injured party.” Generally, a special duty may exist between a government agency and an injured person, rendering the public duty doctrine inapplicable to their encounter, when: (1) a special relationship existed between the governmental agency and the wrongdoer (i.e., the wrongdoer was in the State’s custody or care); (2) a special relationship existed between the governmental agency and the injured person (i.e., the injured person was in the State’s custody or care); or (3) the government agency performed an af | 4 | 2005–2018 |
Conner v. Janes
green
2 sentences2018The public duty doctrine "expresses a general rule that law enforcement duties are owed to the public at large and not to any specific person." Conner v. Janes , 267 Kan. 427 , 429, 981 P.2d 1169 (1999). 2018The public duty doctrine "expresses a general rule that law enforcement duties are owed to the public at large and not to any specific person." Conner v. Janes , 267 Kan. 427 , 429, 981 P.2d 1169 (1999). | 3 | 2005–2020 |
Potts v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS OF LEAVENWORTH COUNTY
green
2 sentences2020App. 2d 71, 81 , 176 P.3d 988 (2008). 2017App. 2d 71, 81 , 176 P.3d 988 (2008). | 3 | 2009–2020 |
P.W. v. Kansas Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services
green
2 sentences2004Under the public duty doctrine, ‘a governmental entity is not liable for torts committed against a person in absence of a special duty owed to the injured party.’ [Citation omitted.]” 255 Kan. at 835 . 1996Under the public duty doctrine, a governmental entity is not liable for breach of a public duty, but only for breach of a special duty owed to an individual. 255 Kan. at 835 . | 2 | 1996–2004 |
Kennedy v. Kansas Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services
green
2 sentences2001Kennedy v. Kansas Dept. of SRS, 26 Kan. 2001The existence of a duty is a question of law, and we have unlimited review of questions of law. [Citation omitted.] “Generally, law enforcement and social services officials owe a legal duty only to the public at large. [Citations omitted.] Under the public duty doctrine, officials have no duty to any individual except where circumstances create a special relationship or specific duty. [Citations omitted.] Where there is no duty, there can be no breach.” Kennedy v. Kansas Dept. of SRS, 26 Kan. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Burney v. Kansas Department of Social & Rehabilitation Services
green
1 sentence2022The court held since SRS owed no statutory duty to abused children under the public duty doctrine, it also owed no duty to the alleged abuser. 23 Kan. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Montgomery v. Saleh
green
1 sentence2020Montgomery v. Saleh, 55 Kan. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Soto v. City of Bonner Springs
green
2 sentences2020See, e.g., Keiswetter, 304 Kan. at 367 ; Soto v. City of Bonner Springs, 291 Kan. 73, 78 , 238 P.3d 278 (2010). 2020See, e.g., Keiswetter, 304 Kan. at 367 ; Soto v. City of Bonner Springs, 291 Kan. 73, 78 , 238 P.3d 278 (2010). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Woodruff Ex Rel. Woodruff v. City of Ottawa
green
2 sentences2020Henderson also argued that the public duty doctrine under K.S.A. 75-6104(d), even if not waived, still did not apply because Grimes had a special relationship with Henderson, and because the statute impermissibly circumvented our Supreme Court's decision in Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369 , 720 P.2d 1093 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in Woodruff v. City of Ottawa, 263 Kan. 557 , Syl. ¶ 8, 951 P.2d 953 (1997). 2020Henderson also argued that the public duty doctrine under K.S.A. 75-6104(d), even if not waived, still did not apply because Grimes had a special relationship with Henderson, and because the statute impermissibly circumvented our Supreme Court's decision in Fudge v. City of Kansas City, 239 Kan. 369 , 720 P.2d 1093 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in Woodruff v. City of Ottawa, 263 Kan. 557 , Syl. ¶ 8, 951 P.2d 953 (1997). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Lovitt ex rel. Bahr v. Board of County Commissioners
green
1 sentence2019Citing Lovitt v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 43 Kan. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 301 Kan. 916, 918 , 349 P.3d 469 (2015). 2018Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc., 301 Kan. 916, 918 , 349 P.3d 469 (2015). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cummins v. Lewis County
green
2 sentences2009In Cummins v. Lewis County, 124 Wash. App. 247 , 98 P.3d 822 (2004), aff'd 156 Wash.2d 844 , 133 P.3d 458 (2006), a wrongful death action based upon failure to respond to a 911 call, the Washington Court of Appeals and then the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff based on her failure to demonstrate the existence of facts to support application of the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. 2009This overbroad argument fails to cite to the record, contradicts the public duty doctrine's central requirement that liability not attach to a government entity's duty to the public at large, and conflicts with all four of the doctrine's exceptions that require a reasonable degree of specificity." Cummins, 124 Wash.App. at 254-55 , 98 P.3d 822 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cummins v. Lewis County
green
2 sentences2009In Cummins v. Lewis County, 124 Wash. App. 247 , 98 P.3d 822 (2004), aff'd 156 Wash.2d 844 , 133 P.3d 458 (2006), a wrongful death action based upon failure to respond to a 911 call, the Washington Court of Appeals and then the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff based on her failure to demonstrate the existence of facts to support application of the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. 2009In Cummins v. Lewis County, 124 Wash. App. 247 , 98 P.3d 822 (2004), aff'd 156 Wash.2d 844 , 133 P.3d 458 (2006), a wrongful death action based upon failure to respond to a 911 call, the Washington Court of Appeals and then the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff based on her failure to demonstrate the existence of facts to support application of the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cummins v. Lewis County
green
2 sentences2009In Cummins v. Lewis County, 124 Wash. App. 247 , 98 P.3d 822 (2004), aff'd 156 Wash.2d 844 , 133 P.3d 458 (2006), a wrongful death action based upon failure to respond to a 911 call, the Washington Court of Appeals and then the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff based on her failure to demonstrate the existence of facts to support application of the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. 2009In Cummins v. Lewis County, 124 Wash. App. 247 , 98 P.3d 822 (2004), aff'd 156 Wash.2d 844 , 133 P.3d 458 (2006), a wrongful death action based upon failure to respond to a 911 call, the Washington Court of Appeals and then the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff based on her failure to demonstrate the existence of facts to support application of the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County
green
2 sentences2009Similarly, in Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447 , 805 A.2d 372 (2002), the court found that the duty of the 911 dispatcher was to the public at large and not to a specific individual: "By its terms, [Maryland's] statutory scheme [requiring all counties to operate an enhanced 911 system] does not create an emergency system to benefit a discrete group of persons. 2009Similarly, in Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447 , 805 A.2d 372 (2002), the court found that the duty of the 911 dispatcher was to the public at large and not to a specific individual: "By its terms, [Maryland's] statutory scheme [requiring all counties to operate an enhanced 911 system] does not create an emergency system to benefit a discrete group of persons. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cummins v. Lewis County
green
2 sentences2009In Cummins v. Lewis County, 124 Wash. App. 247 , 98 P.3d 822 (2004), aff'd 156 Wash.2d 844 , 133 P.3d 458 (2006), a wrongful death action based upon failure to respond to a 911 call, the Washington Court of Appeals and then the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff based on her failure to demonstrate the existence of facts to support application of the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. 2009This overbroad argument fails to cite to the record, contradicts the public duty doctrine's central requirement that liability not attach to a government entity's duty to the public at large, and conflicts with all four of the doctrine's exceptions that require a reasonable degree of specificity." Cummins, 124 Wash.App. at 254-55 , 98 P.3d 822 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cuffy v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2009In Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260 , 513 N.Y.S.2d 372 , 505 N.E.2d 937 (1987), a case involving a claim that the police failed to provide promised protection, the court considered the application of the special duty exception to the general rule that "a municipality may not be held liable for injuries resulting from a simple failure to provide police protection." The court concluded that "when the reliance element is either not present at all or, if present, is not causally related to the ultimate harm, this underlying concern is inapplicable, and the invocation of the `special d 2009In Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260 , 513 N.Y.S.2d 372 , 505 N.E.2d 937 (1987), a case involving a claim that the police failed to provide promised protection, the court considered the application of the special duty exception to the general rule that "a municipality may not be held liable for injuries resulting from a simple failure to provide police protection." The court concluded that "when the reliance element is either not present at all or, if present, is not causally related to the ultimate harm, this underlying concern is inapplicable, and the invocation of the `special d | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Beebe v. Fraktman green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| McCormick v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.