public duty rule in Ohio

2016The court adopted a special duty exception, for which the following elements must be shown: “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.” Id. at paragraph four of the syllabus. -29- {¶ 73} However, in a subsequent decision, the Supreme Cou

2016See Estate of Graves, syllabus (“The public-duty rule adopted by this court in Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 222 , 525 N.E.2d 468 , is not applicable in civil actions brought against employees of political subdivisions for wanton or reckless conduct”). {¶20} In his response, Ferrell draws this court’s attention to R.C. 2743.02(F), which provides: b.

2024No. 18AP-723, 2019-Ohio-1794, ¶ 35 , quoting Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1995). {¶ 13} As defined in R.C. 2743.01(E)(1), “ ‘[p]ublic duty’ includes, but is not limited to, any statutory, regulatory, or assumed duty concerning any action or omission of the state involving any of the following: (a) Permitting, certifying, licensing, inspecting, investigating, supervising, regulating, auditing, monitoring, law enforcement, or emergency response activity * * *.” {¶ 14} An exception to the public duty rule exists, and the state is thus not immune from liability, w

2020“The public duty rule provides a defense independent of sovereign immunity.” Id., quoting Swart v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 133 Ohio App.3d 420, 423 (10th Dist.1999), citing Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002– Ohio–4210.

2020“The public duty rule provides a defense independent of sovereign immunity.” Id., quoting Swart v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 133 Ohio App.3d 420, 423 (10th Dist.1999), citing Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002– Ohio–4210.

2019See Hurst v. State Dept. of Rehab., 72 Ohio St.3d 325 (1995) (partially overruled in Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002-Ohio-4210 , but relevantly reinstated by the enactment of R.C. 2743.02(A)(3) and 2743.01(E)(1)). {¶ 22} The Estate concedes the public duty doctrine purports to provide governmental immunity in situations akin to the one sub judice.

2001Franklin v. Columbus (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 53, 58 , 719 N.E.2d 592, 595-596 . 2 A plaintiff who establishes a special duty not only avoids the operation of the public duty rule but also automatically establishes the duty element of a negligence action.

2001Franklin v. Columbus (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 53, 58 , 719 N.E.2d 592, 595-596 . 2 A plaintiff who establishes a special duty not only avoids the operation of the public duty rule but also automatically establishes the duty element of a negligence action.

2019See Hurst v. State Dept. of Rehab., 72 Ohio St.3d 325 (1995) (partially overruled in Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002-Ohio-4210 , but relevantly reinstated by the enactment of R.C. 2743.02(A)(3) and 2743.01(E)(1)). {¶ 22} The Estate concedes the public duty doctrine purports to provide governmental immunity in situations akin to the one sub judice.

2018For example, in 1995 in Hurst v. State Dept. of Rehab. & Correction, 72 Ohio St.3d 325 , 650 N.E.2d 104 (1995), overruled to the extent inconsistent with Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002-Ohio-4210 , 773 N.E.2d 1018 , the Ohio Supreme Court reversed an appellate court’s judgment that reversed this court’s application of the public-duty doctrine.

2020“The public duty rule provides a defense independent of sovereign immunity.” Id., quoting Swart v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 133 Ohio App.3d 420, 423 (10th Dist.1999), citing Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002– Ohio–4210.

2018If the duty owed is general in nature, the wrong created by its breach is to the public in general and, therefore, not individually actionable.” And in Swart v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Correction, 133 Ohio App.3d 420, 423 , 728 N.E.2d 428 (10th Dist.1999), the Tenth District Court of Appeals stated that the public-duty rule “applies to uniquely governmental functions and, unless avoided by operation of the ‘special duty’ exception, precludes the establishment of the duty element of a negligence action.” {¶10} In Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002-Ohio- 4210, 773 N.E.2d

1991See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cleveland (Jan. 15, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 51602, unreported, 1987 WL 5471 , affirmed (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 234 , 525 N.E.2d 483 .

1991See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cleveland (Jan. 15, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 51602, unreported, 1987 WL 5471 , affirmed (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 234 , 525 N.E.2d 483 .

2002This is the majority’s unstated yet essential premise, for without it there is no basis on which to avoid Sawicki’s holding that the public-duty rule survives the abrogation of sovereign immunity. {¶ 81} Yet in Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776 , the very case upon which the majority relies to support the second paragraph of its syllabus, we specifically rejected this interpretation of R.C. 2743.02, stating that “[t]he abrogation of the sovereign immunity of the state, which was accomplished by the passage of R.C. 2743.02, is not significantly differen

2002This is the majority’s unstated yet essential premise, for without it there is no basis on which to avoid Sawicki’s holding that the public-duty rule survives the abrogation of sovereign immunity. {¶ 81} Yet in Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776 , the very case upon which the majority relies to support the second paragraph of its syllabus, we specifically rejected this interpretation of R.C. 2743.02, stating that “[t]he abrogation of the sovereign immunity of the state, which was accomplished by the passage of R.C. 2743.02, is not significantly differen

2002See Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 325 , 650 N.E.2d 104 (applying public-duty rule to bar liability for negligently failing to detain parole violator); Anderson v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 215 , 569 N.E.2d 1042 (applying public-duty rule to bar liability for negligent liquidation of assets). 4 And even though a handful of states have rejected the public-duty rule as a bar to government liability, 5 a majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question apply the doctrine in some form. 6 {¶ 18} Consistent with this line of cases, the state urg

2002See Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 325 , 650 N.E.2d 104 (applying public-duty rule to bar liability for negligently failing to detain parole violator); Anderson v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 215 , 569 N.E.2d 1042 (applying public-duty rule to bar liability for negligent liquidation of assets). 4 And even though a handful of states have rejected the public-duty rule as a bar to government liability, 5 a majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question apply the doctrine in some form. 6 {¶ 18} Consistent with this line of cases, the state urg

2006Appellants have cited no portion of the statute that expressly provides an exception to immunity for any common law doctrine. {¶ 12} Appellees argue that Yates v. Mansfield Bd. of Edn., 102 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2004-Ohio-2491 , allows the public-duty rule to be asserted as a cause of action in spite of statutory immunity.

2004Chapter 2744.” Yates v. Mansfield Bd. of Edn., 102 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2004-Ohio-2491 , 808 N.E.2d 861, fn. 2 . {¶ 23} Under the public-duty rule, a public official or political subdivision may be liable for a breach of a duty if it is a special duty imposed by law.

1999Rather, appellants challenge the court’s application of the public duty rule, *424 arguing only that the rule does not apply when the conduct in question constitutes negligence per se. 2 In Hurst , the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the continued vitality of the public duty rule in light of its decisions in Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E .2d 776, and Crawford v. Ohio Div. of Parole & Community Serv. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 184 , 566 N.E.2d 1233 .

1999Rather, appellants challenge the court’s application of the public duty rule, *424 arguing only that the rule does not apply when the conduct in question constitutes negligence per se. 2 In Hurst , the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the continued vitality of the public duty rule in light of its decisions in Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E .2d 776, and Crawford v. Ohio Div. of Parole & Community Serv. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 184 , 566 N.E.2d 1233 .

1989We implicitly rejected this reasoning in Delman v. Cleveland Heights (1989), 41 Ohio St. 3d 1 , 534 N.E. 2d 835 , when we held that the public duty rule protected a city against liability for real estate inspections conducted by city employees pursuant to a point-of-sale inspection ordinance.

1989We implicitly rejected this reasoning in Delman v. Cleveland Heights (1989), 41 Ohio St. 3d 1 , 534 N.E. 2d 835 , when we held that the public duty rule protected a city against liability for real estate inspections conducted by city employees pursuant to a point-of-sale inspection ordinance.

2010Auth. (1988), 208 Conn. 161, 167 , 544 A.2d 1185 , citing Shore v. Stonington (1982), 187 Conn. 147, 155 , 444 A.2d 1379 , and Stiebitz v. Mahoney (1957), 144 Conn. 443, 448-449 , 134 A.2d 71 . 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 23} Our determination that the public-duty rule is inapplicable to lawsuits alleging wanton and reckless conduct against political subdivision employees preserves the public policy that justified our adoption of the rule – maintaining the integrity of public finance and the necessity of avoiding judicial intervention into policy decisions.

2010Auth. (1988), 208 Conn. 161, 167 , 544 A.2d 1185 , citing Shore v. Stonington (1982), 187 Conn. 147, 155 , 444 A.2d 1379 , and Stiebitz v. Mahoney (1957), 144 Conn. 443, 448-449 , 134 A.2d 71 . 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 23} Our determination that the public-duty rule is inapplicable to lawsuits alleging wanton and reckless conduct against political subdivision employees preserves the public policy that justified our adoption of the rule – maintaining the integrity of public finance and the necessity of avoiding judicial intervention into policy decisions.

2002Barthelette v. Sanders (Mo.1988), 756 S.W.2d 536 ; Coty v. Washoe Cty. (1992), 108 Nev. 757 , 839 P.2d 97 ; Cuffy v. New York City, 69 N.Y.2d 255 , 513 N.Y.S.2d 372 , 505 N.E.2d 937 ; Catone v. Medberry (R.I.1989), 555 A.2d 328 ; Steinke v. South Carolina Dept. of Labor (1999), 336 S.C. 373 , 520 S.E.2d 142 ; Tipton v. Tabor (S.D.1997), 567 N.W.2d 351 ; Rollins v. Petersen (Utah 1991), 813 P.2d 1156 ; Chambers-Castanes v. King Cty. (1983), 100 Wash.2d 275 , 669 P.2d 451 ; Benson v. Kutsch (1989), 181 W.Va. 1 , 380 S.E.2d 36 . {lib} Five other states — Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, North Carolina

2002Barthelette v. Sanders (Mo.1988), 756 S.W.2d 536 ; Coty v. Washoe Cty. (1992), 108 Nev. 757 , 839 P.2d 97 ; Cuffy v. New York City, 69 N.Y.2d 255 , 513 N.Y.S.2d 372 , 505 N.E.2d 937 ; Catone v. Medberry (R.I.1989), 555 A.2d 328 ; Steinke v. South Carolina Dept. of Labor (1999), 336 S.C. 373 , 520 S.E.2d 142 ; Tipton v. Tabor (S.D.1997), 567 N.W.2d 351 ; Rollins v. Petersen (Utah 1991), 813 P.2d 1156 ; Chambers-Castanes v. King Cty. (1983), 100 Wash.2d 275 , 669 P.2d 451 ; Benson v. Kutsch (1989), 181 W.Va. 1 , 380 S.E.2d 36 . {lib} Five other states — Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, North Carolina

2024No. 18AP-723, 2019-Ohio-1794, ¶ 35 , quoting Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1995). {¶ 13} As defined in R.C. 2743.01(E)(1), “ ‘[p]ublic duty’ includes, but is not limited to, any statutory, regulatory, or assumed duty concerning any action or omission of the state involving any of the following: (a) Permitting, certifying, licensing, inspecting, investigating, supervising, regulating, auditing, monitoring, law enforcement, or emergency response activity * * *.” {¶ 14} An exception to the public duty rule exists, and the state is thus not immune from liability, w

2023See Case No. 2022-00681JD -4- ENTRY Estate of Tokes v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2019-Ohio-1794 , 135 N.E.3d 1200 , ¶ 36 (10th Dist.), quoting Hurst v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 , 650 N.E.2d 104 (1995) (“The [public duty] rule ‘is used to determine the first element of negligence, the existence of a duty on the part of the state.

2020Summit No. 26266, 2012-Ohio-4695, ¶ 31 , citing Rankin v. Cuyahoga Cty.

2019Summit No. 26266, 2012-Ohio-4695, ¶ 32 (“Because the City’s appeal is limited to the court’s denial of immunity and the public duty rule is independent of immunity, the issue is outside the scope of this appeal.”); Baab v. Medina City Schools Bd. of Edn., 9th Dist.