public duty rule in Ohio

2022The public duty immunity doctrine, now codified in R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(a), provides that "the state is immune from liability in any civil action or proceeding involving the performance or nonperformance of a public duty." See also Sawicki v. Ottawa Hills, 37 Ohio St.3d 222 (1988).

2016The court adopted a special duty exception, for which the following elements must be shown: “(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking.” Id. at paragraph four of the syllabus. -29- {¶ 73} However, in a subsequent decision, the Supreme Cou

2024If the duty owed is general in nature, the wrong created by its breach is to the public in general and, therefore, not individually actionable.’ ” Estate of Tokes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-723, 2019-Ohio-1794, ¶ 35 , quoting Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1995). {¶ 13} As defined in R.C. 2743.01(E)(1), “ ‘[p]ublic duty’ includes, but is not limited to, any statutory, regulatory, or assumed duty concerning any action or omission of the state involving any of the following: (a) Permitting, certifying, licensing, inspecting, investigating

2020“The public duty rule provides a defense independent of sovereign immunity.” Id., quoting Swart v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 133 Ohio App.3d 420, 423 (10th Dist.1999), citing Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002– Ohio–4210.

2020“The public duty rule provides a defense independent of sovereign immunity.” Id., quoting Swart v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 133 Ohio App.3d 420, 423 (10th Dist.1999), citing Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002– Ohio–4210.

2019See Hurst v. State Dept. of Rehab., 72 Ohio St.3d 325 (1995) (partially overruled in Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002-Ohio-4210 , but relevantly reinstated by the enactment of R.C. 2743.02(A)(3) and 2743.01(E)(1)). {¶ 22} The Estate concedes the public duty doctrine purports to provide governmental immunity in situations akin to the one sub judice.

2001Franklin v. Columbus (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 53, 58 , 719 N.E.2d 592, 595-596 . 2 A plaintiff who establishes a special duty not only avoids the operation of the public duty rule but also automatically establishes the duty element of a negligence action.

2001Franklin v. Columbus (1998), 130 Ohio App.3d 53, 58 , 719 N.E.2d 592, 595-596 . 2 A plaintiff who establishes a special duty not only avoids the operation of the public duty rule but also automatically establishes the duty element of a negligence action.

2024If the duty owed is general in nature, the wrong created by its breach is to the public in general and, therefore, not individually actionable.’ ” Estate of Tokes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-723, 2019-Ohio-1794, ¶ 35 , quoting Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1995). {¶ 13} As defined in R.C. 2743.01(E)(1), “ ‘[p]ublic duty’ includes, but is not limited to, any statutory, regulatory, or assumed duty concerning any action or omission of the state involving any of the following: (a) Permitting, certifying, licensing, inspecting, investigating

2022Estate of Tokes v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-723, 2019-Ohio-1794, ¶ 17 . {¶ 71} Because the public duty rule is not a jurisdictional issue, OSU waived this argument for purposes of appeal by failing to make the argument in the court of claims.

2010Auth. (1988), 208 Conn. 161, 167 , 544 A.2d 1185 , citing Shore v. Stonington (1982), 187 Conn. 147, 155 , 444 A.2d 1379 , and Stiebitz v. Mahoney (1957), 144 Conn. 443, 448-449 , 134 A.2d 71 . 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 23} Our determination that the public-duty rule is inapplicable to lawsuits alleging wanton and reckless conduct against political subdivision employees preserves the public policy that justified our adoption of the rule – maintaining the integrity of public finance and the necessity of avoiding judicial intervention into policy decisions.

2010Auth. (1988), 208 Conn. 161, 167 , 544 A.2d 1185 , citing Shore v. Stonington (1982), 187 Conn. 147, 155 , 444 A.2d 1379 , and Stiebitz v. Mahoney (1957), 144 Conn. 443, 448-449 , 134 A.2d 71 . 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 23} Our determination that the public-duty rule is inapplicable to lawsuits alleging wanton and reckless conduct against political subdivision employees preserves the public policy that justified our adoption of the rule – maintaining the integrity of public finance and the necessity of avoiding judicial intervention into policy decisions.

2002Barthelette v. Sanders (Mo.1988), 756 S.W.2d 536 ; Coty v. Washoe Cty. (1992), 108 Nev. 757 , 839 P.2d 97 ; Cuffy v. New York City, 69 N.Y.2d 255 , 513 N.Y.S.2d 372 , 505 N.E.2d 937 ; Catone v. Medberry (R.I.1989), 555 A.2d 328 ; Steinke v. South Carolina Dept. of Labor (1999), 336 S.C. 373 , 520 S.E.2d 142 ; Tipton v. Tabor (S.D.1997), 567 N.W.2d 351 ; Rollins v. Petersen (Utah 1991), 813 P.2d 1156 ; Chambers-Castanes v. King Cty. (1983), 100 Wash.2d 275 , 669 P.2d 451 ; Benson v. Kutsch (1989), 181 W.Va. 1 , 380 S.E.2d 36 . {lib} Five other states — Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, North Carolina

2002Barthelette v. Sanders (Mo.1988), 756 S.W.2d 536 ; Coty v. Washoe Cty. (1992), 108 Nev. 757 , 839 P.2d 97 ; Cuffy v. New York City, 69 N.Y.2d 255 , 513 N.Y.S.2d 372 , 505 N.E.2d 937 ; Catone v. Medberry (R.I.1989), 555 A.2d 328 ; Steinke v. South Carolina Dept. of Labor (1999), 336 S.C. 373 , 520 S.E.2d 142 ; Tipton v. Tabor (S.D.1997), 567 N.W.2d 351 ; Rollins v. Petersen (Utah 1991), 813 P.2d 1156 ; Chambers-Castanes v. King Cty. (1983), 100 Wash.2d 275 , 669 P.2d 451 ; Benson v. Kutsch (1989), 181 W.Va. 1 , 380 S.E.2d 36 . {lib} Five other states — Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, North Carolina

2020See Vos v. Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-749, 2018-Ohio-2956, ¶ 12 . {¶ 10} However, the public duty immunity provided in R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(a) does not apply "to any action of the state under circumstances in which a special relationship can be established between the state and an injured party." R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(b).

2019This is known as the "public duty doctrine." Vos v. Ohio EPA, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-749, 2018-Ohio-2956, ¶ 12 . {¶ 18} When the public duty doctrine is at issue, R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(b) serves to specify a situation referenced in R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) in which governmental liability is waived—that is, where a special relationship exists.

2020“The public duty rule provides a defense independent of sovereign immunity.” Id., quoting Swart v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 133 Ohio App.3d 420, 423 (10th Dist.1999), citing Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 72 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002– Ohio–4210.

2018If the duty owed is general in nature, the wrong created by its breach is to the public in general and, therefore, not individually actionable.” And in Swart v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Correction, 133 Ohio App.3d 420, 423 , 728 N.E.2d 428 (10th Dist.1999), the Tenth District Court of Appeals stated that the public-duty rule “applies to uniquely governmental functions and, unless avoided by operation of the ‘special duty’ exception, precludes the establishment of the duty element of a negligence action.” {¶10} In Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266 , 2002-Ohio- 4210, 773 N.E.2d

2002See, e.g., Wilson v. Anchorage (Alaska 1983), 669 P.2d 569, 571 (noting that the Alaska legislature immunized public entities from liability based on negligent safety inspections of private property following Adams, 555 P.2d 235 , in which the Alaska Supreme Court refused to recognize the public-duty rule); Clouse v. State (2001), 199 Ariz. 196, 199 , 16 P.3d 757 (noting that the Arizona legislature reinstated immunity for variety of public functions following abrogation of public-duty rule in Ryan v. State [1982], 134 Ariz. 308 , 656 P.2d 597 ); Persilver v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp.

2002See, e.g., Adams v. State (Alaska 1976), 555 P.2d 235 ; Ryan v. State (1982), 134 Ariz. 308 , 656 P.2d 597 ; Leake v. Cain (Colo.1986), 720 P.2d 152 ; Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty. 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question apply the doctrine in some form.6 {¶18} Consistent with this line of cases, the state urges us to affirm the lower courts’ application of the public-duty rule in this case.

1991See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cleveland (Jan. 15, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 51602, unreported, 1987 WL 5471 , affirmed (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 234 , 525 N.E.2d 483 .

1991See, e.g., Mitchell v. Cleveland (Jan. 15, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 51602, unreported, 1987 WL 5471 , affirmed (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 234 , 525 N.E.2d 483 .

2024Patrol, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-869, 2016-Ohio-8263, ¶ 13 (“[A]n exception to the public duty doctrine ‘allows recovery * * * where a “special relationship,” as defined by meeting all elements of a four-part test, is established between the state and the injured party.’ ”). {¶ 29} “The absence of factual allegations supporting all elements of the special relationship exception to the public duty rule renders a complaint subject to dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).” Gipson v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 23AP-390, 2024-Ohio-227, ¶ 16 (affirming dismissal of inmates’ complaint where

2024Patrol, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-869, 2016-Ohio-8263, ¶ 13 (“[A]n exception to the public duty doctrine ‘allows recovery * * * where a “special relationship,” as defined by meeting all elements of a four-part test, is established between the state and the injured party.’ ”). {¶ 29} “The absence of factual allegations supporting all elements of the special relationship exception to the public duty rule renders a complaint subject to dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).” Gipson v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 10th Dist. No. 23AP-390, 2024-Ohio-227, ¶ 16 (affirming dismissal of inmates’ complaint where

2024Banks, 2018-Ohio-5246, at ¶ 25 , citing Rooney v. Ohio State Hwy.

2024See Banks v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-748, 2018-Ohio-5246, ¶ 14 . {¶ 15} Here, accepting all the allegations in the amended complaint as true, it is clear that any claim for relief against OAPA would entail the performance or nonperformance of a public duty.

2002This is the majority’s unstated yet essential premise, for without it there is no basis on which to avoid Sawicki’s holding that the public-duty rule survives the abrogation of sovereign immunity. {¶ 81} Yet in Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776 , the very case upon which the majority relies to support the second paragraph of its syllabus, we specifically rejected this interpretation of R.C. 2743.02, stating that “[t]he abrogation of the sovereign immunity of the state, which was accomplished by the passage of R.C. 2743.02, is not significantly differen

2002This is the majority’s unstated yet essential premise, for without it there is no basis on which to avoid Sawicki’s holding that the public-duty rule survives the abrogation of sovereign immunity. {¶ 81} Yet in Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 70 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776 , the very case upon which the majority relies to support the second paragraph of its syllabus, we specifically rejected this interpretation of R.C. 2743.02, stating that “[t]he abrogation of the sovereign immunity of the state, which was accomplished by the passage of R.C. 2743.02, is not significantly differen

2002See Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 325 , 650 N.E.2d 104 (applying public-duty rule to bar liability for negligently failing to detain parole violator); Anderson v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 215 , 569 N.E.2d 1042 (applying public-duty rule to bar liability for negligent liquidation of assets). 4 And even though a handful of states have rejected the public-duty rule as a bar to government liability, 5 a majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question apply the doctrine in some form. 6 {¶ 18} Consistent with this line of cases, the state urg

2002See Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 325 , 650 N.E.2d 104 (applying public-duty rule to bar liability for negligently failing to detain parole violator); Anderson v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 215 , 569 N.E.2d 1042 (applying public-duty rule to bar liability for negligent liquidation of assets). 4 And even though a handful of states have rejected the public-duty rule as a bar to government liability, 5 a majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question apply the doctrine in some form. 6 {¶ 18} Consistent with this line of cases, the state urg

2006Appellants have cited no portion of the statute that expressly provides an exception to immunity for any common law doctrine. {¶ 12} Appellees argue that Yates v. Mansfield Bd. of Edn., 102 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2004-Ohio-2491 , allows the public-duty rule to be asserted as a cause of action in spite of statutory immunity.

2004Chapter 2744.” Yates v. Mansfield Bd. of Edn., 102 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2004-Ohio-2491 , 808 N.E.2d 861, fn. 2 . {¶ 23} Under the public-duty rule, a public official or political subdivision may be liable for a breach of a duty if it is a special duty imposed by law.

1999Rather, appellants challenge the court’s application of the public duty rule, *424 arguing only that the rule does not apply when the conduct in question constitutes negligence per se. 2 In Hurst , the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the continued vitality of the public duty rule in light of its decisions in Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E .2d 776, and Crawford v. Ohio Div. of Parole & Community Serv. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 184 , 566 N.E.2d 1233 .

1999Rather, appellants challenge the court’s application of the public duty rule, *424 arguing only that the rule does not apply when the conduct in question constitutes negligence per se. 2 In Hurst , the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the continued vitality of the public duty rule in light of its decisions in Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E .2d 776, and Crawford v. Ohio Div. of Parole & Community Serv. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 184 , 566 N.E.2d 1233 .

1989We implicitly rejected this reasoning in Delman v. Cleveland Heights (1989), 41 Ohio St. 3d 1 , 534 N.E. 2d 835 , when we held that the public duty rule protected a city against liability for real estate inspections conducted by city employees pursuant to a point-of-sale inspection ordinance.

1989We implicitly rejected this reasoning in Delman v. Cleveland Heights (1989), 41 Ohio St. 3d 1 , 534 N.E. 2d 835 , when we held that the public duty rule protected a city against liability for real estate inspections conducted by city employees pursuant to a point-of-sale inspection ordinance.