public duty doctrine in Connecticut

2003“If a public duty exists, an official can be liable only if the act complained of is a ministerial act or one of the narrow exceptions to discretionary acts applies.” Id., 170 . “[Although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private.” Id.

2003“If a public duty exists, an official can be liable only if the act complained of is a ministerial act or one of the narrow exceptions to discretionary acts applies.” Id., 170 . “[Although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private.” Id.

2006Subsequently, the public duty doctrine was reaffirmed in Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 152 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982), where the court said: “[I]f the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a [public, and] not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at [all, in] some form of public prosecution.

2006Subsequently, the public duty doctrine was reaffirmed in Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 152 , 444 A.2d 1379 (1982), where the court said: “[I]f the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a [public, and] not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at [all, in] some form of public prosecution.

2006Thereafter, in Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 589-90 , 116 A.2d 429 (1955), the court adopted the public duty doctrine, which “provided even more immunity to public officials.” Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 166.

2006Thereafter, in Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 589-90 , 116 A.2d 429 (1955), the court adopted the public duty doctrine, which “provided even more immunity to public officials.” Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 166.

1994Under the rule of governmental immunity for the negligent performance of discretionary acts, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Shore, supra , has established three exceptions to the public duty doctrine: (a) when "it would be apparent to the public officer that his failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm." Shore , at 153 et. sec.; (b) when a statute specifically provides a cause of action against an official or municipality for failure to enforce certain laws; see, e.g., Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 , 523-24 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979); (c) when the publ

1994Under the rule of governmental immunity for the negligent performance of discretionary acts, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Shore, supra , has established three exceptions to the public duty doctrine: (a) when "it would be apparent to the public officer that his failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm." Shore , at 153 et. sec.; (b) when a statute specifically provides a cause of action against an official or municipality for failure to enforce certain laws; see, e.g., Sestito v. Groton , 178 Conn. 520 , 523-24 , 423 A.2d 165 (1979); (c) when the publ

2001"In the application of [the public duty doctrine], the problem is always to determine whether the [action] involved does create a duty to the individual. . . . [I]t appears that the test is this: If the duty imposed upon the public official . . . is of such a nature that the performance of it will affect an individual in a manner different in kind from the way it affects the public at large, the faction] is one which imposes upon the official a duty to the individual, and if the official is negligent in the performance of that duty he is liable to the individual." Roman v. Stamford, 16 Conn. A

2001"In the application of [the public duty doctrine], the problem is always to determine whether the [action] involved does create a duty to the individual. . . . [I]t appears that the test is this: If the duty imposed upon the public official . . . is of such a nature that the performance of it will affect an individual in a manner different in kind from the way it affects the public at large, the faction] is one which imposes upon the official a duty to the individual, and if the official is negligent in the performance of that duty he is liable to the individual." Roman v. Stamford, 16 Conn. A

2001"In the application of [the public duty doctrine], the problem is always to determine whether the [action] involved does create a duty to the individual. . . . [I]t appears that the test is this: If the duty imposed upon the public official . . . is of such a nature that the performance of it will affect an individual in a manner different in kind from the way it affects the public at large, the faction] is one which imposes upon the official a duty to the individual, and if the official is negligent in the performance of that duty he is liable to the individual." Roman v. Stamford, 16 Conn. A

2001"In the application of [the public duty doctrine], the problem is always to determine whether the [action] involved does create a duty to the individual. . . . [I]t appears that the test is this: If the duty imposed upon the public official . . . is of such a nature that the performance of it will affect an individual in a manner different in kind from the way it affects the public at large, the faction] is one which imposes upon the official a duty to the individual, and if the official is negligent in the performance of that duty he is liable to the individual." Roman v. Stamford, 16 Conn. A

2000This determination involves a question of law." Id., 219-220; see also Burns v. Board of Education , 228 Conn. 640 , 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994) (holding that existence of duty of care, an essential element of negligence, is matter for court to decide).

2000This determination involves a question of law." Id., 219-220; see also Burns v. Board of Education , 228 Conn. 640 , 646 , 638 A.2d 1 (1994) (holding that existence of duty of care, an essential element of negligence, is matter for court to decide).

2001Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501 , 505 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989). "[A]lthough the public duty doctrine provides the CT Page 14316 starting point of analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private." Gordon v. Bridgeport, supra, 208 Conn. 170 .

2001Evon v. Andrews, 211 Conn. 501 , 505 , 559 A.2d 1131 (1989). "[A]lthough the public duty doctrine provides the CT Page 14316 starting point of analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private." Gordon v. Bridgeport, supra, 208 Conn. 170 .

2025See, e.g., Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 166 , 544 A.2d 1185 (1988) (opining that this court first articulated public duty doctrine in Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585 , 589–90, 116 A.2d 429 (1955)); see also, e.g., Torres v. Dept. of Correction, 50 Conn. Supp. 72 , 79–85, 912 A.2d 1132 (2006) (tracing history of public duty doctrine and concluding that this doctrine is type of defense, governmental in nature, envisioned by § 4-160, as it applies only to public duties exercised by public officials and, therefore, that it is waived in tandem with state’s sovereign immunit

2025See, e.g., Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 166 , 544 A.2d 1185 (1988) (opining that this court first articulated public duty doctrine in Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585 , 589–90, 116 A.2d 429 (1955)); see also, e.g., Torres v. Dept. of Correction, 50 Conn. Supp. 72 , 79–85, 912 A.2d 1132 (2006) (tracing history of public duty doctrine and concluding that this doctrine is type of defense, governmental in nature, envisioned by § 4-160, as it applies only to public duties exercised by public officials and, therefore, that it is waived in tandem with state’s sovereign immunit

2006See Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 208 Conn. 170 (“although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private”); Violano v. Fernandez, 88 Conn. App. 1 , 11 n.10, 868 A.2d 69 , cert. granted, 273 Conn. 936 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005) (“[court] need not engage in a private versus public analysis, as the determination of the discretionary versus ministerial issue is dispositive”); see also Fleming v. Bridgeport,

2006See Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 208 Conn. 170 (“although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private”); Violano v. Fernandez, 88 Conn. App. 1 , 11 n.10, 868 A.2d 69 , cert. granted, 273 Conn. 936 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005) (“[court] need not engage in a private versus public analysis, as the determination of the discretionary versus ministerial issue is dispositive”); see also Fleming v. Bridgeport,

2006See, e.g., Tri-State Mint, Inc. v. Riedel Environmental Services, 29 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 1994) (private company that obtained and inspected hazardous waste samples solely on behalf of state protected by public duty doctrine); Lawyer v. Kemodle, 721 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1983) (private doctor who performed autopsy could assert public duty doctrine because information from autopsy would be used by prosecutor).

2006See Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 208 Conn. 170 (“although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private”); Violano v. Fernandez, 88 Conn. App. 1 , 11 n.10, 868 A.2d 69 , cert. granted, 273 Conn. 936 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005) (“[court] need not engage in a private versus public analysis, as the determination of the discretionary versus ministerial issue is dispositive”); see also Fleming v. Bridgeport,

2006See Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 208 Conn. 170 (“although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private”); Violano v. Fernandez, 88 Conn. App. 1 , 11 n.10, 868 A.2d 69 , cert. granted, 273 Conn. 936 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005) (“[court] need not engage in a private versus public analysis, as the determination of the discretionary versus ministerial issue is dispositive”); see also Fleming v. Bridgeport,

2006Given the unambiguous directive of [the state’s tort claims act], there is no legal or logical basis to conclude that the public-duty rule, which is by definition unavailable to private litigants, can apply to suits against the state . . . .” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ficek v. Morken, 685 N.W.2d 98, 107 (N.D. 2004).

2006See Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 208 Conn. 170 (“although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private”); Violano v. Fernandez, 88 Conn. App. 1 , 11 n.10, 868 A.2d 69 , cert. granted, 273 Conn. 936 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005) (“[court] need not engage in a private versus public analysis, as the determination of the discretionary versus ministerial issue is dispositive”); see also Fleming v. Bridgeport,

2006See Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 208 Conn. 170 (“although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private”); Violano v. Fernandez, 88 Conn. App. 1 , 11 n.10, 868 A.2d 69 , cert. granted, 273 Conn. 936 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005) (“[court] need not engage in a private versus public analysis, as the determination of the discretionary versus ministerial issue is dispositive”); see also Fleming v. Bridgeport,

2006See Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 208 Conn. 170 (“although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private”); Violano v. Fernandez, 88 Conn. App. 1 , 11 n.10, 868 A.2d 69 , cert. granted, 273 Conn. 936 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005) (“[court] need not engage in a private versus public analysis, as the determination of the discretionary versus ministerial issue is dispositive”); see also Fleming v. Bridgeport,

2006See Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, supra, 208 Conn. 170 (“although the public duty doctrine provides the starting point of the analysis, distinctions between discretionary acts and ministerial acts are often controlling without regard to whether the duty is ascertained to be public or private”); Violano v. Fernandez, 88 Conn. App. 1 , 11 n.10, 868 A.2d 69 , cert. granted, 273 Conn. 936 , 875 A.2d 544 (2005) (“[court] need not engage in a private versus public analysis, as the determination of the discretionary versus ministerial issue is dispositive”); see also Fleming v. Bridgeport,

2006See, e.g., Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d 721, 729-30 (Iowa 2001); Roe ex rel.

2006The common law origins of the respective legal doctrines confirm that the public duty rule defense exists independent of the doctrines of municipal and sovereign immunity.” (Citations omitted.) Natrona County v. Blake, 81 P.3d 948, 960 (Wyo. 2003) (Golden, J., dissenting).

2006The common law origins of the respective legal doctrines confirm that the public duty rule defense exists independent of the doctrines of municipal and sovereign immunity.” (Citations omitted.) Natrona County v. Blake, 81 P.3d 948, 960 (Wyo. 2003) (Golden, J., dissenting).

2002"A duty to use care may arise from a contract, from a statute, or from circumstances under which a reasonable person, knowing what he knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result from his act or failure to act." Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc. , 186 Conn. 370 , 375 , 441 A.2d 640 (1982); see also Gazo v. Stamford , 255 Conn. 245 , 251 , 765 A.2d 505 (2001). 1 Public Duty The defendant's public duty argument will be addressed first.

2002"A duty to use care may arise from a contract, from a statute, or from circumstances under which a reasonable person, knowing what he knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result from his act or failure to act." Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc. , 186 Conn. 370 , 375 , 441 A.2d 640 (1982); see also Gazo v. Stamford , 255 Conn. 245 , 251 , 765 A.2d 505 (2001). 1 Public Duty The defendant's public duty argument will be addressed first.