public duty doctrine in Missouri

2025While the public duty doctrine, like official immunity, does not apply to conduct that is malicious or done in bad faith, id. at 612 , we find Appellant has failed to plead those elements, as stated above. 8 Two motions were taken with the case: Galloway and Allison’s Motion to Dismiss (concerning finality of judgment for purposes of appeal) and Appellant’s Motion to Strike (concerning section four of McElroy’s brief).

2024Furthermore, “[t]he public duty doctrine states that a public employee is not civilly liable for the breach of a duty owed to the general public, rather than a particular individual.” Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 611 (Mo. banc 2008). “[T]he protections of the public duty doctrine are not intended to be limitless, and, just as the doctrine of official immunity will 6 not apply to conduct that is willfully wrong or done with malice and corruption, the public duty doctrine will not apply where defendant public employees act ‘in bad faith and malice.’” Id. at 612 (emphasis added

2007Three types of immunity are at issue in this case: official immunity, which protects public officials acting within the scope of their authority from liability for injuries arising from their discretionary acts or omissions, see Kanagawa v. State, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835-36 (Mo. banc 1985); the public duty doctrine, which recognizes that a public employee’s duty normally runs to the public at large rather than to an individual and the public employee therefore cannot be held liable to the individual for injuries allegedly arising from a breach of that duty, see Green v. Denison, 738 S.W.2d 861, 86

2007Three types of immunity are at issue in this case: official immunity, which protects public officials acting within the scope of their authority from liability for injuries arising from their discretionary acts or omissions, see Kanagawa v. State, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835-36 (Mo. banc 1985); the public duty doctrine, which recognizes that a public employee's duty normally runs to the public at large rather than to an individual and the public employee therefore cannot be held liable to the individual for injuries allegedly arising from a breach of that duty, see Green v. Denison, 738 S.W.2d 861, 86

2010"The public duty doctrine shields public officers, and the governmental bodies that employ them, from liability for injuries or damages resulting from the officers' breach of a duty owed to the general public and does not shield public officials from liability resulting from the breach of a duty owed to particular individuals." Id. "`By the public duty doctrine, a public employee is not civilly liable—even for breach of a ministerial duty—if that duty is owed to the general public rather than to a particular individual.'" Id. at 882 (quoting Jungerman v. City of Raytown, 925 S.W.2d 202, 205 (M

2010“The public duty doctrine shields public officers, and the governmental bodies that employ them, from liability for injuries or damages resulting from the officers’ breach of a duty owed to the general public and does not shield public officials from liability resulting from the breach of a duty owed to particular individuals.” Id. “ ‘By the public duty doctrine, a public employee is not civilly liable — even for breach of a ministerial duty — if that duty is owed to the general public rather than to a particular individual.’ ” Id. at 882 (quoting Jungerman v. City of Raytown, 925 S.W.2d 202,

2023Additionally, as with the doctrine of official immunity, the public duty doctrine does not protect public employees from acts done “in bad faith or with malice.” Id. at 612 (quoting Jackson v. City of Wentzville, 844 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993)) (abrogated on other grounds by Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 612-14 , 614 n.13). 12 2.

2017And “just as the doctrine of official immunity will not apply to conduct that is willfully wrong or done with malice or corruption, the public duty doctrine will not apply where defendant public employees act ‘in bad faith or with malice.’ ” Id. at 612 (quoting Jackson v. City of Wentzville, 844 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993)).

2004Accordingly, “[t]he sovereign immunity doctrine is a different legal concept than the public duty doctrine which is the focus of this case.” Beaver, 825 S.W.2d at 872 .

2004As, “[sovereign immunity is ‘uniquely applicable to governmental entities and is not transferable to an agent of that entity,’” id. (quoting Rustici, 673 S.W.2d at 768 ), we find the public duty doctrine does not render section 537.600 meaningless, as argued by Appellant.

2017“The public duty doctrine does not insulate a public employee from all liability, as he could still be found liable for breach of ministerial duties 2 in which an injured party had a ‘special, direct, and distinctive interest.’ ” Id. at 611-12 (emphasis added) (quoting Twiehaus, 706 S.W.2d at 445 ).

2017And “just as the doctrine of official immunity will not apply to conduct that is willfully wrong or done with malice or corruption, the public duty doctrine will not apply where defendant public employees act ‘in bad faith or with malice.’ ” Id. at 612 (quoting Jackson v. City of Wentzville, 844 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993)).

1995Berger, 676 S.W.2d at 41 .

1993See Berger v. City of University City, 676 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo.App.1984).

2024The two doctrines merge; they produce the same result.” Brown v. Tate, 888 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994).

2001Davis-Bey v. Missouri Department of Correction, 944 S.W.2d 294, 297-98 (Mo. App.1997); 4) Under the public duty doctrine (public employee not liable to individuals for injuries resulting from breach of duty owed general public at large), the public employee driver is not shielded from liability where the duty, as here, was to “all who might be injured by his negligent operation of the vehicle, not just the public at large.” Id. at 298 (citing Brown v. Tate, 888 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Mo.App. 1994)); 5) Therefore, enactment of § 546.145 in 1990 did nothing to reduce the time allowed to file cases inv

2017Howenstine v. Roper, 155 S.W.3d 747, 755 (Mo. banc 2005)).

2008See, e.g., Howenstine, 155 S.W.3d at 755 (stating that the public duty doctrine shields employees and the governmental bodies that employ them from liability); Jungerman, 925 S.W.2d at 205 (citing Stacy v. Truman Med.

2008See Jamierson v. Dale, 670 S.W.2d 195, 196 (Mo.App.

1985“The public duty rule denies a civil action against public employees for damages for negligence arising out of duties owed to the public at large.” Jamierson v. Dale, supra, at 196.

2008See, e.g., Heins, 859 S.W.2d at 695 (rejecting argument that statutory abrogation of sovereign immunity has effected a corresponding abrogation of the public duty doctrine); Green v. Mo. Dept. of Transp., 151 S.W.3d at 881-83 (finding no impact on the application of the public duly doctrine from the section 537.600 waivers of immunity); Claxton v. City of Rolla, 900 S.W.2d 635, 636 (Mo.App.1995) (applying the public duty doctrine despite plaintiff’s contention that city had waived immunity by purchase of liability insurance for tort claims); Lawhon v. City of Smithville, 715 S.W.2d 300, 302 (M

2004Appellant, in an attempt to avoid the public duty doctrine, suggests that she is a member of a “discrete class— persons utilizing Missouri’s public roads” and, without citation to authority, argues that “[a] duty owed to motorists using Missouri’s public highways is not a duty ‘owed to the public at large.’ ” 7 However, because it has been held that “[t]he duty of MHTC and its employees to properly design and construct highways runs to the public at large,” Heins, 859 S.W.2d at 695 , we believe the duty to properly repair highways also runs to the public at large.

2011Id.

1992Norton v. Smith, 782 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Mo.App.1989).

2008Under the public duty doctrine, “a public employee is not liable to an individual for injuries resulting from a breach of duty the employee owes only to the general public.” Davis-Bey v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 944 S.W.2d 294 , 298 (Mo.App.1997).

2001Davis-Bey v. Missouri Department of Correction, 944 S.W.2d 294, 297-98 (Mo. App.1997); 4) Under the public duty doctrine (public employee not liable to individuals for injuries resulting from breach of duty owed general public at large), the public employee driver is not shielded from liability where the duty, as here, was to “all who might be injured by his negligent operation of the vehicle, not just the public at large.” Id. at 298 (citing Brown v. Tate, 888 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Mo.App. 1994)); 5) Therefore, enactment of § 546.145 in 1990 did nothing to reduce the time allowed to file cases inv

2004See Spotts v. City of Kansas City, 728 S.W.2d 242, 248 (Mo.App.1987).

1994In Spotts v. City of Kansas City, 728 S.W.2d 242 (Mo.App.W.D.1987), a highway patrolman had negligently released an obviously intoxicated person, whom he had stopped to ticket for driving with an expired license plate, allowing him to drive away.

2008Christine H. v. Derby Liquor Store, 703 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Mo.App.1985).

2008See Christine H. v. Derby Liquor Store, 703 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Mo.App.1985).

2008Application of the public duty doctrine was also limited in these cases: Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 669-71 (Iowa 1979) (public duty doctrine not applicable where statutes plainly impose liability on municipality for torts committed by its employees while acting within the scope of their duties); Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So.2d 1351, 1358 (La.1980) (mere fact that duty is of public nature and benefits general public does not require conclusion that city cannot be liable); Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 496 , 610 N.E.2d 305, 307 (1993); Beaudrie v. Henderson, 465 Mich. 124 , 631 N.W.

2008Application of the public duty doctrine was also limited in these cases: Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 669-71 (Iowa 1979) (public duty doctrine not applicable where statutes plainly impose liability on municipality for torts committed by its employees while acting within the scope of their duties); Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So.2d 1351, 1358 (La.1980) (mere fact that duty is of public nature and benefits general public does not require conclusion that city cannot be liable); Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 496 , 610 N.E.2d 305, 307 (1993); Beaudrie v. Henderson, 465 Mich. 124 , 631 N.W.

2008See, e.g., Busby v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 230, 232 (Alaska 1987); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158-59 (Colo.1986); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010, 1015 (Fla.1979).

1993For support, they cite the example of several courts that have abolished the doctrine after finding it to be closely related to or dependent upon sovereign immunity. 21 See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310 , 656 P.2d 597, 599 (1982); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 160 (Colo.1986); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty., 371 So.2d 1010, 1016 (Fla.1979); Schear v. Board of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo County, 101 N.M. 671, 673-74 , 687 P.2d 728, 730-31 (1984); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401 , 591 P.2d 719, 725 (1979); Coffe

2008GWT-PAT, 801 S.W.2d at 800 (internal citations omitted).

1993GWT-PAT, Inc., 801 S.W.2d at 800-01.

2008Application of the public duty doctrine was also limited in these cases: Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 669-71 (Iowa 1979) (public duty doctrine not applicable where statutes plainly impose liability on municipality for torts committed by its employees while acting within the scope of their duties); Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So.2d 1351, 1358 (La.1980) (mere fact that duty is of public nature and benefits general public does not require conclusion that city cannot be liable); Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 496 , 610 N.E.2d 305, 307 (1993); Beaudrie v. Henderson, 465 Mich. 124 , 631 N.W.

2008Application of the public duty doctrine was also limited in these cases: Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 669-71 (Iowa 1979) (public duty doctrine not applicable where statutes plainly impose liability on municipality for torts committed by its employees while acting within the scope of their duties); Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So.2d 1351, 1358 (La.1980) (mere fact that duty is of public nature and benefits general public does not require conclusion that city cannot be liable); Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 496 , 610 N.E.2d 305, 307 (1993); Beaudrie v. Henderson, 465 Mich. 124 , 631 N.W.

2008Dist., 945 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Mo.App.1997) (discussing public duty and official immunity doctrines collectively for the proposition that an officer is not “under the protective umbrella” of a statute unless he complies with its mandates before exercising his judgment), overmled by Davis, 193 S.W.3d at 764 ; Green v. Mo. Dept, of Transp., 151 S.W.3d at 883 (finding the public duty doctrine does not provide a public employee protection when he fails to comply with an applicable statute, regulation, or common law rule; and discussing that typically the limitation on the public duty doctrine requiring

2004See Pace v. Pacific Fire Protection Dist., 945 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Mo.App.1997).

2008The legislature has resolved this issue by waiving sovereign immunity for injuries arising out of the negligent operation of motor vehicles or for dangerous conditions of public property- In deference to the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity provided by section 537.600.1, this Court is no longer willing to apply the judicially-created protections of the public duty doctrine in a way that would insulate government entities from tort liability where the legislature has expressly abolished such immunity. 12 See Warren v. State, 939 S.W.2d 950, 957-58 (Mo.App.1997) (finding that the public du

2004Saliently, the court in Warren v. State, 939 S.W.2d 950, 957 (Mo.App.1997), held that the public duty doctrine does not protect the state when sovereign immunity has been waived under section 537.600.

2008See, e.g., Busby v. Municipality of Anchorage, 741 P.2d 230, 232 (Alaska 1987); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158-59 (Colo.1986); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010, 1015 (Fla.1979).

1993For support, they cite the example of several courts that have abolished the doctrine after finding it to be closely related to or dependent upon sovereign immunity. 21 See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310 , 656 P.2d 597, 599 (1982); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 160 (Colo.1986); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty., 371 So.2d 1010, 1016 (Fla.1979); Schear v. Board of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo County, 101 N.M. 671, 673-74 , 687 P.2d 728, 730-31 (1984); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401 , 591 P.2d 719, 725 (1979); Coffe

1992In Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661 (Mo.banc 1983), the Supreme Court held that the public duty doctrine and the doctrine of official immunity protected physicians at State mental institutions from civil liability for injuries and damages caused by a released patient.

1987These are the official immunity doctrine 4 and the public duty doctrine. 5 Both are discussed in Sherrill v. Wilson, 653 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. banc 1983), in which we held that psychiatrists at a state hospital were not liable for releasing an allegedly dangerous patient on a short pass, or for failure to return him to custody after he overstayed his leave.

2023But liability may still be imposed on public officers performing ministerial functions. 3 As a result, we need not address the public duty doctrine issue. 8 Clay v. Scott, 883 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994).

1997Defendants cite many cases supporting their assertion, as a matter of law, that they should be shielded from liability under the public duty doctrine, (See Heins Implement, 859 S.W.2d at 694 ; Clay v. Scott, 883 S.W.2d 573 , 576 (Mo.App.

2023General Law “Recklessness is an aggravated form of negligence.” Fowler v. Phillips, 504 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016).

2023Id. at 612 ; Throneberry, 526 S.W.3d at 206 ; see also Fowler, 504 S.W.3d at 109-10 . a.

2011See Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 621 (finding that supervisory conduct and policy decisions are highly discretionary functions that the public immunity doctrine is intended to shield); see also Bates v. State, 664 S.W.2d 563, 565-66 (Mo.App.

2000Bates v. State , 664 S.W.2d 563 (Mo.App. 1983).

2010“The public duty doctrine shields public officers, and the governmental bodies that employ them, from liability for injuries or damages resulting from the officers’ breach of a duty owed to the general public and does not shield public officials from liability resulting from the breach of a duty owed to particular individuals.” Id. “ ‘By the public duty doctrine, a public employee is not civilly liable — even for breach of a ministerial duty — if that duty is owed to the general public rather than to a particular individual.’ ” Id. at 882 (quoting Jungerman v. City of Raytown, 925 S.W.2d 202,

2010“The public duty doctrine shields public officers, and the governmental bodies that employ them, from liability for injuries or damages resulting from the officers’ breach of a duty owed to the general public and does not shield public officials from liability resulting from the breach of a duty owed to particular individuals.” Id. “ ‘By the public duty doctrine, a public employee is not civilly liable — even for breach of a ministerial duty — if that duty is owed to the general public rather than to a particular individual.’ ” Id. at 882 (quoting Jungerman v. City of Raytown, 925 S.W.2d 202,

2008Cox v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 699 S.W.2d 443, 449 (Mo.App.1985) (noting a distinction between cases wherein a plaintiff pleads a personal duty owed particularly to him and cases wherein the duty was owed to the general public and, therefore, protected from private civil liability).

1988Like the Cox court, which, as noted above, relied on the public duty doctrine in regard to the park superintendents, 699 S.W.2d at 449 , we find that relator’s duty regarding safety measures was owed to the public at large rather than to the decedent in particular, for the decedent’s interest in the safety of the park was indirect and indistinct from that of the public as a whole. *539 Because relator is immune from suit and owed a duty only to the public in general, prohibition is the appropriate remedy.