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25 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
White v. Beasleygreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Jones, 190 Mich App at 570 (“The doctrine of governmental immunity has not supplanted the public duty doctrine.”); White, 453 Mich at 323 (opinion by BRICKLEY, C.J.) (holding that “the public-duty doctrine is a doctrine of tort law,” so it was “consistent” with the GTLA).2 None of the cases on which plaintiff relies support plaintiff’s argument that whether a government employee owed a plaintiff a duty is not part of determining whether the government employee was entitled to governmental immunity under the GTLA. 2021On the other hand, if the duty is a duty to the individual, then a neglect to perform it, or to perform it properly, is an individual wrong, and may support an individual action for damages. [White v Beasley, 453 Mich 308, 316 ; 552 NW2d 1 (1996) (opinion by BRICKLEY, C.J.), quoting 2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed), § 300, pp 385-386.] -5- “Applied to police officers, the public-duty doctrine insulates officers from tort liability for the negligent failure to provide police protection unless an individual plaintiff satisfies the special- relationship exception.” White, 453 Mich at 316 . | 6 | 12 |
Ezell v. Cockrellgreen2 sentences2001See Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 399, n. 5 (Tenn., 1995). 2001See Ezell v Cockrell, 902 SW2d 394, 399, n 5 (Tenn, 1995). | 2 | 2 |
Leake v. Caingreen2 sentences2001However, as the Supreme Court of Colorado recognized in Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo., 1986): [A] growing number of courts have concluded that the underlying purposes of the public duty rule are better served by the application of conventional tort principles and the protection afforded by statutes governing sovereign immunity than by a rule that precludes a finding of an actionable duty on the basis of the defendant's status as a public entity. 2001However, as the Supreme Court of Colorado recognized in Leake v Cain, 720 P2d 152, 158 (Colo, 1986): [A] growing number of courts have concluded that the underlying purposes of the public duty rule are better served by the application of conventional tort principles and the protection afforded by statutes governing sovereign immunity than by a rule that precludes a finding of an actionable duty on the basis of the defendant’s status as a public entity. | 2 | 2 |
Beaudrie v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2025A motion submitted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) can be supported by documentary evidence, which a trial court should consider when reviewing the 2 When our Supreme Court limited the public-duty doctrine to only police officers, it did so in part because “the effect of the [public-duty doctrine] arguably is identical to that of governmental immunity,” Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124 , 139 n 13; 631 NW2d 308 (2001), and the Legislature already decided the extent of a government employee’s potential liability and corresponding immunity from liability in the GTLA, id. at 138-141 . 2025A motion submitted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) can be supported by documentary evidence, which a trial court should consider when reviewing the 2 When our Supreme Court limited the public-duty doctrine to only police officers, it did so in part because “the effect of the [public-duty doctrine] arguably is identical to that of governmental immunity,” Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124 , 139 n 13; 631 NW2d 308 (2001), and the Legislature already decided the extent of a government employee’s potential liability and corresponding immunity from liability in the GTLA, id. at 138-141 . | 1 | 9 |
Cuffy v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2001Under the Cuffy test, a special relationship exists between a police officer and an individual plaintiff when there is: “(1) an assumption by the [police officer], through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; “(2) knowledge on the part of the [police officer] that inaction could lead to harm; “(3) some form of direct contact between the [police officer] and the injured party; and “(4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the [police officer’s] affirmative undertaking....” [White, supra at 320-321 , quoting Cuffy, supra at 260 .] See also Ga 2000In the present case, the trial court relied on a four-part special-relationship test set forth in Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255, 260 ; 513 NYS2d 372 ; 505 NE2d 937 (1987), as adopted by our Supreme Court in White v Beasley, 453 Mich 308, 321 (Brickley, J.), 325-326 (Boyle, J.); 552 NW2d 1 (1996), in determining that defendant Pettyjohn owed no duty to plaintiffs decedent under the public-duty doctrine. 6 However, in *299 White , the Supreme Court adopted the four-part Cuffy test “at least when applied to police officers,” and stated that it was not deciding whether the same test should | 1 | 4 |
Jones v. Wilcoxgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Jones, 190 Mich App at 570 (“The doctrine of governmental immunity has not supplanted the public duty doctrine.”); White, 453 Mich at 323 (opinion by BRICKLEY, C.J.) (holding that “the public-duty doctrine is a doctrine of tort law,” so it was “consistent” with the GTLA).2 None of the cases on which plaintiff relies support plaintiff’s argument that whether a government employee owed a plaintiff a duty is not part of determining whether the government employee was entitled to governmental immunity under the GTLA. 1995The public duty doctrine was summarized by this Court in Jones v Wilcox, 190 Mich App 564, 568 ; 476 NW2d 473 (1991), as follows: Absent a special relationship between the parties, a public official owes a duty to the general public and not to any one individual in society. | 1 | 3 |
Gazette v. City of Pontiacgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., Gazette v City of Pontiac, 212 Mich App 162, 171 ; 536 NW2d 854 (1995). 1997The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition in an order entered September 28, 1993. [Gazette, supra at 165-167 .] I The Supreme Court has recently held that the public-duty doctrine applies in Michigan. | 1 | 2 |
Adams v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Rejecting the argument that the state owed a duty only to the public generally, the Supreme Court of Alaska noted that an application of the public duty doctrine in that case would have resulted in a finding of no duty even though “a private defendant would have owed such a duty . ...” Id. at 242 . 2001Id. 7 Other courts have also recognized that routine application of the public duty doctrine has resulted in an artificial distinction between so-called “public” and “private” duties. | 1 | 2 |
Marcelletti v. Bathanigreen2 sentences2021See Marcelletti v Bathani, 198 Mich App 655, 664 ; 500 NW2d 124 (1993). 2021See Marcelletti v Bathani, 198 Mich App 655, 664 ; 500 NW2d 124 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Fane v. Detroit Library Commissiongreen2 sentences2004See also Fane v. Detroit Library Comm'r, 465 Mich. 68, 74 , 631 N.W.2d 678 (2001). [4] The qualifications of John Soave as an expert witness were never established. [5] If it were proven that an arsonist started the fire, the arsonist may be the proximate cause of the deaths. [6] I agree with the majority that, pursuant to Beaudrie v. Henderson, 465 Mich. 124 , 631 N.W.2d 308 (2001), defendant Childs is not afforded common-law immunity under the public duty doctrine. 2004See also Fane v. Detroit Library Comm'r, 465 Mich. 68, 74 , 631 N.W.2d 678 (2001). [4] The qualifications of John Soave as an expert witness were never established. [5] If it were proven that an arsonist started the fire, the arsonist may be the proximate cause of the deaths. [6] I agree with the majority that, pursuant to Beaudrie v. Henderson, 465 Mich. 124 , 631 N.W.2d 308 (2001), defendant Childs is not afforded common-law immunity under the public duty doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
| Clouse v. STATE, DPSgreen | 1 | 1 |
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty.green1 sentence2001In Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Co., 371 So.2d 1010, 1015 (Fla., 1979), the Florida Supreme Court explained that it is circuitous reasoning to conclude that no cause of action exists for a negligent act or omission by an agent of the state or its political subdivision where the duty breached is said to be owed to the public at large but not to any particular person. | 1 | 1 |
| Massey v. Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Verity Ex Rel. Verity v. Dantigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ross v. Consumers Power Co.red | 1 | 1 |
| Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moss v. Cummingsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McKay v. Hargisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Braswell v. Braswellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chambers-Castanes v. King Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brennen v. City of Eugenegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coty v. Washoe Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bailey v. Town of Forksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sawicki v. Village of Ottawa Hillsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
White v. Humbert
green
2 sentences2001THE BASIS OF DEFENDANT’S PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE CLAIM The defendant’s brief in support of summary disposition claimed that “Under the public duty doctrine, a public employee owes a duty to the general public and not to any one individual unless a special relationship exists between the employee and the individual.” In the defendant’s view, the plaintiff in the present case failed to establish that a special relationship existed, citing White v Humbert, 206 Mich App 459 ; 522 NW2d 681 (1994), and Reno v Chung, 220 Mich App 102, 105 ; 559 NW2d 308 (1996), aff’d sub nom Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 1 2001THE BASIS OF DEFENDANT’S PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE CLAIM The defendant’s brief in support of summary disposition claimed that “Under the public duty doctrine, a public employee owes a duty to the general public and not to any one individual unless a special relationship exists between the employee and the individual.” In the defendant’s view, the plaintiff in the present case failed to establish that a special relationship existed, citing White v Humbert, 206 Mich App 459 ; 522 NW2d 681 (1994), and Reno v Chung, 220 Mich App 102, 105 ; 559 NW2d 308 (1996), aff’d sub nom Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 1 | 4 | 1995–2001 |
Harrison v. Director of Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences1997Harrison v Director of Dep’t of Corrections, 194 Mich App 446, 456-460 ; 487 NW2d 799 (1992); Chivas, supra at 476 . *614 The special-relationship exception to the public-duty doctrine exposes a government employee to liability for the employee’s actions whenever a court finds that the government employee has a “special-relationship” with the plaintiff. 1997Harrison v Director of Dep’t of Corrections, 194 Mich App 446, 456-460 ; 487 NW2d 799 (1992); Chivas, supra at 476 . *614 The special-relationship exception to the public-duty doctrine exposes a government employee to liability for the employee’s actions whenever a court finds that the government employee has a “special-relationship” with the plaintiff. | 4 | 1994–1997 |
Murdock v. Higgins
green
2 sentences2001Moreover, the public duty doctrine as applied in White is consistent with the general common-law rule that no individual has a duty to protect another who is endangered by a third person’s conduct absent “a ‘special relationship’ either between the defendant and the victim, or the defendant and the third party who caused the injury.” Murdock v Higgins, 454 Mich 46, 54 ; 559 NW2d 639 (1997). 2001Moreover, the public duty doctrine as applied in White is consistent with the general common-law rule that no individual has a duty to protect another who is endangered by a third person’s conduct absent “a ‘special relationship’ either between the defendant and the victim, or the defendant and the third party who caused the injury.” Murdock v Higgins, 454 Mich 46, 54 ; 559 NW2d 639 (1997). | 3 | 1999–2025 |
Zavala v. Zinser
green
2 sentences1996In one of the cases, Zavala v Zinser, 123 Mich App 352 ; 333 NW2d 278 (1983), a divided Court of Appeals dismissed an action against police officers on the basis of the public-duty doctrine. 25 This Court expressly declined in Ross to decide whether to adopt the public-duty doctrine, 26 and ruled that summary judgment was properly granted, dismissing the action against the police officers, because the “plaintiffs merely alleged negligent performance of a discretionary-decisional act . . . .” 27 The Court thus predicated affirmance of the Court of Appeals decision on the discretionary-ministeri 1996In one of the cases, Zavala v Zinser, 123 Mich App 352 ; 333 NW2d 278 (1983), a divided Court of Appeals dismissed an action against police officers on the basis of the public-duty doctrine. 25 This Court expressly declined in Ross to decide whether to adopt the public-duty doctrine, 26 and ruled that summary judgment was properly granted, dismissing the action against the police officers, because the “plaintiffs merely alleged negligent performance of a discretionary-decisional act . . . .” 27 The Court thus predicated affirmance of the Court of Appeals decision on the discretionary-ministeri | 3 | 1991–1996 |
Murdock v. Higgins
green
2 sentences2019Defendants, as key employees of the MDEQ, had a “special relationship” with the City of Flint which distributed the lead-poisoned water to plaintiffs and the existence of this relationship gave rise to defendants’ duties to exercise reasonable care to protect plaintiffs from an unreasonable risk of harm. 2 See Riddle, 440 Mich at 96 ; Murdock, 208 Mich App at 214 . 2 Defendants are not entitled to application of the public duty doctrine, which generally applies to police officers on the ground that they owe a duty to the public in general and not to any specific individual. 1997Because we hold that defendant Higgins owed no duty at common law to this plaintiff, it is unnecessary to address whether Higgins has a valid defense in the public-duty doctrine. 208 Mich App 210 ; 527 NW2d 1 (1994). | 2 | 1997–2019 |
Reno v. Chung
green
2 sentences2001THE BASIS OF DEFENDANT’S PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE CLAIM The defendant’s brief in support of summary disposition claimed that “Under the public duty doctrine, a public employee owes a duty to the general public and not to any one individual unless a special relationship exists between the employee and the individual.” In the defendant’s view, the plaintiff in the present case failed to establish that a special relationship existed, citing White v Humbert, 206 Mich App 459 ; 522 NW2d 681 (1994), and Reno v Chung, 220 Mich App 102, 105 ; 559 NW2d 308 (1996), aff’d sub nom Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 1 2001THE BASIS OF DEFENDANT’S PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE CLAIM The defendant’s brief in support of summary disposition claimed that “Under the public duty doctrine, a public employee owes a duty to the general public and not to any one individual unless a special relationship exists between the employee and the individual.” In the defendant’s view, the plaintiff in the present case failed to establish that a special relationship existed, citing White v Humbert, 206 Mich App 459 ; 522 NW2d 681 (1994), and Reno v Chung, 220 Mich App 102, 105 ; 559 NW2d 308 (1996), aff’d sub nom Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 1 | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Ryan v. State
red
2 sentences2001In rejecting the public duty doctrine in Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310 , 656 P.2d 597 (1982), the Arizona Supreme Court found the attempt to distinguish between public and individual duties to be a "speculative exercise." [8] We agree with these sentiments. 2001In Commercial Carrier Corp v Indian River Co, 371 So 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla, 1979), the Florida Supreme Court explained that it is circuitous reasoning to conclude that no cause of action exists for a negligent act or omission by an agent of the state or its political subdivision where the duty breached is said to be owed to the public at large but not to any particular person. hi rejecting the public duty doctrine in Ryan v State, 134 Ariz 308, 310; 656 P2d 597 (1982), the Arizona Supreme Court found the attempt to distinguish between public and individual duties to be a “speculative exercise.” 8 | 2 | 1996–2001 |
Maiden v. Rozwood
green
2 sentences2001THE BASIS OF DEFENDANT’S PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE CLAIM The defendant’s brief in support of summary disposition claimed that “Under the public duty doctrine, a public employee owes a duty to the general public and not to any one individual unless a special relationship exists between the employee and the individual.” In the defendant’s view, the plaintiff in the present case failed to establish that a special relationship existed, citing White v Humbert, 206 Mich App 459 ; 522 NW2d 681 (1994), and Reno v Chung, 220 Mich App 102, 105 ; 559 NW2d 308 (1996), aff’d sub nom Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 1 2001THE BASIS OF DEFENDANT’S PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE CLAIM The defendant’s brief in support of summary disposition claimed that “Under the public duty doctrine, a public employee owes a duty to the general public and not to any one individual unless a special relationship exists between the employee and the individual.” In the defendant’s view, the plaintiff in the present case failed to establish that a special relationship existed, citing White v Humbert, 206 Mich App 459 ; 522 NW2d 681 (1994), and Reno v Chung, 220 Mich App 102, 105 ; 559 NW2d 308 (1996), aff’d sub nom Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 1 | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Koenig v. City of South Haven
green
2 sentences2000We conclude that this Court need not decide whether the four-part Cuffy test should apply in the present case with respect to defendant Pettyjohn, who is not a police officer, because other Michigan cases have applied the public-duty doctrine in cases involving government employees other than police officers and situations similar to the instant case. 7 See, e.g., Smith v Kowalski, 223 Mich App 610, 613-615 ; 567 NW2d 463 (1997) (correctional officers and guards); Koenig v South Haven, 221 Mich App 711, 729-730 ; 562 NW2d 509 (1997), rev’d in part on other grounds 460 Mich 667 ; 597 NW2d 99 (1 2000We conclude that this Court need not decide whether the four-part Cuffy test should apply in the present case with respect to defendant Pettyjohn, who is not a police officer, because other Michigan cases have applied the public-duty doctrine in cases involving government employees other than police officers and situations similar to the instant case. 7 See, e.g., Smith v Kowalski, 223 Mich App 610, 613-615 ; 567 NW2d 463 (1997) (correctional officers and guards); Koenig v South Haven, 221 Mich App 711, 729-730 ; 562 NW2d 509 (1997), rev’d in part on other grounds 460 Mich 667 ; 597 NW2d 99 (1 | 2 | 1997–2000 |
Hobrla v. Glass
green
2 sentences2000We conclude that this Court need not decide whether the four-part Cuffy test should apply in the present case with respect to defendant Pettyjohn, who is not a police officer, because other Michigan cases have applied the public-duty doctrine in cases involving government employees other than police officers and situations similar to the instant case. 7 See, e.g., Smith v Kowalski, 223 Mich App 610, 613-615 ; 567 NW2d 463 (1997) (correctional officers and guards); Koenig v South Haven, 221 Mich App 711, 729-730 ; 562 NW2d 509 (1997), rev’d in part on other grounds 460 Mich 667 ; 597 NW2d 99 (1 2000We conclude that this Court need not decide whether the four-part Cuffy test should apply in the present case with respect to defendant Pettyjohn, who is not a police officer, because other Michigan cases have applied the public-duty doctrine in cases involving government employees other than police officers and situations similar to the instant case. 7 See, e.g., Smith v Kowalski, 223 Mich App 610, 613-615 ; 567 NW2d 463 (1997) (correctional officers and guards); Koenig v South Haven, 221 Mich App 711, 729-730 ; 562 NW2d 509 (1997), rev’d in part on other grounds 460 Mich 667 ; 597 NW2d 99 (1 | 2 | 1995–2000 |
Chivas v. Koehler
green
2 sentences1997Harrison v Director of Dep’t of Corrections, 194 Mich App 446, 456-460 ; 487 NW2d 799 (1992); Chivas, supra at 476 . *614 The special-relationship exception to the public-duty doctrine exposes a government employee to liability for the employee’s actions whenever a court finds that the government employee has a “special-relationship” with the plaintiff. 1997Harrison v Director of Dep’t of Corrections, 194 Mich App 446, 456-460 ; 487 NW2d 799 (1992); Chivas, supra at 476 . *614 The special-relationship exception to the public-duty doctrine exposes a government employee to liability for the employee’s actions whenever a court finds that the government employee has a “special-relationship” with the plaintiff. | 2 | 1995–1997 |
McGoldrick v. Holiday Amusements, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025See Jones v Wilcox, 190 Mich App 564, 569-570 ; 476 NW2d 473 (1991); McGoldrick v Holiday Amusements, Inc, 242 Mich App 286 , 298 n 5; 618 NW2d 98 (2000); White v Beasley, 453 Mich. 308, 323 ; 552 NW2d 1 (1996) (opinion by -3- BRICKLEY, C.J.). 2025See Jones v Wilcox, 190 Mich App 564, 569-570 ; 476 NW2d 473 (1991); McGoldrick v Holiday Amusements, Inc, 242 Mich App 286 , 298 n 5; 618 NW2d 98 (2000); White v Beasley, 453 Mich. 308, 323 ; 552 NW2d 1 (1996) (opinion by -3- BRICKLEY, C.J.). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Clay v. Doe
green
2 sentences2025Clay v Doe, 311 Mich App 359 ; 876 NW2d 248 (2015). 2025Clay v Doe, 311 Mich App 359 ; 876 NW2d 248 (2015). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Downs v. SAPERSTEIN ASSOCIATES CORP.
green
1 sentence2021Id. at 134 . -4- and control of another and, in doing so, that party loses the ability to protect himself [or herself].” Downs, 265 Mich App at 701 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Riddle v. McLouth Steel Products Corp.
green
1 sentence2019Defendants, as key employees of the MDEQ, had a “special relationship” with the City of Flint which distributed the lead-poisoned water to plaintiffs and the existence of this relationship gave rise to defendants’ duties to exercise reasonable care to protect plaintiffs from an unreasonable risk of harm. 2 See Riddle, 440 Mich at 96 ; Murdock, 208 Mich App at 214 . 2 Defendants are not entitled to application of the public duty doctrine, which generally applies to police officers on the ground that they owe a duty to the public in general and not to any specific individual. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Gazette v. City of Pontiac
neutral
2 sentences2001Under the Cuffy test, a special relationship exists between a police officer and an individual plaintiff when there is: “(1) an assumption by the [police officer], through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; “(2) knowledge on the part of the [police officer] that inaction could lead to harm; “(3) some form of direct contact between the [police officer] and the injured party; and “(4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the [police officer’s] affirmative undertaking....” [White, supra at 320-321 , quoting Cuffy, supra at 260 .] See also Ga 2001Under the Cuffy test, a special relationship exists between a police officer and an individual plaintiff when there is: “(1) an assumption by the [police officer], through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; “(2) knowledge on the part of the [police officer] that inaction could lead to harm; “(3) some form of direct contact between the [police officer] and the injured party; and “(4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the [police officer’s] affirmative undertaking....” [White, supra at 320-321 , quoting Cuffy, supra at 260 .] See also Ga | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Jean W. v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2001However, "[p]rivate persons [also] have affirmative duties arising from their employment responsibilities that others do not have." Jean W, supra at 508, 610 N.E.2d 305 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Jenkins v. Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc
green
2 sentences2001Justice Cavanagh noted that "the public-duty doctrine recognizes that police officers and their departments must make discretionary or policy decisions in order to carry out the duties imposed on them." Id. at 331, 418 N.W.2d 381 . 2001However, Justice Cavanagh also suggested that the public duty doctrine should apply to "fire fighters, life guards, and similar governmental safety professionals." Id. at 331, n. 1, 418 N.W.2d 381 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Thompson v. Waters green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier
green
2 sentences2001Thus, expanding the common-law public duty doctrine to shield all government employees from tort liability is at least arguably inconsistent with this statutory scheme. [12] Even if that were not the case, the fact that the governmental immunity statute makes public employees immune from liability *316 for conduct that does not amount to "gross negligence" and is not "the proximate cause" of the injury certainly undermines the need for the common-law "immunity" granted by the public duty doctrine. [13] The Supreme Court of Vermont employed similar reasoning in Hudson v. East Montpelier, 161 Vt 2001Thus, expanding the common-law public duty doctrine to shield all government employees from tort liability is at least arguably inconsistent with this statutory scheme. 12 Even if that were not the case, the fact that the governmental immunity statute makes public employees immune from liability for conduct that does not amount to “gross negligence” and is not “the proximate cause” of the injury certainly undermines the need for the common-law “immunity” granted by the public duty doctrine. 13 The Supreme Court of Vermont employed similar reasoning in Hudson v East Montpelier, 161 Vt 168, 179; | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Koenig v. City of South Haven green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Summers v. City of Detroit green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Smith v. Kowalski green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Trager v. Thor green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Johnson v. Bobbie's Party Store green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Rose v. MacKie green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Stigler v. City of Chicago green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Bush v. Oscoda Area Schools green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Lockaby v. Wayne County green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Riss v. City of New York green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Pittman v. City of Taylor green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| MELENDEZ BY MELENDEZ v. City of Phila. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Williams v. State of California green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Shore v. Town of Stonington green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Fessler v. R.E.J. Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Hage v. Stade green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| De Long v. County of Erie green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Markis v. City of Grosse Pointe Park green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.