public duty rule in Massachusetts

2009In inviting the Legislature to act before it abolished the public duty rule, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that the rule was designed to protect “the Commonwealth and municipalities from excessive financial burdens.” Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. at 510 .

1998When the court in Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 496, 499 (1993), announced that it would abolish the public duty rule, it coupled its announcement with an invitation to the Legislature “to consider whether it wishes to respond to this anticipated change by passing additional limitations on liability.” Ibid.

1994There is an exception to *163 the public duty rule, however, when there is a ‘special relationship’ between the public employee and certain individual members of the public.” Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 408 Mass. 605, 609-610 (1990), S.C., 411 Mass. 657 (1992).

1993In Onofrio v. Department of Mental Health, 408 Mass. 605 (1990) , and Mamulski v. Easthampton, 410 Mass. 28 (1991) , we declined to apply the public duty rule to the facts of those cases, despite the fact that the lower courts and the litigants in both cases had treated the cases as public duty cases.

2007The public duty rule was first articulated in Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801 (1982), which held that “[a]s a general rule no liability attaches for failure to use due care in carrying out general governmental functions such as police or fire protection . . . because the duty of due care is owed to the general public and not to any specific individual . . . .” Id. at 807 , quoting from Tuffley v. Syracuse, 82 A.D.2d 110, 114 (N.Y. 1981).

2007The public duty rule was first articulated in Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801 (1982), which held that “[a]s a general rule no liability attaches for failure to use due care in carrying out general governmental functions such as police or fire protection . . . because the duty of due care is owed to the general public and not to any specific individual . . . .” Id. at 807 , quoting from Tuffley v. Syracuse, 82 A.D.2d 110, 114 (N.Y. 1981).

1994Chief Justice Liacos, Justice Greaney, and the author of this opinion agree with the Appeals Court that, for the purposes of the public duty rule, the circumstances of this case are not significantly different from the circumstances of Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745 (1984).

1994Town of Framingham. [3] Chief Justice Liacos, Justice Greaney, and the author of this opinion agree with the Appeals Court that, for the purposes of the public duty rule, the circumstances of this case are not significantly different from the circumstances of Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745 (1984).

1994“We have applied the public duty rule to bar governmental liability unless the statutes or contracts governing the public employee’s duties justifiably allow the conclusion that a special duty was owed.” Cyran, supra at 454 .

1994"We have applied the public duty rule to bar governmental liability unless the statutes or contracts governing the public employee's duties justifiably allow the conclusion that a special duty was owed." Cyran, supra at 454 .

1993In only one other public duty case, A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234 (1988), did we find the “special relationship” necessary to impose liability under the public duty rule. 7 The plaintiffs in that case were two young boys who were molested by a probationer teaching at their school.

1993A.L., supra. In no other public duty case have we discovered the special relationship necessary to invoke the exception to the public duty rule, although many of the litigants have offered statutes and regulations that, in light of Irwin and A.L., would seem to confer special relationships.

2007The public duty rule was first articulated in Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801 (1982), which held that “[a]s a general rule no liability attaches for failure to use due care in carrying out general governmental functions such as police or fire protection . . . because the duty of due care is owed to the general public and not to any specific individual . . . .” Id. at 807 , quoting from Tuffley v. Syracuse, 82 A.D.2d 110, 114 (N.Y. 1981).

2007The public duty rule was first articulated in Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801 (1982), which held that “[a]s a general rule no liability attaches for failure to use due care in carrying out general governmental functions such as police or fire protection . . . because the duty of due care is owed to the general public and not to any specific individual . . . .” Id. at 807 , quoting from Tuffley v. Syracuse, 82 A.D.2d 110, 114 (N.Y. 1981).

1993For example, in Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986), the Supreme Court of Colorado abolished the public duty rule, then went on to find that, under conventional tort principles, police officers did not breach any duty when they failed to detain an intoxicated teenager, because they reasonably believed that the teenager would not be driving.

1993For example, in Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986), the Supreme Court of Colorado abolished the public duty rule, then went on to find that, under conventional tort principles, police officers did not breach any duty when they failed to detain an intoxicated teenager, because they reasonably believed that the teenager would not be driving.

1993Va. 336 (1991), the trend has been to abolish the rule. 10 See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158-159 (Colo. 1986); Adam v. State, 380 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Iowa 1986); Maple v. Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 301 (1986); Schear v. County Comm’rs, 101 N.M. 671 (1984); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526 (1976); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986).

1993Nowhere is there found an exemption for the exercise of a duty owed to the public generally." Maple v. Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 301 (1986). [12] For example, after Alaska abrogated the public duty rule in Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976), the Legislature enacted a statute precluding municipal liability for negligent inspections.

1992See, e.g., Appleton v. Hudson, supra Nickerson v. Commonwealth, supra, Ribeiro v. Granby, supra, Dinsky v. Framingham, supra. In two cases, Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745 (1984), and A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234 (1988), about which more will be said later, there existed circumstances giving rise to a special relationship which created a special duty on the part of the public employees to enforce the law and prevent the harmful activity of third persons.

1990We have discussed the public duty rule and its exception and the criteria for determining when a special relationship exists in A.L. v. Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 234 (1988), Appleton v. Hudson, 397 Mass. 812 (1986), Nickerson v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 476 (1986), Ribeiro v. Granby, 395 Mass. 608 (1985), Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745 (1984), and Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801 (1982).

2024See Fortenbacher, 72 Mass. App. Ct. at 90 . 12 The panelists are listed in order of seniority. 11

2010See Jacome v. Commonwealth, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 486, 489 (2002).

2008See Ariel v. Kingston, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 294 (2007).

2001See Bonnie W., 419 Mass. at 126 (“G.L.c. 258, § 10 [is] the only public duty rule we shall now apply.

1996In Jean W. v. Commonwealth, supra at 499, 510-511 (Liacos, C.J., concurring), supra at 514-515 (Wilkins, J., concurring with whom Abrams, J., joined), supra at 523 (Greaney, J., concurring), however, a majority of the court indicated that the public duty rule was inconsistent with the Act and “announce[d] [the court’s] intention to abolish the rule.” The Legislature responded by amending § 10 of the Act to include “a statutory public duty rule.” Carleton v. Framingham, 418 Mass. 623, 627-628 (1994) (upholding the constitutionality of the amendment to § 10).

1994Officer Cooper “had the same obligation as the officer in Irwin v. Ware, [ 392 Mass. 745 (1984)], to enforce the statutes with respect to intoxicated operators of motor vehicles and could anticipate that his failure to take action to remove a drunk driver from the highway could result in immediate and foreseeable physical injury to a member of the public.” Carleton v. Framingham, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 686, 690 (1993).

1994Officer Cooper "had the same obligation as the officer in Irwin v. Ware, [ 392 Mass. 745 (1984)], to enforce the statutes with respect to intoxicated operators of motor vehicles and could anticipate that his failure to take action to remove a drunk driver from the highway could result in immediate and foreseeable physical injury to a member of the public." Carleton v. Framingham, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 686, 690 (1993).

1993Va. 336 (1991), the trend has been to abolish the rule. 10 See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158-159 (Colo. 1986); Adam v. State, 380 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Iowa 1986); Maple v. Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 301 (1986); Schear v. County Comm’rs, 101 N.M. 671 (1984); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526 (1976); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986).

1993Va. 336 (1991), the trend *509 has been to abolish the rule. [10] See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158-159 (Colo. 1986); Adam v. State, 380 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Iowa 1986); Maple v. Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 301 (1986); Schear v. County Comm'rs, 101 N.M. 671 (1984); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526 (1976); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986).

1993We therefore announce our intention to abolish the public duty rule at the first available opportunity after the conclusion of the 1993 session of the Legislature. 3 In 1978, in response to several entreaties by this court, see Whitney v. Worcester, supra, the Legislature enacted the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

1993We therefore announce our intention to abolish the public duty rule at the first available opportunity after the conclusion of the 1993 session of the Legislature. [3] *500 In 1978, in response to several entreaties by this court, see Whitney v. Worcester, supra , the Legislature enacted the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

1993The traditional public duty rule does make such a distinction, see, e.g., Brennen v. Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 409 (1979), and, despite the Chief Justice’s assertion to the contrary, ante at 507, the distinction is entirely consistent with the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

1993The traditional public duty rule does make such a distinction, see, e.g., Brennen v. Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 409 (1979), and, despite the Chief Justice's assertion to the contrary, ante at 507, the distinction is entirely consistent with the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.

1993Va. 336 (1991), the trend has been to abolish the rule. 10 See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158-159 (Colo. 1986); Adam v. State, 380 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Iowa 1986); Maple v. Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 301 (1986); Schear v. County Comm’rs, 101 N.M. 671 (1984); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526 (1976); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986).

1993Va. 336 (1991), the trend *509 has been to abolish the rule. [10] See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158-159 (Colo. 1986); Adam v. State, 380 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Iowa 1986); Maple v. Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 301 (1986); Schear v. County Comm'rs, 101 N.M. 671 (1984); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526 (1976); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 653 (Wyo. 1986).

1993See Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310 (1982); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015-1016 (Fla. 1979); Brennen, supra at 406-409 .

1993See Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310 (1982); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010, 1015-1016 (Fla. 1979); Brennen, supra at 406-409 .

1993See Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310 (1982); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015-1016 (Fla. 1979); Brennen, supra at 406-409 .

1993See Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310 (1982); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010, 1015-1016 (Fla. 1979); Brennen, supra at 406-409 .

1993Addressing an earlier application of the public duty rule in New York, Chief Judge Desmond wrote: “Any court-created tort-immunity rule should be forthrightly abandoned when its injustice and its unreality are so evident as to produce exceptions, interpretations and inconsistencies galore . . . .” Motyka v. Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 140 (1965) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting).

1993Addressing an earlier application of the public duty rule in New York, Chief Judge Desmond wrote: "Any court-created tort-immunity rule should be forthrightly abandoned when its injustice and its unreality are so evident as to produce exceptions, interpretations and inconsistencies galore...." Motyka v. Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 140 (1965) (Desmond, C.J., dissenting).

1993See Sampson v. Lynn, 405 Mass. 29 (1989) (statutes governing firearm licenses create no special relationship between city and victim of gunshot); Connerty v. Metropolitan Dist.

1993See Sampson v. Lynn, *504 405 Mass. 29 (1989) (statutes governing firearm licenses create no special relationship between city and victim of gunshot); Connerty v. Metropolitan Dist.