ratification doctrine in Texas

2015The Delaware Supreme Court has already rejected the notion the acquiescence, ratification, waiver and estoppel doctrines have any application to plaintiffs’ claims. - 43 - In Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009), the Delaware Supreme Court held that shareholders do not “ratify” a merger by tendering their shares: “the ratification doctrine does not apply to transactions where shareholder approval is statutorily required.” Id. at 714 .

2015The Delaware Supreme Court has already rejected the notion the acquiescence, ratification, waiver and estoppel doctrines have any application to plaintiffs’ claims. - 43 - In Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009), the Delaware Supreme Court held that shareholders do not “ratify” a merger by tendering their shares: “the ratification doctrine does not apply to transactions where shareholder approval is statutorily required.” Id. at 714 .

1948“While the appellees do not controvert the correctness of the descriptions appellants detailed as being entitled to have been read into the two deeds, they do properly, it is thought, rely upon this declaration of the court in the cited Jeffus case [ 94 S.W.2d 259 ], as showing the inapplicability of appellants’ claim that such void deeds could be ratified, or thereafter re-acknowledged, to-wit: ‘ * * * if they could at all be ratified, the ratification clause or portion of the instrument containing same must have been such as would amount to a present conveyance of the property involved, that

1947While the appellees do not controvert the correctness of the descriptions appellants detailed as being entitled to have been read into the two deeds, they do properly, it is thought, rely upon this declaration of the court in the cited Jeffus case [ 94 S.W.2d 259 ], as showing the inapplicability of appellants’ claim that such void deeds could be ratified, or thereafter re-aclcnowledged, to-wit: “ * * * if they could at all be ratified, the ratification clause or portion of the instrument containing same must have been such as would amount to a present conveyance of the property involved, that

1948“While the appellees do not controvert the correctness of the descriptions appellants detailed as being entitled to have been read into the two deeds, they do properly, it is thought, rely upon this declaration of the court in the cited Jeffus case [ 94 S.W.2d 259 ], as showing the inapplicability of appellants’ claim that such void deeds could be ratified, or thereafter re-acknowledged, to-wit: ‘ * * * if they could at all be ratified, the ratification clause or portion of the instrument containing same must have been such as would amount to a present conveyance of the property involved, that

1948“While the appellees do not controvert the correctness of the descriptions appellants detailed as being entitled to have been read into the two deeds, they do properly, it is thought, rely upon this declaration of the court in the cited Jeffus case [ 94 S.W.2d 259 ], as showing the inapplicability of appellants’ claim that such void deeds could be ratified, or thereafter re-acknowledged, to-wit: ‘ * * * if they could at all be ratified, the ratification clause or portion of the instrument containing same must have been such as would amount to a present conveyance of the property involved, that

1937Montgomery v. Hornberger, 16 Tex.Civ.App. 28 , 40 S.W. 628 (writ refused); Lasater v. Jamison (Tex.Civ.App.) 203 S.W. 1151 , Moreover, the original lease in which it is insisted that appellees recognized and ratified their deeds to Blankenship and Farmers Royalty Holding Company here in controversy, sent up fay appellants for inspection by the court, shows that clause 10, set out supra, is a printed clause, in a general printed form used by appellants, printed in fine print.

1937Montgomery v. Hornberger, 16 Tex.Civ.App. 28 , 40 S.W. 628 (writ refused); Lasater v. Jamison (Tex.Civ.App.) 203 S.W. 1151 , Moreover, the original lease in which it is insisted that appellees recognized and ratified their deeds to Blankenship and Farmers Royalty Holding Company here in controversy, sent up fay appellants for inspection by the court, shows that clause 10, set out supra, is a printed clause, in a general printed form used by appellants, printed in fine print.

1937Montgomery v. Hornberger, 16 Tex.Civ.App. 28 , 40 S.W. 628 (writ refused); Lasater v. Jamison (Tex.Civ.App.) 203 S.W. 1151 , Moreover, the original lease in which it is insisted that appellees recognized and ratified their deeds to Blankenship and Farmers Royalty Holding Company here in controversy, sent up fay appellants for inspection by the court, shows that clause 10, set out supra, is a printed clause, in a general printed form used by appellants, printed in fine print.

1936Montgomery v. Hornberger, 16 Tex.Civ.App. 28 , 40 S.W. 628 (writ refused); Lasater v. Jamison (Tex.Civ.App.) 203 S.W. 1151 .

1933This holding is in direct conflict with the rulings made by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth District in the case of Dickinson v. Carter-, 246 S. W. 739 , and by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Sixth District in the case of Perkins v. Norris, 25 S.W.(2d) 979, 981 .

1933This holding is in direct conflict with the rulings made by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth District in the case of Dickinson v. Carter, 246 S. W., 739 , and by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Sixth District in the case of Perkins v. Norris, 25 S. W. (2d) 979 .

1933This holding is in direct conflict with the rulings made by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth District in the case of Dickinson v. Carter-, 246 S. W. 739 , and by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Sixth District in the case of Perkins v. Norris, 25 S.W.(2d) 979, 981 .

1933This holding is in direct conflict with the rulings made by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth District in the case of Dickinson v. Carter, 246 S. W., 739 , and by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Sixth District in the case of Perkins v. Norris, 25 S. W. (2d) 979 .

1931In the case of Sheer v. Cummings, 80 Tex. 294 , 16 S. W. 37 , it appears that Mrs. Jane Cummings, the mother of John Cummings, who owned the lot there in controversy, entered into a contract and pursued proper proceedings to fix a mechanic’s lien on the lot, but it was held that a mechanic’s lien cannot be established against the owner of land without his knowledge or consent, and further that even if the mother had claimed to act as agent, but without authority, the doctrine of ratification would not apply because his taking possession of the improvements must then have been referred to his o

1931In the case of Sheer v. Cummings, 80 Tex. 294 , 16 S. W. 37 , it appears that Mrs. Jane Cummings, the mother of John Cummings, who owned the lot there in controversy, entered into a contract and pursued proper proceedings to fix a mechanic’s lien on the lot, but it was held that a mechanic’s lien cannot be established against the owner of land without his knowledge or consent, and further that even if the mother had claimed to act as agent, but without authority, the doctrine of ratification would not apply because his taking possession of the improvements must then have been referred to his o

2019We believe the trial court made this finding because the third element in a traditional ratification analysis requires evidence that the person have “the intention of giving validity to the earlier act.” Bank of Am., N.A., 510 S.W.3d at 505-06 .

2013Discussion BPS states that it objected to the ratification instruction in question 5, but we have reviewed the record and found no indication that BPS objected to the ratification instruction in question 5 based on its failure to “name a specific person.” See Cruz, 364 S.W.3d at 829 .

2013We conclude the doctrine of ratification does not apply. 8 See Barrand, 214 S.W.3d at 146 .

2003Jordan, 337 S.W.2d at 118 . 3.

2003Jordan, 337 S.W.2d at 118 . 3.

1998Texacadian Fuels, Inc. v. Lone Star Energy Storage, Inc., 896 S.W.2d 233, 237 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), judgment vacated by agreement, 922 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.1996).

1988This Court in McVey relied on Westbrook v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 502 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.1974).

1947The case of Glasscock v. Farmers Royalty Holding Co., 5 Cir., 152 F.2d 537 , relied upon by the appellants, is clearly distinguishable from this cause; in that, there the instruments involved did not involve homestead property, and were also held to have been ratified by the grantor in a subsequent lease, in which he expressly declared that they had originally been legally and validly executed; no such comparable acts, upon the part of the Bradens in this instance, even had they been applicable, were even claimed by the appellants; in fact, Mr. Braden was shown to have died about three years a