judicially created exclusionary rule in California

2025“Where a search is found to be invalid, ‘a Fourth Amendment violation is shown and the question . . . becomes whether such constitutional violation is appropriately remedied by the application of the judicially created exclusionary rule which prohibits the admission at trial of the evidence obtained during the unlawful search.’ (People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641 , 1650–1651 . . ., citing United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] . . . .) Exclusion of the evidence is compelled ‘only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ” ’ (Herring v. United State

2025“Where a search is found to be invalid, ‘a Fourth Amendment violation is shown and the question . . . becomes whether such constitutional violation is appropriately remedied by the application of the judicially created exclusionary rule which prohibits the admission at trial of the evidence obtained during the unlawful search.’ (People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641 , 1650–1651 . . ., citing United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] . . . .) Exclusion of the evidence is compelled ‘only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ” ’ (Herring v. United State

2025“Where a search is found to be invalid, ‘a Fourth Amendment violation is shown and the question . . . becomes whether such constitutional violation is appropriately remedied by the application of the judicially created exclusionary rule which prohibits the admission at trial of the evidence obtained during the unlawful search.’ (People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641 , 1650–1651 . . ., citing United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] . . . .) Exclusion of the evidence is compelled ‘only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ” ’ (Herring v. United State

2025“Where a search is found to be invalid, ‘a Fourth Amendment violation is shown and the question . . . becomes whether such constitutional violation is appropriately remedied by the application of the judicially created exclusionary rule which prohibits the admission at trial of the evidence obtained during the unlawful search.’ (People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641 , 1650–1651 . . ., citing United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 677 ] . . . .) Exclusion of the evidence is compelled ‘only where it “ ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ ” ’ (Herring v. United State

2019(See People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 318 [“Given the probable aim of the voters in adopting section 28[(f)(2)], . . . it is not reasonably likely that the California voters intended to preserve, in the form of a ‘statutory’ privilege, a judicially created exclusionary rule expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution”]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 889 [similar]; Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [applying Mosley without mentioning Pettingill].) Perhaps for this reason, defendant does not seek to rely on Pettingill, and we accept that the

2009II, § 8) may prescribe rules of procedure and of evidence to be followed in the courts of this state.” (In re Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 891 .) We thus concluded that restricting the judicially created exclusionary rule “cannot be considered such a sweeping change either in the distribution of powers made in the organic document or in the powers which it vests in the judicial branch as to constitute a revision of the Constitution . . . .” (Id. at p. 892.) Our decision in Lance W. did state, in dicta and without explanation or citation to authority: “The people could by amendment of the C

1990The reasoning of Jacobs does not survive People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], which held that California Constitution article I, section 28, subdivision (d) abrogated the judicially created exclusionary rule of People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ] [holding that statements obtained in violation of Miranda may not be used for impeachment] in favor of the contrary rule stated in Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ], In May , the issue before the court was whether the “savings clause” of Pr

1990The reasoning of Jacobs does not survive People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], which held that California Constitution article I, section 28, subdivision (d) abrogated the judicially created exclusionary rule of People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ] [holding that statements obtained in violation of Miranda may not be used for impeachment] in favor of the contrary rule stated in Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ], In May , the issue before the court was whether the “savings clause” of Pr

2019(See People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 318 [“Given the probable aim of the voters in adopting section 28[(f)(2)], . . . it is not reasonably likely that the California voters intended to preserve, in the form of a ‘statutory’ privilege, a judicially created exclusionary rule expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution”]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 889 [similar]; Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [applying Mosley without mentioning Pettingill].) Perhaps for this reason, defendant does not seek to rely on Pettingill, and we accept that the

1990The reasoning of Jacobs does not survive People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], which held that California Constitution article I, section 28, subdivision (d) abrogated the judicially created exclusionary rule of People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 360 , 545 P.2d 272 ] [holding that statements obtained in violation of Miranda may not be used for impeachment] in favor of the contrary rule stated in Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ], In May , the issue before the court was whether the “savings clause” of Pr

2022(Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 326 [“If no adverse consequences can be visited upon the convicted person by reason of further testimony, then there is no further incrimination to be feared.”]; see In re Tapia (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1111, fn. 3 [noting in dicta that parolee’s privilege against self-incrimination ended when his conviction became final].) For the reasons set forth above, we conclude, as did the court in Myles, that “defendant has not demonstrated that the 19 same principles and rationale underlying the judicially created exclusionary rule formulated in Cole

2022(Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 326 [“If no adverse consequences can be visited upon the convicted person by reason of further testimony, then there is no further incrimination to be feared.”]; see In re Tapia (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1111, fn. 3 [noting in dicta that parolee’s privilege against self-incrimination ended when his conviction became final].) For the reasons set forth above, we conclude, as did the court in Myles, that “defendant has not demonstrated that the 19 same principles and rationale underlying the judicially created exclusionary rule formulated in Cole

2019(See People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 318 [“Given the probable aim of the voters in adopting section 28[(f)(2)], . . . it is not reasonably likely that the California voters intended to preserve, in the form of a ‘statutory’ privilege, a judicially created exclusionary rule expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution”]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 889 [similar]; Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [applying Mosley without mentioning Pettingill].) Perhaps for this reason, defendant does not seek to rely on Pettingill, and we accept that the

2019(See People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 318 [“Given the probable aim of the voters in adopting section 28[(f)(2)], . . . it is not reasonably likely that the California voters intended to preserve, in the form of a ‘statutory’ privilege, a judicially created exclusionary rule expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court under the federal Constitution”]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 889 [similar]; Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [applying Mosley without mentioning Pettingill].) Perhaps for this reason, defendant does not seek to rely on Pettingill, and we accept that the

1995(See People v. Lively (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1368 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 368 ]; People v. Welsch (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d. 1038 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 87 ].) However, neither of the opinions that applied Penal Code section 836 after the adoption of section 28(d) examined the issue of whether the judicially created exclusionary rule mandating the exclusion of evidence obtained incident to an arrest made in violation of section 836, subdivision (a)(1) has been abrogated by section 28(d).

1995(See People v. Lively (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1368 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 368 ]; People v. Welsch (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d. 1038 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 87 ].) However, neither of the opinions that applied Penal Code section 836 after the adoption of section 28(d) examined the issue of whether the judicially created exclusionary rule mandating the exclusion of evidence obtained incident to an arrest made in violation of section 836, subdivision (a)(1) has been abrogated by section 28(d).

1995Of course, “Language used in any opinion is. . . to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) *539 We conclude that the amendments to Penal Code section 836 adopted by the Legislature in 1992 and 1993 had neither the intent nor the effect of reviving exclusionary rules abrogated by Proposition 8.

1995Of course, “Language used in any opinion is. . . to be understood in the light of the facts and the issue then before the court, and an opinion is not authority for a proposition not therein considered.” (Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 524, fn. 2 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 377 , 393 P.2d 689 ].) *539 We conclude that the amendments to Penal Code section 836 adopted by the Legislature in 1992 and 1993 had neither the intent nor the effect of reviving exclusionary rules abrogated by Proposition 8.

1992Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press." The RTE, then, operates so as to ensure the admissibility of relevant evidence absent the existence of (a) a statutory exclusionary rule enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the California Legislature, or (b) some specifically denominated exception set forth within a California constitutional provision, or (c) some overriding principle of federal constitutional law. *374 Clearly, admissions and confessions constitute "relevant evidence." [2] (Indeed, as noted in the lea

1992Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or constitutional right of the press." The RTE, then, operates so as to ensure the admissibility of relevant evidence absent the existence of (a) a statutory exclusionary rule enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the California Legislature, or (b) some specifically denominated exception set forth within a California constitutional provision, or (c) some overriding principle of federal constitutional law. *374 Clearly, admissions and confessions constitute "relevant evidence." [2] (Indeed, as noted in the lea

1992As for any due process claim, the case law clearly establishes that “ ‘[i]f a defendant contends the hearsay information is unfair or untrue[,] he is given an opportunity to refute it. [Citation.]’ ” (Goodner I, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 615 , quoting People v. Garcia, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 237 ; see also People v. Williams, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 917 .) The defendant had numerous opportunities to dispute the statements.

1990(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 225-226 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4-5 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ]; People v. Kimble (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 726, 731 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 41 ].) From and after passage of section 28, subdivision (d), such statements may also be used for impeachment purposes in this state.

1990(Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 225-226 [ 28 L.Ed.2d 1, 4-5 , 91 S.Ct. 643 ]; People v. Kimble (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 726, 731 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 41 ].) From and after passage of section 28, subdivision (d), such statements may also be used for impeachment purposes in this state.