service requirement in California

2017Code, § 647, italics added.) Rawat claims she produced evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption, so it should have disappeared. ( Id ., § 604; see Farr v. County of Nevada (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 669 , 680-682, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 36 ; In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 535 , 560-561, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 891 .) But the trial court found Rawat appeared in the action, disbelieving her contrary declarations, thereby trumping any issue about the service presumption.

2017Code, § 647, italics added.) Rawat claims she produced evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption, so it should have disappeared. ( Id ., § 604; see Farr v. County of Nevada (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 669 , 680-682, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 36 ; In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 535 , 560-561, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 891 .) But the trial court found Rawat appeared in the action, disbelieving her contrary declarations, thereby trumping any issue about the service presumption.

1990In other words, "[b]oth Elias and Jamison appear to stand for the general proposition that there will be substantial compliance with the claims statute when the claim either is actually received by the proper board or should be received because it was served on a subordinate of the proper board." ( Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 529, 538 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 729 ] [where a service of a claim on the County of Kern did not constitute substantial compliance in filing a claim against the West Kern County Water District where the record was devoid of any evidence establ

1990In other words, "[b]oth Elias and Jamison appear to stand for the general proposition that there will be substantial compliance with the claims statute when the claim either is actually received by the proper board or should be received because it was served on a subordinate of the proper board." ( Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 529, 538 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 729 ] [where a service of a claim on the County of Kern did not constitute substantial compliance in filing a claim against the West Kern County Water District where the record was devoid of any evidence establ

1990In other words, "[b]oth Elias and Jamison appear to stand for the general proposition that there will be substantial compliance with the claims statute when the claim either is actually received by the proper board or should be received because it was served on a subordinate of the proper board." ( Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 529, 538 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 729 ] [where a service of a claim on the County of Kern did not constitute substantial compliance in filing a claim against the West Kern County Water District where the record was devoid of any evidence establ

1990In other words, "[b]oth Elias and Jamison appear to stand for the general proposition that there will be substantial compliance with the claims statute when the claim either is actually received by the proper board or should be received because it was served on a subordinate of the proper board." ( Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 529, 538 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 729 ] [where a service of a claim on the County of Kern did not constitute substantial compliance in filing a claim against the West Kern County Water District where the record was devoid of any evidence establ

1990In other words, “[b]oth Elias and Jamison appear to stand for the general proposition that there will be substantial compliance with the claims statute when the claim either is actually received by the proper board or should be received because it was served on a subordinate of the proper board.” (Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 529, 538 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 729 ] [where a service of a claim on the County of Kern did not constitute substantial compliance in filing a claim against the West Kern County Water District where the record was devoid of any evidence establish

1990In other words, “[b]oth Elias and Jamison appear to stand for the general proposition that there will be substantial compliance with the claims statute when the claim either is actually received by the proper board or should be received because it was served on a subordinate of the proper board.” (Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 529, 538 [ 148 Cal.Rptr. 729 ] [where a service of a claim on the County of Kern did not constitute substantial compliance in filing a claim against the West Kern County Water District where the record was devoid of any evidence establish

1990In other words, "[b]oth Elias and Jamison appear to stand for the general proposition that there will be substantial compliance with the claims statute when the claim either is actually received by the proper board or should be received because it was served on a subordinate of the proper board." ( Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 529, 538 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 729 ] [where a service of a claim on the County of Kern did not constitute substantial compliance in filing a claim against the West Kern County Water District where the record was devoid of any evidence establ

1990In other words, "[b]oth Elias and Jamison appear to stand for the general proposition that there will be substantial compliance with the claims statute when the claim either is actually received by the proper board or should be received because it was served on a subordinate of the proper board." ( Kaslavage v. West Kern County Water Dist. (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 529, 538 [ 148 Cal. Rptr. 729 ] [where a service of a claim on the County of Kern did not constitute substantial compliance in filing a claim against the West Kern County Water District where the record was devoid of any evidence establ

1975Like the service requirement of subdivision (a) and five-year trial requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 583, it is designed to encourage diligence in the prosecution of an action once it has been filed. ( Gonsalves v. Bank of America (1940) 16 Cal.2d 169, 172 [ 105 P.2d 118 ]; Moore v. Superior Court (1970) 8 Cal. App.3d 804, 810 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 620 ]; J.A.

1975Like the service requirement of subdivision (a) and five-year trial requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 583, it is designed to encourage diligence in the prosecution of an action once it has been filed. ( Gonsalves v. Bank of America (1940) 16 Cal.2d 169, 172 [ 105 P.2d 118 ]; Moore v. Superior Court (1970) 8 Cal. App.3d 804, 810 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 620 ]; J.A.

1975Like the service requirement of subdivision (a) and five-year trial requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 583, it is designed to encourage diligence in the prosecution of an action once it has been filed. ( Gonsalves v. Bank of America (1940) 16 Cal.2d 169, 172 [ 105 P.2d 118 ]; Moore v. Superior Court (1970) 8 Cal. App.3d 804, 810 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 620 ]; J.A.

1975Like the service requirement of subdivision (a) and five-year trial requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 583, it is designed to encourage diligence in the prosecution of an action once it has been filed. ( Gonsalves v. Bank of America (1940) 16 Cal.2d 169, 172 [ 105 P.2d 118 ]; Moore v. Superior Court (1970) 8 Cal. App.3d 804, 810 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 620 ]; J.A.

2019Although service was not made until after the 90th day, the period for service is governed by Public Resources Code section 21167.6, which applies "[n]otwithstanding any other law." Section 21167.6 governs when in conflict with section 65009. ( Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 830 , 841, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 560 ["[T]he provisions of section 21167.6 must prevail over directly contradictory provisions in other statutes."].) While the two service provisions may be harmonized when a shorter statute of limitations for filing applies ( *647 Royalty Carpet, supra, 125 Cal.App.4

2019Although service was not made until after the 90th day, the period for service is governed by Public Resources Code section 21167.6, which applies "[n]otwithstanding any other law." Section 21167.6 governs when in conflict with section 65009. ( Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 830 , 841, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 560 ["[T]he provisions of section 21167.6 must prevail over directly contradictory provisions in other statutes."].) While the two service provisions may be harmonized when a shorter statute of limitations for filing applies ( *647 Royalty Carpet, supra, 125 Cal.App.4

2024(Ibid.; but see Rey Sanchez, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 265 [directing the trial court to order expungement, “mindful that adverse consequences might flow if we ordered the expungement of a lis pendens that is valid against defendants just because it is invalid as to petitioner”].) A third case, J&A Mash & Barrel, held that the claimant either actually or substantially complied with the service requirement.

2024(J&A Mash & Barrel, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 29.) A code comment explained that it was “ ‘not the intention of . . . section [405.23] to disapprove the principles of waiver applied in Biddle.’ ” (Id. at p. 24; see also Carr v. Rosien (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 845 , 28 854 (Carr); Rey Sanchez Investments v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 259, 264 (Rey Sanchez).) Carr and Rey Sanchez interpreted Biddle to create a waiver exception to Code of Civil Procedure section 405.23, which may apply only if two conditions are met: (1) the claimant substantially complied with the service requirement;

2024(J&A Mash & Barrel, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 29.) A code comment explained that it was “ ‘not the intention of . . . section [405.23] to disapprove the principles of waiver applied in Biddle.’ ” (Id. at p. 24; see also Carr v. Rosien (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 845 , 28 854 (Carr); Rey Sanchez Investments v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 259, 264 (Rey Sanchez).) Carr and Rey Sanchez interpreted Biddle to create a waiver exception to Code of Civil Procedure section 405.23, which may apply only if two conditions are met: (1) the claimant substantially complied with the service requirement;

2024(See Carr, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 855 ; Rey Sanchez, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 264 .)15 In Carr, the court held that Carr’s lis pendens was ineffective as to Colón, a property owner, because Carr did not serve Colón, who did not receive actual notice of the lis pendens until after selling the property. ( Carr, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 855– 856.) Moreover, “the fact that the lis pendens is ‘void . . . as to’ Colón would be cold comfort if it nevertheless prevented Colón from conveying good title to third parties.” (Id. at p. 856.) The court therefore concluded, “[A] lis pendens th

2022(Carol Gilbert, Inc. v. Haller (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 852, 865 (Carol Gilbert).) “First, there must have been some degree of compliance with the offended statutory requirements.” (Id. at pp. 865–866.) Second, the circumstances of the attempted service must have made it highly probable that it would impart the same notice as strict compliance.

2016(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1) [a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after service of a notice of entry of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment, but if there is no proof of service, the notice of appeal must be filed within 180 days after entry of the judgment]; rule 8.104(e) [“judgment” includes appealable order]; In re Marriage of Lin (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 471, 474-476 [§ 6384, subd. (a), may obviate the need for service of a DVRO for enforcement purposes, but it has no impact upon the service requirement to shorten the time to appeal from 180 days to 60 days].

2016(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1) [a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after service of a notice of entry of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment, but if there is no proof of service, the notice of appeal must be filed within 180 days after entry of the judgment]; rule 8.104(e) [“judgment” includes appealable order]; In re Marriage of Lin (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 471, 474-476 [§ 6384, subd. (a), may obviate the need for service of a DVRO for enforcement purposes, but it has no impact upon the service requirement to shorten the time to appeal from 180 days to 60 days].

2005We must therefore conclude the Legislature intended the time period for service set forth in section 21167.6, subdivision (a) may be extended for good cause. “ ‘The failure of the Legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the subject is generally before it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not amended.’ ” (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 129 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 763 P.2d 852 ].) If the failure to comply with the service requirement under Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision

2005We must therefore conclude the Legislature intended the time period for service set forth in section 21167.6, subdivision (a) may be extended for good cause. “ ‘The failure of the Legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the subject is generally before it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not amended.’ ” (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 129 [ 253 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 763 P.2d 852 ].) If the failure to comply with the service requirement under Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision

2003Thereafter all persons are barred from any such action or proceeding[.] Any such proceeding shall take precedence over all matters of the calendar of the court except criminal, probate, eminent domain and forcible entry and unlawful detainer proceedings.” 6 (Italics added.) In section 66499.37, which is part of the Subdivision Map Act (§ 66410 et seq.), 7 “the Legislature expressly required not only that the action be commenced within 90 days, but also that service of summons be effected within the same 90 days.” (Maginn v. City of Glendale (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 639

2003Thereafter all persons are barred from any such action or proceeding[.] Any such proceeding shall take precedence over all matters of the calendar of the court except criminal, probate, eminent domain and forcible entry and unlawful detainer proceedings.” 6 (Italics added.) In section 66499.37, which is part of the Subdivision Map Act (§ 66410 et seq.), 7 “the Legislature expressly required not only that the action be commenced within 90 days, but also that service of summons be effected within the same 90 days.” (Maginn v. City of Glendale (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 639

1999(E.g., Graf v. Gaslight (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 291, 298 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 759 ].) *1109 Plaintiffs contend they substantially complied with the service requirement by serving defendant with a claim form and attorney letter on August 12.

1999(E.g., Graf v. Gaslight (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 291, 298 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 759 ].) *1109 Plaintiffs contend they substantially complied with the service requirement by serving defendant with a claim form and attorney letter on August 12.

1990To perform this obligation, the state has established subordinate local school districts whose governing board function as agents of the state. ( San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 952 ; Hall v. City of Taft, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 181 .) "However, the fact that a state agency is created by *699 statute to discharge a duty constitutionally imposed on the state does not transmute the agency into `the state,' nor render the state liable for its acts under a general theory of respondeat superior. [Citations.]" ( First Interstate Bank v. State of California (1987)

1990To perform this obligation, the state has established subordinate local school districts whose governing board function as agents of the state. ( San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 952 ; Hall v. City of Taft, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 181 .) "However, the fact that a state agency is created by *699 statute to discharge a duty constitutionally imposed on the state does not transmute the agency into `the state,' nor render the state liable for its acts under a general theory of respondeat superior. [Citations.]" ( First Interstate Bank v. State of California (1987)

1985In construing section 409 we must not “become immersed in the various aspects of statutory construction and lose sight of the.overall objectives of the statutes.” (Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 462, 468 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 515 ].) Since actual notice is the heart of subdivisions (c) and (d), slavish adherence to the technical requirements of service would defeat the overall legislative objective.

1985In construing section 409 we must not “become immersed in the various aspects of statutory construction and lose sight of the.overall objectives of the statutes.” (Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 462, 468 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 515 ].) Since actual notice is the heart of subdivisions (c) and (d), slavish adherence to the technical requirements of service would defeat the overall legislative objective.

1983Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 449, 454 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 541 P.2d 289 ].) However, by its very terms, Code of Civil Procedure section 581a, subdivision (c) is not applicable in cases where defendant has filed an answer which, respondent claims, was done in this case.

1983Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 449, 454 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 541 P.2d 289 ].) However, by its very terms, Code of Civil Procedure section 581a, subdivision (c) is not applicable in cases where defendant has filed an answer which, respondent claims, was done in this case.

1975Thompson & Sons, Inc. v. Superior Court (1963) 215 Cal. App.2d 719, 722 [ 30 Cal. Rptr. 471 ].) However, the three provisions allow extension of time by filed written stipulation, reflecting [2] that the policy of diligence is subordinate to the parties' own interests. (4) The provision requiring written stipulations also reflects a policy designed to avoid unseemly dispute between counsel over purported waiver of the statutory requirements.

1975Thompson & Sons, Inc. v. Superior Court (1963) 215 Cal. App.2d 719, 722 [ 30 Cal. Rptr. 471 ].) However, the three provisions allow extension of time by filed written stipulation, reflecting [2] that the policy of diligence is subordinate to the parties' own interests. (4) The provision requiring written stipulations also reflects a policy designed to avoid unseemly dispute between counsel over purported waiver of the statutory requirements.

1964(See also Branson v. Board of Trustees, 205 Cal.App.2d 680,684-687 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 288 ].) The cases are distinguishable.

1964(See also Branson v. Board of Trustees, 205 Cal.App.2d 680,684-687 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 288 ].) The cases are distinguishable.