retaliation claim in District of Columbia

2025Dev., 107 F. Supp. 3d 100, 130 (D.D.C. 2015). 85 Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 46 (D.C. 1994) (footnote omitted). 86 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 87 Richardson v. Petasis, 160 F. Supp. 3d 88, 134 (D.D.C. 2015). 82 The third causal connection requirement is satisfied if the employer’s actions were “motivated in substantial part by retaliatory reasons, even if they were motivated also by legitimate business reasons.” 88 In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, “[t]he causal connection between the protected activi

1999See Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d at 48 (the “crux of a retaliation claim” is “a causal connection between an adverse personnel action and protected opposition activity”). 12 The link which Millstein alleges is the Spring 1994 staff meeting (see note 2, supra) at which she questioned why Dr. Chretien had not received the medical director position.

2016Id. at 1289 n.6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Grimes v. District of Columbia, 89 A.3d 107 , 112 n.3 (D.C. 2014) (rejecting the trial court‘s rationale for dismissal of a retaliation claim, but affirming the dismissal on the alternative ground, reasoning that there was ―no unfairness in affirming on the 20 William J.

2015Id. at 1289 n. 6 (internal quotation marks and citations, omitted); see also Grimes v. District of Columbia, 89 A.3d 107 , 112 n. 3 (D.C.2014) (rejecting the trial court’s rationale for dismissal of a retaliation claim, but affirming the dismissal on the alternative ground, reasoning that there was “no unfairness in affirming on the {alternative] ground [that the complaint failed to state a DCHRA retaliation claim] ..., because [appellant] briefed that issue in this court and in-the trial court”).

2025Dev., 107 F. Supp. 3d 100, 130 (D.D.C. 2015). 85 Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 46 (D.C. 1994) (footnote omitted). 86 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 87 Richardson v. Petasis, 160 F. Supp. 3d 88, 134 (D.D.C. 2015). 82 The third causal connection requirement is satisfied if the employer’s actions were “motivated in substantial part by retaliatory reasons, even if they were motivated also by legitimate business reasons.” 88 In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, “[t]he causal connection between the protected activi

2023See Bereston v. UHS of Del., Inc., 180 A.3d 95 , 112 n.51 (D.C. 2018) (quoting Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68 ); see also Powell v. Lockhart, 629 F. Supp. 2d 23, 42 (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that the materiality standard for a retaliation claim is more liberal).

2025Payne v. District of Columbia, 4 F. Supp. 3d 80, 90 (D.D.C. 2013) (vacated on other grounds). 92 “[W]here an employer treats an employee differently after she asserts her rights . . . than before she had done so, a retaliatory motive may be inferred.” Cantrell v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 145 Fed.

2025Dev., 107 F. Supp. 3d 100, 130 (D.D.C. 2015). 85 Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 46 (D.C. 1994) (footnote omitted). 86 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 87 Richardson v. Petasis, 160 F. Supp. 3d 88, 134 (D.D.C. 2015). 82 The third causal connection requirement is satisfied if the employer’s actions were “motivated in substantial part by retaliatory reasons, even if they were motivated also by legitimate business reasons.” 88 In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, “[t]he causal connection between the protected activi

2025On the other hand, “temporal proximity, though often an indicator of causation, is not a required element of a retaliation claim, particularly at this stage of the proceedings.” Dave v. Lanier, 606 F. Supp. 2d 45, 52-53 (D.D.C. 2009) (emphasis added). 91 “[R]epeated, escalating acts of retaliation,” such as “internal complaints”; “threats that [the employee] would be terminated”; and “formal action . . . to reduce [her] duties” can constitute a pattern of antagonism supporting an inference of causation.

2025Dev., 107 F. Supp. 3d 100, 130 (D.D.C. 2015). 85 Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 46 (D.C. 1994) (footnote omitted). 86 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 87 Richardson v. Petasis, 160 F. Supp. 3d 88, 134 (D.D.C. 2015). 82 The third causal connection requirement is satisfied if the employer’s actions were “motivated in substantial part by retaliatory reasons, even if they were motivated also by legitimate business reasons.” 88 In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, “[t]he causal connection between the protected activi

2025“Such a prima facie showing gives rise to a presumption that the employer’s conduct was unlawful, which the employer may rebut by articulating a legitimate reason for the employment action at issue.” Id. 81 Grant v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 786 A.2d 580, 586 (D.C. 2001); see also Propp v. Counterpart Int’l, 39 A.3d 856, 863 (D.C. 2012) (“An employee is protected from retaliation even if the employer’s conduct alleged to be discriminatory is lawful, so long as the employee reasonably believed the employer’s action was discriminatory.”). 82 Vogel, 944 A.2d at 465 (internal quotation marks and footn

2025Dev., 107 F. Supp. 3d 100, 130 (D.D.C. 2015). 85 Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 46 (D.C. 1994) (footnote omitted). 86 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 87 Richardson v. Petasis, 160 F. Supp. 3d 88, 134 (D.D.C. 2015). 82 The third causal connection requirement is satisfied if the employer’s actions were “motivated in substantial part by retaliatory reasons, even if they were motivated also by legitimate business reasons.” 88 In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, “[t]he causal connection between the protected activi

2025Code § 2-1402.61 (b). 80 engaged in protected activity by opposing or complaining about employment practices that are unlawful under the Act; (2) her employer took an adverse personnel action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. 80 To satisfy the first requirement, the employee need only have had “a reasonable good faith belief that the practice she opposed” was prohibited by the Human Rights Act. 81 But “the onus is on the employee to clearly voice her opposition to illegal discrimination; a vague charge of discrimination wi

2025Code § 2-1402.61 (b). 80 engaged in protected activity by opposing or complaining about employment practices that are unlawful under the Act; (2) her employer took an adverse personnel action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. 80 To satisfy the first requirement, the employee need only have had “a reasonable good faith belief that the practice she opposed” was prohibited by the Human Rights Act. 81 But “the onus is on the employee to clearly voice her opposition to illegal discrimination; a vague charge of discrimination wi

2025“Such a prima facie showing gives rise to a presumption that the employer’s conduct was unlawful, which the employer may rebut by articulating a legitimate reason for the employment action at issue.” Id. 81 Grant v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 786 A.2d 580, 586 (D.C. 2001); see also Propp v. Counterpart Int’l, 39 A.3d 856, 863 (D.C. 2012) (“An employee is protected from retaliation even if the employer’s conduct alleged to be discriminatory is lawful, so long as the employee reasonably believed the employer’s action was discriminatory.”). 82 Vogel, 944 A.2d at 465 (internal quotation marks and footn

2025Retaliation Against Sonmez The Human Rights Act makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee who “has opposed any practice” of unlawful discrimination. 79 An employee may plead such a retaliation claim by alleging in her complaint that (1) she 78 See Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 422-23 (4th Cir. 2014) (adopting “a negligence standard for analyzing an employer’s liability for third-party harassment under Title VII[,]” and holding that “an employer is liable under Title VII for third parties creating a hostile work environment if the employer knew or should have

2025Dev., 107 F. Supp. 3d 100, 130 (D.D.C. 2015). 85 Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 46 (D.C. 1994) (footnote omitted). 86 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 87 Richardson v. Petasis, 160 F. Supp. 3d 88, 134 (D.D.C. 2015). 82 The third causal connection requirement is satisfied if the employer’s actions were “motivated in substantial part by retaliatory reasons, even if they were motivated also by legitimate business reasons.” 88 In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, “[t]he causal connection between the protected activi

2024In so doing, the District Court construed the retaliation claim as being filed pursuant to Title VII7 and did not address the claim as being 7 “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) the defendant knew of the protected activity, (3) the defendant thereafter took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff, and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Greer v. Cummins, Inc., 6th Cir. No. 22-5663 (Oct. 23, 2023), citing Mont

2023See, e.g., Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that probation could constitute an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim).

2023See, e.g., Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that probation could constitute an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim).

2023See Bereston v. UHS of Del., Inc., 180 A.3d 95 , 112 n.51 (D.C. 2018) (quoting Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68 ); see also Powell v. Lockhart, 629 F. Supp. 2d 23, 42 (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that the materiality standard for a retaliation claim is more liberal).

2023However, “the standard of material adversity is meant to separate significant from trivial harms . . . .” Bereston, 180 A.3d at 112 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[N]ot 16 everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.” Id. (citation omitted).

2023See Bereston v. UHS of Del., Inc., 180 A.3d 95 , 112 n.51 (D.C. 2018) (quoting Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68 ); see also Powell v. Lockhart, 629 F. Supp. 2d 23, 42 (D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that the materiality standard for a retaliation claim is more liberal).

2023See also Powell, 629 F. Supp. 2d at 42-43 (concluding that a PIP was capable of constituting an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim).

2020See id. at § 1311(b). 19 The trial court made several comments on the merits of Mr. Sivaraman’s retaliation claim: “I don’t really know that there was retaliation, liability as to the retaliation claim to be honest . . . .”; “[Mr. Guizzetti] had some defenses here I am not at all certain that that retaliation claim would have been resolved in Mr. Sivaraman’s favor.”; “Mr. Guizzetti has defenses he would have raised as to why 26 damages under similar circumstances, where a default was entered in the plaintiff’s favor yet the trial court issued no award because of the plaintiff’s failure to “pro

2020See id. at § 1311(b). 19 The trial court made several comments on the merits of Mr. Sivaraman’s retaliation claim: “I don’t really know that there was retaliation, liability as to the retaliation claim to be honest . . . .”; “[Mr. Guizzetti] had some defenses here I am not at all certain that that retaliation claim would have been resolved in Mr. Sivaraman’s favor.”; “Mr. Guizzetti has defenses he would have raised as to why 26 damages under similar circumstances, where a default was entered in the plaintiff’s favor yet the trial court issued no award because of the plaintiff’s failure to “pro

2020This is true even if one of the acts or omissions contributed more than another to causing the harm, so long as each act or omission played a substantial part in the harm.”); Sutherland, 631 A.2d at 369 (affirming the use of the following jury instruction for a retaliation claim under the D.C.

2020You, however, determine if protected activity, that is, the discrimination claim, was a substantial contributing factor in [the] decision.”); Furline v. Morrison, 953 A.2d 344, 350-51 (D.C. 2008) (noting that the jury instruction on a retaliation claim required that the “retributive motive ‘played a substantial part in the suspension decision, even though other factors also may have motivated’ the decision”). 36 “but-for,” would have provided the jury any further clarity than was provided by the use of “because of” and “based on.” Alternatively, and more importantly, appellants argue that the

2017Such conduct can support a retaliation claim.69 69 See, e.g., Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743-44 (1983) (holding ―that it is an enjoinable unfair labor practice to prosecute a baseless lawsuit with the intent of retaliating against an employee for the exercise of rights protected by § 7 of the NLRA[]‖; ―such suits are not within scope of First Amendment protection‖ and state interests in maintaining domestic peace and protecting citizens‘ health and welfare do not enter into play when suit has no reasonable basis.); United Credit Bureau of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 643 F.2d 101

2017Such conduct can support a retaliation claim.69 69 See, e.g., Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743-44 (1983) (holding ―that it is an enjoinable unfair labor practice to prosecute a baseless lawsuit with the intent of retaliating against an employee for the exercise of rights protected by § 7 of the NLRA[]‖; ―such suits are not within scope of First Amendment protection‖ and state interests in maintaining domestic peace and protecting citizens‘ health and welfare do not enter into play when suit has no reasonable basis.); United Credit Bureau of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 643 F.2d 101

2015See Long v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters Retirement & Relief Bd., 728 A.2d 112 , 116 n. 5 (D.C.1999) (holding that claim first raised during oral argument was waived under Rule 28 for failure to preserve it); Ramos v. United States, 569 A.2d 158 , 162 n. 5 (D.C.1990) (noting that appellant’s failure to brief this court on Fifth Amendment claim constituted Rule 28 waiver of claim). 9 .

2013See Gomez v. Independence Mgmt., 967 A.2d 1276, 1291 (D.C.2009) (“[T]he statutory presumption relieves the tenants of the burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory action.”).

2012The trial court reminded plaintiffs counsel of the preliminary retaliation instruction, but the District’s counsel declared: “I don’t think that was read.” The trial court replied, “I cut out a lot.” After the jury retired, plaintiffs counsel again objected generally “to the instruction on the Defendant’s theory of the case,” “the instruction relating to the law on retaliation,” and other instructions that are not at issue in this appeal. “[Objections to jury instructions must be specific enough to direct the judge’s attention to the correct rule of law; a party’s request for jury instructions

2012The trial court reminded plaintiffs counsel of the preliminary retaliation instruction, but the District’s counsel declared: “I don’t think that was read.” The trial court replied, “I cut out a lot.” After the jury retired, plaintiffs counsel again objected generally “to the instruction on the Defendant’s theory of the case,” “the instruction relating to the law on retaliation,” and other instructions that are not at issue in this appeal. “[Objections to jury instructions must be specific enough to direct the judge’s attention to the correct rule of law; a party’s request for jury instructions

2012See Thomas v. District of Columbia, 942 A.2d 645, 650 (D.C.2008) (Plain error requires that appellant establish “(1) error (2) that [was] plain, (3) that affect[ed] substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2007See Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 231 F.3d 791 , 800 (11th Cir.2000) (rejecting imputed knowledge theory; “[T]he fact the employer is a corporation does not relieve a plaintiff of the burden of showing a causal connection between the protected conduct and the decision to take the adverse employment action.”); see also Road v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District, 323 F.3d 1185, 1197-98 (9th Cir.2003) (decision-maker must have knowledge of protected activity to find an employment action retaliatory); Gupta v. Florida Board of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir.2000)

2007Without more, this is simply too shaky a platform to support a retaliation claim. “[A] jury should never be permitted to guess as to a material element of the case such as damages, negligence, or causation.” Jimenez, 683 A.2d at 461-62 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).