Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
19 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason Universitygreen2 sentences2017See Constantine, 411 F.3d at 500 (“The cause of action targets conduct that tends to chill such activity, not just conduct that freezes it completely.” (Emphases in original.)). ¶ 25 In our view, we believe that Johnson’s alleged conduct resulted in something more than a “de minimis inconvenience” to the plaintiff’s exercise of her first amendment right to freedom of association. ¶ 26 As to the third and final element of her first amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff must establish that her protected activity was a substantial motivating factor in Johnson’s conduct—i.e., that there was a 2016See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005) ("The cause of action targets conduct that tends to chill such activity, not just conduct that freezes it completely."). ¶ 25 In our view, we believe that Johnson's alleged conduct resulted in something more than a "de minimis inconvenience" to the plaintiff's exercise of her first amendment right to freedom of association. - 11 - No. 1-15-3377 ¶ 26 As to the third and final element of her first amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff must establish that her protected activity was a substantial mo | 2 | 2 |
George Williams v. Conagra Poultry Company, Equal Employment Advisory Council, Amicus on Behalf Ofgreen2 sentences2009See Williams, 378 F.3d at 798 (analogizing a section 1981 harassment claim to a Title VII harassment claim in assessing the third Gore factor). 2009See Williams, 378 F.3d at 798 (analogizing a section 1981 harassment claim to a Title VII harassment claim in assessing the third Gore factor). | 2 | 2 |
Blount v. Stroudgreen2 sentences2009See 376 Ill. 2009See 376 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Whitegreen2 sentences2025Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). ¶ 60 We agree with the Commission that Gibson failed to show that Mount Olive committed a material adverse act because he was not authorized to work as a police officer in Illinois. 2021Id. ¶ 43 Here, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the dismissal of petitioner’s retaliation claim because he again failed to establish he was subjected to a “material adverse act”—even under the less demanding standard. | 1 | 2 |
Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino Countygreen1 sentence2024Arizona Students’ Ass’n, 824 F.3d at 867 (quoting Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). ¶ 71 Count II fails from a pleading standpoint in several respects. | 1 | 1 |
Kidwell v. Eisenhauergreen1 sentence2023See Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
John C. Babcock v. R.L. White and G. McDanielgreen1 sentence2022In fact, we note a case cited by plaintiff on appeal, Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996), states, “the ultimate question is whether events would have transpired differently absent the retaliatory motive.” Under these circumstances, we conclude the retaliation claim against Dronenberg is insufficiently stated. ¶ 18 In summary, we conclude plaintiff has not established any error with respect to the circuit court’s dismissal of his complaint. ¶ 19 III. | 1 | 1 |
Welch v. Hoehgreen1 sentence2020See Welch v. Hoeh, 314 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Wilkiegreen1 sentence2019That method allows the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case without proving a direct causal link.” Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences2009Defendants do not contest the sufficiency of Blount's evidence to support such a claim if it is cognizable under section 1981. *937 Section 1981 guarantees that all people within the United States have the same right as "white citizens" in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); see also Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474 , 126 S.Ct. 1246, 1249 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1069, 1075 (2006) (discussing section 1981). 2009Defendants do not contest the sufficiency of Blount's evidence to support such a claim if it is cognizable under section 1981. *937 Section 1981 guarantees that all people within the United States have the same right as "white citizens" in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); see also Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474 , 126 S.Ct. 1246, 1249 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1069, 1075 (2006) (discussing section 1981). | 1 | 1 |
Maple v. Gustafsongreen2 sentences2007See Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 , 603 N.E.2d 508, 512 (1992). 9 1-06-2428 & 1-06-2928 Consolidated As we explained above, plaintiff here raised two retaliation claims: a common law retaliatory discharge claim and a retaliation claim based on section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 2007See Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 , 603 N.E.2d 508, 512 (1992). 9 1-06-2428 & 1-06-2928 Consolidated As we explained above, plaintiff here raised two retaliation claims: a common law retaliatory discharge claim and a retaliation claim based on section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
M.U. v. Team Illinois Hockey Club, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025Aiding and Abetting ¶ 56 Last, we note that Gibson’s final claim—namely, that Mount Olive aided and abetted the ILETSB by denying him work and discharging him—is difficult to interpret, as the Commission also noted when it wrote, “[I]t is unclear from [Gibson’s] charge of discrimination or the investigation report what violation of the Act [Gibson] is alleging that [Mount Olive] was aiding and abetting.” After the Commission concluded that an aiding and abetting claim was without merit because Gibson failed to allege any violation of the Act that Mount Olive aided and abetted, the Commission n | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Arizona Students' Ass'n v. Arizona Board of Regents
green
1 sentence2024Arizona Students’ Ass’n, 824 F.3d at 867 (quoting Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). ¶ 71 Count II fails from a pleading standpoint in several respects. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Hoffelt v. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF HUMAN RIGHTS
green
1 sentence2021Hoffelt v. Illinois Dep’t of Human Rights, 367 Ill. - 10 - App. 3d 628, 635-36[, 867 N.E.2d 14, 19-20 ] (*** 2006). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Folbert v. Department of Human Rights
green
2 sentences2020“The agency’s findings of fact are entitled to deference.” Id. “[O]ur review is limited to deciding whether the chief legal counsel’s decision dismissing the claim for lack of substantial evidence is “arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.” Id. ¶ 38 We accept the Commission’s determination Evans’s retaliation claim was administratively closed, and that Evans did not appeal that decision, as prima facie true and correct. 2020“The agency’s findings of fact are entitled to deference.” Id. “[O]ur review is limited to deciding whether the chief legal counsel’s decision dismissing the claim for lack of substantial evidence is “arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.” Id. ¶ 38 We accept the Commission’s determination Evans’s retaliation claim was administratively closed, and that Evans did not appeal that decision, as prima facie true and correct. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bigger v. Facebook, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Bigger, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1014 . ¶ 38 “A plaintiff can also succeed on a retaliation claim by the “indirect method” which “refers to the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
1 sentence2019Bigger, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1014 . ¶ 38 “A plaintiff can also succeed on a retaliation claim by the “indirect method” which “refers to the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Rozsavolgyi v. The City of Aurora
green
1 sentence2016In count I, the refusal-to-accommodate claim, plaintiff alleged that: she was qualified to perform and adequately performed her job; her medical conditions (unipolar depression, anxiety, panic attacks, and partial hearing loss) constituted a disability under the 10 Count III is a retaliation claim, which is not relevant to this certified question. - 30 - 2016 IL App (2d) 150493 statute; plaintiff communicated to the City that she sought a reasonable accommodation for her disability; the City had a duty to engage in the interactive process; the City dismissed plaintiff’s request; and the City d | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Healy v. Vaupel
green
1 sentence2012Thus, the circuit court properly dismissed the retaliation claim against Pelletier individually. ¶ 39 Plaintiffs’ apparent reliance on Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 549 , N.E.2d 1240 (1990), for the proposition that sovereign immunity does not apply to a state’s agent who has allegedly committed a statutory violation is misplaced. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Darnell v. Impact Industries, Inc.
green
2 sentences1994Darnell v. Impact Industries, Inc. (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 158 , 473 N.E.2d 935 , recognized that it is a violation of public policy for an employer to discharge an employee in retaliation for the employee’s exercise of the protected right of filing a workers’ compensation claim against a prior employer. 1994Darnell v. Impact Industries, Inc. (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 158 , 473 N.E.2d 935 , recognized that it is a violation of public policy for an employer to discharge an employee in retaliation for the employee’s exercise of the protected right of filing a workers’ compensation claim against a prior employer. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.