retaliation claim in Pennsylvania

2023As for the second prong, an “‘[a]dverse action,’ for purposes of evaluating an inmate’s retaliation claim, is one which is ‘sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional rights.]’” Yount, 966 A.2d at 1121 (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)).

2022For purposes of a retaliation claim, an adverse action is “one which is ‘sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional rights.]’” Yount, 966 A.2d at 1121 (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original).

2023As for the second prong, an “‘[a]dverse action,’ for purposes of evaluating an inmate’s retaliation claim, is one which is ‘sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional rights.]’” Yount, 966 A.2d at 1121 (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)).

2022For purposes of a retaliation claim, an adverse action is “one which is ‘sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional rights.]’” Yount, 966 A.2d at 1121 (quoting Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original).

2019Additionally, Derrickson argues in his brief that he “never plead [sic] a retaliation claim,” but rather “raised a First Amendment violation claim asking this Court to recognize his free speech right to communicate by mail, and to freely associate with outside prisoner advocacy organizations and groups.” (Derrickson’s Br. at 9.) 10 claim, a petitioner must state sufficient facts showing the petitioner “(1) . . . engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) the retaliation against that conduct resulted in adverse action; (3) the protected conduct was a substantial and motivating factor fo

2016After reviewing the complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, I “conclude that the alleged facts are insufficient to meet the fourth prong [of a retaliation claim] because they fail to demonstrate that the retaliatory action - [not removing Nifas from the RRL] - did not further a legitimate penological goal.” Richardson, 74 A.3d at 357 .

2019See Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166 , 1170 n.10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (“Section 1983 only provides for damages when a state actor violates rights of a citizen that arise under federal law.”) We, therefore, treat Koehler’s cause of action as a retaliation claim for damages pursuant to Section 1983. 5 to retaliation.

2013However, the attachments to the DOC Defendants’ preliminary objections confirm that the hearing examiner and the administrative appeal tribunals were aware of and considered the contents of the letter, but nonetheless found Richardson’s assertion of innocence not credible. 4 See Brown, 833 A.2d at 1171 n. 11 (stating that a complainant must allege more than the fact that he was charged and found guilty of misconduct in order to state a retaliation claim under the First Amendment).

2019The final test for a retaliation claim . . . was set forth in Abdul–Akbar [v. Department of Corrections, 910 F. Supp. 986 (D.

2009Commonwealth Court Order, 7/20/06, at 2 (citing Abdul-Akbar v. Department of Corrections, 910 F.Supp. 986 (D.Del.1995)).

2025Lerch v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). 13 Employer argues that Complainant did not establish the first element of a retaliation claim, i.e., that she was engaged in a protected activity of which Employer was aware prior to terminating her employment.

2024In Bush v. Veach, 1 A.3d 981, 986 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), our Court held that we could not infer that a prison superintendent had actual knowledge of an inmate’s retaliation claim merely by reviewing the inmate’s grievances filed after the alleged deprivations occurred.

2022Additionally, in Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 424 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third Circuit applied the Farrell approach for causal relationship to a retaliation claim by an inmate.

2022The Third Circuit clarified that “[w]here the temporal proximity is not so close as to be unduly suggestive, the appropriate test is timing plus other evidence.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

2022See Renna v. PPL Electric Utilities, Inc. 207 A.3d 355, 371 (Pa. Super. 2019). -4- J-A23024-21 her in her ability to function normally.” Id. at ¶ 13.

2022See Renna, 207 A.3d at 371 . - 17 - J-A23024-21 5749924 (E.D.

2022Prison, 602 F. App’x 892, 894-95 (3d Cir. 2015) (reinstating a retaliation claim that involved the removal of a mattress), with Branch v. Bauman, No. 2:12-CV-16, 2014 WL 413512 (W.D.

2021Id. at 177-78. 14 The complaint in Clayton was dismissed due to the bystander not having standing to assert the discrimination claims, and the Eight Circuit reversed, finding that she sufficiently alleged an injury in fact, a hostile work environment, and the injury was an interest arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by Title VII, which is to be liberally construed. 875 F.2d at 679 -80 (citing, e.g., Trafficante’s statement that persons aggrieved included those who were not the objects of discrimination but were injured by the benefit of interracial association).

2021Thomas v. Independence Township, 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006).

2018Ctr., 739 A.2d 571, 576-77 (Pa. Super. 1999) (finding recipient of Medicaid funding is “public body” for purposes of Whistleblower Law; appellant alleging discharge for good-faith reports of wrongdoing and waste stated valid cause of action; complaint erroneously dismissed). -8- J-A14033-18 trial court, Appellant was not required to invoke the PHRL to pursue a retaliation claim under the PWL.

2017This is a personal and unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make.” Lomas v. Kravitz, 130 A.3d 107, 122 (Pa, Super, 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (affirmed, — Pa. —, 170 A.3d 380 (2017)); Com. v. Watkins, 630 Pa. 652 , 108 A.3d 692 (2014); Com. v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51 (Pa. Super. 2014). .

2017Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997).