48 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1999–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Peterson v. Buckeye Steel Casingsgreen2 sentences2026Peterson v. Buckeye Steel Casings, 133 Ohio App.3d 715, 728 (10th Dist. 1999). 2023No. 22AP-524 36 {¶ 105} This court has observed that “denial of consideration for promotion, exclusion from meetings, and being singled out for discipline were sufficient to demonstrate adverse employment action for a retaliation claim.” Moody at ¶ 39 , citing Peterson v. Buckeye Steel Casings, 133 Ohio App.3d 715, 728 (10th Dist.1999). | 3 | 4 |
Diller v. Miami Valley Hosp.green2 sentences2024Specifically, R.C. 4112.02(I) states that “it is an unlawful business practice to discriminate against a person because that person has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice defined in this section or because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under sections 4112.01 to 4112.07 of the Revised Code.” {¶ 48} “A plaintiff may prove a retaliation claim through either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Diller v. Miami Valley Hosp., 2017-Ohio-9051, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.), citing Imwalle v. Reliance Med. 2023Franklin No. 12AP-1073, 2013-Ohio-4210, ¶ 60 . “[T]o prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that retaliation is a determinative factor—not just a motivating factor—in the employer’s decision to take adverse employment action.” Diller v. Miami Valley Hospital, 2017-Ohio-9051 , 102 N.E.3d 520, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.), quoting Nebozuk at ¶ 45. {¶11} “To demonstrate a causal connection between a materially adverse action, such as suspension or termination, and the exercise of protected rights, ‘a plaintiff must proffer evidence sufficient to raise the inference that [the] protected activity | 2 | 2 |
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2024“A plaintiff may establish pretext by proving that: (1) the employer’s stated reason for [the action] has no basis in fact, (2) the reason offered was not the actual reason for the [action], or (3) the reason offered was insufficient to explain the employer’s action.” Id. at ¶ 77. {¶24} “To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must ‘establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.’” EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 770 (6th Cir. 2015). 2023“To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must ‘establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.’” EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 770 (6th Cir.2015). | 2 | 2 |
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Whitegreen2 sentences2023Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006). 2021Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006) ("Demonstrating the third prima facie element in a Title VII retaliation case, an adverse employment action, is less onerous than in the discrimination context in that it 'is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.' "). {¶ 39} We have held that denial of consideration for promotion, exclusion from meetings, and being singled out for discipline were sufficient to demonstrate adverse employment action for a retaliation claim. | 2 | 2 |
Nebozuk v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co.green2 sentences2024Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008), and Nebozuk v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 2014-Ohio-1600, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.). 2016Franklin No. 13AP-591, 2014-Ohio-1600, ¶ 45 . {¶53} With respect to the third element of a retaliation claim, the majority reiterates its position that Vogt’s transfer to the Pioneer Group constituted an adverse employment action. | 1 | 4 |
Smith v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safetygreen2 sentences2025“Because of the similarities between R.C. 4112.02(I) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Ohio courts look to federal case law for Case No. 2023-00531JD -18- DECISION assistance in interpreting retaliation claims under R.C. 4112.02(I).” Moody v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 2021-Ohio-4578, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.). {¶50} A plaintiff may prove a retaliation claim through either direct or circumstantial evidence that unlawful retaliation motivated the employer’s adverse employment decision.” Smith, 2013-Ohio-4210, at ¶ 47 (10th Dist.). 2023Franklin No. 12AP-1073, 2013-Ohio-4210, ¶ 60 . “[T]o prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that retaliation is a determinative factor—not just a motivating factor—in the employer’s decision to take adverse employment action.” Diller v. Miami Valley Hospital, 2017-Ohio-9051 , 102 N.E.3d 520, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.), quoting Nebozuk at ¶ 45. {¶11} “To demonstrate a causal connection between a materially adverse action, such as suspension or termination, and the exercise of protected rights, ‘a plaintiff must proffer evidence sufficient to raise the inference that [the] protected activity | 1 | 3 |
Greer-Burger v. Temesigreen2 sentences2016Retaliation Claim {¶52} To establish a case of retaliation, a claimant must prove that “(1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) the defending party was aware that the claimant had engaged in that activity, (3) the defending party took an adverse employment action against the employee, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action.” Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2007-Ohio-6442 , 879 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 13 . “[T]o prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that retaliation is a determinative factor — not just a motivating factor — 2016Retaliation Claim {¶52} To establish a case of retaliation, a claimant must prove that “(1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) the defending party was aware that the claimant had engaged in that activity, (3) the defending party took an adverse employment action against the employee, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action.” Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2007-Ohio-6442 , 879 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 13 . “[T]o prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that retaliation is a determinative factor — not just a motivating factor — | 1 | 3 |
Neal v. Hamilton Countygreen2 sentences2014But “[t]he plaintiff cannot prevail if it appears from the evidence that the employer would have made the same decision regardless of the plaintiff’s participation in the protected activity.” Neal v. Hamilton Cty., 87 Ohio App.3d 670, 678 , 622 N.E.2d 1130 (1st Dist.1993). {¶24} In this case, there was no error in the trial court’s entry of summary judgment on the retaliation claim. 2014But “[t]he plaintiff cannot prevail if it appears from the evidence that the employer would have made the same decision regardless of the plaintiff’s participation in the protected activity.” Neal v. Hamilton Cty., 87 Ohio App.3d 670, 678 , 622 N.E.2d 1130 (1st Dist.1993). {¶24} In this case, there was no error in the trial court’s entry of summary judgment on the retaliation claim. | 1 | 3 |
Spengler v. Worthington Cylindersgreen2 sentences2013Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481, 494 (6th Cir. Ohio 2010); Skrjanc at 317 . 2011Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders (C.A.6, 2010), 615 F.3d 481, 494 . {¶18} Manigault testified that the May 11, 2006 physician certification remained in effect for one year. | 1 | 3 |
Pettay v. Adtalem Global Edn., Inc.green2 sentences2024Pettay v. Adtalem Global Edn., Inc., 2022-Ohio-3015, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.), quoting Greer-Burger at ¶ 13, fn. 2 , citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 2023No. 21AP-508, 2022-Ohio-3015, ¶ 10 . | 1 | 2 |
Michael v. Caterpillar Financial Services Corp.green2 sentences2023Michael, 496 F.3d 584 at 596 . 2009See Michael, 496 F.3d at 596 ; Tuttle v. Metro. | 1 | 2 |
Weishaar v. Strimbugreen1 sentence2026To prevail on a retaliation claim under R.C. 5321.02(A), “[a] tenant must, therefore, show by a preponderance of the evidence, that the relationship between the complaint and action resulted from a retaliatory motive.” Id.; Webb v. C & J Properties, LLC, 2010-Ohio-3818 , ¶ 17 (12th Dist.), quoting Weishaar 12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS v. Strimbu, 76 Ohio App.3d 276, 286 (1991). {¶34} Here, the eviction was filed 16 days after Conrex received the citation from the City, and there is nothing in the record to show that Conrex had notice of the citation until after it had filed the evic | 1 | 1 |
Moody v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Servs.green1 sentence2025“Because of the similarities between R.C. 4112.02(I) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Ohio courts look to federal case law for Case No. 2023-00531JD -18- DECISION assistance in interpreting retaliation claims under R.C. 4112.02(I).” Moody v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 2021-Ohio-4578, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.). {¶50} A plaintiff may prove a retaliation claim through either direct or circumstantial evidence that unlawful retaliation motivated the employer’s adverse employment decision.” Smith, 2013-Ohio-4210, at ¶ 47 (10th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp.green1 sentence2024As the court explained in Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 721 (2d Cir. 2010): [A]t least in a run-of-the-mine case, . . . an employer’s failure to investigate a complaint of discrimination cannot be considered an adverse employment action taken in retaliation for the filing of the same discrimination complaint. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Imwalle v. Reliance Medical Products, Inc.green1 sentence2024Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008), and Nebozuk v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 2014-Ohio-1600, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Petrovski v. Federal Express Corp.green1 sentence2023Petrovski v. Federal Express Corp., 210 F.Supp.2d 943, 948 (N.D. | 1 | 1 |
Yolanda Arnold v. City of Columbusgreen1 sentence2023As such, demonstrating an adverse employment action for purposes of a retaliation claim “is less onerous than in the discrimination context.” Arnold v. Columbus, 515 Fed.Appx. 524, 536-37 (6th Cir.2013), quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. | 1 | 1 |
Motley v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., 07ap-923 (5-13-2008)green1 sentence2023No. 07AP- 923, 2008-Ohio-2306, ¶ 15-16 (holding that the “mere assertion of a union grievance, not based upon opposition to discrimination, does not constitute protected activity” for purposes of a retaliation claim); Ksiazek v. Columbiana Cty. | 1 | 1 |
Delphine Henry v. Abbott Laboratoriesgreen1 sentence2023See also Henry v. Abbott Laboratories, 651 Fed.Appx. 494, 505 (6th Cir.2016) (finding that a low performance evaluation and a “letter of expectations threatening further action if her performance did not improve” were adverse employment actions for purposes of a retaliation claim); Arnold at 537 . {¶ 106} Mr. Childs’ Action Plan obligated him to send to Ms. Flury each week a recap of his process walks, a written copy of his store walks, a recap demonstrating that he “ask[ed] 5 department leaders or backups for feedback,” and “a detailed copy of his planning sessions.” (Childs Dep., Ex. 18.) Th | 1 | 1 |
Boggs v. Scotts Co., Unpublished Decision (3-22-2005)green1 sentence2023Franklin No. 04AP- 425, 2005-Ohio-1264, ¶ 26 (interpreting case law to hold that “an interval of two months between complaint and adverse action so diluted an inference of causation that, without more, a retaliation claim could not stand”). {¶20} In fact, even if the record clearly established that this subordinate had been aware of Hall’s report in the March 2020 email exchange, temporal proximity alone still would not, given the other deficiencies already noted in this analysis, have been sufficient to establish causation given that almost fourteen weeks had elapsed between the March 2020 em | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. AT & T Services, Inc.green1 sentence2020See Thomas v. AT&T Servs., 933 F.Supp.2d 954, 969 (N.D.Ohio 2013) (noting that "any [employer] activity that pre-dates Plaintiff's [protected activity] cannot, as a matter of law, serve as the basis for Plaintiff's retaliation claim"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
green
2 sentences2011FLSA RETALIATION Case No. 2003-10198 -5- ENTRY {¶13} With regard to the retaliation claim, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3) of the FLSA provides that it shall be unlawful for any person “to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee.” {¶14} Ohio courts apply the burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas v. Green (1973), 411 2007There are no genuine issues of material fact and defendants are entitled to application of the exemption from FSLA overtime requirements, by operation of 29 U.S.C. 213 (b)(1) and 29 CFR 782.2 {¶ 25} With regard to the retaliation claim, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3) of the FSLA provides that it shall be unlawful for any person: {¶ 26} "to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be *Page 9 instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such pro | 3 | 2007–2016 |
Adair v. Charter County Of Wayne
green
2 sentences2011Adair v. Charter Cty. of Wayne (C.A.6, 2006), 452 F.3d 482 ; Nicklas v. UPS, Inc. (N.D. 2007Adair v. Charter County of Wayne (C.A., 6 2006), 452 F.3d 482 . {¶ 28} A plaintiff must prove the following elements to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FLSA: {¶ 29} (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity under the FLSA; (2) his or her exercise of this right was known by the employer; (3) thereafter, the employer took an employment action adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. | 2 | 2007–2011 |
Onderko v. Sierra Lobo, Inc. (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2026The Onderko Court explained that requiring an employee to have a viable workers’ compensation claim to bring a retaliation claim “ignores the language of the statute as well as its import.” Onderko, 2016-Ohio-5027, at ¶ 37 . 2026Rather than focusing on whether an employee’s injury was workplace related, the relevant inquiry for a worker’s compensation retaliation claim is simply “whether a claim was pursued and whether the employee was fired or otherwise punished for doing so.” Id. {¶55} Turning to Ungerbuehler’s complaint, she alleged that the Kellys threatened to challenge Ungerbuehler’s workers’ compensation claim, which she alleged “would dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity.” She also alleged that after she gave the Kellys notice of her intent to pursue a claim under R.C. 4123.90, they | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Becker v. Lake County Memorial Hospital West
green
2 sentences2022More specifically, we must consider “‘the jury charge as a whole and “must determine whether the jury charge probably misled the jury in a matter materially affecting the complaining party’s substantial rights.”’” Cromer, 142 Ohio St.3d 257 , 2015-Ohio-229 , 29 N.E.3d 921 at ¶ 35 , quoting Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co., 73 Ohio St.3d 89, 93 , 652 N.E.2d 671 (1995), quoting Becker, 53 Ohio St.3d at 208 , 560 N.E.2d 165 . {¶ 144} Here, we found that the trial court’s retaliation instruction, as given to the jury, improperly limits the jury’s focus on the retaliation claim solely to appellant’s termi 2022More specifically, we must consider “‘the jury charge as a whole and “must determine whether the jury charge probably misled the jury in a matter materially affecting the complaining party’s substantial rights.”’” Cromer, 142 Ohio St.3d 257 , 2015-Ohio-229 , 29 N.E.3d 921 at ¶ 35 , quoting Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co., 73 Ohio St.3d 89, 93 , 652 N.E.2d 671 (1995), quoting Becker, 53 Ohio St.3d at 208 , 560 N.E.2d 165 . {¶ 144} Here, we found that the trial court’s retaliation instruction, as given to the jury, improperly limits the jury’s focus on the retaliation claim solely to appellant’s termi | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2022More specifically, we must consider “‘the jury charge as a whole and “must determine whether the jury charge probably misled the jury in a matter materially affecting the complaining party’s substantial rights.”’” Cromer, 142 Ohio St.3d 257 , 2015-Ohio-229 , 29 N.E.3d 921 at ¶ 35 , quoting Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co., 73 Ohio St.3d 89, 93 , 652 N.E.2d 671 (1995), quoting Becker, 53 Ohio St.3d at 208 , 560 N.E.2d 165 . {¶ 144} Here, we found that the trial court’s retaliation instruction, as given to the jury, improperly limits the jury’s focus on the retaliation claim solely to appellant’s termi 2022More specifically, we must consider “‘the jury charge as a whole and “must determine whether the jury charge probably misled the jury in a matter materially affecting the complaining party’s substantial rights.”’” Cromer, 142 Ohio St.3d 257 , 2015-Ohio-229 , 29 N.E.3d 921 at ¶ 35 , quoting Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co., 73 Ohio St.3d 89, 93 , 652 N.E.2d 671 (1995), quoting Becker, 53 Ohio St.3d at 208 , 560 N.E.2d 165 . {¶ 144} Here, we found that the trial court’s retaliation instruction, as given to the jury, improperly limits the jury’s focus on the retaliation claim solely to appellant’s termi | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cromer v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2022More specifically, we must consider “‘the jury charge as a whole and “must determine whether the jury charge probably misled the jury in a matter materially affecting the complaining party’s substantial rights.”’” Cromer, 142 Ohio St.3d 257 , 2015-Ohio-229 , 29 N.E.3d 921 at ¶ 35 , quoting Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co., 73 Ohio St.3d 89, 93 , 652 N.E.2d 671 (1995), quoting Becker, 53 Ohio St.3d at 208 , 560 N.E.2d 165 . {¶ 144} Here, we found that the trial court’s retaliation instruction, as given to the jury, improperly limits the jury’s focus on the retaliation claim solely to appellant’s termi 2022More specifically, we must consider “‘the jury charge as a whole and “must determine whether the jury charge probably misled the jury in a matter materially affecting the complaining party’s substantial rights.”’” Cromer, 142 Ohio St.3d 257 , 2015-Ohio-229 , 29 N.E.3d 921 at ¶ 35 , quoting Kokitka v. Ford Motor Co., 73 Ohio St.3d 89, 93 , 652 N.E.2d 671 (1995), quoting Becker, 53 Ohio St.3d at 208 , 560 N.E.2d 165 . {¶ 144} Here, we found that the trial court’s retaliation instruction, as given to the jury, improperly limits the jury’s focus on the retaliation claim solely to appellant’s termi | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Smith v. Superior Prod., L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2021No. 13AP- 690, 2014-Ohio-1961, ¶ 34 ; see also Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2007- Ohio-6442, ¶ 13, fn. 2 (noting that under R.C. 4112.02(I) "the adverse action need not be employment-related, so the filing of a lawsuit or a counterclaim can constitute an adverse No. 21AP-159 15 employment action in circumstances such as those in this case"); Arnold at 536-37 , quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Daniel R. Arban, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. West Publishing Corp., Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appellee
green
1 sentence2020Arban, 345 F.3d at 403 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Coch v. Gem Ind., Unpublished Decision (6-17-2005)
green
1 sentence2020Lucas No. L-04-1357, 2005-Ohio-3045, ¶ 27 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Johnson v. Cleveland City School Dist. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sundance Rehabilitation Corp. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Mitseff v. Wheeler green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Little York Tavern v. Lane green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Smiddy v. Wedding Party, Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Gale Edgar v. Jac Products, Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Wholf v. Tremco, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins red | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Staub v. Proctor Hospital green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Pytlinski v. Brocar Prod., Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Pytlinski v. Brocar Products, Inc. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State ex rel. Capretta v. Zamiska neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Mowery v. City of Columbus, Unpublished Decision (3-14-2006) green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Wysong v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., Unpublished Decision (9-8-2006) neutral | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Parries v. Makino, Inc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Bickers v. Western & Southern Life Insurance green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Johnson v. Lewis Cass Intermediate School District (In Re Johnson) green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Lawrence Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, an Illinois Corporation David's Restaurant Supply green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Gosden v. Louis green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Bradigan v. Strongsville City Schools, 88606 (6-7-2007) green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Burkes v. Stidham green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Comm'n v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Chandler v. Empire Chemical, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Franks v. the Lima News green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Bryans v. English Nanny & Governess School, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Ward v. Hengle green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.