retaliation claim in Colorado

2024See People v. Eppens , 979 P.2d 14, 22 (Colo. 1999) (appellate court may affirm the court’s ruling on any basis supported by the record ). ¶ 32 The fourth element in the court’s retaliation instruction , quoted in full above, stated that Acevedo’s credible threat must be made “ as retaliation or retribution against a judge who was serving in a legal matter assigned to the judge that involved Mr. Acev edo. ” A reasonable juror of common intelligence would understan d from this instruction that retaliation against a judge is n ’ t merely a threat made against a judge in their personal capacity,

2019Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 178 P.3d 524, 535 (Colo. 2008) (noting that the principle of judicial restraint requires courts to avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them). ¶ 28 In sum, we conclude that front pay and compensatory damages for a retaliation claim under the CADA are equitable remedies not barred by the CGIA.

2019Yet, the court ruled that he had “failed to allege facts necessary to support the element that any defendant’s actions ‘would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to’ file grievances or exercise a constitutional right.” Id. at 319 (citation omitted). ¶ 52 Similarly, verbal harassment and name calling, while unprofessional and unpleasant, do not constitute adverse action sufficient to support a retaliation claim.

2019Colo. 2007); see also Allen v. Avance, 491 F. App’x 1, 6 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The 27 prospect of punishment severe enough to satisfy the Eighth Amendment is sufficient to ‘chill a person of ordinary firmness’ from exercising his constitutional rights.”). ¶ 54 Considering the circumstances, we conclude that Gandy’s allegations — that he lost some privileges and income due to his transfer and must sleep on the top bunk in a third-floor cell — do not assert adverse action sufficient to support a retaliation claim. ¶ 55 Even assuming, however, that his transfer to the CTCF was an act that would chil

2019See Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1211 (10th Cir. 2018). ¶ 53 On the other hand, “common sense leads to the conclusion that being taken out of the general population and placed in twenty-three-hour-per-day confinement in retaliation” for constitutionally protected activity “would deter a reasonable inmate from exercising that First Amendment right in the future.” Montoya v. Bd. of Cty.

2010The Tenth Cireuit Court of Appeals has "never ruled that all [of an employer's acts], no matter how trivial, are sufficient to support a retaliation claim." Couch v. Bd. of Trs., 587 F.3d 1223, 1237 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun.

2003See Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., supra (opposition activity is protected when it is based on a mistaken, but good faith belief that Title VII has been violated).

2003See Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., supra (retaliation claim does not require that the plaintiff prevail on the underlying claim of discrimination; rather, the plaintiff must have a good faith belief that the employer’s actions are illegal).

2003See, e.g., Smith v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 96 F.Supp.2d 1177 (D.Kan.2000).

1996Id. at 332 ; see also DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir.1993).